Engen v. James

448 P.2d 977, 92 Idaho 690, 1969 Ida. LEXIS 219

• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Decided: January 6, 1969
• Docket: 10222
• Status: Published

Opinions

SMITH, Chief Justice.

The facts are stipulated. In 1952 the city of Coeur d’Alene established a “Policeman’s Retirement Fund” in accordance with the provisions of Idaho Code, Title 50, chap. 15. Appellants constitute the board of police retirement fund commissioners of Coeur d’Alene, hereinafter sometimes designated as the board.

July 18, 1941, respondent was appointed a policeman by the city of Coeur d’Alene. He remained on the payroll of the police department until July 15, 1960. At that time he held the rank of chief of police. July 15, 1960, pursuant to his petition, the board granted him retirement benefits on account of illness attributable in large part to his services as a policeman.

Respondent has, as a result of this disability retirement, continued to receive $2,700.00 per year payable monthly from the retirement fund, such amount being one-half the salary he received as chief of police during the year prior to his retirement.

December 19, 1966, respondent petitioned the board for permanent retirement based upon the accumulation of 25 years of continuous service. This was subsequent to the enactment in 1965 of I.C. § 50-2116(i) and prior to repeal, reenactment, and modification, as of April 12, 1967, óf provisions relating to establishment of a policemen’s retirement fund, S.L. 67, ch. 429, §§ 253-276. Respondent contended that his period of disability should be counted as part of his “continuous service,” which would effect an increase of his benefits to an amount equal to one-half the current rate of pay of the office of chief of police. He based his contention on the provisions of I.C. § 50 — 2116(i),¹ a new section of the police retirement fund act enacted by the 1965 legislature and included in S.L. 1965, ch. 262. The board refused to grant respondent’s petition on the ground that he had previously been retired and that therefore, the amendment had no effect on his rights.

May 4, 1967, respondent commenced this declaratory judgment action in the district court. The cause having been submitted upon stipulated facts for decision, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in effect holding that appellant was entitled to retirement based upon 25 years of continuous service, I.C. § 50-2114(a) (1961 amendment); that the period of 25 years continuous service was attained for the reason that the combined periods of appellant’s active service and of his disability exceeded 25 years; and that the rate of his retirement compensation would increase to one-half the current rate of pay for the job classification (chief of police) which he held July 14, 1960, the time of disability. I.C. § 50 — 2116(i) (1965 enactment). Judgment was entered accordingly, from which this appeal ensued.

Appellants, by their assignments, in effect contend that the trial court erred in holding that under the language contained in the amendment, I.C. § 50 — 2116(i), respondent became eligible for the increased benefits equal to one-half the current salary of the “job classification,” i. e., chief of police, “which he held at the time of disability.”

Appellants cite the present I.C. § 50-1516 (a) (5),which states, “The decision of the said board as to eligibility allowances or benefits shall be final,” for the proposition that the trial court and this court have no jurisdiction to review the determination of the board.

Appellants, however have taken I.C. § 50-1516(a) (5) out of its proper context. As written, I.C. § 50-1516(a) refers only to disability retirement, where determinations by the board of eligibility for disability retirement are not reviewable. It is not applicable here.

As appellants candidly admit, the complaint establishes that this proceeding arises under the declaratory judgment act, I.C., Tit. 10, ch. 12, and I.R.C.P. 57. Here, I.C. § 50-2108 (recodified 1967 in similar import as I.C. § 50-1508) provides that the board in a city having a policeman’s retirement fund “have the power to sue or be sued in all courts of the state in all matters arising out of the administration, management and enforcement of this act.” The basic question is whether I.C. § 50-2116(i) grants the right to respondent to obtain additional benefits from the policeman’s retirement fund. This obviously is a question arising out of the administration or management of the act; therefore, the board is a proper party to this action. Moreover, since the board denied respondent’s petition, and respondent thus has exhausted his administrative remedies, he was entitled to judicial relief. We, therefore, hold that there is a justiciable controversy presented as between the two parties at bar, and that respondent’s action for declaratory judgment is the proper form of action. Whitney v. Randall, 58 Idaho 49, 70 P.2d 384 (1937). The district court, therefore properly assumed jurisdiction.

Appellants further contend that the district court had no power to enforce the legislative enactment which had been repealed April 12, 1967, prior to the commencement of this action on May 4, 1967. There is no merit in appellants’ contention. There is no question presented here of impinging on the unquestioned right of the legislature to repeal or alter its own acts. Rather, respondent submitted his verified petition for retirement to the board on December 19, 1966, and the board informed him of the denial of such petition by letter dated January 18, 1967. The board and the district court were both ruling on the law as it existed as of the time of the petition, on December 19, 1966. The subsequent repeal of the statute by the legislature is thus irrelevant to this case.

Moreover, this court recently held that “the rights of the employees in pension plans such as Idaho’s Retirement Fund Act are vested, subject only to reasonable modification for the purpose of keeping the pension system flexible and maintaining its integrity.” Hanson et al. v. City of Idaho Falls, Idaho, 446 P.2d 634 (1968). Thus, if respondent had acquired pension rights under I.C. § 50 — 2116(i), those existing rights could not be taken from him by a later act of the legislature. This follows from the compensatory nature of pension plans, as this court held in the cited case.

Appellants next contend that any new rights granted by I.C. § 50-2116 (i) should not be available to respondent, since he had already been “retired,” and hence all his rights had already vested. They further contend that I.C. § 50-2114 (enacted in 1947) covers the right of permanent retirement, and so provides only for those who (under 65 years of age) “shall have served not less than twenty-five years accumulatively * * They note that “twenty-five years of Accumulated Service” is defined in I.C. § 50-2102 (i) (enacted in 1947) as follows:

“(i) Twenty-five Years of Accumulated Service: An individual who has been employed by a regularly constituted police department in a city or town in the state of Idaho without having engaged in any other gainful occupation and has had twenty-five (25) years of accumulated service with the same police department of said city or town and has been carried on the payrolls of such department for that period of accumulated time.”

It is admitted that respondent cannot comply with the two conditions of this definition, i. e. that he had 25 years of accumulated service and be on the payroll of the department for that period of time.

The essential question is whether I.C. 50 — 2116(i), added to the policeman’s retirement fund act in 1965, created a new right. The learned district judge, in a succinct memorandum opinion reviewing the legislative history, held that the section did create a new right. We agree with his interpretation of the law, set out as follows:

“The 1965 act [Chapter 262] dealt only with I.C. 50-2116. It deleted the provision that if reinstated after disability that an officer could add pre-disability service to post-disability service for retirement eligibility. The 1965 act added subsection (i) as follows: ‘When a policeman has been disabled and when the period of his disability combined with his prior service as a policeman makes him eligible for retirement under the provisions of this chapter, he may, upon application to the board, be retired at one-half the current rate of pay for the job classification, or its equivalent, which he held at the time of disability.’

“The Title of the 1965 act is also significant: ‘Amending Section 50-2116, Idaho Code, by providing that an injured policeman may use his disability period in computing retirement eligibility, and by providing the rate of retirement pay.’

“After the 1965 act an officer had the following possibilities:

1. Retirement upon twenty-five years active service.

2. Disability retirement of any time disabled, subject to reinstatement to duty or, if not reinstated, then receipt of separation benefits.

3. Adding active duty time and disability nme toward eligibility for permanent retirement.

“The 1965 act [I.C. § 50-2116(i)] effectively abolished any distinction between active duty time and disability time insofar as earning permanent retirement benefits.

* * * * * 4?

“The construction of the laws here involved is guided by I.C. 50-2118 admonishing that the police retirement act be liberally construed with the object of promoting the welfare of the persons subject to its provisions.

“Defendants [appellants] contend that I.C. 50-2114(a) controls and that when plaintiff [respondent] retired under order of the Board his service terminated and he was no longer on the department payroll. This proposition was undoubtedly true under the 1947 act. But the 1965 act created a new right. * * *

“Defendants [appellants] contend that the only permanent retirement is under I.C. 50-2114 and that that section requires twenty-five years accumulated service and that I.C. 50-2102 (i) requires for accumulated service that the officer be carried on the payroll for twenty-five years.

“If there is conflict between I.C. 50-2102(i) and I.C. 50-2116(i) then the later must control. It is the later enactment of the legislature and amends by implication the provision of I.C. 50-2102(i). Since there is no prescribed length of service to make a policeman eligible for disability retirement the only possible thing that I.C. 50 — 2116(I) could refer to in providing that active service be added to disability time is either the provision for twenty-five years active service or twenty-five years of accumulated service. There is no retirement (except disability) based on less than twenty-five years of service. If I.C. 50-2116 (i) is to have any logical meaning it must apply to I.C. 50-2102(i). .Any conflict will be resolved in favor of the later enactment.”

Appellants next contend that even if I.C. 50-2116(i) did create a new right, such right should not inure to respondent, since he had previously retired, and since the statute admittedly operates only prospectively. They cite the provision of I.C. § 50-2114(a) (1961 enactment) which states,. “When the board issues an order of retirement, said order shall terminate and end the services of a person in such police department * *

We cannot agree with appellants’' contentions. First, I.C. § 50-2114(a) (1961 amendment) deals with only the permanent retirement (including disability retirement) based on age and length of service. Respondent was granted a disability retirement under the terms of I.C. § 50-2116(a) (1947 enactment), which retirement would last only so long as the disability continued. That section of the statute provides retirement benefits to a policeman if “incapacitated by injury in the course of duty, or by illness attributable wholly or partially to service as a paid policeman.” Since there was no permanent retirement in the granting of disability relief under I.C. § 50-2116, the application of I.C. § 50-2116(i) to respondent does not constitute a retroactive or retrospective application of the statute.-

Several general statements are made regarding retroactivity of statutes; see 37A Words and Phrases p. 217 (permanent edition, 1950). “A retrospective law is one which affects rights, obligations, acts, transactions ’ and conditions which are performed or exist prior to the adoption of the statute.” American States Water Service Co. of California v. Johnson, 31 Cal.App.2d 606, 88 P.2d 770 (1939); Ware v. Heller, 63 Cal.App.2d 817, 148 P.2d 410 (1944). Another statement of the same-principle is the following:

“A retroactive or restrospective law, in the legal sense, is one that takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposses a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 412.

Ohlinger v. United States, 135 F.Supp. 40 (D.C. Idaho 1955); Henry v. Jean, 112 So.2d 171 (La.App.1959); Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Gibbons, 168 F.Supp. 867 (D.C. Utah 1958); Barber v. Barber, 327 Mich. 5, 41 N.W.2d 463 (1950); U.S. Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 32 Ill.2d 138, 204 N.E.2d 4 (1965); Pape v. Department of Labor and Industries, 43 Wash.2d 736, 264 P.2d 241 (1953). In short, a statute is not retroactive unless it changes the “legal effect” of previous transactions or events. Dye v. School District No. 32 of Pulaski County, 355 Mo. 231, 195 S.W.2d 874 (1946); Duff v. Black Diamond Collieries, 161 Tenn. 486, 33 S.W.2d 63 (1930); State ex rel. American Savings Union v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447, 50 P. 119 (1897).

I.C. § 50—2116(i), as enacted in 1965, did not change the existing “rights and conditions” of respondent; nor did it change the “legal effect” of any previous event. This is not a case where an employee had already fully retired and a subsequent law would increase his benefits, or perhaps even create the right to a pension which did not previously exist. Here, respondent, as of the time of the 1965 enactment of I.C. § 50—2116(i), still did not have the right to permanent retirement; that is, his service time and disability period as of that time added up only to 24 years, not the required 25. Therefore, his right to the benefits of the new statute, i. e., to compute together his disability time and his period of prior service, in determining retirement eligibility, did not create the right to a change of status until after the new section was in full force.

In cases such as this, the law is settled that operation of a statute based in whole or in part upon antecedent facts does not constitute retroactive application of the law. The supreme court of the United States stated the rule: “A statute is not rendered retroactive merely because the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent action depends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent to the enactment.” Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443, 54 S.Ct. 800, 78 L.Ed. 1353 (1934). That case dealt with the right of an ex-soldier to pension benefits for hospitalization expenses during a period prior to the passage of a certain statute. See also Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 43 S.Ct. 154, 67 L.Ed. 332 (1922). In State ex rel. Highsmith v. Brown Service Funeral Co., 236 Ala. 249, 182 So. 18 (1938), involving a statute altering the reserves necessary for life insurance, the following statement appears: “The Act then would only look to the future in making its requirements for future operation, and to the past only for information on which a computation is to be made to ascertain an amount to be effective for such future operation. A law is not retroactive merely because it looks to the past for such purpose.” Cf. State ex rel. Bishop v. Board of Education of Mount Orab Village School District, Brown County, 139 Ohio St. 427, 40 N.E.2d 913 (1942).

In the case at bar, the right which respondent seeks to enforce did not accrue until after the enactment in 1965 of the statute in question, and the period anterior to its passage is merely used for purposes of computation. Given these circumstances, we hold that I.C. § 50-2116(i) does apply to respondent, and that this construction does not constitute a retroactive or retrospective application thereof.

This court is constrained to refer to Brooks v. City of Los Angeles, 243 Cal.App.2d 436, 52 Cal.Rptr. 392 (1966), a case similar to the present one, but which holds contrary to our holding herein. In that case the facts were similar to those in the case at bar, and involved California enactments similar to those of Idaho construed herein. However, the distinction between the statutes of the two states relating to disability retirement is crucial, and accounts for the difference of opinion in the cases. Article XVII, § 182 of the Los Angeles city charter provides that service-connected disability pensions shall be paid for life and cease only “when the disability * * * ceases and such member * * * shall have been restored to active duty.” Under that enactment the court held that the statutory provision which permitted combination of both service and disability time for purposes of computing retirement time applied only in the case where an officer had been disabled and subsequently restored to active duty. The situation under the Idaho statute is quite different. I.C. § 50-2116(a) created the right to receive benefits only so long as the disability continues. When the disability terminates, so do the benefits, regardless of whether the policeman resumes active duty. Thus, where the California court was able to view the policeman’s pension rights as adequately covered by either of two independent systems (i. e., disability or normal retirement), it held that the section which might on its face connect the two systems, in reality merely clarified a questionable element in the normal retirement system. Here, I.C. § 50-2114 still provides the only permanent retirement system for policemen in Idaho. I.C. § SO — 2116(i) was intended to bring disabled policemen within the purview of that system.

Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondent.

TAYLOR and McFADDEN, JJ., concur.

1 . The 1967 legislature, by S.L. 67, ch. 429, revised the Policeman’s Retirement Fund Act. Formerly I.C., Tit. 50, ch. 21, the Act now comprises I.C., Tit. 50, ch. 15. I.C. § 50-2116 (i), a 1965 enactment, was repealed; this sub-section now appears in altered form as I.C. § 50-1516(h). Since however, this appeal deals with the statute as it existed prior to the 1967 revision, the former section numbers will be used in this opinion unless otherwise specified.

50-2116 (i). “When a policeman has been disabled and when the period of his disability combined with his prior service as a policeman makes him eligible for retirement under the provisions of this chapter, he may, upon application to the board, be retired at one-half the current rate of pay for the job classification, or its equivalent, which he held at the time of disability.”