Benham, Judge.
On December 18, 1983, plaintiff F. A. Blanchard entered into a contract with defendants Daniel Edelschick and Shelley Edelschick for the purchase of defendants’ home in Gwinnett County, Georgia. After transfer of the property, plaintiff discovered a crack in the marble bathtub which he had not seen during earlier inspections. Plaintiff brought this suit against defendants alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract and seeking $3,000 actual damages, $10,000 punitive damages, and attorney fees. Plaintiff alleged that defendants deliberately hid the defect in the bathtub by using plants and a sealant to obscure visibility of the crack.
The complaint was served on defendant Shelley Edelschick on August 17, 1984, and on defendant Daniel Edelschick on September 21, 1984. On September 11, 1984, prior to service on Daniel, defendants filed a motion for special appearance to contest jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court found that defendants were subject to its jurisdiction. On November 1, 1984, defendants filed their joint answer and simultaneously filed a motion for summary judgment. The answer was filed 75 days after service of the complaint on Shelley and 40 days after service of the complaint on Daniel. Defendants paid court [411]*411costs on December 13, 1984.
On December 3, 1984, plaintiff filed a “Motion to Strike Defendants’ Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment,” requesting the court to “(a) strike the Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Shelley and Daniel Edelschick; (b) grant Plaintiff a default judgment against both Defendants as to the issue of liability; and (c) grant Plaintiff such other relief as it deems just.” After a hearing the trial court held: “The Defendant Shelley Edelschick’s answer not having been timely filed, her answer is hereby dismissed . . . The Defendant Daniel Edelschick’s answer is also dismissed due to the fact that it. was filed after 30 days but prior to 45 days after service without having paid the costs prior to the filing of the answer . . . Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is partially granted as to the liability of the Defendants under Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint as this Court finds that the facts as stated in the complaint are sufficient for this Court to find liability on the Defendants for damages ... As to prayers for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees in Counts II and III, this Court does not find sufficient facts stated for this Court to grant a partial motion for summary judgment as to Defendant’s liability on those counts.” It is from this order that defendants appeal (Case No. 70940) and plaintiff cross-appeals (Case No. 70941).
1. “Since the trial court purported to grant a partial summary judgment, the order is appealable without a certificate for immediate review. [OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)].” Avis Rent A Car &c. v. Rice, 132 Ga. App. 857 (1) (209 SE2d 270) (1974).
2. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants.
The complaint alleges that defendants are nonresidents and are subject to jurisdiction under Georgia’s Long Arm Statute (OCGA § 9-10-91). This Code section states in pertinent part that “[a] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident. . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in person or through an agent, he: . . . (2) [cjommits a tortious act or omission within this state . . . [or] (4) [ojwns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state.”
Plaintiff presented evidence by way of affidavit alleging that defendants concealed a defect in real property located within this state. This allegation alone is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under subsection (2) of the Georgia Long Arm Statute. Compare Yarbrough v. Estate of Yarbrough, 173 Ga. App. 386 (326 SE2d 517) (1985). Secondly, “under the provision of our Long Arm Statute referring to the ownership, use or possession of Georgia realty, jurisdictional requirements are satisfied when a substantial connection or nexus exists between [412]*412the basis of the controversy and the property within this state.” Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715 (2B) (250 SE2d 169) (1978). The basis of the controversy in the instant case relates directly to the ownership and sale of real property located within this state. Therefore, we find that a substantial connection with this state existed so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants reasonable. See Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182 (237 SE2d 672) (1977). Therefore, the trial court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction pursuant to subsections (2) and (4) of the Georgia Long Arm Statute.
3. Defendants contend that they were not in default inasmuch as their “Motion for Special Appearance to Contest Jurisdiction” was a general denial, thus constituting an answer within the contemplation of OCGA § 9-11-8. To make a general denial, the pleader must in good faith intend to controvert all averments of the complaint. OCGA § 9-11-8 (b). A review of defendants’ motion, “late” answer, and plaintiffs complaint leads to the conclusion that a general denial was precisely what defendants intended. The first three paragraphs of defendants’ motion controvert the first three paragraphs of the complaint on the issues of personal jurisdiction, venue, and parties in interest. The fourth paragraph of their motion states: “The Defendant’s [sic] have not breached any contract nor committed any tort within the State of Georgia.” That language is a general denial of the remaining allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, i.e., that defendants did not intentionally and/or fraudulently conceal the alleged defect in the bathtub. The alleged act of concealment being the gravamen of the complaint, plaintiff was thereby put on notice that defendants denied liability. The denials asserted by defendants in their answer, filed after the trial court ruled on the question of jurisdiction, correspond to the general denial made in defendants’ motion, with the exception of the admission that plaintiff inspected the house before signing the contract (which admission is only detrimental to plaintiff). The answer merely states, as so many answers do, that defendants deny the remaining allegations of the complaint. Defendants’ response in their motion that they did not commit any tort in Georgia is no less acceptable than the denial made in their answer. The assertion made in defendants’ motion necessarily includes a denial of intentional or fraudulent concealment.
The objective in adopting the Civil Practice Act and rejecting “issue” pleading was to avoid dismissal on technicalities and to give parties fair notice of claims and/or defenses to be asserted against them; the discovery process was to be used to fill in details. The substance or function of a pleading, rather than its name, should détermine its nature. Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274 (2) (274 SE2d 604) (1980). Since all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial [413]
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Benham, Judge.
On December 18, 1983, plaintiff F. A. Blanchard entered into a contract with defendants Daniel Edelschick and Shelley Edelschick for the purchase of defendants’ home in Gwinnett County, Georgia. After transfer of the property, plaintiff discovered a crack in the marble bathtub which he had not seen during earlier inspections. Plaintiff brought this suit against defendants alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract and seeking $3,000 actual damages, $10,000 punitive damages, and attorney fees. Plaintiff alleged that defendants deliberately hid the defect in the bathtub by using plants and a sealant to obscure visibility of the crack.
The complaint was served on defendant Shelley Edelschick on August 17, 1984, and on defendant Daniel Edelschick on September 21, 1984. On September 11, 1984, prior to service on Daniel, defendants filed a motion for special appearance to contest jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court found that defendants were subject to its jurisdiction. On November 1, 1984, defendants filed their joint answer and simultaneously filed a motion for summary judgment. The answer was filed 75 days after service of the complaint on Shelley and 40 days after service of the complaint on Daniel. Defendants paid court [411]*411costs on December 13, 1984.
On December 3, 1984, plaintiff filed a “Motion to Strike Defendants’ Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment,” requesting the court to “(a) strike the Answer and Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Shelley and Daniel Edelschick; (b) grant Plaintiff a default judgment against both Defendants as to the issue of liability; and (c) grant Plaintiff such other relief as it deems just.” After a hearing the trial court held: “The Defendant Shelley Edelschick’s answer not having been timely filed, her answer is hereby dismissed . . . The Defendant Daniel Edelschick’s answer is also dismissed due to the fact that it. was filed after 30 days but prior to 45 days after service without having paid the costs prior to the filing of the answer . . . Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is partially granted as to the liability of the Defendants under Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint as this Court finds that the facts as stated in the complaint are sufficient for this Court to find liability on the Defendants for damages ... As to prayers for exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees in Counts II and III, this Court does not find sufficient facts stated for this Court to grant a partial motion for summary judgment as to Defendant’s liability on those counts.” It is from this order that defendants appeal (Case No. 70940) and plaintiff cross-appeals (Case No. 70941).
1. “Since the trial court purported to grant a partial summary judgment, the order is appealable without a certificate for immediate review. [OCGA § 9-11-56 (h)].” Avis Rent A Car &c. v. Rice, 132 Ga. App. 857 (1) (209 SE2d 270) (1974).
2. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over defendants.
The complaint alleges that defendants are nonresidents and are subject to jurisdiction under Georgia’s Long Arm Statute (OCGA § 9-10-91). This Code section states in pertinent part that “[a] court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident. . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner as if he were a resident of the state, if in person or through an agent, he: . . . (2) [cjommits a tortious act or omission within this state . . . [or] (4) [ojwns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within this state.”
Plaintiff presented evidence by way of affidavit alleging that defendants concealed a defect in real property located within this state. This allegation alone is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under subsection (2) of the Georgia Long Arm Statute. Compare Yarbrough v. Estate of Yarbrough, 173 Ga. App. 386 (326 SE2d 517) (1985). Secondly, “under the provision of our Long Arm Statute referring to the ownership, use or possession of Georgia realty, jurisdictional requirements are satisfied when a substantial connection or nexus exists between [412]*412the basis of the controversy and the property within this state.” Hart v. DeLowe Partners, Ltd., 147 Ga. App. 715 (2B) (250 SE2d 169) (1978). The basis of the controversy in the instant case relates directly to the ownership and sale of real property located within this state. Therefore, we find that a substantial connection with this state existed so as to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants reasonable. See Cox v. Long, 143 Ga. App. 182 (237 SE2d 672) (1977). Therefore, the trial court properly exercised in personam jurisdiction pursuant to subsections (2) and (4) of the Georgia Long Arm Statute.
3. Defendants contend that they were not in default inasmuch as their “Motion for Special Appearance to Contest Jurisdiction” was a general denial, thus constituting an answer within the contemplation of OCGA § 9-11-8. To make a general denial, the pleader must in good faith intend to controvert all averments of the complaint. OCGA § 9-11-8 (b). A review of defendants’ motion, “late” answer, and plaintiffs complaint leads to the conclusion that a general denial was precisely what defendants intended. The first three paragraphs of defendants’ motion controvert the first three paragraphs of the complaint on the issues of personal jurisdiction, venue, and parties in interest. The fourth paragraph of their motion states: “The Defendant’s [sic] have not breached any contract nor committed any tort within the State of Georgia.” That language is a general denial of the remaining allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, i.e., that defendants did not intentionally and/or fraudulently conceal the alleged defect in the bathtub. The alleged act of concealment being the gravamen of the complaint, plaintiff was thereby put on notice that defendants denied liability. The denials asserted by defendants in their answer, filed after the trial court ruled on the question of jurisdiction, correspond to the general denial made in defendants’ motion, with the exception of the admission that plaintiff inspected the house before signing the contract (which admission is only detrimental to plaintiff). The answer merely states, as so many answers do, that defendants deny the remaining allegations of the complaint. Defendants’ response in their motion that they did not commit any tort in Georgia is no less acceptable than the denial made in their answer. The assertion made in defendants’ motion necessarily includes a denial of intentional or fraudulent concealment.
The objective in adopting the Civil Practice Act and rejecting “issue” pleading was to avoid dismissal on technicalities and to give parties fair notice of claims and/or defenses to be asserted against them; the discovery process was to be used to fill in details. The substance or function of a pleading, rather than its name, should détermine its nature. Bosworth v. Cooney, 156 Ga. App. 274 (2) (274 SE2d 604) (1980). Since all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial [413]*413justice (OCGA § 9-11-8 (f)) and serve the best interests of the pleader (Rodgers v. Ga. Tech Athletic Assn., 166 Ga. App. 156 (303 SE2d 467) (2b) (1983)), defendants’ motion to contest jurisdiction should have been considered a timely answer in the cause; the other defenses asserted in the answer should be considered an amendment under OCGA § 9-11-15. Since defendants were not in default under the foregoing analysis, we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing defendants’ answer and finding defendants liable for actual damages on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
4. The trial court did not err in finding that the allegations in the complaint were insufficient to authorize an award of punitive damages and attorney fees. The only defect alleged was a crack in the bathtub which, if it existed at the time of inspection as plaintiff contends, could have been discovered through the exercise of ordinary prudence on his part. Compare Batey v. Stone, 127 Ga. App. 81 (192 SE2d 528) (1972), in which the defects concealed from plaintiffs/homebuyers by defendant/builder/seller were improper waterproofing, inadequate and varying thicknesses of the driveway, and other structural defects of a nature such that the buyers could not have discovered them “by the exercise of ordinary prudence and caution.” Moreover, plaintiff’s affidavit states that had he known about the crack before contracting to purchase the house, he would have required it be fixed at defendants’ expense or have required that defendants reduce the house price accordingly, as opposed to foregoing the purchase of the house. Based on our reading of the complaint and affidavit, we agree with the trial court that there are insufficient facts to support a grant of summary judgment as to defendants’ liability for fraud, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Blanchard v. West, 115 Ga. App. 814 (2) (156 SE2d 164) (1967); OCGA § 51-6-1.
5. Having determined that defendants were not in default and that, therefore, the grant of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion as to defendants’ liability for actual damages was error, we find no merit in plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court’s order granting “summary judgment” should be corrected to read “default judgment.”
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No. 70940. Judgment affirmed in Case No. 70941.
Banke, C. J., Deen, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Sognier and Beasley, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., Carley and Pope, JJ., dissent.