Utter, J.
The plaintiffs1 brought this action to enjoin the construction of a 128-unit, 5-story condominium apartment building on lots 1 through 8, block 52 of Lake Union Shorelands in Seattle. Defendants were Roanoke Reef Associates, the developer, and the City of Seattle and superintendent of buildings thereof, who issued building permits for the Roanoke Reef condominium.2
[478]*478Plaintiffs make five contentions: (1) the building permit for the condominium was issued in violation of the Seattle building code and zoning ordinances; (2) the grant of the second renewal of the building permit was unlawful as being arbitrary and capricious; (3) the grant of the third renewal of the building permit was unlawful as no environmental impact statement was prepared or issued in accordance with the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) (RCW 43.21C); (4) the defendant-developer failed to obtain the permit required by the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (RCW 90.58) prior to undertaking their substantial development; and (5) the building being constructed is an obstruction to navigation. We will discuss these contentions separately.
After a trial involving disputed testimony, the court declined to grant an injunction and entered judgment for the defendants. The court held the issuance of the May 8, 1969 building permit “although done contrary to the terms of the Building Code” was cured by subsequent compliance with the code requirements, and against the plaintiffs’ remaining contentions.
Plaintiffs on appeal raise the same issues they urged before the trial court. We agree with plaintiffs that the building permit was issued in violation of the Seattle building code, that this irregularity was not cured by subsequent compliance and that, as well, even if the permit issuance was valid, an environmental impact statement was required prior to the third renewal of the building permit.
In 1967, defendant purchased lots 1 through 8 in Roanoke Bay of Lake Union, which then contained a boat marina comprising 60 covered boat moorages and a boat sales and repair shop. On June 19, 1967 the defendant applied to the City of Seattle for a building permit to construct a condominium. This application used state-leased submerged lands adjacent to the lots owned by defendant to satisfy the bulk and density requirements under the city zoning ordinance. [479]*479This lease was not executed to them by the state until March 22,1968.
On January 3, 1969 the 1967 application was reintroduced using the earlier application form, apparently to avoid forfeiting the previous plan checking fee. No new drawings or specifications were submitted with this “new” application as required by Seattle code 3.03.020. On May 7 or 8, 1969 the completed plans required by the code were filed and on May 8, 1969 a building permit (No. 531945) was issued “subject to structural and ordinance check.” Such a conditional permit grant procedure was not and is not provided for by the Seattle code and the trial court concluded the May, 1969 permit was issued contrary to the code’s terms.
Effective September 5, 1969 the Seattle zoning ordinance was amended to prohibit the use of submerged state-leased lands for computing floor area ratio, dwelling unit ratio and lot coverage. Such lands were so used by defendant in its 1967 and 1969 applications and in the city’s 1969 conditional permit issuance.
On April 22, 1970 the first renewal of the 1969 permit was issued for 1 year.3
Another significant Seattle zoning ordinance amendment became effective on May 30, 1970 which provided that city council approval was required in the construction of an apartment house in a general commercial (CG) zone. The subject area is CG zoned and the condominium here received no such council approval.
On October 22, 1970 the superintendent of buildings ap[480]*480proved the building plans for the condominium by removing the condition “subject to structural and' ordinance check” on the permit issued May 8, 1969. It was the removal of this condition which finally permitted the defendant, for the first time, to commence construction. Based on extensive and disputed testimony, the trial court found that work did commence on March 15 and 16, 1971 with the demolition of a portion of the moorage improvements on the subject property and the driving of 10 steel pipe piles.
On April 19, 1971 the second renewal of the original May 1969 permit was issued for a 6-month period, after the building superintendent determined, pursuant to code requirements, the work authorized had been started and was progressing at an approved rate.
The Shoreline Management Act of 1971 became effective on June 1, 1971 and the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA) became effective on August 9,1971.
On October 17, 1971 the third renewal of the 1969 permit was issued for 1 year.
I
Building Permit Issued in Violation of Code and Zoning Ordinances
The plaintiffs first contend the trial court erred in holding the defendant has a vested right to develop the property in accordance with the zoning ordinances in effect on January 3,1969, the date of permit application. We agree.
Our ruling in Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958) sets forth this jurisdiction’s rule as to when rights vest with an applicant for a building permit. We there expressly rejected, at page 129, the majority rule which states:
any substantial change of position, expenditures or in-currence of obligations under a permit entitles the per-mittee to complete the construction and use the premises for the purpose authorized irrespective of subsequent zoning or changes in zoning. ... 8 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1949), § 25.157 at 360.
Illustrative of jurisdictions which adopt this rule is Vir[481]*481ginia, where in Board of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972), the court held, at page 358:
where, as here, a special use permit has been granted under a zoning classification, a bona fide site plan has thereafter been filed and diligently pursued, and substantial expense has been incurred in good faith before a change in zoning, the permittee then has a vested right to the land use described in the use permit and he cannot be deprived of such use by subsequent legislation.
We rejected that approach at page 130 of Hull, where we noted:
We prefer not to adopt a rule which forces the court to search through (to quote from State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, supra [45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954)]) “the moves and countermoves of . . . parties . . . by way of passing ordinances and bringing actions for injunctions” — to which may be added the stalling or acceleration of administrative action in the issuance of permits — to find that date upon which the substantial change of position is made which finally vests the right.
The rule we adopted is concise and provides for easy application. It is:
[T]he right vests when the party . . . applies for his building permit, if that permit is thereafter issued. This rule, of course, assumes that the permit applied for and granted be consistent with the zoning ordinances and building codes in force at the time of application for the permit.
Therefore, no rights may vest where either the application submitted or the permit issued fails to conform to the zoning or building regulations.
The Seattle building code sets forth specific and extensive requirements for the orderly and equitable issuance of building permits. 3.03.020. The provisions therein, provide in part, that (a) to obtain a permit an application must be filed and accompanied by drawings and specifications; (b) each application is to have two sets of drawings and specifications; (c) the application and materials filed “shall be [482]*482checked by the Superintendent of Buildings”; (d) “If the Superintendent of Buildings is satisfied” that the application and materials conform to the law and a building permit fee has been paid “he shall issue a permit therefor to the applicant”; and (e) when a permit has been issued the drawings and specifications are to be marked “Approved”.
The record indicates, and the trial court found, that the building permit of May 8, 1969 was issued contrary to these provisions in that the permit grant was made prior to any check of the drawings or specifications. In fact, the grant made was explicitly a conditional permit, which is not authorized by the code.
We have held that:
The acts of administering a zoning ordinance do not go back to the questions of policy and discretion which were settled at the time of the adoption of the ordinance. Administrative authorities are properly concerned with questions of compliance with the ordinance, not with its wisdom.
(Italics ours.) State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 495, 275 P.2d 899 (1954). This rule is of equal force in the administration of a building code. To permit another course of administrative behavior, thereby inviting discretion, may well result in violations of the equal protection of the laws. The code is positive in its requirements and contains no exceptional procedures like those employed here; hence, no city officer was authorized to permit its violation. The duty of those empowered to enforce the codes and ordinances of the city is to insure compliance therewith and not to devise anonymous procedures available to the citizenry in an arbitrary and uncertain fashion.
This permit grant violation alone frustrates the vesting of defendant’s rights, but there were also apparent inconsistencies regarding the applications to which no trial court findings were made. The code requires each application to have drawings and specifications submitted at the same time, yet here the “reintroduced” application was not accompanied by any new materials. It might be argued that [483]*483the 2-year-old drawings and specifications from the 1967 application can be deemed to satisfy this code requirement as they remained on file, but this raises the code provision pertaining to retention of drawings which provides:
Drawings submitted for checking, for which no permit is issued, and on which no action is taken by the applicant for six months, shall be destroyed ... to renew action on said drawings, new drawings and a payment of a new drawing check fee shall be required.
The record is clear that no permit was issued on the 1967 application and drawings; however, the record is unclear whether the applicant was idle for any 6-month period between the June 1967 application and the reintroduced January 1969 application. If no action was undertaken by the applicant, it was incumbent upon the building department to destroy the drawings and require new fee, application, and materials in order to renew a permit request.
Since the permit grant itself was patently impermissible, we need not decide if the application was also defective.
The trial court deemed this unlawful permit was immaterial because it was cured by “subsequent compliance”. We decline to accept this validation of an otherwise invalid permit because there is no such curing device in the Seattle building code. Moreover, we must speculate as to what was the “subsequent compliance”, presumably the October 22,1970 removal of the permit’s condition.
To the contrary, where a building permit is found to be invalid it is void and confers no rights. Nolan v. Blackwell, 123 Wash. 504, 212 P. 1048 (1923); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958); Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn.2d 402, 341 P.2d 499 (1959). In both Nolan and Steele a primary deficiency in the permit was caused by errors on the part of the property owners, yet the officers and agents of the city were also causes for the unlawfulness of the permit issuance. In Nolan, the permit was issued under an error of fact by the officials. Regardless of the source of the invalidity, be it solely the wrongdoing of the applicant, the administrator, or both, the evil is identi[484]*484cal; namely, the disregard of legislation established to further a social good. In Steele, the court found the city had no authority to issue the permit or keep it alive by granting extensions.
To ignore these mandatory code requirements is not only improper under the reasoning of Nolan and Steele, but would also seriously undermine, if not demolish, the protections of the rule established in Hull v. Hunt, supra. In the pursuit of certainty in the date of vesting of rights, we recognized our rule in Hull might invite speculation in building permits, but felt two factors diminished this possibility. First, a 180-day time limitation existed under the Seattle code within which construction must commence or a permit would become null and void. Second, the cost of preparing plans and meeting the requirements of building codes is such that good faith application can be assumed. The first factor is no longer the law in the Seattle code and so we must rely solely upon the burdens of meeting the pertinent building code requirements as the device for insuring the proper exercise of the Hull rule. Ignoring the violations here removes the code’s burdens, inviting speculation.
The defendant urges us to look away from these code violations and provide equitable relief but fails to cite any legal or equitable principles to support the claim. This arbitrary approach must be avoided and we should not excuse the application of established codes and ordinances. Equitable relief is usually only appropriate where there are two private parties in dispute within a contractual or propertied relationship.4 This is not the case here. Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wn.2d 161, 443 P.2d 833 (1968).
We cannot find that a litigant has any right to be a beneficiary of unlawful administrative conduct where the public’s interest will suffer, by the mere assertion that extensive financial investment is in the balance. Defendant [485]*485started the project with full awareness that there were multiple, serious legal obstacles and cannot now claim relief simply because money was expended in the face of an awareness it might not have a legal right to proceed.
We have not been persuaded in the past that because a financial investment is in jeopardy, the public interest should suffer. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn.2d 306, 462 P.2d 232, 40 A.L.R.3d 760 (1969) and Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn.2d 575, 445 P.2d 648 (1968).
In Bach, at page 581, we recognized that “[fjrom the very commencement of defendants’ construction they were aware of the protests of other riparian owners. The encroaching structure did not exist at the time of suit, but was built during the pendency of this suit.” In that case we refused to consider equitable relief premised upon the money expended during litigation.
Litigation here commenced with the filing of complaints on September 20, 1971, yet the developers assert on appeal that construction continues. Factually, in the instant case we are faced, at the time litigation commenced, with construction no further advanced than the fill, concrete slab and pilings in Bach.
The issue of whether defendant can comply with the now existing laws is not before us, nor is the question of what is to be done with the existing construction.
“Equity came to fulfil the law, not to destroy it” and we fail to see how the legal principles here at issue are fulfilled by excusing their application. L. Curzon, Equity 6 (1967).
Another reason exists to reject the theory that the May 1969 permit is unlawful, yet made valid by the October 1970 approval. If the 1969 permit is invalid, what is to be made of the permit renewals of April 1970, April 1971 and October 1971? It is nonsensical to argue that one can have a valid renewal of an invalid permit and the subsequent renewals of that invalid permit are also improper. If the October 1970 approval, by removing the condition on the permit is deemed an independent and lawful “permission” to construct, there still have been no renewals triggered by [486]*486that approval and based on that date because no one looked at that action as establishing a valid, lawful permit as of that date. No consistent argument can be made for the vesting of rights on an invalid permit allegedly cured by a subsequent event under a code which does not allow for any such curing.
II
Second Renewal of the Building Permit Was Not Unlawful as Being Arbitrary and Capricious
Assuming the second and third renewals of the May 1969' building permit are valid, we turn to a consideration of the issues raised in relation to them. The plaintiffs contend that the building superintendent acted arbitrarily and capriciously in granting the second renewal permit. We disagree.
Arbitrary and capricious administrative action is defined as:
[B]eing willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of facts or circumstances . . . where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary and capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be otherwise felt that a different conclusion might be reached.
Bishop v. Houghton, 69 Wn.2d 786, 794, 420 P.2d 368 (1966). The discretion to which the abuse is asserted is authorized by Seattle code 3.03.020 (h) which provides that renewed permits after the initial renewal may be granted “provided that the work permitted has been started and is progressing at a rate approved by the superintendent of buildings.”
The trial court found no abuse of discretion and the record supports such a finding. The record indicates considerable deliberation and time in coming to a decision. The investigation entailed a report from the superintendent’s chief inspector, photographs taken of the site by a department inspector, the inspector’s filed report, a visitation to the site by the superintendent of buildings, a meeting with the developer, information obtained indicating adequate and proper project financing, and information that pur[487]*487chase orders for materials had been released. Though there may be room for debate as to whether the work had sufficiently progressed under the circumstances to justify the granting of the second renewal, where the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn them. Croton Chem. Corp. v. Birkenwald, 50 Wn.2d 684, 314 P.2d 622 (1957); Stringfellow v. Stringfel-low, 56 Wn.2d 957, 350 P.2d 1003, 353 P.2d 671 (1960), and cases cited therein; Sheldon v. Hallis, 72 Wn.2d 993, 435 P.2d 988 (1967).
Ill
Third Renewal of the Building Permit Was Unlawful as no Environmental Impact Statement Was Prepared
or Issued
It is also contended that the superintendent of buildings failed in his duty in regard to the third renewal by neglecting to file an environmental impact statement pursuant to SEPA, RCW 43.21C. We agree.
The settled law regarding application of environmental protection acts to the facts in this case requires that we find the city should have commenced environmental evaluation of the project’s impact prior to the third renewal. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc’y v. Texas Highway Dep’t, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932, 29 L. Ed. 2d 711, 91 S. Ct. 2257 (1971); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972); Note, 39 Tenn. L. Rev. 735 (1972).
To do otherwise would be to not only ignore precedents already established but to also ignore the unusually vigorous statement of legislative purpose contained in this act to consider the total environmental and ecological factors to the fullest in deciding major matters.
The particular question raised by the assertion that SEPA embraces the Roanoke Reef project is whether the decision by the building department to issue a third re[488]*488newal permit for such a project constitutes a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment so as to require a detailed environmental impact statement. RCW 43.21C.030.
In this case, the necessity of an environmental impact statement is mandated by an analysis of SEPA and a review of Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wn.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973) in which we first construed SEPA, and those leading federal cases interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. § 4321, etseq.).5
It is undisputed that (a) no environmental impact statement (RCW 43.21C.030 (c)) has ever been prepared on the project at any stage of governmental action relating to the project; (b) the Roanoke Reef project and the governmental actions permitting its continuance significantly affect the environment; and (c) a governmental action related to the project (the October 19, 1971 renewal) did take place after the effective date of SEPA and the Roanoke Reef project was ongoing before the act’s effective date (August 9,1971).
The facts of this case do not present the retroactive [489]*489application of SEPA because a major action triggering the act’s application exists after SEPA’s effective date. If no major action existed after the effective date of SEPA, we would then be faced with the retroactivity question. In this case, we have a single project — the Roanoke Reef condominium — with multiple stages of governmental action approving the project by permit issuance and their renewal. Some of the actions occurred before the act’s effective date and one occurred after. See Note, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 732 (1971). The action occurring after was the permit renewal, which is a major action requiring the prospective application of SEPA in this case.
Governmental agencies essentially affect the environment in two ways. First, they may, as part of their regulatory functions, grant permits or licenses to private parties who in turn develop projects affecting the environment. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, supra; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972). Second, the governmental agencies may initiate and develop projects of their own, an occurrence most common to federal agencies. Under either agency function, its activities are the “action” covered by SEPA though in the first example the actual project is undertaken by a nongovernmental entity. However, regardless of the function involved, SEPA may apply.
The significant point to be recognized is that either function may involve more than one “major action”, although there is only one project. There may exist several phases or stages of decision making for any one project and each stage, if “major”, requires an environmental impact statement.
We hold that the provisions of SEPA apply because the agency action is “major”, and the project had not reached a stage of completion by the date of SEPA’s effectiveness which would foreclose the consideration of environmental factors mandated by the legislature. >•
In determining what “major action” means, we must ascertain and give effect to that meaning which the [490]*490legislature had intended for the term. The legislature’s intent and purpose are to be determined from the subject matter and statutory text as a whole, interpreted in terms of the general object and purpose of the legislation. Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wn.2d 241, 501 P.2d 178 (1972) and In re Estates of Donnelly, 81 Wn.2d 430, 502 P.2d 1163 (1972).
To fulfill these purposes of restoring ecological health to our lives, SEPA mandates governmental bodies to consider the total environmental and ecological factors to the fullest in deciding major matters. The procedural duties imposed by SEPA — full consideration to environmental protection —are to be exercised to the fullest extent possible to insure that the “attempt by the people to shape their future environment by deliberation, not default” will be realized. Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, supra at 118.
The “continuing” policy and responsibility of the state is not only to maintain and. enhance our environment, but to also “prevent or eliminate damage to the environment” and “restore” it. RCW 43.21C.010-.030. (Italics ours.) The maintenance, enhancement and restoration of our environment is the pronounced policy of this state, deserving faithful judicial interpretation. In view of this clear legislative mandate that SEPA be given a broad and vigorous construction, it is applicable to the third permit renewal of this case.
The October 1971 renewal of the building permit was a “major action” because it involved a discretionary nonduplicative stage of the building department’s approval proceedings relative to an ongoing major project. As we noted previously, governmental action may be separated from the actual project, yet the action may be deemed “major”. When such separation exists, as here, the character of the project must be considered in determining whether the government action is to be deemed “major”.
There is no question but that if a building complex of this character had been initiated and constructed by the city it would constitute a major governmental action. The fact that the priváte sector undertakes the project, but only [491]*491with the approval of the government, does not diminish the “major” impact of the governmental participation.
In Stempel, we held the issuance of a water appropriation permit to be a “major action” though the actual project was not undertaken by the government, and here find that a renewal of a building permit is similarly the type of government action coming within SEPA provisions. To enforce the vigorous mandate of the legislature we include within the operation of the act those governmental actions that grant permits or other entitlements. This does not necessarily mean that every such “major action”, whether it is the initial permit grant or a subsequent renewal, requires an environmental impact statement, for only those “major actions” which are “significantly affecting the quality of the environment” come within the act’s provisions. ROW 43.21C.030 (c).
Given that the ongoing project was significant in itself we are left to decide whether the renewal of the building permit is a discretionary and nonduplicative act so as to warrant SEPA’s application. The October 1971 renewal was a discretionary act not mandatory under, the Seattle building code. The relevant ordinance requires in permit renewals after the first that the superintendent of buildings, in approving the renewal application, must determine that the work permitted under the initial permit has begun and is progressing at an approved rate. In addition, the superintendent of buildings may, in his discretion, issue nonrenewable permits. Only the first renewal is mandatory under the ordinance and thus nondiscretionary.
The brief and argument of both the city and the developer indicate the approval sought pursuant to the permit renewal ordinance may involve “detailed study” and not mere routine. In rebutting the plaintiffs’ assertion that the second renewal of the building permit was arbitrary and capricious, the city and the developer convincingly demonstrated that the review involved considerable discretion, deliberation and time.
[492]*492However, what is consequential is the discretionary quality of the decision, and not the quantity of labor going to the decision’s making. The fact is that this renewal stage of project approval could have resulted in termination of the project.
It is no answer to this finding of discretion in the renewal process that the department is bound and limited in its considerations to the permit renewal provisions of the Seattle code. Such a claim was raised and rejected in Stempel as being “no longer meritorious in light of the enactment of . . . SEPA.” SEPA requires an integration of environmental factors into the normal governmental decision-making processes, so that the “presently unquantified environmental amenities and values will be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and technical considerations.” RCW 43.21C.030 (2) (b). Furthermore, the act expressly provides that it is “supplementary” to existing authorizations (RCW 43.21C.060) and that all branches of government are to review their present statutory authority to determine, in part, whether they are consistent with the act so that inconsistencies may be brought into conformity. RCW 43.21C.040.
In addition, in this case, it is no answer to the application of SEPA, to claim the renewal of a building permit is a modest exercise in a long process. Governmental action in approving a long-term project may occur at various intervals during the life of the project with various degrees of significance. It is unquestionable that numerous, modest and common governmental actions may be as damaging to the environment as a single, vigorous and critical action.
The granting of the renewal was nonduplicative because environmental issues were not considered in the granting of the original building permit or at any subsequent “major action”. Furthermore, the intervention of new information or developments since an earlier “major action” that did' consider environmental factors, would make the action nonduplicative. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. [493]*493Cir. 1971). In this case, no environmental evaluation has taken place at any of the critical stages of governmental action. In addition, new developments (such as changes in the city’s zoning ordinances) have presented themselves making this renewal nonduplicative and therefore an appropriate point for environmental evaluations in accordance with SEPA.
The renewal of the building permit is therefore a “major action” and because the project being approved has not reached a stage of completion foreclosing SEPA’s effectiveness, an environmental impact statement would be required. Doubtless there may be ongoing projects at the effective date of SEPA which are at such a stage of development that the remaining governmental action, even though “major”, could not possibly alter the program in accordance with ROW 43.21C.030(c). Investment Syndicates, Inc. v. Richmond, 318 F. Supp. 1038, 1039 (D. Ore. 1970).
The environmental impact statement provision of SEPA envisions detailed studies that consider a host of matters, including impact of the action, adverse environmental effects, alternatives, short and long-term consequences, and the extent to which resources are irreversibly or irretrievably committed. ROW 43.21C.030(c) (i-v). In addition, this study requires consultation with other public agencies and the development of “appropriate alternatives” to the recommended action. ROW 43.210.030(d) and (e). Thus, SEPA is not applicable to the project which has reached that “critical stage” of completion foreclosing the consideration of environmental protection desired by the act. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, supra at 1128; Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1331 (4th Cir. 1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 1971).
This project, prior to the third permit renewal, had not reached that critical stage because the possibility of modification or abandonment remained viable under the substantive options available in SEPA. ROW 43.210.020 (1), (2).
[494]*494There are three alternate dates possible for application of SEPA to this project: the effective date of SEPA, August 9, 1971; the month prior to renewal on October 19, 1971; or, the actual date of renewal on October 19, 1971. On none of these dates had the project progressed beyond the construction of piling, and it clearly had not reached a stage of completion sufficient to warrant frustration of the mandate of SEPA that “no action which might minimize environmental damage may be dismissed out of hand.” Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, supra at 1128. Where the governmental body has a “major action” upcoming (October 1971) it must begin its environmental evaluation sufficiently ahead of the action for it to be of value.
If the building department is allowed to await the date of its “major action” (here, the October 1971 renewal) in commencing its consideration of possible alternatives, effective evaluation may be foreclosed. The second renewal was made on April 19, 1971 and would expire on or about October 19, 1971. The record is silent as to when the application for the third renewal was made, but under the ordinance it could have been made on or about September 19, 1971, but no later than on or about October 19, 1971. The actual application for the third renewal need be made under the Seattle building code only “within the thirty day period immediately preceding the date of expiration.”
The comprehensive review envisioned by SEPA is to be “detailed” and does not invite a lackadaisical approach. Not only must the reviews utilize the natural and social sciences, but also the environmental design arts in planning. ROW 43.210.030(1) (a). In addition, prior to any detailed environmental statements (required by ROW 43.210.030(1) (c)) the responsible official must consult other relevant public agencies and the resulting commentary must be forwarded to specific entities, including the Governor and the public. ROW 43.210.030(1) (d). This circulation is to permit external review before the “major [495]*495action” occurs to insure governmental compliance with the provisions of SEPA.
Given the thoroughness of the environmental evaluation required under SEPA and the anticipated third renewal shortly forthcoming, the building department should have begun their review at SEPA’s effective date or at such a time after SEPA’s effective date that they could anticipate an application for a permit renewal would be made. The actual application cannot serve as the triggering mechanism to the building department’s duty to prepare an environmental impact statement for that would create the paradoxical situation of having the operation of SEPA placed within the discretion of the developer, a result inconsistent with the act. The act speaks to the governmental entities and it is their duty to begin environmental evaluations when required by the act, independent of requests by the public or because of the developer’s behavior. Therefore, the effective date of SEPA or when the building department could have anticipated a permit renewal application are the dates by which we measure the extent of the project’s completion. The former date is August 9, 1971 and the latter at least sometime between September 19-October 19, 1971.
A review of the evidence and arguments indicates that by September 1, 1971, about 20 days after the effective date of SEPA, the only work completed at the site was the demolition of the previous structures (a moorage) and the placement of the pilings for the building. By October 1, well after SEPA’s effectiveness and shortly prior to the third renewal, the pilings were filled with concrete but the capping of the filled pilings had yet to commence.
The work at the site commenced March 16, 1971 but no piling work was subsequently done on the site until June 7, 1971 and the demolition of the last portions of the moorage did not occur until June 21, 1971. On July 7, 1971 the last piling placements began and this work was completed by September 1, 1971. These hollow steel pipe pilings were then filled with concrete during September and [496]*496October. Caps then had to be placed on the concrete filled pilings but the record is silent as to the precise date this work was commenced or completed. The earliest such work could have been undertaken would be in the month of October.
Those federal cases concerned with the practicability of requiring an impact statement where there exists an ongoing project commenced prior to the effective date of the environmental policy act, suggest a balancing of appropriate factors. Conservation Soc’y of S. Vt., Inc. v. Volpe, 343 F. Supp. 761, 766-67 (D. Vt. 1972); Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, supra at 1333; Lathan v. Volpe, supra at 1121; Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm’n, supra at 1128. The essential factors balanced are the substantiality and likelihood of environmental harm due to the absence of any environmental evaluation if the project is constructed, as against the economic cost of investment in the project should it be suspended or abandoned.
Recognizing that there is no contest over the facts that no environmental evaluation has at any stage been undertaken by the building department or that this project significantly affects the environment, may the presence of the pilings alone frustrate the application of SEPA? They must not. It is far more consistent with the “fullest extent possible” mandate of the act to delay operation at this stage, where real environmental protection may come about, than to permit the completion of this project.
This result is compelled, as only it fulfills the act’s mandate that governmental bodies exercise their substantive discretion in protecting the environment “to the fullest extent possible.” It is the avoidance of crisis decision making and catastrophic environmental damage for which SEPA is designed and its application in the instant case furthers that legislative policy. SEPA mandates governmental evaluation of environmental factors when choices are still available. In this case plausible choices remained prior to the third renewal. Therefore the impossible alter[497]*497natives resulting from action in which environmental considerations are defaulted, may be avoided.
The particular choice ultimately arrived at, be it abandonment, alteration, or permission to complete construction, is not dictated by SEPA.6 It is the evaluation of pertinent environmental factors that is mandated. The Roanoke Reef project was in an early stage of construction when the environmental impact statement should have been prepared. Given this early stage, the application of SEPA would have resulted in minimizing the investment costs if the ultimate decision is abandonment or alteration.
The developer contends that at time of trial and appeal construction had continued despite the litigation, and the project has thereby achieved a present stage of completion removing it from SEPA. Advancement towards the project’s completion done in disregard of litigation-raising issues, such as SEPA, which may be held to be correct, can be of no consequence in the effort to refute the act’s applicability. To permit such a contention would invite circumvention of SEPA by those quick to advance their projects to completion.
Finally, as we held in Stempel and should affirm here, the permit-granting process is subject not only to the particular legislation authorizing it but also to those legislative enactments which require particular additional duties to be fulfilled by the governmental body (such as SEPA). Thus, cases may arise in which those who do business with regulatory agencies may be affected by the mandate of legislation subsequent to their grant from the government. In such cases, an objection to what the agency is required to do or not to do by virtue of the subsequent enactment need not be sustained. Federal Housing Administration v. [498]*498Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 3 L. Ed. 2d 132, 79 S. Ct. 141 (1958); Morningside-Lenox Park Ass’n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 146 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Though those parties holding permits from the government may be disadvantaged by a subsequent mandatory act, such as SEPA, they may in some instances be favored. National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151 (D. Kan. 1971).
The policy of the people of the state, as announced in the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, required an environmental impact statement before reissuance of the third renewal of the building permit.
IV
Compliance With the Shoreline Management Act of 1971
Assuming the original permit and construction valid, the trial court did not err in holding that construction of Roanoke Reef condominium is exempt from the permit requirements of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (RCW 90.58).7 RCW 90.58.140 provides in part:
(2) No substantial development shall be undertaken on shorelines of the state without first obtaining a permit from the government entity having administrative jurisdiction under this chapter.
The plaintiffs argue that actual bona fide construction of Roanoke Reef condominium did not commence until after June 1, 1971, the effective date of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, and thus the defendant should be required to obtain a permit under RCW 90.58.140. All parties agree that Roanoke Reef condominium is a substantial development within the meaning of RCW 90.58.
The trial court found actual construction commenced upon the condominium project on March 15 and 16, 1971, by the demolition of a portion of the preexisting moorage improvements on the Roanoke property and the driving of 10 steel pipe piles. There is substantial evidence these test [499]*499pilings were also permanent and this supports the trial court’s findings.
V
Building Being Constructed Is Not an Obstruction To Navigation
Lastly, the trial court concluded the condominium’s construction does not impair the public right of navigation and recreation. It found the standards provided in Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wn.2d 306, 316-17, 462 P.2d 232, 40 A.L.R.3d 760 (1969) for regulation by government of intrusions by property owners into navigable bodies of water were met.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion, as the record establishes the existence of harbor lines and planned zoning, and in the absence of any showing of governmental abuses or irregularities in the adoption of such measures we decline to presume neglect by the public authority in considering the public interest. Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wn.2d 312, 317, 501 P.2d 594 (1972).
In Wilbour v. Gallagher, supra at 315-16, we required the abatement of certain fills in Lake Chelan insofar as they interfered with the public rights of navigation, primary and corollary, and thereby recognized that in the absence of governmental authorization to private property owners permitting such fills, “the public has the right to go where the navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters lie over privately owned lands.” Thus, in the absence of such permission “[w]hen the land is submerged, the owner has only a qualified fee subject to the right of the public to use the water over the lands consistent with navigational rights . . .”
This rule was based not on the plaintiffs’ offered theory of prescriptive rights nor on the particular deed of the case which explicitly provided the public with the right of access over the subject property. Rather, we based the decision’s rule “on the proposition that the fills made by the defendants constitute an obstruction to navigation.” Wil-bour v. Gallagher, supra at 313. Such a rule was of neces[500]*500sity on a lake of great beauty and recreational value for which modest governmental planning was provided.
In circumstances where appropriate planning by the relevant governmental bodies is undertaken through the establishment of harbor lines and by careful zoning, much of the problem faced in Wilbowr would be cured. Such governmental effort is a more common occurrence in our urban situated waterways. Harris v. Hylebos Indus., Inc., 81 Wn.2d 770, 505 P.2d 457 (1973).
The necessity of thoughtful management of our shorelines Was recognized by our Wilbowr decision and the legislature has recently enacted significant instruments for such management, the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 and the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971. Such enactments should provide the means for intelligently reconciling disparate interests in shoreline uses.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed.
Hale, C.J., Finley, Rosellini, Hamilton, and Stafford, JJ., concur.