Edwin Soto-Santana v. Stephan Wengen

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 25, 2025
• Docket: 24-2032
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 24-2032 _______________

EDWIN SOTO-SANTANA; YANAHIRA SOTO, Appellants

v.

STEPHAN WENGEN, Individually

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3:23-cv-01819) Magistrate Judge: Honorable Daryl F. Bloom

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 30, 2025

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 25, 2025) _______________

OPINION _______________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. PORTER, Circuit Judge.

Yanahira Soto and Edwin Soto-Santana sued Officer Stephan Wengen for false

arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983 and false imprisonment under state law.

The District Court1 granted Officer Wengen’s motion to dismiss the complaint, holding

that he had probable cause to arrest Soto and Soto-Santana for defiant trespass. We will

affirm.

I

A

Soto and Soto-Santana resided at 250 Carey Avenue in Wilkes-Barre,

Pennsylvania. Soto contacted the City of Wilkes-Barre regarding a plumbing issue at

their apartment, and the City sent Inspector Dan Kratz, a member of the City’s Code

Enforcement Department, to inspect the property. Kratz determined that the property was

unfit for habitation and posted a notice to that effect.

After Kratz posted the notice, Soto and Soto-Santana began residing elsewhere.

But Soto and Soto-Santana’s landlord told them that they could remain at 250 Carey

Avenue while he made repairs.

Officer Wengen was dispatched to 250 Carey Avenue after Soto and Soto-

Santana’s neighbors called the police and reported someone was trespassing. One of the

neighbors informed Officer Wengen that Soto had been staying in the apartment at 250

Carey Avenue for six nights, every night since it was declared uninhabitable.

1 The term “District Court” in this case refers to the magistrate judge proceeding with the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636.

2 Upon arriving at the apartment Officer Wengen tried to contact Soto, but she

would not come to the door. The landlord came to the property after Officer Wengen

contacted him. Officer Wengen then entered the apartment and arrested Soto and Soto-

Santana for defiant trespass.

Soto and Soto-Santana appeared at their preliminary hearing; Officer Wengen did

not. The charges against Soto and Soto-Santana were dropped.

B

After their defiant trespass charges were dropped, Soto and Soto-Santana sued

Officer Wengen, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution claims in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under § 1983, as well as claims of false

imprisonment under state law.

The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, holding that Officer

Wengen had probable cause to arrest Soto and Soto-Santana for defiant trespass. The

District Court also held that, as to the claims brought under § 1983, Officer Wengen was

entitled to qualified immunity.

Soto and Soto-Santana timely appealed.2

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is plenary. Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). A “motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well- pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds that plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).

3 II

To state a claim for false arrest under § 1983 or false imprisonment under state

law, Soto and Soto-Santana must plausibly allege that Officer Wengen lacked probable

cause to arrest them. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995)

(false arrest); Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (false

imprisonment). Similarly, to state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, Soto

and Soto-Santana must plausibly allege that Officer Wengen initiated the proceeding

against them without probable cause. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d

Cir. 2003).

Probable cause requires only that “the facts and circumstances within the arresting

officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe

that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v.

N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). Probable cause does not “require the

same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to

support a conviction.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). In analyzing

whether probable cause existed for an arrest, the court must use a “totality-of-the-

circumstances approach.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).

When considering a motion to dismiss, we “generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

4 B

Officer Wengen arrested Soto and Soto-Santana for defiant trespass under

Pennsylvania law. Section 3503(b) of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code defines a defiant

trespasser as a person who, “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, [ ]

enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by: . . . posting

in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders.”

18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(b)(1)(ii). Wilkes-Barre’s housing code provides that the

inspection and issuing of orders “shall be the exclusive responsibility of the enforcement

officer,” and “[n]o order for correction of any violation under [the housing code] shall be

issued without the approval of the enforcement officer.” Wilkes-Barre City Code of

Ordinances § 7-81(d) (2024).

C

Soto and Soto-Santana do not dispute that Inspector Kratz posted a notice stating

that the property at 250 Carey Avenue was uninhabitable, or that they were found inside

the property. Rather, they argue that Officer Wengen lacked probable cause because their

landlord allegedly permitted them to remain on the property while repairs were made and

informed Officer Wengen of this permission before the arrest.

Soto and Soto-Santana point to an affirmative defense to defiant trespass: when an

“actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to

license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain.” Opening Br. at 12

(quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3503(c)(3)). Soto and Soto-Santana contend that they

therefore lacked the necessary mens rea to commit defiant trespass.

5 Soto and Soto-Santana cite to this Court’s decision in Radich v. Goode, where we

assumed, without deciding, that the existence of an affirmative defense was relevant to

the determination of probable cause. 886 F.2d 1391, 1396 (3d Cir. 1989). But this Court

has not held that an affirmative defense is a relevant consideration in the probable cause

analysis.

After Radich, this Court has at least twice decided that certain affirmative defenses

should not be part of a probable cause determination. In Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d

263, 269 (3d Cir. 2007), we held that raising an affirmative defense that the statute of

limitations has expired is not “a relevant consideration at the time a police officer files

charges.” And in Holman v. City of York, 564 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2009), we held that

the affirmative defense of necessity, which appeared in a different section of the criminal

code than the charged offense of trespass, would require an officer “to examine countless

factual permutations” before making an arrest and therefore should have no bearing on

the probable cause determination.

Even if an affirmative defense were relevant to the probable cause determination,

Officer Wengen had probable cause to arrest Soto and Soto-Santana. Officer Wengen

was told that Soto and Soto-Santana had been living at 250 Carey Avenue despite the

property being deemed uninhabitable. True, the landlord explained that he gave Soto and

Soto-Santana permission to remain at the property while he made repairs. But two other

facts undermine Soto and Soto-Santana’s argument that the landlord’s permission was the

reason they remained at 250 Carey Avenue: (1) the landlord was not at the property

performing repairs when Officer Wengen first arrived and yet Soto and Soto-Santana

6 were inside, and (2) a neighbor told Officer Wengen that Soto had been staying at the

property every night.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, and mindful that probable cause

“does not require that officers correctly resolve conflicting evidence,” Wright v. City of

Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 603 (3d Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556 (2024), Officer Wengen reasonably

believed that Soto and Soto-Santana had committed defiant trespass. Accordingly, Soto

and Soto-Santana failed to state a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious

prosecution.3

***

For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

3 As to the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims brought under § 1983, Officer Wengen would be granted qualified immunity even if he lacked probable cause to arrest Soto and Soto-Santana. As described above, at the time of Soto and Soto-Santana’s arrest, there was not clearly established law that an officer lacks probable cause to arrest for defiant trespass when affirmative defenses bar prosecution. Accordingly, Officer Wengen would be entitled to qualified immunity. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (“[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).