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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 13-10874 ________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:12-cv-01427-CC; 1:08-cr-00082-CC-1
CHRISTOPHER STOUFFLET,
Petitioner–Appellant, versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent–Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia _______________________
(July 8, 2014)
Before PRYOR, Circuit Judge, WOOD, ∗ Chief District Judge, EDENFIELD, ∗ ∗ District Judge.
∗ Honorable Lisa Godbey Wood, Chief United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. ∗∗ Honorable B. Avant Edenfield, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. Case: 13-10874 Date Filed: 07/08/2014 Page: 2 of 15
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal requires us to decide whether a federal prisoner may collaterally
attack the voluntariness of his guilty plea in a motion to vacate his sentence, 28
U.S.C. § 2255, after he already presented that issue as an objection to his appointed
counsel’s motion to withdraw in his direct appeal. See Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). We conclude that the prisoner is procedurally
barred from relitigating the voluntariness of his plea. We affirm the denial of the
prisoner’s motion to vacate his sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Christopher Stoufflet conspired with others to establish an online pharmacy
in violation of federal law. Customers could order prescription drugs from the
online pharmacy by completing a form, which required them to choose the type
and quantity of drugs they wanted and to answer certain questions about their
medical conditions. The website of the online pharmacy represented that a
physician would review those forms before the online pharmacy distributed the
drugs, but no physician had face-to-face contact with the customers. The
conspirators dispensed over 260 thousand prescriptions, including Schedule III and
Schedule IV controlled substances, and generated over $75 million in sales.
On August 8, 2006, a grand jury indicted Stoufflet and six others with
engaging in a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846, engaging in a money laundering
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conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), money laundering, id.§§ 1956, 1957, and
distributing controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 841. Stoufflet pleaded not guilty
and proceeded to trial. In 2007, Stoufflet disclosed that he planned to defend
himself at trial on the ground that he lacked the mens rea to conspire because he
thought the online business was legal after consulting various attorneys.
Initially, the United States asked Stoufflet to confirm that he intended to rely
on that advice-of-counsel defense so that it could interview the attorneys who had
advised him. But then in February 2008, the United States filed a motion in limine
to exclude Stoufflet’s advice-of-counsel defense. The United States argued that the
defense was irrelevant. The United States contended that, because Stoufflet was
charged with general-intent crimes, not specific-intent crimes, any advice he
received from attorneys was not a defense for his illegal conduct.
Then on March 4, 2008, the United States initiated a second criminal
proceeding against Stoufflet by filing an information charging him with engaging
in a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and money laundering, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957. Stoufflet pleaded guilty the same day. He admitted to “conspir[ing],
combin[ing], confederat[ing], agree[ing], and ha[ving] a tacit understanding with
others, including . . . [the codefendants], to knowingly and intentionally distribute
and dispense Schedule III and IV controlled substances, . . . other than for a
legitimate medical purpose and not in the course of professional practice.” In
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exchange for that guilty plea, the United States agreed to dismiss the counts against
Stoufflet in the 2006 indictment.
The district court accepted Stoufflet’s guilty plea as knowing and voluntary.
Three days after Stoufflet pleaded guilty, the district court denied the motion in
limine filed by the United States to exclude the advice-of-counsel defense in the
prosecution of the 2006 charges. The court ruled, contrary to the argument of the
United States, that the crimes were specific-intent crimes and Stoufflet’s advice-of-
counsel defense was relevant.
Stoufflet then attempted to withdraw his guilty plea. Stoufflet’s newly
appointed counsel contended in the motion to withdraw that Stoufflet pleaded
guilty “under extreme pressure” because his former counsel advised that it was
“highly probable” that the district court would grant the motion in limine filed by
the United States for the trial of the 2006 charges. He stated that he was “numb” at
the plea hearing and that his attorneys forced him into the plea agreement.
The district court conducted a hearing on Stoufflet’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, and Stoufflet and his former counsel testified. The district court denied
the motion to withdraw and later sentenced Stoufflet to 70 months of imprisonment
and 3 years of supervised release.
Stoufflet filed a direct appeal, and the district court appointed appellate
counsel. The appointed appellate counsel moved to withdraw her representation.
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See Anders, 368 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396. In her Anders brief, counsel concluded
that Stoufflet’s potential arguments on appeal were frivolous. Stoufflet filed a
response to the Anders brief, in which he argued that his plea was invalid because
he was unaware of all the elements of the crimes for which he was charged. He
explained that he did not understand that conspiracy was a specific-intent crime
until the district court denied the motion in limine in the other criminal proceeding.
We granted the appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirmed
Stoufflet’s judgment of conviction and sentence. United States v. Stoufflet, 424 F.
App’x 881 (11th Cir. 2011). We stated, in part, “Because independent examination
of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to
withdraw is GRANTED, Stoufflet’s motion for the appointment of new counsel is
DENIED, and Stoufflet’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.” Id. at 881.
Stoufflet next filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
He stated that he was “obliged to plead guilty” and that the “Court accepted [his]
plea without informing him that criminal intent was essential.”
The district court denied the motion. Because our Court had rejected
Stoufflet’s claim that his plea was involuntary when we affirmed his conviction
and sentence in his direct appeal, the district court ruled that Stoufflet could not
relitigate that issue in a motion to vacate his sentence. But the district court granted
a certificate of appealability, which asks whether Stoufflet may again litigate
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whether his guilty plea was voluntary even though the appointed appellate counsel
and Stoufflet presented that claim in the Anders briefing and our Court rejected it
on direct appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When we review the denial of a motion to vacate, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, we
review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Thomas v.
United States, 572 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009).
III. DISCUSSION
It is long settled that a prisoner is procedurally barred from raising
arguments in a motion to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, that he already
raised and that we rejected in his direct appeal. See United States v. Nyhuis, 211
F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Once a matter has been decided adversely to a
defendant on direct appeal it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under
section 2255.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d
1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[P]rior disposition of a ground of error on direct
appeal, in most cases, precludes further review in a subsequent collateral
proceeding.”); United States v. Rowan, 663 F.2d 1034, 1035 (11th Cir. 1981)
(“This Court is not required on § 2255 motions to reconsider claims of error raised
and disposed of on direct appeal.”); United States v. Johnson, 615 F.2d 1125, 1128
(5th Cir. 1980) (“When an issue has already been determined on direct appeal, a
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Court need not reconsider it on a Section 2255 motion.”); Buckelew v. United
States, 575 F.2d 515, 517–18 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[A] matter need not be reconsidered
on a section 2255 motion if it has already been determined on direct appeal.”).
Instead of applying this procedural bar, both Stoufflet and the United States
argue about whether the “law of the case” bars Stoufflet’s motion to vacate his
sentence, but we decline to invoke that doctrine. We have never applied the law-of-
the-case doctrine by name to a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence that raises
again an argument raised earlier in a prisoner’s direct appeal. See Rozier v. United
States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012) (declining to reconsider a claim already
decided against a prisoner because there had been no intervening change in law,
but not explicitly stating that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the appeal);
Thomas v. United States, 572 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because we find
that the law of the case doctrine does not bar review here as to each claim specified
in the [Certificate of Appealability], we assume that it could apply in such a
scenario.”).
The law-of-the-case doctrine is similar to the procedural bar limiting the
claims a federal prisoner may bring in a motion to vacate his sentence, but it is
unfit to describe the interplay between claims raised in a direct appeal and those
raised in a collateral proceeding attacking a final judgment. Like the procedural bar
for federal prisoners, the law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of issues that a
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court necessarily or by implication decided against the litigant in an earlier appeal.
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo ex rel. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2005). Even though the law-of-the-case doctrine would control multiple
collateral attacks of a sentence, see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 9, 83 S.
Ct. 1068, 1074 (1963); Westbrook v. Zant, 743 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1984), that
doctrine is an imprecise descriptor for the preclusive effect of a judgment in a
direct appeal on a later collateral attack. The law-of-the-case doctrine is intended to
“regulate judicial affairs before final judgment.” 18B Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasis
added). But when a federal prisoner files a motion to vacate his sentence, the
prosecution against him has come to an end. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (“A prisoner in
custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the
right to be released . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate,
set aside or correct the sentence.”). Because a motion to vacate a sentence is a
collateral attack on a sentence that has become final, the resolution of that motion
is not part of the “single continuing lawsuit” beginning with the indictment against
the defendant-movant, but neither is it an entirely “separate action” from the
criminal proceeding. Wright & Miller, supra, § 4478. Even though the clerk
dockets a collateral attack by a federal prisoner on the same docket as the original
prosecution and even though the same court of appeals that considered his direct
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appeal will also consider any appeal arising from his collateral attack, the collateral
attack is distinct from the original prosecution that ended in a final judgment
against the prisoner.
Moreover, we are reluctant to call the procedural bar the “law of the case”
because the exceptions to the discretionary law-of-the-case doctrine are in tension
with the limited scope of collateral review of federal prisoners’ sentences. An
appellant may overcome the law-of-the-case doctrine if he presents new and
substantially different evidence, if the prior decision was clearly erroneous and
would result in a manifest injustice, or if there has been an intervening change in
the law. See This That & the Other Gift & Tobacco, Inc. v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 439
F.3d 1275, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2006). But Congress and the courts have imposed
far greater limitations on collateral attacks than the limitations imposed by the law-
of-the-case doctrine and its exceptions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2253, 2255; United
States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185–87, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 2240–41 (1979); see
also Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 384, 124 S. Ct. 786, 793 (2003) (“[The
law-of-the-case doctrine] simply expresses common judicial practice; it does not
limit the courts’ power.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For example, new
evidence, by itself, is not a ground for relief in a motion to vacate unless that new
evidence establishes an error of constitutional proportions or a “fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v. United States,
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368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 471 (1962); see, e.g., Mills, 36 F.3d at 1056
(“Even if this evidence could support a finding that the property had lost its
wetlands character prior to the appellants’ ownership, a finding upon which we
voice no opinion, the time to present this proof was at the trial on the merits.”).
Likewise, a court of appeals reviewing a motion to vacate will not disturb a prior
decision—even if so clearly erroneous that it results in manifest injustice—if that
decision did not result in a constitutional error or a complete miscarriage of justice.
Hill, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S. Ct. at 471. And only a limited set of intervening
changes of law warrant setting aside a ruling in the defendant’s direct appeal
because not all intervening changes in law have retroactive effect after a judgment
of conviction has become final. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310–11, 109 S.
Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule,
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases
which have become final before the new rules are announced.”); McCoy v. United
States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Davis v. United States, 417
U.S. 333, 341–43 & 341 n.12, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 2303–04 & 2303 n.12 (1974)
(rejecting the application of law of the case by a court of appeals because there had
been an intervening change in law, but not deciding whether that intervening
change in law warranted relief because the parties had not argued whether the
change in law was retroactive). The procedural bar for collateral review better
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addresses these nuances than the common-law doctrine of law of the case, which
safeguards decisions of a court of appeals before final judgment. See Wright &
Miller, supra, § 4478 (“Law-of-the-case rules have developed to maintain
consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of
a single continuing lawsuit. . . . After final judgment, direct relief from the
judgment is governed by the rules governing direct and collateral attack. . . .”).
We acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit has described this procedural bar
as the “law of the case.” See, e.g., Fuller v. United States, 398 F.3d 644, 648 (7th
Cir. 2005); Peoples v. United States, 403 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 2005). But, unlike
the Seventh Circuit, we decline to read the decisions of the Supreme Court in
Sanders and Davis for the proposition that the procedural bar is synonymous with
the law-of-the-case doctrine. The Seventh Circuit has relied on Sanders for the
proposition that federal courts may “employ the more flexible doctrine of law of
the case even when rules of preclusion do not govern.” Peoples, 403 F.3d at 847.
But the Supreme Court in Sanders applied the doctrine to bar a second motion to
vacate because that second motion “sought to retry a claim previously fully
considered and decided against” the appellant in his first motion to vacate. 373
U.S. at 9, 83 S. Ct. at 1074 (“[N]othing in § 2255 requires that a sentencing court
grant a hearing on a successive motion alleging a ground for relief already fully
considered on a prior [§ 2255] motion and decided against the prisoner.”). The
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Seventh Circuit has also relied on Davis, but the Supreme Court in Davis did not
endorse the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine. 417 U.S. at 342, 94 S. Ct.
at 2303. Instead, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, when a court considers a
prisoner’s motion to vacate, the court must consider intervening changes in law
that would render a prisoner’s conviction invalid. Id. at 341 n.12, 346–47, 94 S. Ct.
at 2303 n.12, 2305 (explaining that collateral relief is justified if an intervening
change in law is retroactive and renders a prisoner guilty “for an act that the law
does not make criminal”). But in doing so, the Supreme Court did not purport to
apply the exceptions of the law-of-the-case doctrine; it instead applied the rules
that govern postconviction review and relief. The intervening change of law, the
Supreme Court recognized, might have rendered Davis guilty for an act that the
law did not make criminal. Id. at 346, 94 S. Ct. at 2305. If so, Davis’s final
conviction and sentence resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. Id. at 346–
47, 94 S. Ct. at 2305. In fact, the Supreme Court has only “[a]ssum[ed] for
argument’s sake that the doctrine applies” to motions to vacate, and the Court has
rejected it as an “insurmountable obstacle” barring reconsideration of a prior
judgment. Castro, 540 U.S. at 384, 124 S. Ct. at 793.
Instead of adopting the “law of the case” terminology, we conclude that
Stoufflet is procedurally barred from relitigating the voluntariness of his plea in a
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motion to vacate his sentence because he already raised that issue in his direct
appeal. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343.
We reject Stoufflet’s argument that his objection to appointed counsel’s
Anders brief should not trigger the procedural bar because the posture pits counsel
against defendant. Stoufflet clearly presented the issue of the voluntariness of his
plea when he responded to appointed counsel’s Anders brief. In her Anders brief,
appointed counsel evaluated the plea colloquy and Stoufflet’s motion to withdraw
that plea, and she concluded that his plea was knowing and voluntary such that it
would be frivolous to appeal the voluntariness of it. Stoufflet objected that his plea
was not voluntary because he was misinformed about the elements of his crime.
When our Court granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, we agreed that
her “assessment of the relative merit of [Stoufflet’s] appeal [wa]s correct” and
affirmed Stoufflet’s conviction and sentence “[b]ecause independent examination
of the entire record reveal[ed] no arguable issues of merit.” Stoufflet, 424 F. App’x
at 881. We necessarily rejected Stoufflet’s contention about the voluntariness of
his plea. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that an issue “[p]resented is
presented,” White v. United States, 371 F.3d 900, 902–03 (7th Cir. 2004), even if
raised only in the pro se response to an Anders brief.
Stoufflet’s argument that there has been an intervening change in the law of
conspiracy, which might warrant reconsideration of his claim previously rejected,
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is misguided. There has been no retroactive change in law that would render our
earlier consideration of Stoufflet’s claim incorrect as a matter of constitutional law
or a complete miscarriage of justice. See Rozier, 701 F.3d at 684–85. Stoufflet
contends that our decision in United States v. Tobin, 676 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir.
2012), which we decided after his direct appeal, made clear that the sentencing
judge should have instructed Stoufflet that his conduct must have been willful to
constitute criminal conspiracy. But in Tobin, we did not change the law of
conspiracy. Instead, we clarified that “[w]e have repeatedly recognized that a
conviction [for a drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846,] requires evidence of
willfulness on the part of the defendant” and that “the defendant[] must have joined
the agreement knowing the unlawful purpose of the plan.” Tobin, 676 F.3d at
1284–85 (emphasis added). Setting aside whether our decision in Tobin would
constitute a “new rule,” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S. Ct. at 1070, it is clear that
Tobin did not change the law of conspiracy.
Stoufflet also urges us to reconsider our earlier rejection of his argument
because that decision was clearly erroneous and resulted in a manifest injustice.
But for the reasons stated above, we decline to import the exceptions of the law-of-
the-case doctrine, including the exception for manifest injustice, to the procedural
bar for federal prisoners. When he pleaded guilty, Stoufflet admitted under oath
that he conspired to knowingly and intentionally distributing and dispensing
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controlled substances. After a full hearing, the district court rejected Stoufflet’s
motion to withdraw that plea. And we later affirmed Stoufflet’s conviction over his
objection that his plea was involuntary. Stoufflet, 424 F. App’x at 881. We refuse
to reconsider our previous decision, which procedurally bars Stoufflet from again
arguing that his plea was involuntary in a motion to vacate his sentence.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the denial of the motion to vacate Stoufflet’s sentence.