CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus:
Appellants Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. (“ELSCO”), and Jack Snyderman, appeal from the order entered in the Court of Com[306]*306mon Pleas of Philadelphia County granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees Raymond Cullen, Ronald Hauben, and Joseph Wolfson (collectively referred to as the “attorney defendants”). We affirm.1
The trial court aptly summarizes the protracted litigation and involved facts underlying this case:
During the 1980’s, Plaintiff Electronic Laboratory Supply Company, Inc. (“ELSCO”) purchased large quantities of scrap material, from Motorola, Inc., which ELSCO then smelted (or caused to be smelted) to reclaim various metal ingredients, both precious (e.g. gold, silver) and non precious (e.g. copper). Plaintiff Snyderman is EL-SCO’s president.
In early 1988, Motorola became concerned, because it believed that material it had sold as scrap—perhaps to ELSCO—had turned up intact and for sale in Asia.
Motorola then conducted two audits of EL-SCO’s operation, and concluded that EL-SCO was the source—or at least a source—of the diverted scrap products, and filed suit in Federal Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against ELSCO, Snyderman and others, on March 23, 1988, claiming—among other things— that ELSCO was “passing off’ inferior Motorola scrap as first-quality Motorola parts, in violation of the Lanha[m] Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. Subsequently, Motorola moved for the ex parte issuance of a Writ of Seizure, pursuant to the Lanha[m] Act, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the ex parte issuance of such writs.
After the seizure occurred, ELSCO and Snyderman counterclaimed in Federal Court against Motorola and its officers ... and the attorneys who procured the ex parte seiz[ure] order on Motorola’s behalf. Over the course of the next few years, all of Motorola’s claims against ELSCO and Snyderman were dismissed, leaving active only Motorola’s claims against other defendants -not relevant to this discussion, and ELSCO’s and Snyderman’s claims against the Motorola parties and counsel. Subsequently, in May 1991 the Motorola parties, ELSCO and Snyderman (and the other defendants in Motorola’s original suit) entered into a settlement agreement, by which Motorola agreed not to appeal the dismissal of the original suit as against ELSCO and Snyderman, to pay ELSCO and Snyderman $259,206.00, and to dismiss the Motorola v. ELSCO, et al action as to all defendants, with prejudice.
In return for dismissal of the Motorola suit and the payment described above, ELSCO and Snyderman dismissed the portion of ELSCO, et al vs. Motorola, et al directed against the Motorola parties, with prejudice, but specifically preserved its claims against Motorola’s counsel, in the original action, defendants Cullen, Hauben and Wolfson.
Subsequently, the District Court, on December 30, 1991, dismissed ELSCO’s claims for wrongful seizure pursuant to the Lanham Act, violation of due process, and unreasonable seizure as against the attorney defendants. Since those were the only “federal question” claims remaining—and because there was no diversity of citizenship between ELSCO and the lawyer defendants—the District Court dismissed the [307]*307remaining state law claims (for wrongful use of Civil Proceedings) without prejudice—declining to exercise “pendent jurisdiction” over them—for transfer to State Court.
ELSCO docketed the transferred claims in this Court on February 26, 1992, meanwhile appealing dismissal of its “federal question” claims against the lawyer defendants to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claims, holding that only the Plaintiff, and not its attorneys, could be liable for wrongful seizure under the Lanham Act.
After transferring the case to state court, the attorney defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County asserting that the federal proceedings did not terminate in favor of the accused (ELSCO), and, therefore, that ELSCO had failed to state a claim for wrongful use of civil process. The motion was denied and the state claims were set for trial. Thereafter, another trial court judge granted a second summary judgment motion filed by the attorney defendants. This appeal followed.
On appeal, ELSCO and Snyderman present the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Did the Court err in entering summary judgment in favor of defendants after defendants’ motion for summary judgment raising the same issues had previously been denied by another judge?
(2) Did the Court err in finding that settlement of the underlying claims between plaintiffs and the Motorola parties released plaintiffs’ claims against those defendants as a matter of law, notwithstanding the express language to the contrary in the settlement agreement?
(3) Did the proceedings in the United States District Court terminate in favor of plaintiffs so that an action under the Dra-gonetti Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351, et seq., could be maintained by plaintiffs?
Our standard of review in cases of summary judgment is well settled. This court will only reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment where there was an abuse of discretion or an error of law. Merriweather v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 453 Pa.Super. 464, 470, 684 A.2d, 137, 140 (1996). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits demonstrate that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2, 42 Pa.C.S.A. In determining whether to grant summary judgment a trial court must resolve all doubts against the moving party and examine the record in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment may only be granted in cases where it is clear and free from doubt that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
Normally, where a motion has been preserved and decided and where no new facts are presented in a second motion seeking the same relief, the court’s decision on the first motion should be followed based on considerations of judicial economy and efficiency. Drapeau v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 447 Pa.Super. 560, 670 A.2d 165 (1996), citing Harrity v. Medical College of Pennsylvania Hospital, 439 Pa.Super. 10, 653 A.2d 5 (1994). This rule prevents forum shopping because without this rule, the same issue could be raised repeatedly before different judges of the same court until a litigant finds a judge sympathetic to his or her position. Id. See Yudacufski v. Commonwealth of Pa Dep’t of Transportation, 499 Pa. 605, 612, 454 A.2d 923, 926 (1982) (“[a]bsent the most compelling circumstances, a judge should follow the decision of a colleague on the same court when based on the same set of facts.”).
There is an exception, however, to the rule prohibiting one trial judge from overruling the other. This rule provides that the second judge is authorized to overrule the first if new evidence or newly decided legal authorities compel him or her to do so. Golden v. Dion & Rosenau, 410 Pa.Super. 506, 600 A.2d 568 (1991) citing Vincent v. Fuller Company, 400 Pa.Super. 108, 582 A.2d 1367 (1990). Courts employing this exception view the following situations as exceptional circumstances which permit a judge to [308]*308overrule a prior judge of the same court: (1) where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) where there has been a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or (3) where a judge’s prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed. Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 453 Pa.Super. 364, 372, 683 A.2d 1226, 1230 (1996). See Rosenfield v. Pennsylvania Auto. Ins., 431 Pa.Super. 383, 636 A.2d 1138 (1994).
In the present case, the evidence is clear that in December of 1994, the Honorable Joseph D. O’Keefe, of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment; in April of 1997, the Honorable Bernard J. Goodheart, also from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, granted the defendants’ second summary judgment motion. The record contains letters to Judge Goodheart, from both appellants’ and appellees’ counsel, regarding the issues that Judge Goodheart is to “re-examine” hr the second summary judgment motion. In appellees’ November 17, 1996 reply to a letter written by Judge Goodheart, appellees state:
I am in receipt of Your Honor’s letter of November 20[, 1996] requesting a copy of the settlement agreement and release between plaintiffs and the Motorola parties. As I explained to your law clerk, it appears Your Honor’s letter was sent before the “timeline” submitted by Mr. Kittredge [plaintiffs’ counsel] on November 22nd which contains a copy of that agreement at Tab 21. Since I was not counsel at the time, I have checked the docket entries (Timeline Tabs 32 and 33) and see no record of any courtroom proceeding concerning the May 7th settlement in either of the federal matters.
Accordingly, Judge Goodheart was provided with new evidence, namely the parties’ important settlement agreement, when he decided the defendants’ second summary judgment motion.
It is equally evident from the record that Judge O’Keefe did not have a copy of the parties’ settlement agreement at the time he decided the first summary judgment motion. Neither the defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, nor the plaintiffs’ response to said motion discuss the settlement agreement and its terms. Moreover, in order to thoroughly and properly analyze plaintiffs’ cause of action for wrongful use of civil process it is essential that a court examine the settlement agreement. This agreement will ultimately prove whether the proceedings terminated in ELSCO’s favor at the federal level, and, therefore, whether an essential element of a wrongful use cause of action has been stated.2
Further, we note that Judge Goodh-eart did not decide the second motion without first giving thought as to whether it was appropriate judicial action in light of Judge O’Keefe’s prior summary judgment ruling. Transcribed proceedings from November 18, 1996 reveal that Judge Goodheart determined that “[he could] decide the issue that was already been [sic] decided by Judge O’Keefe. [He could] revisit it at this point.” Judge Goodheart made this comment immediately after advising the attorneys that he would need additional documents to decide such motion. Because a trial court may reconsider a summary judgment motion, already decided by a colleague of the same court when the motion contains new evidence or facts of record, this issue is meritless. Golden, supra. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in light of the new evidence that was highly relevant to the parties’ dispute. Riccio, supra.
In their next issue on appeal, Appellants assert that the trial court improperly determined, as a matter of law, that the parties’ settlement agreement effectively precluded them from bringing suit for wrongful use of civil' proceedings against the attorney-defendants. In effect, appellants claim that the court incorrectly viewed the relationship between appellees (Motorola and the attorney defendants) as that of principal-agents and, [309]*309therefore, could not find the agents (attorney-defendants) potentially liable where their principal (Motorola) has been released from all future suits under the parties’ settlement agreement.
The Dragonetti Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351, permits one who is sued without probable cause to sue the original plaintiff in turn. Bannar v. Miller, 701 A.2d 232 (Pa.Super.1997). See Mi-Lor, Inc. v. DiPentino, 439 Pa.Super. 636, 654 A.2d 1156 (1995) (wrongful use of process is a tort which arises when a party has instituted a lawsuit with malicious motive and a lack of probable cause). Accordingly, an attorney who knowingly prosecutes a groundless action to accomplish a malicious purpose may be held accountable under the Dragonetti Act. Adelman v. Rosenbaum, 133 Pa.Super. 386, 3 A.2d 15 (1938), cited in Dietrich Indus., Inc. v. Abrams, 309 Pa.Super. 202, 455 A.2d 119 (1982) (appellee-attorney was not invulnerable to allegations of wrongful use of process merely because he was counsel to the party of record).
A wrongful use of civil process action cannot be instituted by one who was not a party to the underlying action; however, the fact that a non-party to the underlying action is sued as a defendant for wrongful use of process is of no significance as long as the elements to a Dragonetti Act claim are established. Weiss v. Equibank, 313 Pa.Super. 446, 460 A.2d 271 (1983). Pursuant to the Dragonetti Act, a person is liable for the tort of wrongful use of civil process under the following circumstances:
(a) Elements of action.—A person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or continuation of civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful use of civil proceedings if:
(1) He acts in a grossly negligent manner or without probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are heard; and
(2) The proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351 (a) (emphasis added); Bannar, supra; Robinson v. Robinson, 362 Pa.Super. 568, 525 A.2d 367 (1987); Dietrich Indust. v. Abrams, 309 Pa.Super. 202, 455 A.2d 119 (1982). Comment a to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674, which has been cited with approval in several other cases involving claims of wrongful use of civil process, defines the meaning of the phrase “initiation of proceedings.” Georgiana v. UMW, 392 Pa.Super. 58, 62, 572 A.2d 232, 234 (1990). See Rosenfield, 431 Pa.Super. at 389, 636 A.2d at 1141 (“Pennsylvania law regarding the wrongful use of civil proceedings is in conformity with the Restatement of Tort, Second, § 674.”). The comment defines the term as someone who “sets the machinery of the law in motion, whether he acts in his own name or in that of a third person, or whether the proceedings are brought to enforce a claim of his own or that of a third person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. a (1977).
Looking to section 674 and its comment for guidance, we conclude that in order to bring a wrongful use of civil process action, the plaintiff is not required to include any and all third parties or principals which may have had a connection to the real party who “initiated the proceedings” in the underlying action. Rather, the real party’s potential liability may be based upon his or her own personal and wrongful actions. Consequently, even though the attorney-defendants may have been enforcing a legal claim in the interest of their employer, Motorola Inc., they were properly sued as defendants in their individual capacities in the instant wrongful use of civil proceedings case. We find, therefore, that the trial court erred in holding that appellants did not have a viable cause of action against the attorney-defendants merely because Motorola settled its claims against appellants. Appellants had a right to bring a wrongful use of civil process claim against the attorney-defendants separate and apart from such negotiated settlement of the underlying case. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351(a).
[310]*310Having found that Appellees are proper defendants in Appellants’ wrongful use of civil process action, we must now determine whether the Appellants successfully established the enumerated elements for a Drago-netti Act claim. Weiss, supra. To this end, appellants assert that the trial court improperly determined that the proceedings did not terminate in favor of ELSCO, and, thus, that the Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In the present ease, the appellants’ cause of action for malicious abuse of process/intentional misuse of process was converted from a federal claim to a state claim cognizable under the Dragonetti Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351. This conversion occurred when the federal court allowed ELSCO to amend its complaint upon removal to state court. In order to determine whether the proceedings were properly terminated in favor of EL-SCO, we must determine whether the proceedings that terminated at the federal court level constituted “termination in favor of EL-SCO.” In other words, whether the settlement agreement entered into between the parties is considered sufficient “termination” for purposes of a wrongful use of process action.
In the final settlement agreement the parties acknowledge that the federal court’s order and final judgment dismissed with prejudice Motorola’s claims against ELSCO and the other defendants. The document further states that the agreement “represents a compromise and satisfaction of disputed claims and shall constitute a final and binding resolution of all the disputes, rights and obligations ... that could have been raised by the parties in the litigation.” Motorola also agreed that it would not attempt to appeal, vacate or modify the judgment entered in favor of defendants Snyderman and ELSCO. Finally, Motorola acquiesced in signing a stipulation and order dismissing with prejudice all claims against ELSCO; nothing in the agreement, however, was intended to “diminish or extinguish the claims of ... EL-SCO against [the attorney] defendants.”
In Dravo Corp. v. Ioli, 401 Pa.Super. 124, 129, 584 A.2d 1011, 1013 (1991), our court “acknowledged that, as a matter of law, a compromise does indeed fail to meet the requirements of favorable termination [for purposes of-a wrongful use of civil process cause of action], thereby rendering summary judgment appropriate.” Id. Furthermore, “whether withdrawal or an abandonment constitutes a final termination of a case in favor of the person against whom the proceedings are brought ... depends on the circumstances under which the proceedings are withdrawn.” Rosenfield v. Pennsylvania Auto. Ins., 431 Pa.Super. 383, 389, 636 A.2d 1138, 1142 (1994), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 674 cmt. j (1977). Additionally, withdrawals of proceedings as a result of compromise or agreement, or the impossibility of bringing an accused to trial, do not constitute a termination favorable to the party against whom proceedings have been brought. Id.
In Georgiana v. UMW, 392 Pa.Super. 58, 572 A.2d 232 (1990), the trial court dismissed a complaint filed by Mr. and Mrs. Georgiana, (h/w), that asserted, inter alia, a wrongful use of civil process action against the United Mine Workers of America (UMW). The UMW had originally sued the Georgianas, accusing Mrs. Georgiana of fraud. The fraud charges were ultimately dropped when the parties entered into a settlement agreement. When the trial court found that the settlement agreement did not constitute a termination in favor of the Georgianas, it dismissed the Georgianas’ complaint alleging wrongful use of civil process.
On appeal, Mr. Georgiana asserted that his wife, alone, entered into the settlement agreement with UMW. Accordingly, he claimed that the trial court should not have dismissed his interest in the wrongful use of process action by finding that he was bound by the settlement. The trial court recognized that in some circumstances a jury could infer that settlement by one party may be “effective” with regard to another party, such that the settlement of the suit does not represent a termination in favor of the other party for purposes of an action under the Dragonetti Act. Georgiana, 392 Pa.Super. at 64, 572 A.2d at 235 (emphasis in original). In fact, the court acknowledged that a husband-wife relationship could raise such an infer[311]*311ence of a settlement as effective on both parties. Finding that the issue was one that should have gone to a factfinder, the court reversed its dismissal of the Georgianas’ complaint and remanded for a determination of whether the husband was effectively bound by the settlement for purposes of a viable cause of action for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
In Georgiana, the court interpreted the civil abuse of process element that requires “termination in favor of the person against whom [the proceedings] are brought” by looking to section 660 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 660 governs “indecisive termination of [criminal] proceedings.” While there is an obvious distinction between unjustifiable litigation in a civil versus a criminal proceeding, comment j of section 674 directs one to section 660 in order to “determin[e] the effect of withdrawal” in a wrongful use of civil process case.
Section 660 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a plaintiff has not made out a successful cause of action for criminal malicious prosecution where the charge against the plaintiff was withdrawn or abandoned pursuant to an agreement or compromise. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 660. Under such circumstances the proceeding is not considered to have “terminated in favor of the accused”—a phrase mirroring the analogous civil element in a wrongful use of process action. In a situation where an accused has accepted a compromise with the prosecution under section 660, the comment states that “the fact of compromise indicates that the question of [the accused’s] guilt or innocence is left open. Having bought peace the accused may not thereafter assert that the proceedings have terminated in his favor.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 660 cmt. on clause (a). Similarly, in the parties’ present agreement to settle and compromise their federal civil action, the parties jointly agreed to end the proceedings in a non-litigious nature; the liability of the defendant, therefore, was never legally determined by a fact-finder. In such eircum-stances we do not consider it a “favorable termination.”
We glean from both Georgiana and the various Restatement sections that settlement agreements are often not considered favorable termination for purposes of a wrongful use of civil process action. In the present case, there is clear evidence in the record that the parties truly settled their claims— the settlement agreement indicates that the agreement “represents a compromise and satisfaction of all disputed claims.” Moreover, the trial court had the parties’ entire settlement agreement before it when deciding the summary judgment motion. Cf. Dra-vo supra (summary judgment inappropriately granted by trial court where appellee failed to identify any compromise and where the evidence showed that no affidavits were presented concerning the nature of such a compromise; court could not term resolution of original case a “compromise” such that it would show that the proceedings did not terminate in favor of the accused for purposes of wrongful use of civil process). Accordingly, we find that the proceedings did not terminate in ELSCO’s favor; when the federal district court dismissed ELSCO’s federal claims against the attorney defendants with prejudice, the court determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed in the ease at bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351(a)(2); see Rosenfield (where trial court granted motion for summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs in underlying lawsuit, where such lawsuit was voluntarily withdrawn, court found that defendants failed to state a claim for wrongful use of civil process because prior lawsuit was not terminated in favor of defendants). More important, however, is the fact that both parties agreed to settle the case; under such circumstances, ELSCO’s liability was never legally determined. Summary judgment was properly granted; it is clear that Appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Merriweather, supra.
Order affirmed.3
JOHNSON, J., files a Dissenting Opinion.