Ellard v. Cannon

• Court: District Court, M.D. Florida
• Decided: May 1, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00281
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JAMES ELLARD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-281-MMH-PDB

B. CANNON,

Defendant. ___________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, James Ellard, an inmate of the Florida penal system, is proceeding on a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1; Complaint). He requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) and an order requiring his classification officer to provide his six-month inmate account statement (Doc. 3). In the Complaint, Ellard names as the sole Defendant Licensed Practical Nurse B. Cannon, who is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Coordinator at Suwannee Correctional Institution (SCI). Complaint at 2. He contends that Defendant failed to provide him with proper medical care. Id. at 4. He alleges that he has a sore on his right hip, but Defendant told him there is “nothing she can do for [it],” and she also denied his request for a foam pad to ease his hip pain while sleeping. Id. He asserts that he has a medical pass that precludes him from lifting, pulling, or pushing over twenty pounds, but Defendant “causes [him] to violate” that pass “everyday by failing/refusing to

assign [him] an inmate assistant.” Id. at 12. Ellard further alleges that a correctional officer impounded his wheelchair lapboard upon arriving at SCI in 2023. Id. When Ellard inquired about the lapboard and being assigned an inmate assistant, Defendant said he will not get a lapboard and they do not

assign inmate assistants at SCI. Id. Ellard also complains about the condition of his wheelchair and fearing retaliation from medical and security staff for filing this Complaint. Id. He further states that he requested ointment for his dry, flaky, itchy skin and something for “fungus” but “both [requests were]

turned down.” Id. In his statement of facts, Ellard alleges that he “can[]not get [an] inmate assistant to help [him] go where [he] needs to go,” and SCI is not compliant with the ADA. Id. at 5. He lists his injuries as “sore on right hip, fungus on

toe[]nails, [and] extremely dry[,] flaky, itchy skin.” Id. As relief, he requests a “lapboard [be] reissued”; “adequate rohoair cushions issued so when [his wheelchair] seat sags [it] does not hurt to sit in”; an “inmate assistant assigned to assi[s]t to meals and callouts”; “adequate ADA nurse, equipment, and

facilities”; and monetary damages for “refusing medical care” and “pain and suffering.” Id.

2 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the language of the PLRA mirrors the language of Rule

12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.1 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection

1 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 3 between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation

omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262- 63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not

required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

4 A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alternation and internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”)

(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant. In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Ellard’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);

Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto

counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837,

5 839 (11th Cir. 2011)2 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part

on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709). Here, Ellard’s Complaint is due to be dismissed pursuant to this Court’s screening obligation. The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials

must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment

violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison officials violate the bar on cruel and

unusual punishments when they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104

2 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”). 6 (1976)). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff

must show: First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844-45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and emphasis omitted);3 see Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024) (recognizing that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show that he suffered “an objectively serious medical need,” and that the

3 For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence” standard in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255. In Wade, the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 1253. The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue to be cited as binding precedent.” Id. at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring). 7 defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need, meaning that the defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2)

disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective recklessness” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). “As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Importantly, medical

treatment gives rise to a constitutional violation “only when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the law is well

settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). Thus, a complaint that a medical provider has been negligent “in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d

1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

8 Ellard fails to allege sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim. His allegations are generally conclusory, and

some of his allegations have no connection to Defendant. For example, he does not allege that Defendant participated in the denial of a new wheelchair or replacement parts. Nor does he present facts connecting Defendant to the denial of his request for ointment for his skin, treatment for his fungus, or his

fear of retaliation. To the extent he complains about Defendant denying his requests for a lapboard, medical care for the sore on his hip, a foam pad, and assignment of an inmate assistant, his allegations fail to cross the constitutional threshold of an Eighth Amendment claim. Ellard does not

describe an objectively serious medical need. He does not describe the “sore” on his hip or explain how the failure to provide treatment affected the sore. He also does not describe the hip pain he allegedly endures, how that pain affects him, or what serious medical needs would be rectified by the lapboard or

assignment of an inmate assistant. While the Court could hypothesize about these things, it is Ellard’s duty to place Defendant on notice of the claims and allegations he raises. Even assuming Ellard indentifies a serious medical need, he does not allege facts that would lead the Court to infer that Defendant acted

with subjective recklessness. Thus, Ellard fails to state a plausible Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant.

9 To the extent Ellard attempts to raise an ADA claim against Defendant in her individual capacity, such claim fails because only public entities can be

liable under the ADA. See, e.g., Owens v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 475, 478 (11th Cir. 2015); Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Only public entities are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA.”); Badillo v. Thorpe, 158 F. App’x 208, 211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no

individual capacity liability under Title II of the ADA[.]”). Moreover, insofar as Ellard alleges that Defendant violated prison policy, such an allegation, without more, is insufficient to state a claim. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (recognizing that prison regulations are “not designed to

confer rights on inmates”); see also Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to follow procedures does not, by itself, rise to the level of deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a form of negligence.”). Considering the foregoing, the Court finds this case is due to be

dismissed without prejudice for Ellard’s failure to state a plausible claim for relief. Ellard may refile his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with factual allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief if he elects to do so. Notably, pro se litigants are subject to the same law and rules of court that govern other

litigants who are represented by counsel. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,

10 837 (11th Cir. 1989). All filings with the Court must be made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules. Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice. 2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file. DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 29th day of April, 2025.

United States District Judge

JAX-3 4/25 James Ellard, #037119