Elias v. City of St. Paul

350 N.W.2d 442, 1984 Minn. App. LEXIS 3250

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: June 19, 1984
• Docket: C6-83-1250
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment based on a directed verdict for defendant in a negligence case. The trial court found insufficient evidence to permit a verdict on causation. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Jerry Elias and his wife, Jill, were injured in an accident near the intersection of Whitall and Westminster streets in St. Paul. Whitall ends in a “T” at Westminster.

Appellant claims he overshot the T-intersection and careened down a 16-18 foot embankment. He charged the City of St. Paul with negligence for failing to install protective warning devices or barricades. There were none at the time of the accident. Evidence would sustain a finding that plaintiff was unfamiliar with the intersection.

Neither appellant nor his wife has any memory about the accident or preceding driving behavior. There were no eyewitnesses. There is no evidence on the control of plaintiffs car before the accident, or indicating whether other vehicles or distractions were involved.

The appellant consumed three or four beers at a party he attended before the accident. His wife did not feel he was intoxicated.

Jill Elias recalled that the van driven by her husband had no brake problems earlier in the evening. She believed she would have protested if Jerry Elias had driven at an unusual speed.

The trial court concluded that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving that alleged negligence of the city was a direct cause of the accident. Saying that a jury verdict for plaintiff would require speculation, the court directed a verdict for defendant.

ISSUE

Does plaintiffs evidence on causation permit a directed verdict for defendant?

ANALYSIS

A motion for a directed verdict presents a question of law regarding the sufficiency of the evidence “to sustain a verdict for the opponent.” Rule 50.01 Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure. In Hanson v. Homeland Ins. Co. of America, 232 Minn. 403, 404, 405, 45 N.W.2d 637, 638 (1951), the Minnesota Supreme Court said:

It is elementary that a motion for a directed verdict, which by its very nature accepts the view of the entire, evidence most favorable to the adverse party and admits the credibility (except in extreme cases) of the evidence in his favor and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, should be granted only in those unequivocal cases where (1) in the light of the evidence as a whole, it would clearly be the duty of the trial court to set aside a contrary verdict as being manifestly against the entire evidence, or where (2) it would be contrary to the law applicable to the case.

(emphasis omitted).

Evidence for plaintiff, if sufficient, may be direct or circumstantial. In Hagsten v. Simberg, 232 Minn. 160, 163, 164, 44 N.W.2d 611, 613 (1950), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:

While it is true that civil damages may be recovered where the proof is circumstantial if the evidence meets the legal quantum of proof, mere proof of the happening of the accident or proof that death or injury was the result of the act of another, without proof of negligence or its causal relation to the result complained of, is not sufficient.

A claim of causation is against the' evidence when it rests on mere conjecture. Kludzinski v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 130 Minn. 222, 224, 153 N.W. 529 (1915). In that case the Supreme Court said:

It is not incumbent on the defendant to show, how the accident happened. If the cause of its happening is not established, the defendant is entitled to prevail. The proof must establish causal connection beyond the point of conjecture. It must show more than a possibility of injury from defendant’s acts. It must be more than merely consistent with plaintiffs theory of how the accident occurred. 130 Minn, at 224.

Directed verdicts are to be used cautiously. In Wohlfeil v. Murray Machinery, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 869, 873, No. C1-83-1169, slip. op. at 7 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), we said this action is appropriate “only in the exceptional case.” The Minnesota Supreme Court said in Kolatz v. Kelly, 244 Minn. 163, 166, 69 N.W.2d 649, 652 (1955):

While the right to direct a verdict also involves the duty to do so, nevertheless, it is a right to be cautiously and sparingly exercised.

Caution is “especially” required before directing a verdict against plaintiff at the close of his case. Usher v. Allstate Insurance Company, 300 Minn. 52, 57, 218 N.W.2d 201, 205 (1974).

In this matter, appellant’s theory of causation is no more supported by evidence than speculative theories which would relieve defendant from liability.

The prospects of sleep or inattention of the driver, or the effects on him of alcohol, are plausible explanations of his accident. No evidence in the case suggests otherwise, and the theories are consistent with evidence on the time of the accident and plaintiff’s preceding activities. Likewise, it is plausible to consider the prospect for involvement of other vehicles or distractions. No evidence conflicted with those theories. They take into account the time and the site of the accident, an urban street at midnight on a Saturday night.

Appellant’s arguments rest principally on the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Larson v. Township of New Haven, 282 Minn. 447, 165 N.W.2d 543 (1969). There the trial court and the appellate court found plaintiff’s evidence sufficient for a verdict. The facts involved a T-intersection without motorist protections and a driver unfamiliar with the site.

The Larson decision is flawed precedent. It rested specifically on a statutory presumption, since held unconstitutional, and now repealed. See Price v. Amdal, 256 N.W.2d 461 (Minn.1977). The driver in Larson was fatally injured. His due care was presumed under Minn.Stat. Sec. 602.-04, repealed by Minn.Laws 1978 Ch. 491 § 1.

This distinction of the Larson case was first declared by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Zinnel v. Berghuis Const. Co., 274 N.W.2d 495, 499, 500 (Minn.1979).

Appellant does not enjoy any presumption of his due care. His theory of causation stands on the evidence alone. The evidence requires speculation on cause, guesses as to what might have happened.

The Larson decision is also distinguishable on its facts. The driver there was on a business mission with a heavily loaded truck. There was no evidence the driver had consumed any alcohol.

DECISION

Since appellant introduced insufficient evidence for a jury to find the city’s failure to use warning devices or barricades was the direct cause of plaintiff’s alleged injuries, the trial court’s directed verdict was proper.

Affirmed.