Lakeata Nicole Lillie v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: July 27, 2006
• Docket: 01-05-00957-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued July 27, 2006

Opinion issued July 27, 2006

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

NO. 01-05-00957-CR

LAKEATA NICOLE LILLIE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 179th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 998855

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Lakeata Nicole Lillie pleaded guilty to injury to a child[1] without an agreed recommendation for sentencing.  After a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) was prepared, the trial court found Lillie guilty and assessed punishment at forty-five years’ confinement.  In one issue, Lillie contends her guilty plea was involuntary.  We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

          In August 2004, police and paramedics were dispatched to Lillie’s apartment where they found her six-year-old son, Johnnie, lying dead in his bed.  The autopsy revealed that Johnnie had bite marks on his back, calf, and arm; severe bruising on his forearm and hand; and severe hemorrhaging on both sides of his skull.  The cause of death was blunt force trauma.

          The State charged Lillie by indictment with one count of felony murder and one count of injury to a child.  In May 2005, Lillie appeared before the trial court and pleaded guilty to injury to a child.  The State abandoned the felony murder charge.  In conjunction with her plea, Lillie signed admonishments indicating that she understood she was charged with “the felony offense of felony injury to a child” and faced the first-degree felony punishment range of life imprisonment or any term of imprisonment of not more than ninety-nine years or less than five years.  She also signed statements and waivers indicating that she fully understood both the nature of the charge against her and the consequences of her plea, and that she was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily.  The trial court accepted Lillie’s plea, withheld a finding of guilt pending completion of the PSI, and reset the case for sentencing.  At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the court found Lillie guilty of injury to a child and assessed punishment at forty-five years’ confinement.  The trial court certified Lillie’s right of appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).

Analysis

          On appeal, Lillie contends her guilty plea was involuntary.  In assessing the voluntariness of a plea, we review the record as a whole and consider the totality of the circumstances.  Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Lee v. State, 39 S.W.3d 373, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).  A trial court may accept a guilty plea only if the defendant enters it freely and voluntarily.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005).  An admonishment on punishment is prima facie evidence that a plea was knowing and voluntary.  Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Lee, 39 S.W.3d at 375.  The burden then shifts to the defendant to show that she entered the plea without understanding the consequences thereof.  Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Lee, 39 S.W.3d at 375.  “A defendant’s attestation of voluntariness at the original plea hearing imposes a heavy burden on the defendant at a later hearing to show a lack of voluntariness.”  Dusenberry v. State, 915 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref’d).

          Here, Lillie signed admonishments recognizing that (1) she was charged with “the felony offense of felony injury to a child,” (2) she faced the first-degree felony punishment range of life imprisonment or any term of imprisonment of not more than ninety-nine years or less than five years, (3) she was mentally competent, (4) she understood the nature of the charge against her, (5) she understood the admonishments, (6) she fully understood the consequences of her plea, (7) she understood English, and (8) her plea was freely and voluntarily made.  These statements are prima facie evidence that Lillie entered her plea knowingly and voluntarily.  Lee, 39 S.W.3d at 375.  Hence, the burden shifts to Lillie to show that she did not understand the consequences of her plea.  Id.

          Lillie contends her plea was involuntary because the indictment alleges that she “intentionally, knowingly and recklessly cause[d] serious bodily injury to [her son],” and nothing in the record indicates that she understood she was pleading guilty to a first-degree felony (i.e., intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to a child), as opposed to a second-degree felony (i.e., recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child).  Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04(e) (Vernon Supp. 2005).  To support her assertion, Lillie points to a letter she wrote to the trial court after her sentence was pronounced in which she states that she “didn’t intentionally, knowling [sic], and willingly hurt [her] son,” but rather did so while sleepwalking.  Lillie wrote, “I didn’t mean to hurt my son.  It was an accident.  I was sleepwalking. . . .  I am so sorry about what happened to my Baby.  I didn’t know what I was doing.”  Lillie reasons that if she knew she suffered from sleepwalking, or had committed violent acts while asleep in the past, then she committed the offense recklessly because she injured her son while aware of, but consciously disregarding, a substantial risk that violent conduct could occur while she was sleepwalking.  See id. § 6.03(c) (Vernon 2003) (defining recklessness).  She therefore asserts that her guilty plea was involuntary because nothing in the record affirmatively indicates that she understood she was pleading guilty to intentionally or knowingly—as opposed to recklessly—causing serious bodily injury to her son.

          The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals considered a similar argument in Garcia v. State, 877 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, pet. ref’d).  In that case, Garcia had pleaded guilty to an indictment alleging that he “intentionally or knowingly caus[ed] the death of another.”  Id. at 812.  On appeal, Garcia asserted that his plea was involuntary because the record failed to show that he knowingly pleaded guilty to murder instead of voluntary manslaughter.[2]  Id.  He pointed to record evidence raising inferences of voluntary manslaughter and urged that “the record must affirmatively show he understood the distinction between the offenses.”  Id.  The court of appeals rejected Garcia’s argument, noting that “[h]e never contended in the trial court that his plea was entered involuntarily.”  Id.  Nor did he present evidence to show that he misunderstood the consequences of his plea.  Id.  Though the trial court never explicitly informed Garcia that he was charged with murder, the court correctly admonished Garcia regarding the punishment range for a first-degree felony.  Id.  Hence, the court of appeals concluded that Garcia’s plea was voluntary.  Id.

          Here, as in Garcia, Lillie “never contended in the trial court that h[er] plea was entered involuntarily.”  Id.  In fact, though she wrote a letter to the trial court, she did not attack the voluntariness of her plea—nor did she assert that she did not understand the consequences of her plea.  See id.; see also Costilla v. State, 84 S.W.3d 361, 364–65 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002), aff’d, 146 S.W.3d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding appellant failed to meet burden of showing he entered guilty plea without understanding consequences thereof when, among other things, letter he wrote to trial court did not mention plea hearing).  Moreover, there is no indication in the record that Lillie knew she suffered from sleepwalking, or that she had committed violent acts while asleep in the past.  Thus, the record does not support Lillie’s contention that she committed the offense recklessly and therefore intended to plead guilty only to a second-degree felony.  See Garcia, 877 S.W.2d at 812, 814 (noting that, although Garcia asserted he intended to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter rather than murder, evidence in record did not support voluntary manslaughter).

          To the contrary, as in Garcia, Lillie was “correctly informed . . . on the punishment range for a first degree felony.”  Id. at 812.  The written admonishments stated that she was charged with felony injury to a child and, if convicted, “face[d] the following range of punishment: . . . FIRST DEGREE FELONY: a term of life or any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice . . . .”  The admonishments instructed Lillie to initial each item if she fully understood it; Lillie initialed the paragraph explaining the punishment range for a first-degree felony.  She also initialed the paragraphs stating that she fully understood both the nature of the charge against her and the consequences of her plea, and that she was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily.  The record therefore shows that Lillie was fully admonished as to the consequences of her guilty plea.  As such, we conclude that her plea was voluntary.  See State v. Jimenez, 987 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Generally, a guilty plea is considered voluntary if the defendant was made fully aware of the direct consequences.”); Garcia, 877 S.W.2d at 812; see also Terry v. State, 681 S.W.2d 136, 137–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (where trial court, in admonishing appellant as to statutory definition of theft, did not state that amount stolen exceeded $10,000, which raised offense from third- to second-degree felony, nevertheless upholding propriety of admonishment because court delineated proper punishment range for second-degree felony, and appellant responded that he understood full punishment range).  Accordingly, we hold that Lillie has not met her heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of regularity of the judgment and proceedings.  See Lee, 39 S.W.3d at 375–76.

Conclusion

          We conclude that Lillie entered her guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                          Jane Bland

                                                          Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Alcala, and Bland.

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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[1] See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2005).

[2] At the time Garcia entered his plea, murder—a first-degree felony—was defined as “intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of an individual[.]”  Act of May 23, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, sec. 19.02(a)(1), (b), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1123, amended by Act of May 8, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, sec. 19.02(b)(1), (c), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3613.  Voluntary manslaughter—a second-degree felony—was defined as intentionally or knowingly causing the death of an individual “under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.”  Act of May 23, 1973, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, sec. 19.04(a), (d), 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1124, amended by Act of May 8, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 900, § 1.01, secs. 19.02(d), 19.04, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3586, 3613–14.