Golden v. Dion & Rosenau

600 A.2d 568, 410 Pa. Super. 506, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3733

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 11, 1991
• Docket: 851
• Status: Published

Opinions

BECK, Judge:

This case requires us to construe and apply the principle that judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same court and in the same case should not overrule the decisions of each other.” Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 556 A.2d 827, 831 (1989). Since we find that this rule was not complied with in this case, we reverse the order on appeal granting appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissing appellant’s complaint.¹

On January 27, 1988, plaintiff appellant Lamar Golden filed a complaint against defendants appellees, Dion & Rosenau (a law firm), Dennis Veneziale, Esquire, and State Farm Insurance Company. Golden alleged that when he attempted to collect benefits from State Farm after he was injured in an automobile accident, appellees subjected Golden to medical examinations that were unnecessary and embarrassing, causing him physical pain and mental suffering. Golden alleged that the examinations were intended to harass him, that the service of the petition filed by State Farm to compel the examinations was in derogation of the rules of civil procedure and that he had been denied due process of law. Golden’s complaint included five counts, for breach of contract, wrongful use of civil proceedings, misuse of process, and infliction of emotional distress. Golden sought both compensatory and punitive damages.

Appellees filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer. They alleged that Golden failed to state a cause of action because his allegations were conclusory and unspecific and because the medical examination at issue was not actionable since it took place pursuant to court order and was, therefore, privileged. Appellees also argued that Golden’s action was barred by the statute of limitations since the medical examination in question had been ordered by the court in 1981.

By order dated May 2, 1989, the trial judge assigned to handle the case denied appellees’ preliminary objections. Further pleadings were then filed by both parties. On February 1, 1990, appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their preliminary objections. In this motion, appellees asserted that two other lawsuits filed by the same counsel and alleging the same operative facts and causes of action had been filed against appellees in the same court and that in each of those cases, preliminary objections identical to those filed in this case had been granted. Thus, appellees argued that in the interest of consistency, the denial of their preliminary objections should be reconsidered. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration by order dated February 9, 1990.

Although the record does not contain any further request for reconsideration, inexplicably on March 12, 1990 a different judge sitting on the same court entered the following order:

... upon reconsideration of this Court’s order dated May 2, 1989, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint are GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

As stated above, this order was not signed by the judge who had originally denied the preliminary objections and who had denied reconsideration, but rather by a different judge. In addition, the judge who signed the March 12th order was the same judge who had granted appellees’ preliminary objections in the two other similar cases that had been filed against appellees.² The present appeal is taken from the March 12, 1990 order.

As the foregoing recitation reveals, this is clearly a case where a party who had been unsuccessful before one judge was later able to convince another judge on the same court that the relief requested by that party should be granted. That is not how our system of justice is intended to operate. It is a well-recognized principle that "... judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same court and in the same case should not overrule the decisions of each other.” Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 556 A.2d 827, 831 (1989). This principle was clearly violated here. Once a matter has been decided by a trial judge the decision should remain undisturbed, unless the order is appealable and an appeal therefrom is successfully prosecuted. Where the order is clearly interlocutory, as were the first order denying preliminary objections and the second order denying reconsideration thereof, it is impermissible for another judge of the same court simply to ignore the previous decision and, without explanation, enter its own inconsistent order.³

As a panel of this court has cogently stated, the purpose of the rule prohibiting one trial judge from overruling a decision by another judge on the same court is to "... ensure a degree of pretrial finality ‘so that judicial economy and efficiency can be maintained.’ ” Salerno v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 377 Pa.Super. 83, 87, 546 A.2d 1168, 1170 (1988) (quoting Commonwealth v. Eck, 272 Pa.Super. 406, 409, 416 A.2d 520, 522 (1979)). Clearly the second judge’s reversal of the first judge’s order did not serve the interests of judicial economy and efficiency which the rule seeks to promote. The issue concerning the preliminary objections had been decided and reconsideration thereof denied. At that point, the trial court should not have been called upon to devote any further time to the consideration of that issue.

Moreover, the course followed in this case does not comport with basic fairness. It smacks of judge shopping and should not be condoned. Once an interlocutory pre-trial decision has been rendered, the party in whose favor that decision was rendered must be allowed to rely on it and proceed in accordance with it. To allow the opposing party to continue to attack that decision by seeking the same relief from a different judge, as if the order were somehow appealable within the trial court system, is not fair to the successful party. The proper avenue of redress for the opposing party is to wait until it can appeal the allegedly objectionable ruling once a final appealable order has been entered in the case.

Appellees argue that the second judge’s action in this case does not constitute reversible error because the rule against one trial judge overruling another is not a matter of jurisdiction, but rather is based on the policy favoring finality. Appellees also argue that the Salerno case, referred to above, carves out an exception to the rule in any case where the original decision, later overruled by another judge of the same court, is not supported by an opinion and that this case falls within that exception. We disagree on both counts.

First, the fact that the rule generally prohibiting one trial judge from overruling another is not jurisdictional, i.e. the rule is not based on the second judge’s lack of jurisdiction or power to decide the matter, has no relevance to whether the rule was violated here. There is no question as to whether the second judge here had jurisdiction over this case once it was assigned to him. The question is whether a trial judge should redecide those issues that have already been decided by the trial judge previously assigned to the case. Clearly he should not. Where a trial judge overrules the decision of another trial judge in the same case, he violates the rule of law which disfavors such action. That is what occurred here.

Second, appellees’ reliance on Salerno is misplaced. Salerno involved an appeal from a grant of summary judgment for defendant in a libel action. Appellants argued that the grant of summary judgment was improper because another judge on the trial court had previously denied preliminary objections filed by defendants on substantially the same grounds as those asserted in the summary judgment motion. Granting summary judgment, appellants argued, constituted a reversal of this prior ruling. Salerno, 377 Pa.Super. at 84-86, 546 A.2d at 1169-70. A panel of this court disagreed, holding that a denial of preliminary objections does not preclude a later grant of summary judgment. The panel relied primarily on the difference between preliminary objections, which address only the complaint and are filed in the initial pleadings stage of the case, and a motion for summary judgment, which is filed at a much later stage and is based upon what has been revealed through discovery. Therefore, the panel concluded that a denial of preliminary objections, especially when unaccompanied by an opinion providing a legal explanation, should not preclude entry of summary judgment after discovery and further refinement of the positions of the parties has revealed no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

Appellees misconstrue Salerno insofar as they focus on the Salerno court’s observation that there had been no opinion authored by the judge who had previously denied the defendant’s preliminary objections in that case. There is no parallel between this case and Salerno simply because in this case the first judge did not author an opinion in support of his order denying appellees’ preliminary objections. First, Salerno did not actually involve one trial judge overruling another. The first judge in Salerno had denied preliminary objections, whereas the second judge granted summary judgment. This distinction was crucial to the Salerno court’s approval of the second judge’s action. Such a distinction is not present in this case.

Second, the Salerno court’s observation concerning the lack of an opinion by the first judge appears to have been intended merely to indicate that the lack of an opinion rendered the exact reasons for the first judge’s denial of preliminary objections unclear. Thus, the Salerno court could not precisely ascertain whether the second judge had actually contradicted the first judge at all. In contrast, in this case the contradictory nature of the two rulings is self-evident. The first judge here denied the preliminary objections and refused to reconsider that decision. The second judge expressly reconsidered this decision, granted the preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint. We do not have two different procedural stages of the litigation, there was no further development of the facts or positions of the parties between the two decisions, and the fact that the second judge overruled the first judge on precisely the same issue is undeniable.

We can find no reason to ignore the clear applicability of the rule prohibiting one trial judge from overruling the other in the same case to the facts before us. We recognize, of course, that there is an exception to the rule prohibiting one trial judge from overruling the other which provides that the second judge is authorized to overrule the first if new evidence or newly decided legal authorities compel him to do so. See, e.g., Vincent v. Fuller Company, 400 Pa.Super. 108, 582 A.2d 1367 (1990). However, this exception is clearly not applicable here. The fact that in two other cases pending before the trial court the same preliminary objections had been granted by another judge of the same court does not constitute new evidence in this case, and the interlocutory decisions of the trial court in those cases do not bind the judge deciding this case.

Thus, despite the fact that the second judge may have quite correctly determined that appellees’ preliminary objections should be granted and appellant’s complaint dismissed, we must reverse the second judge’s order on the ground that it impermissibly overruled the prior orders of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction in the same case. To ignore the invalidity of the order on this ground would be to sanction an approach to the resolution of cases that does not comport with basic fairness and that ultimately erodes the goals of finality and judicial economy.

The order of the trial court is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

POPOVICH, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . We granted panel reconsideration in this case on February 25, 1991 to consider this issue. Our initial decision in the case, in which we affirmed the trial court, was filed on December 11, 1990.

2 . For convenience of reference, we will hereinafter refer to the judge who initially denied the preliminary objections and refused to reconsider that decision as the "first judge”. We will refer to the judge who entered the order on appeal, in which the preliminary objections were granted, as the "second judge”.

3 . The record does not reveal whether the second judge was even aware of the entry of the first judge's order denying reconsideration. Whether he was aware or not does not, however, alter our analysis since the impact of the second judge’s order overruling the first judge’s order is the same in any event.