IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION
KEVIN KENTRELL, ) EDWARDS ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) 7:22-cv-08041-LSC ) (7:18-cr-00460-LSC-TMP) UNITED STATES OF ) AMERICA, ) Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION I. Introduction Before this Court is a motion by Kevin Kentrell Edwards (“Edwards” or “Petitioner”) to vacate, set aside, or otherwise correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“§ 2255”). (Doc. 1.) The United States (“Government”) responded in opposition to the motion. (Doc. 3.) For the reasons set forth below, Edwards’s § 2255 motion (doc. 1) is due to be denied and the present actiIoI.n disBmaicsksegdro. u n d A. Charges and Sentencing
On April 26, 2019, a grand jury indicted Edwards, charging him with 1 being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 2 (Cr. Doc. 1 atS 1ee.) Stuart D. Albea represented Edwards in the subsequent proceedings. ( Cr. Doc. 5.) Edwards ultimately entered into a plea agreement and pled guilty to the charge on November 15, 2018. (Cr. Doc. 7.) Pursuant to his agreement, Edwards stipulated that the factual basis therein was “substantially correct.” (Cr. Doc. 7 at 7.) Specifically, Edwards acknowledged that he had admitted to possessing thIed .f irearm at issue and that
he had previously accrued five felony convictions. ( at 7.) The Government, in turn, agreed to recommenIdd. a term of incarceration on the low end of the sentencing guideline range. ( at 8.) Additionally, Edwards waived his right to challenge his conviction and/or sentence through an appeal or a motion
pursuant to § 2255 unless (a) this Court imposed a sentence greater than the applicable statutory maximum sentence and/or (b) the guidelinIed .sentencing range, or (c) Edwards received ineffective assistance of counsel. ( at 9–10.)
At Edwards’s sentencing hearing, this Court adopted the findings of
1 For purposes Seoef this Opinion, the tersmee a“flseolo Tnayy”l orre vfe. rUsn ittoe d“ Sat actreisme punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” and “felon” refers to an individual convicted of such a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); , 495 U.S. 575, 578 (1990) (“Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a person who has been convicted previously [of] a felony to possess a firearm.”). United 2States v. Edwards Edwards’s pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) and determined that his
advisory guideline imprisonment range was 110 months to 120 months. (Cr. Doc. 12 at 22.) Accordingly, on April 2, 2019, this Court sentenced Edwards to 120 months of. imprisonment followed by 36 months of supervised release. (Cr.
Doc. 14 aBt 2. –§3 2)2 55 Proceedings
3 Edwards filed the present § 2255 petition on November 18, 2022. (Doc. 1.) Edwards argues that his sentence should be Nva.Yc.a Stetadt ed uReif lteo &a Pcliastimol Aarsiss'nin vg. fBrroumen the United States Supreme Court ruling in III., 59N7o Un.S-S. u1c (c2e0s2s2iv).e (nDeoscs. o1f a Et d5w.) ards’s § 2255 Motion
Edwards is bringing his first § 2255 motion, so it is not “second or successive'' within the meaninSge eo f the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenIaVl.t y ASctta onfd 1a9r9d6 o (f“ AREeDviPeAw”) . 28 U.S.C. at §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3)(A).
Because collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
3 Applying the “mailboxJ orunlees, ”v t. hUen Eitleedv eSntathte Csircuit deems a prisoner’s § 2255 motion as filed upon the “date that he delivered it to prison authorities for mailing, presumptively, . . . the day that he signed it.” , 304 F.3d 1035, 1038 n.7 (11th Cir. 2002) (per are limited. A petitioner is entitled to relief under § 2255 if the court imposed a
sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded theS eme aximum authorizeUd nbiyte lda wSt, aotre s( 4v). iPsh oiltlhipesrwise subject to collateral attack. 2U8n Uit.eSd.C S. t§a t2e2s5 v5. W; alker
, 225 F.3d 1198, 1199 (11th Cir. 2000); , 198 F.3d 811, 813 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999). “Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ‘is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other
injury that could not have been raised in directL aypnpne va.l aUnndit ewdo uStlda,t eifs condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of juRsitcichea.r’”d s v. United States , 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting , 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988)).
In litigation stemming from a § 2255 motion, “[a] hearing is not required on patently frivolous claims or those which are based upon unsupported generalizations. Nor is a hearing required whHeorlem these pv.e tUitnioitneder ’Sst aaltleesgations are
affirmatively contradicted by the recorGdu.”e rra v. United States , 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting , 588 F.2d 519, 520–21 (5th Cir. 1979)). However, an evidentiary hearing is appropriate if,
“accept[ing] all of the petitioner’s alleged facts as true,” the pDeiatizt iovn. eUrn ihteads “Satallteegse[d] facts which, if proven, would entitle him Atgoa rne lvi.e Df.”u gger Futch v. Dugger 1337, 1338 (11th Cir. 1987) and , 874 F.2d 1483, 1485 (11th
Cir.V 1. 989D))i. scussion A. Timeliness of Edwards’s § 2255 Motion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), there is a one-year statute of
limitations starting from “the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes final” for § 2255 motions. Since Edwards did not file a notice of appeal, the District Court’s judgment became final onS eAep ril 16, 2019, fourteen days
after judgment was entered on April 2, 2019. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i) (“a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district c;o sueret walistoh iMn u1r4p dhay yvs. oUfn .i t.e .d t hSeta etnestry of the judgment or order being appealed”)
, 634 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that “when a defendant does not appeal his conviction or sentence, the judgment of conviction becomes final when the time for seeking that review expires.”).
Edwards filed the instant § 2255 motion on November 18, 2022, which is ovSeeer two years after the one-year period on which his conviction became final. 4 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Thus, this motion is due to be dismissed as untimely.
4 Although 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3) allows the statute of limitations to also run one year from “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,” this B. Appeal Waiver
Edwards’s challenge alleged in his § 2255 motion is precluded by the appeal waiver he signed in his plea agreement with the Government. “A criminal defendant who wishes to plead guilty can waive the righKti ntog
cvh. aUlnleitnegde Shtias tceosnviction and sentence in exchange for a better plea deal.” , No. 20-14100, 2022 WL 2980490, at *1 (11th Cir. July 28, 2022). “A plea agreemenUtn iist,e idn Setsasteensc ve., aH coownlteract between the government and
a criminal defendant.” , 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999). “Among the considerations that a defendant may offer as a part of such a contract is waiver of his rIigdh. t to appeal, provided that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily.” “With limited exceptions, a valid waKivinegr of the
right to appeal bars habeas claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” , at *1. “[A] waiver is not knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver provision of the plea
agreement during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates thUen idteefde Sntdaatnest dv.i dB unsohte orttherwise understand the full significance of the waiver.” , 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). “For an appeal waiver to bar
claims raised in a § 2255 motion, at a minimum, the would-be petitioner must know at the time of the guilty plea that the right to federal habeas review e Sxtiosntse, v. United States , No. 20-10666-A, 2020 WL 4933699, at *1 (11th Cir. June 9,
2020). As part of his plea agreement, Edwards expressly waived the right to challenge his conviction or sentence in a § 2255 motion:
In consideration of the recommended disposition of this case, I, KEVIN KENTRELL EDWARDS, hereby waive and give up my right to appeal my conviction and/or sentence in this case, as well as any fines, restitution, and forfeiture orders, the court might impose. Further, I waive and give up the right to challenge my conviction and/or sentence, any fines, restitution, forfeiture orders imposed or the manner in which my conviction and/or sentence, any fines, restitution, and forfeiture orders were determined in any post- conviction proceeding, including, but not limited to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(Cr. Doc. 7 at 9–10.) The only three rights reserved by the defendant to contest his conviction are: “(a) Any sentence imposed in excess of the applicable statutory maximum sentence(s); (b) Any sentence imposed in excess of the guideline sentencing range determined by the court at the time senItdence is imposed; and (c) Any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” ( . at 10.) The record clearly demonsStreaet es that Edwards was sentenced within the guideline sentencing range. ( Cr. Doc. 12 at 22.) Because of this waiver he signed as part of his plea agreement, Edwards’s claim on ground one cannot be brought. Ground one alleges a violation of the Bruen Supreme Court ruling in . (Doc. 1 at 4.) This claim does not fall into any of
the three exceptions listed above that he can bring despite his agreement with the Government. This claim is not based on his sentence being in excess of the statutory maximum, his sentence being in excess of the guideline sentencing
range, or ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, Edwards’s § 2255 motion is due to bCe. dPirsomciesdseudr aals Dweafiavueldt.
As well as being precluded by an appeal waiver as deBtrauileend above, Edwards’s claim that the United States Supreme Court ruling in entitles him relief is procedurally defaulted. Edwards’s claim is procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise it in the district court or on direct appeSael.e Nor did
Edwards allege any actual prejudice or cause in his § 2255 motion. ( Doc. 1). “Procedural bar” and “procedural default” have dSisetein Sceta mbreoaonkisn gvs. ,U annitde da pSteattiteisoner cannot overcome them in the same manner.
, 32 F.4th 1375, 1383–84 (11th. Cir. 2022). “A procedural bar prevents a defendant from raising arguments in a § 2255 proceeding that he raised and [the Eleventh Circuit] rejected on direct appeal. A defendant can oIvde. rcome a
procedural bar when . . . thSetroeu ifsfl eatn v i.n Utenritveedn Sintag tcehsange in the law.” at 1383 (citations omittDeda)v i(sc vit. iUnng ited States , 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th “By contrast, a ‘procedural default’ occurs when a defendaIndt. raises a new
challengLey ntno hv.i sU cnointevdic tSitoante osr sentence in a § 2255 motion.” at 1383–84 (citing , 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004)). “If a defendant fails to raise an issue on direct appeal, he may not present the issue
in a § 2255 proceeding unless his procedural default is excused. To overcome a procedural default, a defendant must show eitheIrd (. 1) cause and prejudice, or (2) a mMisccKararyi avg. eU noift jeuds tSitcaet,e osr actual innocence.” at 1384 (citation omitted)
(citing , 657 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011)). Bruen Edwards contends that the United States Supreme Court ruling entitles him to relief because it undermines the previous decision that was made on his case by violating his Second Amendment right. (Doc. 1 at 13–16.)
Edwards’s claim, however, is procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise the claim on direct appeal. “Under the procedural default rule, a defendant generally must advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction or
sentence on direct appeal or else tLhyen ndefendant is barred from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” , 365 F.3d at 1234. Edwards failed to advance any claim on direct appeal. As a result, Edwards can overcome the
procedural deSfeaeu lMt ocnKlayy if one of the two exceptions to the procedural default rule applies. , 657 F.3d at 1196. “Under the cause and prejudice by ‘show[ing] cause for not raising tIhde. claim of eLryrnonr on direct appeal and actual
prejudice from the alleged error.’” (quoting , 365 F.3d at 1234). “Under the actual innocence exception[,] . . . a [petitioner]'s procedural default is excused if he can1 s.h Coawu tshea at nhde iPs raecjtuudaillcye i Enxncoecpentito.”n
Edwards cannot establish cause and prejudice. “The novelty of a claim may constitute cause for excusing the procedural default, but only when the
claim is truly Unnoivteeld, mSteaatneisn vg. tBhaant e‘its legal basis [was] not reasonably available to counseRl.e’”e d v. Ross , 948 F.3d 1290, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting , 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)) (alteration in original). There are three ways a defendant can prove a claim was novel and therefore demonstrate
cause: 1) “when a decision of the Supreme Court explicitly overrules one of its precedents,” 2) “when a Supreme Court decision overturns a “longstanding and widespread practice to which the Supreme Court has not spoken,” or 3) “when
a Supreme Court decision disapproves oGf raan pdara vc.t iUceS [the Supreme Court] arguably has sanctioned in prior cases.”” , 990 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted).
BruenAlthough no binding court has made tRheeh aniof velty determination about , the Eleventh Circuit has decided that “ US vw. Iansn noocet n‘ttruly novel’ in the 1084 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, Edwards, likely cannot utilize the “novelty”
eRxecheapiftion to excuse his proceduraBl rdueefna ult in this scenario either. Just as with , a novelty argument for Gradnodeas not meet any of the patBhrsu etno establishing novelty articulated in . 990 F.3d at 1286. The
decision, as further discussed below, does not affect any Eleventh Circuit precedent in the 2w. aAy cEtduwala Irndns oactteenmcpet Es xtcoe upttiliiozne it.
Edwards cannot establish MaccKtuaayl innocence. The asceteu aall soi nSncohcluepn cve. Dexecloeption is exceedingly narrow. , 657 F.3d at 1198; , 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (stating that the actual innocence standard “ensures that petitioner’s case is truly ‘extraordinary’”) (citation omitted). A
petitioner must “show that ‘a constitutional vioSlacthilounp has probably resulted in tMhuer croanyv vi.c Ctiaornr ioefr one who is actually innocent.’” , 513 U.S. at 327 (quoting , 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986B)o).u “s‘lAecytual innocence’ meea.gn.s MfaccKtuaayl
innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” , 523 U.S. at 623; , , 657 F.3d at 1198. “To establish actual innocence, [a] petitioner must demonstrate that, ‘in light of all the evidence,’ B‘ito uiss lmeyore likely than not that no
rSecahsluopn able juror would have convicted him.’” , 523 U.S. at 623 (quoting 513 U.S. at 327–28). “The petitioner thus isS rcehqluuipred to make a stronger A petitioner alleging actual innocence on an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
conviction “must show that he hWahdi tntloe knowledge of being a convictedR efehlaoinf when he possessed the fireHaartmch.”e r v. Uni, t2e0d2 S3t WateLs 3071092, at *2 (citing , 139 S. Ct. at 2200, and , No. 19-cv-8053, 202R2e hWaiLf
4474915, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Sep. 26, 2022) (“To be actually innocent under , . . . [the] [p]etitioner would have to be unaware that he is a felon.”)). Notably, though, “[i]n felon-in-possession cases where the defendant was in fact a felon
when he possessed firearms, the defendant faces an uphill climb in trying [to argue] . . . that he did not know he was a felon. The reason is simple: If a person is a felon, he ordinarily knowGrse here vis. Ua nfeitleodn .S ‘Ftaetleosny status is simply not the kind of thing tUhanti toende S tfoartegse tvs. .G’”a ry , 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 (2021)
(quoting see also, e.g. Uni, t9e6d3 S tFa.3teds 4v2. I0n,n 4o2c3e n(t4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)); , , 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[M]ost people convicted of a felony know that they are felons.”).
Multiple felony convictions and serving a term of imprisonment for longer than one yeaSre ec aUn npirteodv idSeta ctiersc uvm. sRtaenedtial evidence that a petitioner knew he was a felon. , 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019)
(“[S]omeone who has beInenno ccoennvticted of felonies repeatedly is especially likely to know he is a felon.”); , 977 F.3d at 1083 (“[S]erving more than a year Greer , 141 S. Ct. at 2097–98 (discussing the defendants’ multiple felonies;
failure to dispute the fact of their prior convictions; stipulations to their felon status at trial and upon pleading guilty, respectively; and failure to argue on appeal “that they would have presented evidence at trial that they did not in
fact know they were felons when they possessed firearms” as “substantial evidence that [the defendants] knew they were felons”). Edwards fails toS cmhleuept vt.h Dee dloemanding standard required to establish
actual innocence. See , 513 U.S. 298, 332 (1995). In addition to never filing a direct appeal, Edwards offers no reason for excusal from his claims underS ethee procedural default rule, nor does he make any claims of actual innocence. ( Doc. 1.) Considering Edwards’s extensive criminal record, this
Court finds no evidence suppSoereting Edwards’s contention that he is serving an unconstitutional sentence. ( Cr. Doc. 12.) Therefore, Edwards’s § 2255 motion isD d.u Me etor ibtse odfis Emdiwssaerdd a’ss Pperoticteidounr ally defaulted.
Bruen Even if Edwards’s claim is not procedurally defaulted, applies to law-abiding citizens, thus having no effect on the present case. The Second
Amendment states, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the peopDleis ttroic tk eoef pC oalunmd bbiae avr. HAerlmlesr, shall not be Court explained that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited,” and reiterated the “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms bByru feenlons.” 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). In , the Supreme Court struck down a state law requiring law-
abiding citizens to demonBsrturaetne a special need for self-defense before issuance of a public-carry license. , 597 U.S. at 71. The Court held that a state may not enforce a law that “prevents law-abiding citizens with ordIidn.ary self-deBferunesne
needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” Notably, protected the firearm rights of law-aHbeildleinrgS eciet iBzreunesn without abrogating the longstanding prohibitions outlined Binru en . , 597 U.S. at 87.
Id. It follows that the holding in has no effect on Edwards’s case here. The Second Amendment protections afforded to law-abidingU cnitiitzeedn Sst daote ns ovt. aRpopzileyr to Edwards, an individual with prior felony convictions. , 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that “statutory restrictions
of firearm possession… are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of cSeeret ain classes of people,” including individuals with felony convictions). ( Cr. Doc. 12.) Thus, this Circuit’s ruling stating “§
922(g)(1) is a constitutional restriction on [a defendaRnotz’sie] rS, e5c9o8n Fd. 3Adm. endment righVtI”. stilCl oapnpclliuessi, owna rranting no relief for Edwards. at 772. For the foregoing reasons, Edwards’s § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside,
or correct a sentence is due to be denied and this case dismissed with prejudice. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings requires the Court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse
to the applicant. See Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. This Court
may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a “petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), or that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-EL v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). This Court finds that Edwards’s claims do not satisfy either standard. A separate order consistent with this opinion will be entered. DONE and ORDERED on June 5, 2024. Xe United States Disthét Judge 215708