Eugenia L. Conde v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, Joan Bell, Nikki Mendoza, Fatima Guillot, Jessica Bowes, and Cynthia Rodriguez

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 2, 2026
Docket1:25-cv-08484
StatusUnknown

This text of Eugenia L. Conde v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, Joan Bell, Nikki Mendoza, Fatima Guillot, Jessica Bowes, and Cynthia Rodriguez (Eugenia L. Conde v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, Joan Bell, Nikki Mendoza, Fatima Guillot, Jessica Bowes, and Cynthia Rodriguez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Eugenia L. Conde v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, Joan Bell, Nikki Mendoza, Fatima Guillot, Jessica Bowes, and Cynthia Rodriguez, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK EUGENIA L. CONDE, Plaintiff, -against- 25-CV-8484 (LLS) NYS DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR ORDER TO AMEND VEHICLES, JOAN BELL, NIKKI MENDOZA, FATIMA GUILLOT, JESSICA BOWES, and CYNTHIA RODRIGUEZ, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2654, alleging that her employer discriminated against her based on her race and her family leave. Plaintiff sues her employer, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), as well as DMV employees Joan Bell, Nikki Mendoz, Cynthia Rodriguez, Fatima Guillot, and Jessica Bowes. By order dated October 29, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474

(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her based on her race and retaliated against her for protected activity under the FMLA. (ECF 1 at 4–5.) Plaintiff claims Defendants manipulated her timesheets to reflect tardiness after she filed harassment claims. (Id. at 5.) She also states that she received “disciplinary memos” after attending jury duty and medical appointments. (Id.)

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. In December 2024, Defendants approved Plaintiff’s request to use the rest of her bereavement leave after the death of her granddaughter. (Id.) Plaintiff was approved to take paid time off on December 17–20 and 23–24, 2024. (Id.) However, Plaintiff was marked absent from work December 1–27, 2024. (Id. at 6.) When provided with documentation, Defendants adjusted

Plaintiff’s time records to reflect “unexcused absences/awol to impact holiday pay & benefits,” causing Plaintiff’s paycheck to be delayed. (Id.) Plaintiff received a disciplinary memo after reporting a workplace robbery. (Id.) The memo alleged she was negligent with workplace equipment that she was not assigned to handle. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the “level 20 supervisors used various low level supervisors to complete write-up memos so that it appears [Plaintiff has] problems within the workplace.” (Id.) On the day Plaintiff was terminated, she became aware of a second disciplinary memo, which was included in her termination package. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered emotional distress, pain, and suffering. (Id. at 7.) After her dismissal, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on August 18, 2025. (Id.) She received a notice of Right to Sue on September 12, 2025. (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Title VII Claim Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII also includes a provision outlawing retaliation by employers when employees exercise their rights under this statute. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants fired her from her position at the DMV because of her race but does not provide any facts that suggest her race—which she does not identify—was a motivating factor in that decision. She also does not claim that she was treated differently than other coworkers of other races. Furthermore, because Plaintiff does not allege facts describing

the contents of her harassment complaint, the Court cannot determine whether it falls under the protected activity of Title VII. (ECF 1 at 5.) The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint to allege facts demonstrating that she has a claim against her employer under Title VII.2 B. Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Under the FMLA, certain eligible employees are “entitled to a total of 12 work weeks of leave during any 12-month period” for any one of several reasons enumerated in the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The FMLA covers, among other things, leave that is necessary “[i]n order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.” Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Generally, plaintiffs may assert two varieties of FMLA claims: interference claims and retaliation claims. An employee

brings an interference claim when the employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee’s ability to exercise rights under the FMLA. An employee brings an ‘interference’ claim when the employer has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee’ s ability to exercise rights under the FMLA. Woods v.

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Bluebook (online)
Eugenia L. Conde v. NYS Department of Motor Vehicles, Joan Bell, Nikki Mendoza, Fatima Guillot, Jessica Bowes, and Cynthia Rodriguez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/eugenia-l-conde-v-nys-department-of-motor-vehicles-joan-bell-nikki-nysd-2026.