2020 IL App (1st) 190209 No. 1-19-0209 Opinion filed June 11, 2020 Fourth Division ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ADDISON DYNEK, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 16 L 4508 ) THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ) Honorable ) Janet Brosnahan, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Reyes and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict, which found defendant, the City of
Chicago (City), not liable in the negligence cause of action brought by plaintiff, Addison Dynek.
¶2 On appeal, Dynek argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on the trial court’s alleged
errors regarding jury instructions, special interrogatories, motions in limine, the exclusion of
evidence, and the City’s improper statements during closing argument. Dynek also argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for sanctions based on defendant’s alleged
discovery violation. No. 1-19-0209
¶3 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 In October 2015, Dynek had a bicycle accident while riding over the Chicago Avenue
bridge. He sued the City for negligence, alleging that his front tire went into a hole created by a
“broken grating bar” on the bridge, causing him to fall and sustain injuries. Dynek alleged the City
was negligent by failing to repair the hole and by making the bridge part of a bicycle route even
though the bridge was not safe for cyclists.
¶6 Among its affirmative defenses, the City asserted that the condition described by Dynek
was reasonably safe, he was comparatively negligent, the City was entitled to discretionary
immunity for its designation of bicycle routes, and the statute of repose barred a claim based on
the design of the bridge.
¶7 At trial, Dynek testified that he usually rode his bicycle east on Chicago Avenue to get to
his office on La Salle Street. Chicago Avenue did not have designated bike lanes, but Dynek
believed that the signs on Chicago Avenue showing bicycle symbols and distances to various
destinations, like the lakefront, “[told] bikers where to go.” He took Chicago Avenue because it
was the most direct route for his commute. Although Kinzie Street had a protected bike lane, he
did not take Kinzie Street because that route would have been longer for him to get to work. He
had previously ridden his bicycle over the Chicago Avenue bridge without difficulty.
¶8 About 8:30 a.m. on the date in question, Dynek rode east on Chicago Avenue “just going
with the flow of traffic.” Traffic was moving at the bridge, which had two eastbound lanes for
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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traffic. He was riding in the right eastbound lane on the bridge when a car stopped suddenly in
front of him and “cut off” his path. It was impossible to get around the car on its right side, so he
turned his bicycle to the left to get around the car. His bicycle then “stopped,” causing him to fall.
After he fell, he looked back at his bicycle and saw that it was “lodged in the grate” on the bridge.
¶9 Later, he returned to the bridge and determined that his bicycle “got trapped” at the
centerline between the eastbound and westbound traffic and between grating panels where there
was “also an old broken grating bar.” The broken grating bar was just west of a portion of the
bridge that was filled with concrete, which was at “[t]he middle section of the bridge.” Dynek
testified that the broken grating bar and gap between grating panels, together, caused his accident.
He acknowledged, however, that his earlier affidavit describing the accident did not mention a gap
between grating panels.
¶ 10 Eyewitness Peter Taub testified that he was riding his bicycle behind Dynek at the time in
question. Taub estimated that Dynek was traveling about 20 miles per hour as he approached the
bridge. Eastbound vehicular traffic near the bridge was not moving, and Dynek was riding his
bicycle between the stopped cars. Taub said that it was typical during the morning rush hour for
bicyclists to try to make their way through stopped vehicles. Taub did not see the accident. When
he reached the bridge, he saw that Dynek was lying on the westbound lane of the bridge and
Dynek’s front bicycle tire was lodged in a gap between the metal grates and oriented in an
eastbound direction. The space where the bicycle got lodged was between the eastbound and
westbound lanes and just past the crest of the bridge and east of the bridge’s concrete center
portion. Taub did not recall seeing a broken grating bar where the bicycle was lodged.
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¶ 11 Cathryn Shubert testified that she had a bicycle accident over the Chicago River on the
La Salle Street bridge, which also had metal grates. She stated that bicyclists had to navigate that
bridge by going straight and not turning their front wheel or else it would get stuck in a gap between
grating panels. Her accident happened when she tried to maneuver around a car in front of her, but
her tire did not get stuck in a gap between grating panels. Afterward, she petitioned the City to
examine the safety of metal grate bridges for bicyclists, and the City hired engineering firm T.Y.
Lin for that purpose.
¶ 12 In 2004, T.Y. Lin issued a report that identified ways to improve metal grate bridges and
make them safer for cyclists. The report found that the metal grating on bridges could cause a
channeling effect or sliding for bike tires and narrow tires could become lodged in the gaps
between bridge grates. Longitudinal gaps, which were oriented in the direction of travel, were the
most problematic for cyclists. The report rated the deck quality of the Chicago Avenue bridge as
poor.
¶ 13 Mike Amsden was the assistant director of transportation planning at the City’s
transportation department at the time of Dynek’s accident. Amsden was in charge of the City’s
bike map in 2014 and 2015 and did not know about the T.Y. Lin report until Dynek sued the City.
The City’s bike map designated Chicago Avenue between Elston Avenue and the lakefront as a
signed bike route but had a squiggly line over the Chicago Avenue bridge, which warned cyclists
to use caution there. Amsden stated that metal grate bridges were a “fact of life” that people had
to cross throughout the City, but he knew these bridges were difficult and intimidating for cyclists
to cross at times. He relied on his personal judgment when he designated signed bike routes and
considered factors like destinations, street widths, traffic volume and street ownership.
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¶ 14 Amsden chose to designate Chicago Avenue as a signed bike route because it connected to
many mass transit lines, the lakefront trail, and the bike lanes on Milwaukee Avenue. The width
and amount of vehicular traffic on Chicago Avenue did not have enough space to install bike lanes.
Amsden rejected the option of designating Division Street as a bike route because Division Street
had two bridges over the Chicago River and connected to fewer destinations whereas Chicago
Avenue had just one bridge. He also rejected North Avenue, which was a state route, was narrow,
and had highspeed traffic. Grand Avenue also had highspeed traffic. Amsden stated that it was
nonsensical to designate a bike route using a bridge that had a better rating for cycling but was
miles away from the route.
¶ 15 Amsden described the Chicago bike 2015 plan, which the City published in 2006, as a
planning document with aspirational goals and objectives to make the City more bike friendly.
Although the plan recommended retrofitting metal grate bridges to make them safer for cycling,
the plan’s recommendations were not mandatory. Moreover, the plan did not mention longitudinal
gaps in the center of a roadway, and Amsden did not expect cyclists to ride in the center of the
road.
¶ 16 Luis Benitez, the chief bridge engineer of the City’s transportation department, testified
that the Chicago Avenue bridge used metal grating panels after it was resurfaced in 1960 from
wood to metal. This bridge, which would rise open to allow boat traffic to pass beneath it, used
metal grates to minimize weight and allow drainage. The longitudinal gaps between grating panels
were a design feature that accommodated the expansion and contraction of the metal grates during
changes of temperature. Inspection reports from 2010 and 2014 noted that some of the grating bars
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on the Chicago Avenue bridge were broken, but broken grating bars did not cause structural
concerns.
¶ 17 Dynek presented the testimony of Greg Pestine, a civil engineer, who opined that the 1.75
inch wide gap between grating panels and a broken grating bar in the vicinity of that gap caused
Dynek’s accident. The engineering field recognized that gaps between grating panels on a metal
grate bridge can be hazardous for bicyclists. Pestine opined that the longitudinal gap between
grating panels on the Chicago Avenue bridge violated the safety standards of the American
Association of State Highway Transportation Officials and the Federal Highway Association.
¶ 18 Dynek moved for a directed verdict on the question of whether the City had notice that the
Chicago Avenue bridge was dangerous for bicyclists. The City opposed the motion, arguing that
the jury heard evidence that the condition Dynek complained of did not present an unreasonable
risk of harm to bicyclists. The court agreed with the City and denied Dynek’s motion.
¶ 19 The jury reached a verdict in favor of the City and, by answering special interrogatories,
found that Dynek was contributorily negligent, Amsden determined policy and exercised
discretion when he designated Chicago Avenue as a signed bike trail, and the City was not
negligent by failing to repair a broken grating bar on the Chicago Avenue bridge and by
designating the Chicago Avenue bridge as part of a bike route.
¶ 20 Dynek moved the court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial based on
the court’s allegedly erroneous rulings on evidence and jury instructions, and sanctions based on
the City’s alleged discovery violation. The court denied Dynek’s motions, and he appealed.
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¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 Dynek argues that he is entitled to a new trial due to the trial court’s alleged erroneous
rulings regarding jury instructions, special interrogatories, motions in limine, motion for a directed
verdict, and the City’s improper statements during closing argument. He also argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion for sanctions based on the City’s alleged
discovery violation.
¶ 23 A. Jury Instructions
¶ 24 Dynek argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury about the statute of repose because
his pleadings, which did not allege negligent operation and maintenance of property, did not
implicate that statute and the trial evidence did not support that instruction. Dynek argues that the
statute of repose was irrelevant and the jury was given no guidance concerning how to apply it.
¶ 25 “The trial court has discretion to determine which instructions to give the jury and that
determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Schultz v. Northeast Illinois
Regional Commuter R.R. Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 260, 273 (2002). A trial court abuses its discretion
when its decision is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would adopt
its view. People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Kotara, L.L.C., 379 Ill. App. 3d 276, 286
(2008). This discretion of the trial court includes determining which issues are raised by the
evidence presented at trial and which jury instructions are thus warranted. Mikolajczyk v. Ford
Motor Co., 231 Ill. 2d 516, 549 (2008). “All that is required to justify the giving of an instruction
is that there be some evidence in the record to justify the theory of the instruction.” Heastie v.
Roberts, 226 Ill. 2d 515, 543 (2007). Moreover, an instruction does not justify reversal unless it
“clearly misled the jury and resulted in prejudice to the appellant.” Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at 274.
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¶ 26 According to the record, when the City proposed a jury instruction that presented
affirmative defenses, including one based on the statute of repose, Dynek objected, arguing that
his pleadings did not allege a design defect or construction-related issue and thus did not implicate
the statute of repose. He also argued that the City’s proposed instruction failed to use the actual
language of the statute of repose.
¶ 27 The trial court ruled that an instruction about the statute of repose was appropriate because
the trial testimony made a “big deal about the longitudinal gap” on the Chicago Avenue bridge
and the jury could find from that evidence that the longitudinal gap was the only thing that caused
Dynek’s injury. The court ruled, however, that the statute of repose would not be presented as an
affirmative defense because that would confuse the jury. Instead, the City was allowed to argue
that it could not be held liable for the longitudinal gap because it was a structural design issue that
was over 10 years old. The court used Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 60.01 (rev. Dec.
2011) to create the nonpattern instruction Dynek challenges on appeal. 2
¶ 28 The complained of instruction stated:
“There was in force in the state of Illinois at the time of the occurrence in
question a certain statute which provided no action based upon tort, contract, or
otherwise may be brought against any person for an act or omission of such person
in the design, planning, supervision, observation, or management of construction
or construction of an improvement to real property after ten years have elapsed
from the time of such act or omission.”
2 Because the jury used a nonpattern jury instruction, we do not address Dynek’s groundless argument challenging this instruction based on the court’s exclusion of the irrelevant second paragraph of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 60.01 (rev. Dec. 2011).
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¶ 29 We find that the trial evidence justified the nonpattern instruction about the statute of
repose, which bars actions “against any person for an act or omission of such person in the design,
planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an
improvement to real property after 10 years have elapsed from the time of such act or omission.”
735 ILCS 5/13-214(b) (West 2018). The nonpattern instruction followed the language of the
statute, and the jury heard evidence that a design feature of the Chicago Avenue bridge could have
caused Dynek’s accident. Specifically, Benitez testified that longitudinal gaps between grating
panels on the Chicago Avenue bridge were a design feature since 1960. Taub testified that Dynek’s
bicycle became lodged in a longitudinal gap on the east side of the crest of the bridge, which was
not where the broken grating bar was located. Amsden and Pestine testified about the danger that
gaps between grating panels posed to bicyclists. This testimony could have led the jury to find the
City liable based solely on the existence of the longitudinal gap design feature even though the
statute of repose did not allow Dynek to recover on that basis because that feature was more than
10 years old. The trial court’s nonpattern instruction about the statute of repose made clear to the
jury the legal principle that Dynek could not recover if only the longitudinal gap caused his injury.
¶ 30 Dynek also argues that the court erred by rejecting his proposed instruction No. 29, which
would have informed the jury that “[t]he City previously took the position[s] in this case that a
metal grate bridge is an obvious danger to any bicyclist” and “that metal grating tends to deflect
bicycle wheels and makes staying upright a challenge.” This argument lacks merit. According to
the record, the City withdrew its first motion for summary judgment, which had argued that the
“potential danger posed by [a metal grating] surface is readily apparent to anyone who has ridden
a bicycle.” That statement does not constitute a judicial admission of danger by the City because
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it was not clear, unequivocal, and uniquely within the City’s personal knowledge. See Abruzzo v.
City of Park Ridge, 2013 IL App (1st) 122360, ¶ 36. Rather, the statement, which appeared in a
motion the City later withdrew, mentioned a potential danger and addressed how a typical bicyclist
would have perceived the bridge. The trial court acted within its discretion by rejecting Dynek’s
instruction No. 29.
¶ 31 Last, Dynek argues the court erred by rejecting his instruction Nos. 7 and 27, which
pertained to the City’s alleged concealment of prior similar lawsuits involving bicycles that
crashed on metal grate bridges. We find no abuse of discretion here because, as discussed below,
the record supports the trial court’s ruling that the City did not conceal that information.
¶ 32 B. Special Interrogatories
¶ 33 Dynek argues the trial court committed reversible error when it gave the jury four special
interrogatories that were all improper because the interrogatories asked compound questions or
contained multiple questions and subparts, rather than consisting of a single direct question.
¶ 34 Section 2-1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs special interrogatories and states:
“Unless the nature of the case requires otherwise, the jury shall render a general
verdict. The jury may be required by the court, and must be required on request of
any party, to find specially upon any material question or questions of fact
submitted to the jury in writing. Special interrogatories shall be tendered, objected
to, ruled upon and submitted to the jury as in the case of instructions. Submitting
or refusing to submit a question of fact to the jury may be reviewed on appeal, as a
ruling on a question of law. When the special finding of fact is inconsistent with
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the general verdict, the former controls the latter and the court may enter judgment
accordingly.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1108 (West 2016).
¶ 35 The trial court has no discretion to reject a special interrogatory that is in proper form.
Thomas v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1033 (2003). A special interrogatory is
in proper form if “(1) it relates to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties
depend, and (2) an answer responsive thereto is inconsistent with some general verdict that might
be returned.” Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 555 (2002). A special interrogatory’s response
is inconsistent with a general verdict only where it is “clearly and absolutely irreconcilable with
the general verdict.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 555-56. The purpose of a special
interrogatory is not to instruct the jury but to serve as a check on the jury’s deliberation and to
enable the jury to determine one or more specific issues of ultimate fact. Id. at 555. Additionally,
a special interrogatory (1) should consist of a single direct question, (2) should not be prejudicial,
repetitive, misleading, confusing or ambiguous, and (3) should use the same language or terms as
the tendered instructions. Id. at 563. We review a trial court’s ruling regarding a request for a
special interrogatory de novo, i.e., without any deference to the trial court. Garcia v. Seneca
Nursing Home, 2011 IL App (1st) 103085, ¶ 35.
¶ 36 According to the record, the trial court gave the jury the following four special
interrogatories, which the jury answered as indicated below by an “X.” Each special interrogatory
was given to the jury on a separate page. The City proposed the first and second special
interrogatories. The trial proposed the third and fourth special interrogatories, which aimed to
identify “what theory [the jury is] finding liability on” in the event of a verdict in Dynek’s favor.
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“1. Was there contributory negligence on the part of Addison Dynek before
and at the time of the occurrence which was more than 50 percent of the proximate
cause of his injury? __X__Yes _____No”
“2. On or before October 19, 2015, did Mike Amsden of the City of Chicago
Department of Transportation serve in a position involving the determination of
policy or the exercise of discretion?__X___Yes _____No
If you answer no, please stop here and answer no further questions
on this page.
If you answered yes to the question above, please answer the
following question:
On or before October 19, 2015, did Mike Amsden both
determine policy and exercise discretion regarding the designation
of Chicago Avenue as a signed bike route? __X_Yes
___No”
“3. Was the City of Chicago negligent in failing to repair a broken or
corroded metal grating bar on the Chicago Ave. Bridge, which it knew or should
have known presented an unreasonable risk of harm? _____Yes
__X__No
If your answer to the above question is “no,” stop here and do not
answer the next question.
If you answer to the above question is “yes,” answer the next
question:
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Was the City of Chicago’s negligent failure to repair a
broken or corroded metal grating bar on the Chicago Ave. Bridge a
cause of Plaintiff’s injuries on October 19, 2015?
_____Yes _____No”
“4. Was the City of Chicago negligent in designating the Chicago Avenue
Bridge part of a bicycle route when it knew or should have known that the Chicago
Avenue Bridge presented an unreasonable risk of harm for bicyclists?
_____Yes __X__No -
If your answer to the above question is “no,” stop here and do not
answer the nest question.
If your answer to the above question is “yes,” answer the next
Was the City of Chicago’s negligent designation of the
Chicago Avenue Bridge as part of a bicycle route a cause of plaintiff’s
injuries on October 19, 2015?_____Yes _____No”
¶ 37 We agree with Dynek that special interrogatory No. 1 was impermissibly compound
because it required the jury to consider multiple questions relating to the cause of Dynek’s injuries.
The jury was asked (1) whether Dynek was contributorily negligent; (2) if so, whether his
negligence proximately caused his injuries; and (3) if so, whether the negligence attributable to
him was greater than 50% of the total negligence contributing to his injuries. Those multiple
questions rendered the interrogatory impermissibly compound. See Smart v. City of Chicago, 2013
IL App (1st) 120901, ¶ 37.
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¶ 38 Although special interrogatory No. 2 had a subpart and thus asked the jury two questions,
neither question was improperly compound. Special interrogatory No. 3 also had a subpart and
thus asked the jury two questions, but the first question was improperly compound, asking the jury
whether the broken metal grating bar presented an unreasonable risk of harm and whether the City
knew or should have known about that risk. Similarly, special interrogatory No. 4 impermissibly
asked the jury a compound question in the first of its two subparts, i.e., whether the Chicago
Avenue bridge presented an unreasonable risk of harm for bicyclists and whether the City knew
or should have known about that risk. The form of special interrogatory Nos. 1, 3 and 4 was “in
direct contradiction to the established rule that a special interrogatory must be phrased as a single,
straightforward question.” Id. We find, however, that special interrogatory No. 2 did not violate
this rule because each subpart of that interrogatory was a single, straightforward question.
¶ 39 It can be reversible error to refuse a special interrogatory that is in proper form. See Van
Hattem v. Kmart Corp., 308 Ill. App. 3d 121, 132 (1999). However, a court’s decision to submit a
special interrogatory can merit a new trial “only upon a showing of prejudice to the complaining
party or jury confusion.” Douglas v. Arlington Park Racecourse, LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 162962,
¶ 66.
¶ 40 Dynek cannot show prejudice to him or jury confusion because the court did not enter
judgment in favor of the City based on any special interrogatory answer. Rather, the jury reached
a general verdict in favor of the City, and the court entered judgment on the verdict. The answers
to the four special interrogatories were consistent with the general verdict and merely showed that
the jury also found in favor of the City on each of the issues the special interrogatories addressed.
See id. ¶ 72 (even if the special interrogatory was improperly given, the reviewing court could not
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“see how plaintiffs could possibly establish prejudice from the special interrogatory, standing
alone,” where the special finding was consistent with the general verdict). The special
interrogatories tracked the trial court’s proper instructions on the issues of contributory negligence,
discretionary immunity, and Dynek’s theories of the City’s alleged negligence, and the jury’s
answers were consistent with the verdict. We do not find that the jury was confused when the
general verdict and special finding were perfectly consistent. See id. ¶ 73.
¶ 41 We conclude that Dynek cannot obtain a new trial on the basis that the court gave the jury
special interrogatories that were not in the proper form because Dynek has not shown prejudice or
jury confusion.
¶ 42 C. Motions in Limine
¶ 43 Dynek argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on the trial court’s allegedly erroneous
rulings on motions in limine and the admission of evidence during the trial. We review the trial
court’s decisions on motions in limine and the admission of evidence at trial for an abuse of
discretion. Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc., 2019 IL App (1st) 172459, ¶ 140; Boyd v. City of
Chicago, 378 Ill. App. 3d 57, 67 (2007). The exclusion of cumulative evidence is also within the
discretion of the trial court. Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 495 (2002).
¶ 44 First, Dynek argues the court erred by granting the City’s motion in limine No. 20, which
sought to bar evidence of maintenance on bridges other than the Chicago Avenue bridge. Dynek
argues the City’s improvements to other metal grate bridges were relevant to the issue of notice
and would have shown that the City knew metal grate bridges were dangerous to bicyclists. Dynek
also argues the court’s ruling prevented him from showing that the City had a ministerial duty to
make metal grate bridges safer for cyclists. The trial court barred evidence regarding ways the City
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could have improved the Chicago Avenue bridge because Dynek’s negligence claim was not based
on a failure to improve the Chicago Avenue bridge and the barred evidence incorrectly suggested
the City had a duty to improve that bridge.
¶ 45 We find no abuse of discretion here. See Horrell v. City of Chicago, 145 Ill. App. 3d 428,
432 (1986) (the City does not have a duty to improve its property). Furthermore, the exclusion of
this evidence did not prejudice Dynek because Amsden testified that he knew metal grate bridges
made cycling more challenging and could be difficult and intimidating to cross at times. Dillon,
199 Ill. 2d at 495 (“the exclusion of cumulative evidence is within the discretion of the trial court”).
Moreover, Dynek’s theory of a ministerial duty lacks merit. Improvements become ministerial
only when a municipality begins to undertake them; at that point, the City has a duty “to see that
the work is done in a reasonably safe and skillful manner.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Greene v. City of Chicago, 73 Ill. 2d 100, 108 (1978). Dynek presented no evidence showing that
the City had commenced improvements to the Chicago Avenue bridge.
¶ 46 Next, Dynek argues the court erred by denying his motion in limine No. 12, which sought
to bar Amsden from testifying about the deliberative process the City used to designate bicycle
routes. Dynek argues that the City failed to disclose its intention to elicit that testimony from
Amsden. The trial court, however, allowed Amsden’s testimony about this topic because Dynek
had identified Amsden as a witness, the City disclosed that it had reserved the right to call any
witness Dynek disclosed regarding any subject matter the witness discussed at a deposition, and
Amsden’s deposition testimony showed that he was asked about the planning process the City used
to designate bicycle routes. We find no abuse of discretion here. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(g) (eff. Jan.
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1, 2018) (“[i]nformation disclosed in a discovery deposition need not be later specifically
identified in a” party’s disclosure of witnesses).
¶ 47 Next, Dynek argues the court erred by granting the City’s motion in limine No. 36, which
sought to exclude a photograph of the Chicago Avenue bridge from 2011, four years before
Dynek’s accident. The photograph, which depicted the bridge when it was under construction and
had barricades to guide traffic, did not resemble the scene Dynek encountered on the date of his
accident. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by excluding the irrelevant photograph,
which could have confused the jury.
¶ 48 Next, Dynek argues the court erred by granting the City’s motion in limine No. 21, which
sought to bar Taub from testifying about his prior accident on the Chicago Avenue bridge. Dynek
argues that ruling prevented him from showing the danger of a gap between grating panels. The
court excluded that evidence, explaining that Taub did not report his accident to the City and could
not say where on the bridge the accident happened. We find no abuse of discretion. Due to Taub’s
vague testimony about the location of the accident, Dynek could not lay the necessary foundation
for that testimony. See Alwin v. Village of Wheeling, 371 Ill. App. 3d 898, 917 (2007) (“Where
evidence of prior accidents is offered to show the existence of a particular danger or hazard, a
foundation must be laid establishing the similarity between the prior accidents and the present
accident.”). Moreover, Dynek presented evidence about the gap danger with the T.Y. Lin report’s
description of the longitudinal gap problems.
¶ 49 Next, Dynek argues the court erred by excluding certain statements Amsden allegedly
made about metal grate bridges. Amsden, however, did not recall making those statements, which
had appeared in a blog post before he was employed by the City. Moreover, the statements did not
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pertain specifically to the Chicago Avenue bridge. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in excluding those irrelevant statements.
¶ 50 Next, Dynek complains that offers of proof should have been allowed for “all questions”
asked of various witnesses. Dynek had forfeited review of this claim by failing to cite the record
to identify any specific questions and supporting legal authority in violation of Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2008). See Sekerez v. Rush University Medical Center, 2011 IL
App (1st) 090889, ¶ 80.
¶ 51 Finally, Dynek argues the trial court erred by barring publicly available evidence that he
discovered immediately before the trial. The excluded evidence concerned two lawsuits that
involved bicycle accidents that did not occur on the Chicago Avenue bridge and did not involve
the longitudinal gap design at issue in this case. In addition to the complaints, the excluded
evidence about the two prior lawsuits included a discovery deposition, meeting minutes of a project
for barrier free cycling, field notes and photographs, memoranda concerning metal grate bridges
and bicycle safety, certain presentation materials, and e-mails, letters and postcards sent to the City
regarding the danger of metal grate bridges to bicyclists. The trial court ruled that Dynek did not
timely disclose this evidence, but Dynek argued that the City withheld this evidence, did not
request these materials during discovery, and could not have been prejudiced by the admission of
this evidence because the City could not have been unfairly surprised by its own project safety
committee records, letters to its employees, the deposition testimony of its employee, the lawsuits
it defended, and the evidence it possessed since 2002. Dynek argues he suffered severe prejudice
by the exclusion of this evidence that proved the City negligently failed to tell Amsden, the City
employee responsible for designating the Chicago Avenue bridge as a bike route, that this bridge
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was unsafe and negligently put Benitez in charge of bridge safety even though he never
investigated whether the Chicago Avenue bridge was safe for cyclists.
¶ 52 A decision to bar evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Boyd, 378 Ill. App. 3d
at 67. Dynek disclosed his intention to use those publicly available documents after discovery had
closed and days before the trial was set to begin. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
ruling that Dynek’s use of those documents would have unfairly prejudiced the City, which had
no notice that it had to defend against the facts in the excluded documents because Dynek never
made those facts a part of his case and the City would not have assumed Dynek would want to use
old documents, some of which were from 2002 to 2004, when his discovery requests went back
only to 2005. We address below Dynek’s allegations that the City withheld this evidence during
discovery.
¶ 53 D. Directed Verdict
¶ 54 Dynek argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the issue
of the City’s notice that the Chicago Avenue bridge was not safe for cyclists. We review the court’s
decision to deny a directed verdict de novo. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012 IL
112530, ¶ 37.
¶ 55 Dynek was not entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of notice because there was
evidence that the bridge did not present an unreasonable risk of harm. Specifically, Dynek testified
that he had ridden over the bridge many times without incident. Also, the City presented evidence
through Taub and Amsden and the cross-examination of Dynek that showed the condition that
apparently caused his accident was in the center of the Chicago Avenue bridge, between opposing
lanes of traffic, where bicyclists were not expected to ride.
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¶ 56 E. Closing Argument
¶ 57 Dynek argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on multiple improper statements by
the City during closing argument. “[C]ounsel is afforded wide latitude in closing argument”
(Wilson v. Humana Hospital, 399 Ill. App. 3d 751, 760 (2010)), and the trial court’s determination
on the propriety of closing argument will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion
(Thornhill v. Midwest Physician Center of Orland Park, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1053 (2003)). A
party’s “[f]ailure to object to improper closing argument results in forfeiture of the objection on
appeal.” Jacobs v. Yellow Cab Affiliation, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 151107, ¶ 121.
¶ 58 Dynek objected several times when the City described the effect of the statute of repose
and emphasized that Dynek could not prevail if the longitudinal gap was the sole cause of his
accident because the City could not be liable based on a design issue that was over 10 years old.
Our review of the record establishes that the City’s arguments were consistent with the court’s
proper pretrial ruling that the statute of repose prevented Dynek from arguing that the City could
be strictly liable for the existence of the gap. Contrary to Dynek’s argument on appeal, the City
did not make the improper argument that the statute of repose defeated his entire case. Instead, the
City argued that if the longitudinal gap caused the accident, the City could have been liable to
Dynek only if he proved the City negligently designated the Chicago Avenue bridge as part of a
bicycle route. Furthermore, the court informed the jurors that the court would instruct them on the
law and they should disregard any arguments by counsel that were inconsistent with the court’s
instructions or not supported by the evidence. See People v. Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d 670, 688
(1993) (a new trial based on a party’s description of the law is not warranted where the trial court
gave the jury a curative instruction).
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¶ 59 Dynek also contends the City improperly argued about matters not in evidence when the
City told the jury not to speculate about any (1) medical bills because Dynek was not seeking
recovery based on any medical bills and (2) lost wages because he failed to introduce any evidence
on that matter other than his testimony that had he missed time off of work. Dynek’s arguments
lack merit. The record establishes that Dynek neither sought medical expenses nor presented
evidence to support a claim of lost wages. The City’s challenged remarks were proper and relevant
to the issue of damages.
¶ 60 Dynek argues that no evidence supported the City’s description of the accident, i.e., that
Dynek, instead of waiting with the stopped vehicular traffic, was trying to pass the stopped cars.
The record, however, establishes that Dynek chose to cycle on Chicago Avenue, which did not
have a designated bicycle lane, because it was a direct route to his office that enabled him to get
to work faster. Moreover, Taub testified that, at the time of the accident, Dynek approached the
bridge at a fast speed while vehicular traffic was stopped and rode between the stopped cars, trying
to make his way through the stopped traffic—a maneuver typical of bicyclists during the morning
rush hour. Taub also testified that after the accident, he saw Dynek lying on the westbound lane of
the bridge and the front tire of his bike was lodged in a space between the eastbound and westbound
lanes. We find that the City’s challenged argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence
presented at trial. See Sikora v. Parikh, 2018 IL App (1st) 172473, ¶ 60.
¶ 61 Dynek challenges other remarks the City made during closing argument, but the record
establishes that he failed to preserve those issues for review by both making a timely objection and
filing a sufficiently specific posttrial motion that contains the points relied upon and specifies the
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grounds in support thereof. Jacobs, 2017 IL App (1st) 151107, ¶ 121; Sekerez, 2011 IL App (1st)
090889, ¶ 64.
¶ 62 F. Discovery and Sanctions
¶ 63 Dynek argues the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for sanctions based
on the City’s alleged discovery violation. Specifically, Dynek contends the City failed to produce
documents of prior lawsuits involving bicycle crashes on metal grate bridges and thereby violated
the trial court’s order to produce any documents giving the City notice of dangerous or defective
conditions or safety issues concerning the Chicago Avenue bridge.
¶ 64 According to the record, Dynek’s requests for documents during discovery included
request No. 16, which sought “[a]ny and all Complaints filed against the City within ten years
prior to the subject occurrence alleging cycling accidents caused by broken, defective, and/or
dangerous grating on City owned bridges.” The City objected to this request as overbroad and
seeking irrelevant information. In his response letter to the City, Dynek asserted that the requested
information was relevant and neither overbroad nor unduly burdensome. When Dynek later filed
a motion to compel, however, he did not seek the production of documents responsive to request
No. 16. Instead, he moved to compel the production of documents responsive to his request No. 13,
which sought “[a]ny and all documents notifying the City of dangerous and/or defective conditions
and/or safety issues with respect to the bridge identified in Plaintiff’s Complaint from October 19,
2010 to the present.” The court’s order granted Dynek’s motion to compel with respect to request
No. 13 but did not mention request No. 16, which sought complaints alleging bicycle accidents on
any of the City’s metal grate bridges.
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¶ 65 Ten days before the trial date, Dynek moved for sanctions, alleging the City had concealed
two lawsuits involving bicycle accidents on the La Salle Street bridge and thereby violated the
court’s order regarding document discovery. Dynek also asserted during both a discovery
conference and a hearing on the motion to compel that the City’s counsel orally represented that
“no lawsuits existed.” The City responded that it had complied with the discovery order, Dynek
failed to support his allegations about statements from the City’s counsel with a transcript or
bystander’s report, and Amsden’s deposition, which had occurred almost one year earlier,
indicated that Dynek’s counsel knew about a La Salle Street bridge lawsuit. The court denied
Dynek’s motion for sanctions, stating the court had consistently limited the scope of discovery to
items relevant to plaintiff’s alleged defect, i.e., the broken grating bar that created a hole in the
Chicago Avenue bridge. The court added that information about the La Salle Street bridge lawsuits
had been publicly available and plaintiff’s failure to timely learn about those lawsuits by
conducting an online search earlier was not the City’s fault. The trial court concluded that the facts
did not indicate the City had concealed the La Salle Street lawsuits.
¶ 66 We agree with the trial court’s ruling and reasoning and find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Dynek’s motion for sanctions.
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 69 Affirmed.
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No. 1-19-0209
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-L-4508; the Hon. Janet Brosnahan, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael M. Viglione, of Ryan, Ryan & Viglione, of Waukegan, for for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Mark A. Flessner, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth for Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Stephen G. Collins, Appellee: Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellee.
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