TURNAGE, Judge.
Ann Engman filed suit individually and as next friend for her children Nora and Walter against Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for invasion of privacy. The Engmans and Bell filed motions for summary judgment and the court sustained Bell’s motion and overruled the Engman motion. Engman appeals the granting of Bell’s motion. The Engmans now contend their petition stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy and the tariff relied upon by Bell was not a defense as a matter of law. Reversed and remanded.
Engman first filed suit in 1975, and filed an amended petition in two counts in 1977. The first count alleged that Ann Engman was a subscriber of Bell and received telephone service for a number of years, that in March, 1975, Ann became delinquent in the payment of her bills to Bell and her service was discontinued. Bell notified her that her telephone equipment would be removed if the bills were not paid by a day certain. The petition continued that about 9:30 A.M. on April 7, 1975, Nora Engman missed school and was at home sick in bed when an employee of Bell appeared at her bedroom door and stated he was there to take out the telephones. It was alleged the employee had not attempted to advise Engman that he was coming nor did he knock at the front door of the Engman apartment before he entered. The petition alleged the entry of the Bell employee constituted a trespass and an invasion of the privacy of the Eng-man home and caused Nora and Ann Eng-man humiliation, embarrassment, annoyance and exposed them to public contempt and ridicule. The petition alleged the acts of the Bell employee were willful, wanton, reckless and malicious and prayed for actual and punitive damages.
The second count in the Engman petition made the same allegations with reference to Ann Engman subscribing to telephone service from Bell. It was alleged the Eng-man telephone service was suspended in May, 1977, for non-payment of her bill and she was notified in early May that if her bill was not paid by a date certain the telephone equipment would be removed from her premises. The petition continued that on May 12, 1977, Walter Engman was in bed in the family apartment when he [80]*80was awakened at 2:30 P.M. by an employee of Bell who informed him he was there for the purpose of removing the telephone equipment. It was alleged the Bell employee did not attempt to advise Ann Engman of his intent to enter the apartment nor did he knock on the door before entering. It alleged the first Walter knew of the presence of the Bell employee was when he was touched sharply on the foot by the employee and he awoke. It was alleged the Bell employee committed a trespass and invaded the privacy of the Engman home. It was alleged the entry by the Bell employee invaded the privacy of both Walter and Ann and caused both humiliation, embarrassment, annoyance, disgrace and exposed both to public ridicule. The conduct of Bell was termed unwarranted, willful, intentional, malicious, without just cause or excuse, and the prayer was for both actual and punitive damages.
Bell’s answer relied principally upon a tariff filed with the Public Service Commission which Bell alleged granted to it a license coupled with an interest to enter the Engman apartment for the purpose of removing its telephone equipment. The tariff relied upon by Bell was as follows:
Ownership-Equipment, instruments and lines on customers premises, furnished by the Telephone Company, shall be and remain the property of the Telephone Company, whose agents and employees have the right to enter said premises at any reasonable hour for the purpose of installing, inspecting, maintaining or repairing the equipment, instruments and lines for the purpose of making collections from coin boxes and, upon termination of service, for the purpose of removing such equipment, instruments and lines.
Depositions of all the Engmans and Thomas Singleton, the Bell employee who entered the Engman apartment on both occasions to remove the telephone equipment, were taken and filed. There is no doubt Singleton entered the Engman apartment and removed the telephone equipment in both 1975 and 1977. The parties apparently felt the primary issue to be resolved was whether the tariff gave Singleton the right to enter the apartment even if the Engman version that he did not knock or obtain permission to enter on either occasion be accepted. The Engmans took the position the tariff did not authorize Singleton’s entry, but even if it did, he committed a trespass under § 560.447, RSMo 1975 Supp. Bell contended the tariff raised a bar to the Engman action with the result the respective motions for summary judgment were presented for the purpose of resolving the tariff defense. The court overruled the Engmans’ motion and sustained Bell’s motion without elaboration.
On this appeal the parties continue to maintain the positions they assumed in the trial court. The effect of the tariff was decided in Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.1968). In that case the court considered the defense of a tariff limitation on the amount of damages which could be recovered for erroneous listings in the directory. The court held the Public Service Commission has the authority to determine the reasonableness of the rates and regulations and limitations promulgated by Bell and its determination in that regard may only be reviewed in the method provided by statute. The court held, however, that “[t]he courts have jurisdiction of a suit for damages based on negligence in which a determination of the legal validity and the applicability of such provisions to a given state of facts is required.” 428 S.W.2d 602[9-11], Under this holding the legal validity and applicability of the tariff raised as a bar to the Engman action by Bell is to be determined by the courts. Warner further held “ ‘[a] bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of a willful breach of duty is illegal, * * * and “[w]e conclude that the limitation of defendant’s liability was and is effective if defendant’s conduct was merely negligent, but that it does not constitute an exemption for willful and wanton conduct.” 428 S.W.2d 603[12—14].
[81]*81It is clear from Warner that Bell’s tariff in this case would exempt it from liability for negligence but not for willful and wanton conduct. “Willfulness implies intentional wrongdoing. A wanton act is a wrongful act done on purpose, or in malicious disregard of the rights of others.” Evans v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 289 Mo. 493, 233 S.W. 397, 400[3] (banc 1921). Thus, willful and wanton conduct as used in Warner refers to an intentional act.
The question in this case hinges on whether the conduct of Singleton in entering the apartment may be termed willful and wanton or in other words intentional, or merely negligent. This question was answered in Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Civ.App.1977), where the court held a Bell employee’s entry into a private residence without the occupant’s permission in order to remove telephones was a willful tort of invasion of privacy. Gonzales had become delinquent in his telephone bill and a Bell employee was dispatched to remove the telephone equipment from the Gonzales home.
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TURNAGE, Judge.
Ann Engman filed suit individually and as next friend for her children Nora and Walter against Southwestern Bell Telephone Company for invasion of privacy. The Engmans and Bell filed motions for summary judgment and the court sustained Bell’s motion and overruled the Engman motion. Engman appeals the granting of Bell’s motion. The Engmans now contend their petition stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy and the tariff relied upon by Bell was not a defense as a matter of law. Reversed and remanded.
Engman first filed suit in 1975, and filed an amended petition in two counts in 1977. The first count alleged that Ann Engman was a subscriber of Bell and received telephone service for a number of years, that in March, 1975, Ann became delinquent in the payment of her bills to Bell and her service was discontinued. Bell notified her that her telephone equipment would be removed if the bills were not paid by a day certain. The petition continued that about 9:30 A.M. on April 7, 1975, Nora Engman missed school and was at home sick in bed when an employee of Bell appeared at her bedroom door and stated he was there to take out the telephones. It was alleged the employee had not attempted to advise Engman that he was coming nor did he knock at the front door of the Engman apartment before he entered. The petition alleged the entry of the Bell employee constituted a trespass and an invasion of the privacy of the Eng-man home and caused Nora and Ann Eng-man humiliation, embarrassment, annoyance and exposed them to public contempt and ridicule. The petition alleged the acts of the Bell employee were willful, wanton, reckless and malicious and prayed for actual and punitive damages.
The second count in the Engman petition made the same allegations with reference to Ann Engman subscribing to telephone service from Bell. It was alleged the Eng-man telephone service was suspended in May, 1977, for non-payment of her bill and she was notified in early May that if her bill was not paid by a date certain the telephone equipment would be removed from her premises. The petition continued that on May 12, 1977, Walter Engman was in bed in the family apartment when he [80]*80was awakened at 2:30 P.M. by an employee of Bell who informed him he was there for the purpose of removing the telephone equipment. It was alleged the Bell employee did not attempt to advise Ann Engman of his intent to enter the apartment nor did he knock on the door before entering. It alleged the first Walter knew of the presence of the Bell employee was when he was touched sharply on the foot by the employee and he awoke. It was alleged the Bell employee committed a trespass and invaded the privacy of the Engman home. It was alleged the entry by the Bell employee invaded the privacy of both Walter and Ann and caused both humiliation, embarrassment, annoyance, disgrace and exposed both to public ridicule. The conduct of Bell was termed unwarranted, willful, intentional, malicious, without just cause or excuse, and the prayer was for both actual and punitive damages.
Bell’s answer relied principally upon a tariff filed with the Public Service Commission which Bell alleged granted to it a license coupled with an interest to enter the Engman apartment for the purpose of removing its telephone equipment. The tariff relied upon by Bell was as follows:
Ownership-Equipment, instruments and lines on customers premises, furnished by the Telephone Company, shall be and remain the property of the Telephone Company, whose agents and employees have the right to enter said premises at any reasonable hour for the purpose of installing, inspecting, maintaining or repairing the equipment, instruments and lines for the purpose of making collections from coin boxes and, upon termination of service, for the purpose of removing such equipment, instruments and lines.
Depositions of all the Engmans and Thomas Singleton, the Bell employee who entered the Engman apartment on both occasions to remove the telephone equipment, were taken and filed. There is no doubt Singleton entered the Engman apartment and removed the telephone equipment in both 1975 and 1977. The parties apparently felt the primary issue to be resolved was whether the tariff gave Singleton the right to enter the apartment even if the Engman version that he did not knock or obtain permission to enter on either occasion be accepted. The Engmans took the position the tariff did not authorize Singleton’s entry, but even if it did, he committed a trespass under § 560.447, RSMo 1975 Supp. Bell contended the tariff raised a bar to the Engman action with the result the respective motions for summary judgment were presented for the purpose of resolving the tariff defense. The court overruled the Engmans’ motion and sustained Bell’s motion without elaboration.
On this appeal the parties continue to maintain the positions they assumed in the trial court. The effect of the tariff was decided in Warner v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.1968). In that case the court considered the defense of a tariff limitation on the amount of damages which could be recovered for erroneous listings in the directory. The court held the Public Service Commission has the authority to determine the reasonableness of the rates and regulations and limitations promulgated by Bell and its determination in that regard may only be reviewed in the method provided by statute. The court held, however, that “[t]he courts have jurisdiction of a suit for damages based on negligence in which a determination of the legal validity and the applicability of such provisions to a given state of facts is required.” 428 S.W.2d 602[9-11], Under this holding the legal validity and applicability of the tariff raised as a bar to the Engman action by Bell is to be determined by the courts. Warner further held “ ‘[a] bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of a willful breach of duty is illegal, * * * and “[w]e conclude that the limitation of defendant’s liability was and is effective if defendant’s conduct was merely negligent, but that it does not constitute an exemption for willful and wanton conduct.” 428 S.W.2d 603[12—14].
[81]*81It is clear from Warner that Bell’s tariff in this case would exempt it from liability for negligence but not for willful and wanton conduct. “Willfulness implies intentional wrongdoing. A wanton act is a wrongful act done on purpose, or in malicious disregard of the rights of others.” Evans v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 289 Mo. 493, 233 S.W. 397, 400[3] (banc 1921). Thus, willful and wanton conduct as used in Warner refers to an intentional act.
The question in this case hinges on whether the conduct of Singleton in entering the apartment may be termed willful and wanton or in other words intentional, or merely negligent. This question was answered in Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Civ.App.1977), where the court held a Bell employee’s entry into a private residence without the occupant’s permission in order to remove telephones was a willful tort of invasion of privacy. Gonzales had become delinquent in his telephone bill and a Bell employee was dispatched to remove the telephone equipment from the Gonzales home. When the employee arrived, no one was home, so he opened the front door and entered the home where he removed a telephone from the hallway and one from the bedroom. The employee stated he was in the house approximately three minutes. Gonzales filed suit for invasion of privacy and the court held the entry by the Bell employee into the Gonzales home without permission was a willful tort of invasion of privacy.
This court agrees with Gonzales. Here the Engmans’ allegation that the telephone employee entered their apartment without permission is a sufficient allegation of intentional conduct or willful invasion of privacy. Thus the tariff in this case, which protects Bell only against negligent conduct, did not constitute a bar to the Eng-mans’ action because the petition alleged a willful or intentional invasion of privacy.
Gonzales cannot be distinguished from the present case on the basis of disputed testimony as to whether the employee broke the Gonzales door to gain entry. Gonzales testified the employee did not have permission and that issue was submitted. The issue in that case was whether the employee had the owner’s permission to enter, the method of entry being only incidental.
Summary judgment is not appropriate if there is any theory within the scope of the pleadings or in the broad scope of probable evidence as revealed by the depositions filed which, if believed by the trier of fact, would authorize a recovery. Scott v. Thornton, 484 S.W.2d 312, 314[5, 6] (Mo.1972). In this case the Engmans relied principally upon a theory of invasion of privacy. This theory was recently recognized by this court in Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 215[6] (Mo.App.1978). This court recognized an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another constitutes an invasion of privacy. This court held “[t]o make a submissi-ble case of intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the existence of a secret and private subject matter; (2) a right possessed by plaintiff to keep that subject matter private; and (3) the obtaining of information about that subject matter by defendant through some method objectionable to the reasonable man.”
Engman’s petition did state a cause of action for invasion of privacy for unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another. The existence of the Engman apartment and the right of the Engmans to keep that place of abode private satisfies the first two elements. The obtaining of information about the abode by Singleton when he entered was held by Gonzales to satisfy the third element when the court stated, “[tjhere is no question that the telephone company’s employee saw whatever there was to see in the plaintiff’s bedroom and the other áreas of their home. Whatever there was to see was the private property of the plaintiffs.” 555 S.W.2d 222[2]. The petition pleaded facts sufficient to demonstrate the method employed to invade the Engman privacy was objectionable to the reasonable person.
[82]*82Because the petition stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy there is no need to explore the alternate theory that Singleton was guilty of trespass.
One further question remains concerning punitive damages. It is well settled that punitive damages may be awarded upon a showing that a party intentionally committed a wrongful act without just cause or excuse. Murski v. Sportsman Cycles, Inc., 559 S.W.2d 67, 68[2, 3] (Mo.App.1977). The tariff does not protect Bell against punitive damages because it does not protect against intentional acts.
The court was correct in overruling Eng-man’s motion for summary judgment because they must now prove the cause of action alleged. The court erred in sustaining the motion for summary judgment filed by Bell, and, therefore, that judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
PRITCHARD, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion.
SOMERVILLE, P. J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion.