2024 IL App (1st) 221956-U No. 1-22-1956 Order filed June 20, 2024 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ KATE O’LAUGHLIN, Individually and as Mother and ) Appeal from the Next Friend of Sean Hladik, a Minor, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 18 L 2984 ) NORTHWESTERN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, ) NORTHWESTERN MEDICAL FOUNDATION, and ) MARC FELDSTEIN, M.D., ) ) Defendants ) Honorable ) James M. Varga, (Marc Feldstein, M.D., Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Martin and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: In a medical malpractice jury trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) allowed testimony from defendant’s controlled expert that was a logical corollary of that expert’s disclosed opinion, (2) allowed defendant’s expert to use a video as a demonstrative exhibit about a medical procedure that was not performed in the instant case, and (3) denied plaintiff’s request to instruct the jury that contributory negligence of the parents was not an issue in this case. No. 1-22-1956
¶2 Plaintiff, Kate O’Laughlin, individually and as mother and next friend of Sean Hladik, a
minor, appeals the circuit court’s judgment entered in favor of defendant, Marc Feldstein, M.D.,
after a jury trial on plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
negligently performed a circumcision, causing a urethral fistula. Defendant denied liability,
maintaining that the fistula was a congenital condition for which no one was to blame.
¶3 On appeal, plaintiff argues that a new trial is warranted because the court below abused its
discretion by (1) allowing the undisclosed opinion of defendant’s controlled expert, (2) allowing
defendant to impeach plaintiff’s expert with a demonstrative video of an inaccurate procedure
featuring an irrelevant medical device on direct examination of defendant’s own expert, and (3)
refusing to instruct the jury that contributory negligence of the parents was not an issue in this
case.
¶4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.1
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 On November 5, 2014, Sean Hladik was born to Ms. O’Laughlin and David Hladik. The
next day, Dr. Feldstein performed a Mogen clamp circumcision. The procedure involves pulling
the foreskin forward and clamping down on the excess skin, which is then cut off. The head of the
penis and all the other tissue remain on the other side of the clamp. As is common in circumcisions,
Sean had some bleeding during the circumcision. Dr. Feldstein used silver nitrate (a chemical) to
control the bleeding; stitches were not necessary. He notified the parents that the circumcision
went well and they may see some blood due to the removal of the foreskin.
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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¶7 The following day, Ms. O’Laughlin noticed some blood in Sean’s diaper. She stated a
significant amount of red blood was on the gauze over the surgical site and within the diaper. Mr.
Hladik saw some blood and the stringy material from the gauze used to cover the surgical site.
They contacted Dr. Kenneth Polin at Town & Country Pediatrics. On November 7, 2014, at the
doctor’s office, Ms. O’Laughlin mentioned seeing blood around the surgical site and within Sean’s
diaper. Ms. O’Laughlin stated the blood was oozing, but no active bleeding was present, nor was
it dripping. Dr. Polin removed the gauze from the penis and saw some blood. Dr. Polin documented
no active bleeding during the exam. He noted some bleeding after the circumcision, as stated by
Dr. Feldstein to Ms. O’Laughlin and Mr. Hladik.
¶8 On November 9, 2014, Dr. Anne Wyman at Town & Country Pediatrics saw Sean. Dr.
Wyman documented, consistent with Dr. Polin, that silver nitrate stopped the post-procedure
bleeding. Dr. Wyman removed gauze stuck to areas of the surgical site, which is common after a
circumcision.
¶9 When Sean was about two years old and undergoing toilet training, Ms. O’Laughlin noticed
urine coming from two locations on his penis. She called Sean’s pediatrician, who referred Sean
to Dr. Max Maizels, a pediatric urologist. Dr. Maizels found a second pinpoint opening on the
ventral (underside) of the penis. Dr. Maizels diagnosed Sean with a urethral fistula, which is a
communication from the urethra to the skin. On February 14, 2017, Dr. Maizels closed the urethra
fistula.
¶ 10 On March 22, 2018, Ms. O’Laughlin filed this medical negligence action on behalf of Sean
against Dr. Feldstein and Northwestern Memorial Hospital (Northwestern), alleging Dr. Feldstein
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negligently performed the circumcision. Dr. Feldstein answered the complaint, denying all the
material allegations. Plaintiff dismissed Northwestern before trial.
¶ 11 The case proceeded to trial against Dr. Feldstein in August 2022. Plaintiff moved in limine
to bar any reference or argument that Sean’s parents were contributorily negligent. The motion
was granted without objection from defendant, who had not filed an affirmative defense alleging
contributory negligence.
¶ 12 After trial started, plaintiff’s counsel sent defense counsel a link to a video of a Mogen
shield circumcision being performed on a different patient, stating plaintiff’s intention to use that
video to help her expert explain the procedure. Other demonstrative videos of circumcisions with
different devices were included in the link. One additional video provided by plaintiff’s counsel to
the defense included the Gomco circumcision video that plaintiff claims was incorrectly admitted
at trial.
¶ 13 Mr. Hladik testified that there was blood in Sean’s diaper for the first week, potentially
longer, after he was brought home from the hospital. Ms. O’Laughlin testified that by about 10 to
14 days after the procedure, Sean’s skin started to heal and scab over. Ms. O’Laughlin and Mr.
Hladik both observed a scab on the underside of Sean’s penis, which remained there for a few
weeks.
¶ 14 Dr. Feldstein testified about the anatomy of the penis and how the urethra is within the
penis, surrounded by other tissue. The urine goes through the urethra out the tip of the penis. He
explained bleeding is a known risk of any surgical procedure, including a circumcision, because
the surgeon uses a sharp scalpel to cut the skin.
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¶ 15 Dr. Feldstein explained the circumcision. He used a demonstrative exhibit to provide a
visual of the procedure and placement of the Mogen Shield. The procedure begins by lysing the
adhesions between the foreskin and head of the penis. The foreskin is elevated away from the head
of the penis and a tool is inserted between the foreskin and head of the penis to free the adhesions.
Dr. Feldstein performed the lysing with a curved hemostat. The curved hemostat is rotated 360
degrees between the foreskin and head of the penis to clear all the adhesions. The foreskin is then
pulled through the Mogen Shield and away from the tip of the penis. The Mogen Shield is a V-
shaped clamp that produces a crushing effect on the foreskin pulled through its opening. The
Mogen Shield is locked and remains locked for several minutes prior to removing the foreskin.
The foreskin located on the far side of the Mogen Shield, opposite the head of the penis, is then
removed with a scalpel. The clamp is removed, and the surgical site is dressed.
¶ 16 Dr. Feldstein used the Mogen clamp in 99% of the procedures he has performed throughout
his career. He preferred the Mogen clamp to the Gomco clamp because he believes the Mogen
clamp better controls and minimizes bleeding. A reasonably careful doctor would place the Mogen
clamp perpendicular to the penis and at a 90-degree angle; otherwise the clamp could capture
underlying tissue in addition to the foreskin.
¶ 17 Bleeding is common during a circumcision, so silver nitrate was provided with the
circumcision tray. Silver nitrate stops superficial bleeds. Dr. Feldstein told the mother about the
silver nitrate because he did not want its black appearance to cause any concern.
¶ 18 Dr. Feldstein testified to the rarity of congenital fistulas and how identification of a fistula
would have resulted in his not performing the circumcision.
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¶ 19 Dr. Feldstein answered hypothetical questions about the possibility of the Mogen Shield’s
angle causing a fistula. He explained the injury would have been extensive and severe if the Mogen
clamp had injured the urethra on the underside of the head of the penis. Closing the Mogen Shield
clamp on the urethra would require the head of the penis to be pulled through the clamp as well.
For the clamp to close on the urethra, as claimed by plaintiff, all the tissue between the clamp and
the urethra would have been crushed, requiring immediate surgical intervention, which was not
required here.
¶ 20 Dr. Polin testified that Sean’s penis was normal upon exam one day after the circumcision
with no active bleeding during the exam. Dr. Polin documented no second opening on the
underside of the penis, much less a crushing injury. He clarified his documentation, which left out
the appropriate punctuation. He testified that his charting should read, “normal appearance for age.
Circ’d was bleeding. At time of exam, not actively bleeding.”
¶ 21 Dr. Wyman testified to the thoroughness of the pediatrician’s exams and the lack of an
identifiable hole at the time of the exams. She explained stringy debris with gauze can be present,
no matter how much Vaseline is applied.
¶ 22 Dr. Maizels showed the jury the location of the pinpoint opening in the skin proximal to
the head of the penis. He testified about how well his repair surgery went and that Sean never
returned following a post-operative visit when he was off pain medications. Dr. Maizels stated the
fistula came from the urethra, which means it came from the urethra and worked its way to the
surface, not from the surface to the urethra, as plaintiff claimed. Dr. Maizels had not heard from
the parents since the follow-up visit a month after the surgery. He testified that the penis was
wrinkled and the scar would remodel and improve with age.
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¶ 23 Dr. Diane Holmes assumed the role of Sean’s primary pediatrician following the initial
well child examination. She testified that she thoroughly examined Sean on 10 visits and never
noted an opening or a fistula. The “History of Present Illness” in her documentation is subjective
and comes from the parents. Therefore, the note about the fistula being there from circumcision
was not her professional opinion; rather, it documented a comment made by the mother or father.
Dr. Holmes documented no parental concern during any of these visits. Had there been concerns,
she would have detailed them. Dr. Holmes stated the opening was on the glans (head) of the penis,
while describing the anatomical positioning.
¶ 24 Dr. Richard Luciani is a board-certified obstetrician and gynecologist who has been
practicing since 1977. Before he testified as plaintiff’s expert, the defense objected to plaintiff
showing the jury the Mogen Shield video plaintiff produced after trial had begun. The trial court
overruled defendant’s objections and allowed plaintiff to show the video during Dr. Luciani’s
direct examination. Plaintiff played the demonstrative video of a Mogen Shield circumcision early
in Dr. Luciani’s direct examination. Plaintiff’s counsel periodically paused the video and allowed
Dr. Luciani to describe what was on the screen. Dr. Luciani testified that if there was a congenital
hole in the penis, the circumcision should not have been performed.
¶ 25 Dr. Luciani acknowledged that he had not performed a Mogen Shield circumcision in over
40 years. Instead, he uses a Gomco clamp. He testified that there was no way to injure the glans
of the penis with a Gomco clamp because, when using a Gomco, the doctor cuts the foreskin above
the coronal groove below the head of the penis. He testified, however, that an injury to the glans
can occur with a Mogen clamp.
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¶ 26 Dr. Luciani testified that Dr. Feldstein deviated from the standard of care, causing the
urethral fistula. Dr. Luciani testified the injury would not occur during the normal course of a
¶ 27 Dr. Luciani testified to his opinions about the proper technique and usage, and about how
he believed the fistula was caused. Because the clamp was placed at an incorrect low angle, he
testified, the urethra was pulled forward into the clamp. Because the urethra is only protected by
thin skin and tissue, part of the urethra was crushed and died, creating an abscess and forming the
fistula. Dr. Luciani opined that Sean’s fistula was not congenital in nature. Rather, it was a crush
injury that involved the skin and the urethra, and the damage underneath the skin would be
considerable.
¶ 28 After plaintiff rested her case, the defense called its expert witness, Dr. Ann LaBarge, an
obstetrician and gynecologist. She used the Mogen clamp exclusively in her practice for 15 years.
She testified that Dr. Feldstein met the standard of care. Dr. LaBarge explained how using the
Mogen clamp could not result in Sean’s injury without evidence of injury to different parts of the
penis. The numerous doctor visits, all of which documented no abnormalities, supported this
testimony. She explained how an opening of the urethra would not be identified by Dr. Feldstein’s
examination of the penis because the urethra was under the skin.
¶ 29 Dr. LaBarge testified that bleeding can occur during a circumcision in the absence of
negligence. The use of silver nitrate, which is used only for minor, superficial bleeds, is common.
¶ 30 With the assistance of a demonstrative exhibit, Dr. LaBarge explained how a Mogen
circumcision could not injure the urethra behind the head of the penis. Her main point was that
Sean’s fistula was nowhere near where the Mogen clamp is compressed. Also, it would be nearly
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impossible to pull enough of the foreskin through the clamp to damage the urethra. Dr. LaBarge
explained how the whole head of the penis would have to be pulled through the Mogen Shield to
cause the injury plaintiff described, which would have resulted in a much more severe injury based
on the fistula’s location. Although damage to the glans and the tip of the urethra can occur, there
would be collateral damage that would be “quite traumatic” if it did. Over plaintiff’s objection, Dr.
LaBarge testified that a child would not be able to urinate if the urethra was pulled into the clamp
and crushed.
¶ 31 Dr. LaBarge’s direct exam concluded with testimony describing the difference between the
Mogen and Gomco circumcisions. Plaintiff did not object to Dr. LaBarge’s testimony, but did
object to defendant’s use of the Gomco circumcision video to illustrate that testimony. Defense
counsel responded that Dr. Luciani solely used the Gomco Shield after his residency and the video
of that method allowed the jury to see the difference between the Gomco and Mogen methods.
Over plaintiff’s objection, Dr. LaBarge explained the process of performing a Gomco clamp
circumcision as the video played, detailing how the Gomco and Mogen procedures are quite
different.
¶ 32 Another defense expert, Dr. Marc Cendron, a pediatric urologist, testified to his expert
opinion on causation. He testified about his credentials, understanding of urethral fistulas, and how
the Mogen Shield did not cause the alleged injury. He testified that Sean’s fistula was congenital
and was not caused by the circumcision. He testified that surgical trauma from a circumcision
would appear as a traumatic injury to the glans of the penis and would result in significant scar
tissue. He conceded that the urethra can be injured by the crushing mechanism of the clamp and
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acknowledged that if the tissue surrounding the urethra is underdeveloped, the urethra can be
injured without significant bleeding.
¶ 33 The jury returned a verdict for the defense. Plaintiff filed a posttrial motion, which the trial
court denied.
¶ 34 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 35 A. Dr. LaBarge’s Opinion
¶ 36 Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Dr. LaBarge, defendant’s
controlled expert, to testify, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213, that an infant would
not be able to urinate if his urethra was crushed during a Mogen clamp circumcision.
¶ 37 Rule 213 states in pertinent part that, “[f]or each controlled expert witness, the party must
identify: (i) the subject matter on which the witness will testify; (ii) the conclusions and opinions
of the witness and the bases therefore; (iii) the qualifications of the witness; and (iv) any reports
prepared by the witness about the case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018). Furthermore,
“[t]he information disclosed in answer to a Rule 213(f) interrogatory, or in a discovery
deposition, limits the testimony that can be given by a witness on direct examination at
trial. Information expressed in a discovery deposition need not be later specifically
identified in a Rule 213(f) answer, but, upon objection at trial, the burden is on the
proponent of the witness to prove the information was provided in a Rule 213(f) answer or
in the discovery deposition.” Id. 213(g).
¶ 38 The purpose of discovery rules, governing the “timely disclosure of expert witnesses, their
opinions, and the bases for those opinions[,] is to avoid surprise and to discourage strategic
gamesmanship.” Thomas v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1032 (2003). Rule 213
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disclosures are mandatory and strict compliance is required. Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill.
2d 100, 109 (2004). A party’s Rule 213 disclosures must “drop down to specifics” (id.); however,
a “witness may elaborate on a disclosed opinion as long as the testimony states logical corollaries
to the opinion rather than new reasons for it” (Foley v. Fletcher, 361 Ill. App. 3d 39, 47 (2005)).
“The testimony at trial must be encompassed by the original opinion.” Id. Permitting either side to
ignore Rule 213’s plain language defeats its purpose and encourages tactical gamesmanship.
Sullivan, 209 Ill. 2d at 109-10. As a result, expert testimony may be barred where there is
inadequate disclosure of all opinions and the bases therefor. Petre v. Kucich, 331 Ill. App. 3d 935,
946 (2002).
¶ 39 Whether to admit or exclude evidence, including whether to allow an expert to present
certain opinions, “rests solely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion”—i.e., only if “ ‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted
by the trial court.’ ” Foley, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 46 (quoting Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207
Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2003)). “ ‘[E]rror in the exclusion or admission of evidence does not require
reversal unless one party has been prejudiced or the result of the trial has been materially
affected.’ ” Spaetzel v. Dillon, 393 Ill. App. 3d 806, 814 (2009) (quoting Stricklin v. Chapman,
197 Ill. App. 3d 385, 388 (1990)).
¶ 40 Plaintiff contends that Dr. LaBarge’s challenged opinion was not a logical corollary to any
opinion the defense disclosed before trial. Plaintiff argues that Dr. LaBarge’s undisclosed opinion
was highly prejudicial because it directly undercut plaintiff’s theory of causation where plaintiff’s
expert, Dr. Luciani, opined that Sean’s urethral fistula was caused by Dr. Feldstein’s negligent use
during Sean’s circumcision of a Mogen clamp, which crushed Sean’s urethra. Plaintiff also argues
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that Dr. LaBarge’s undisclosed opinion was highly prejudicial because it denied plaintiff a fair
opportunity to prepare for cross-examination or otherwise respond to defendant’s new argument.
¶ 41 Defendant responds that the trial court was within its discretion to let Dr. LaBarge say that
urine could not pass through a crushed urethra because her brief remark was a logical corollary to
her disclosed opinion that the clamp did not crush the urethra and cause a fistula. Defendant
contends that plaintiff recognized this line of questioning as part of Dr. LaBarge’s disclosed
opinions and allowed substantial testimony on the subject without objecting until plaintiff objected
to the question and answer at issue. Defendant argues that the challenged exchange was brief, was
properly allowed, caused plaintiff no prejudice, and provides no basis for reversal.
¶ 42 During discovery, defendant disclosed that Dr. LaBarge would testify regarding her
knowledge of the methods, advantages, and risks of the methods of performing a circumcision;
that Dr. Feldstein’s pre-operative assessment, examination, and performance of the procedure
complied with the standard of care; that no act or omission of Dr. Feldstein contributed to Sean’s
injuries; that Dr. Feldstein’s failure to notice the urethral fistula on examination did not mean it
was not present, and failing to notice it was not a deviation from the standard of care; that the
fistula was so small that it was not noticed by Sean’s parents for the first two years of his life; that
the fistula could not have been caused by the Mogen clamp circumcision performed by Dr.
Feldstein because the location of the fistula on the distal shaft of the penis was not in the area
affected by the mechanism of the Mogen clamp, which does not go down to the area where the
fistula was located; and that the fistula was congenital.
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¶ 43 At her discovery deposition, Dr. LaBarge testified:
“Q. Are there any other reasons or reasons for your opinion that this is a congenital
injury?
A. Well, if it’s either the—got to be either the Mogen or the circumcision or not the
circumcision and it’s congenital. It’s congenital. I don’t believe the Mogen caused this
injury. It’s just not in the right spot. It’s—
Q. Right. That’s what I am getting at. I think you answered my question, but let me
try to—. Other than the Mogen not being in the spot where this injury occurred and you
not doing the procedure around that injury, is there any other reasons why you believe that
this injury was not caused by the Mogen clamp or have you told me all the reasons?
A. I think so.
***
Q. The only two real possibilities—and I understand your opinion that the Mogen
did not cause this, but the real possibilities in this case are, one, it was a circumcision or
two, it was congenital. There is really no other mechanism of injury other than those two
things, is that fair?
A. Yes, I think that’s correct.”
¶ 44 During direct examination of Dr. LaBarge at trial, her opinions about collateral damage to
the penis were admitted into evidence without objection. Specifically, she testified:
“Q. If this can’t happen just say so, but if the urethra is somehow pulled forward
into the clamp and crushed by the clamp, what else would be injured?
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A. I would imagine the glans would be injured. You’d have, you’d have collateral
damage for that. ***
There would be terrible damage to this penis.”
Thereafter, Dr. LaBarge held a Mogen clamp up to the jury and explained the circumcision
procedure, testifying:
“A. You hold onto that and you take as much as you want, and then you bring this
around, you clamp it. And then you can tighten, and you see there’s line between them,
there’s no light, there’s no anything, but basically just smooshes the tissue, and then you
take a scalpel, and you just shave it off.
Then you release it, open it up. The penis pops out. You open that area of tissue
that’s been squished, and the circumcision is done. You just push it back.
And again, it’s at the tip. It’s nowhere near. I can’t imagine how you could ever
pull that much penis in and not have damage to the penis. Like you couldn’t. It’s just
impossible.
Q. If you crushed the urethra in the clamp, would the child be able to urinate after?”
¶ 45 Plaintiff objected that the opinion was undisclosed in violation of Rule 213, and defense
counsel responded, “I think it’s a logical corollary what she’s describing in the anatomy of a
circumcision.” The court overruled plaintiff’s objection, and Dr. LaBarge testified:
“Q. Could a child urinate if the urethra was pulled into the clamp and crushed”
A. No. It would be smooshed. That’s really tight.”
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¶ 46 Later, during cross-examination, plaintiff’s counsel asked Dr. LaBarge, “Okay. And if the
clamp is not placed correctly, the urethra might get damaged, there might be some collateral
damage as well, but the urethra might be damaged, correct?”
¶ 47 During closing argument, defense counsel argued, “crushing the urethra inside the clamp,
which is what Dr. Luciani claimed, would have been a catastrophic occurrence. The urethra, as Dr.
LaBarge said, would have been crushed closed. The poor baby would not have been able to
urinate.”
¶ 48 We conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to allow Dr. LaBarge to elaborate
briefly on her opinion that the circumcision could not have been performed in the way plaintiff
claimed based on Dr. LaBarge’s disclosed opinion that Sean’s urethral fistula could not have been
caused by the Mogen clamp circumcision because the fistula, which was located on the distal shaft
of the penis, occurred outside of the area that is affected by the mechanism of the Mogen clamp.
Consistent with this disclosed opinion, defense counsel responded to plaintiff’s Rule 213 objection
at trial by observing that Dr. LaBarge was describing “the anatomy of a circumcision.” Dr.
LaBarge’s testimony about the anatomical features of a circumcision was neither a new opinion
nor a new basis for her expert opinion; it illustrated her opinion that, contrary to plaintiff’s theory
that the Mogen clamp caused the urethral fistula, the Mogen clamp did not affect the urethra
because if the clamp had crushed the urethra, then urine would have been blocked.
¶ 49 We review Dr. LaBarge’s challenged remark in the context of her unchallenged testimony
at trial and her disclosed opinion that plaintiff’s causation theory was at odds with the anatomy of
the penis, especially the location of the clamp in relation to the urethral fistula. Moreover, Rule
213 does not require a verbatim recitation at trial of the opinions disclosed in discovery. “ ‘A
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witness may elaborate on a disclosed opinion as long as the testimony states logical corollaries to
the opinion rather than new reasons for it.’ ” Spaetzel, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 812 (quoting Foley, 361
Ill. App. 3d at 47); see Skubak v. Lutheran General Health Care Systems, 339 Ill. App. 3d 30, 39
(2003); Brax v. Kennedy, 363 Ill. App. 3d 343, 355-56 (2005). Defendant’s Rule 213 disclosures
set forth the location of the fistula as key to the defense, because the clamp was placed distal to
(beyond) the head of the penis, not on the urethra within the penis and proximal to the head.
¶ 50 Dr. LaBarge’s opinions about collateral damage to the penis were admitted into evidence
without objection. Plaintiff even elicited testimony about collateral damage to the urethra in cross-
examining Dr. LaBarge. Dr. LaBarge had already testified without objection that the Mogen clamp
“smooshes the tissue.” Near the end of her extended testimony about how and where a Mogen
clamp is used in performing a circumcision, Dr. LaBarge said nothing significantly different in her
brief answer to the follow up question, stating that urine could not come through a “smooshed”
urethra. Her answer illustrated her opinion countering plaintiff’s theory by way of a logical
corollary that did not violate Rule 213. If the clamp crushed the urethra closed and the scalpel
removed everything on the other side of the clamp, the urine would not come through the urethra.
Defendant disclosed Dr. LaBarge’s opinions about the anatomy of the penis, including the urethra
and the location of the fistula, relative to the placement of the clamp.
¶ 51 Dr. LaBarge’s remark was well within an expert’s latitude to elaborate on a disclosed
opinion, and the trial court’s conclusion that the answer was a logical corollary was within its
discretion and does not call for a new trial.
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¶ 52 B. Demonstrative Exhibit
¶ 53 Plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, during the direct examination
of Dr. LaBarge, the court allowed admission of an eight-minute-long video depicting a Gomco
clamp, which did not explain Dr. LaBarge’s testimony. Plaintiff argues the video was admitted
solely to impeach Dr. Luciani’s credibility and qualifications, whereby defendant argued that Dr.
Luciani’s opinions carried less weight because he used the Gomco clamp instead of the Mogen
clamp in most of the circumcisions he performed throughout his career. Plaintiff contends the
Gomco clamp video should have been disallowed because it (1) failed to accurately depict the
procedure actually performed on Sean, (2) allowed Dr. LaBarge to use demonstrative evidence to
indirectly comment on Dr. Luciani’s qualifications and credibility and thereby “go after” him
because he used a Gomco clamp instead of a Mogen clamp, (3) did not contradict any of Dr.
Luciani’s testimony and thus should not have been allowed for impeachment, (4) should have been
barred as improper extrinsic evidence on a collateral issue, (5) was admitted without a proper
foundation, and (6) was unfairly prejudicial to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that allowing the video
was particularly prejudicial given the trial court’s earlier decision to prohibit Dr. Luciani from
testifying that the reason he lacked experience with a Mogen clamp was because he preferred the
Gomco clamp for safety reasons. According to plaintiff, the jury was left with the unfair impression
that Dr. Luciani, plaintiff’s only expert, was inexperienced and unqualified to discuss the Mogen
clamp procedure at issue and that his theory of causation was anatomically impossible. Plaintiff
adds that because these attacks were launched after Dr. Luciani had already testified, plaintiff was
denied the fair warning demanded by the discovery rules and was deprived of the opportunity to
prepare and respond.
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¶ 54 Defendant responds that demonstrative trial exhibits are admissible to illustrate a witness’s
testimony if they accurately represent what they purport to represent. The defense showed a video
of the Gomco circumcision method Dr. Luciani used to show how that method differed from the
Mogen method used in this case, as Dr. LaBarge explained without objection. Defendant argues
that the video was relevant to the jury’s comparison of the two experts and their experience with
the Mogen clamp and procedure at issue here.
¶ 55 A physical object that does not have a direct part in the incident at issue and is only being
used to help explain or illustrate to the trier of fact the verbal testimony of a witness or other
evidence is considered to be demonstrative evidence. Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 74
(1956). Demonstrative evidence has no probative value in and of itself and is merely admitted or
used as a visual aid to the trier of fact. Id.; Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital, 144 Ill. 2d 339,
341-42 (1991). The great value of demonstrative evidence “lies in the human factor of
understanding better what is seen than what is heard.” Smith, 10 Ill. App. 2d at 75. The use of
demonstrative evidence, therefore, is looked upon favorably by the courts because it allows the
trier of fact to have the best possible understanding of the matters before it. Id. at 75-76. However,
the same human factor that makes demonstrative evidence valuable—that people learn and
understand better what they see, rather than what they hear—also makes it possible for parties to
abuse the use of demonstrative evidence by giving a dramatic effect or undue or misleading
emphasis to some issue, at the expense of others. Id. at 76. Thus, in ruling upon the admissibility
of demonstrative evidence, the trial court must be watchful to prevent or eliminate that abuse. Id.
at 76-77.
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¶ 56 The primary considerations in determining whether demonstrative evidence is admissible
or may be used at trial are relevancy and fairness. See Ill. Rs. Evid. 401, 402, 403 (eff. Jan. 1,
2011); Schuler v. Mid-Central Cardiology, 313 Ill. App. 3d 326, 337 (2000); People ex rel.
Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 283-84 (2003); Smith, 10 Ill. App. 2d at 74-77. As for relevancy,
for demonstrative evidence to be admissible, it must actually be used to illustrate or explain the
verbal testimony of a witness as to a matter that is relevant in the case in question. See id.; Michael
H. Graham, Graham’s Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 401.3, at 160 (10th ed. 2010). With regard
to fairness, even if the relevancy test has been satisfied, demonstrative evidence may still be
excluded by the trial court if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff.
Jan. 1, 2011); Sherman, 203 Ill. 2d at 284; Cisarik, 144 Ill. 2d at 342. A trial court’s ruling on the
admissibility of evidence, including demonstrative evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion. Sharbono v. Hilborn, 2014 IL App (3d) 120597, ¶ 29.
¶ 57 Despite plaintiff’s numerous objections raised on appeal, her objection that the Gomco
video was irrelevant was the only one she made both at trial and in her posttrial motion. Thus,
plaintiff has forfeited all but one of the arguments she raises on appeal by failing to raise them
both at trial or in her posttrial motion. See Gillespie v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 387 Ill.
App. 3d 540, 546 (2008); Dynek v. City of Chicago, 2020 IL App (1st) 190209, ¶ 61 (In addition
to a timely objection at trial, preservation of error for appellate review requires “a sufficiently
specific posttrial motion that contains the points relied upon and specifies the grounds in support
thereof.”). Although plaintiff mentioned a “213 issue,” she did not elaborate or renew any Rule
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213 objection in her posttrial motion. Plaintiff made no foundation objection, nor did she object
that the video depiction was not accurate. In her posttrial motion, plaintiff argued only that the
video was “misleading” and “extremely bloody/gory and was prejudicial to the [p]laintiff.” The
motion did not take issue with Dr. LaBarge’s testimony about the procedure with a Gomco clamp.
Nor did plaintiff object that the video was improperly used to challenge her expert’s credibility,
that it was improper extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter, or that it improperly focused on her
expert’s credentials and experience. Accordingly, we address the only contention plaintiff
preserved for review: that the Gomco video should have been barred because the device and
procedure it depicted were substantially different from the Mogen device and procedure at issue.
¶ 58 The Gomco video was not meant to represent the circumcision at issue, let alone to depict
it. Dr. LaBarge testified without objection about the different procedure and different clamp that
Dr. Luciani used in his practice instead of the Mogen clamp used here, and the video accurately
illustrated Dr. LaBarge’s testimony to that effect. Plaintiff did not take issue at trial or in her
posttrial motion or any related filing or hearing in the trial court with Dr. LaBarge’s testimony
describing a circumcision procedure as performed using a Gomco clamp. Even on appeal, plaintiff
offers no objection to the expert testimony itself; she challenges only that the video was “used to
help explain or illustrate to the trier of fact the verbal testimony of a witness,” just as demonstrative
evidence is supposed to do. See Sharbono, 2014 IL App (3d) 120597, ¶ 30. The difference between
the two methods was a prominent point of Dr. LaBarge’s testimony. Defense counsel elicited Dr.
LaBarge’s opinion that the video depicted a procedure that was not the same as the use of the
Mogen clamp:
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“Q. And are all of the steps they’ve just seen completely different from the Mogen
clamp procedure?
A. Definitely from here on out, it’s definitely different.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 59 Plaintiff objects to the use of “a demonstrative video of an inaccurate procedure featuring
an irrelevant medical device.” But the video accurately depicted what it purported to depict: a
different procedure using a different clamp. Nor was the video “irrelevant”; plaintiff’s argument
overlooks the purpose of the video to illustrate the Gomco procedure and technique Dr. Luciani
used, and to emphasize the substantial difference between that procedure and the Mogen procedure
at issue, about which he professed expertise despite not having used it since his training more than
40 years ago. Dr. Luciani made the depiction of the Gomco procedure more relevant by describing
the technique as “similar” to the Mogen technique. The Gomco video was never intended to depict
the event at issue, and the defense did not identify it to the jury that way. To the contrary, Dr.
LaBarge was clear in explaining that the video did not depict the circumcision at issue. It was an
accurate portrayal of what it purported to show—the different procedure Dr. Luciani used. The
trial court was within its discretion to admit it for that purpose.
¶ 60 This purpose sets this case apart from Yanello v. Park Family Dental, 2017 IL App (3d)
120592, cited by plaintiff. In Yanello, the court found it improper to use demonstrative exhibits—
in that case, skulls originally used for demonstrative purposes—as real evidence, as if they
faithfully represented the anatomy of the patient-plaintiff. Id. ¶ 34. Here, the defense did not use
the video as real evidence; to the contrary, the defense not only acknowledged that the procedure
depicted in the video was something different from the procedure at issue, but stressed that that
was the point of showing it.
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¶ 61 Furthermore, plaintiff’s expert’s experience with a different device and procedure was
relevant to challenging his credibility. This court drew a distinction between attempts to impeach
an expert’s opinion with matters going to schooling and licensing, which have an “attenuated
relevance to the medical opinion in issue” and are generally inadmissible, and impeachment with
“a clear link to facts and assumptions underlying the opinion, the methodology or testing used, the
knowledge and experience of the expert in the matters to which he testifies, personal bias (such as
the fact he or she is paid to testify), and so forth.” (Emphasis added.) O’Brien v. Meyer, 196 Ill.
App. 3d 457, 462-63 (1989). While the court found it improper for the defense to inform the jury
of the expert’s history of failing the state licensing exam, the court contrasted that impropriety
with the proper conduct of showing the jury that, although she did read and interpret X-rays, she
would defer to trained radiologists—which the court described as “the type of impeaching
examination that aids the jury in deciding the strength of the opinion[.]” Id. at 464.
¶ 62 Dr. Luciani conceded that he used the Gomco clamp and had not performed a circumcision
using the Mogen clamp since his training four decades before. While he acknowledged the Gomco
clamp was a “[t]otally different piece of metal,” he claimed that “the technique is very similar.”
Dr. LaBarge, however, testified that a circumcision is a very different procedure with a Gomco
clamp. Her testimony had a clear link to Dr. Luciani’s knowledge and experience in the matter to
which he testified and was the type of evidence that aided the jury in deciding the strength of his
opinion. Plaintiff did not object to Dr. LaBarge’s testimony on this point at trial and does not
challenge it on appeal. The video illustrated her testimony, and the trial court was well within its
discretion to let the defendant use it for that purpose.
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¶ 63 Furthermore, plaintiff shows no unfair prejudice resulting from the video. The defense
stressed throughout Dr. LaBarge’s testimony that the Gomco video did not show the Mogen device
at issue, and the trial court cured any potential unfair prejudice by instructing the jury that the
Gomco video was for demonstrative purposes only.
¶ 64 Plaintiff cited Poole v. University of Chicago, 186 Ill. App. 3d 554 (1989), to support her
claim that improper impeachment evidence causes prejudice that requires a new trial. In Poole, the
defense attacked the plaintiff’s expert with evidence that he faced disciplinary charges in another
state. Furthermore, that improper evidence alone was not the basis for a new trial in Poole;
prejudice resulted from the defense counsel’s closing argument, in which he relied on the improper
evidence to persuade the jury that the plaintiff’s expert could not be trusted. Drawing the jury’s
attention to the pending disciplinary charges against the plaintiff’s expert, the defense counsel
described the charges as involving “incompetence” and accused the plaintiff’s expert of being a
“liar” and a “prostitute.” Id. at 561. Here, plaintiff quotes the court’s observation in Poole that
“[t]he prejudice to plaintiff is readily apparent” (id.), but plaintiff ignores the inflammatory
accusations prompting that observation.
¶ 65 Defense counsel’s closing argument was nothing like Poole. Here, defense counsel urged
the jury to consider Dr. LaBarge more credible than Dr. Luciani based on the differences in their
professional backgrounds, barely alluding to the Gomco clamp. Defense counsel’s unremarkable
rhetorical questions about which expert the jury should trust more were appropriate argument in
this medical-malpractice case featuring competing experts, and not at all what the court found
unfairly prejudicial in Poole.
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¶ 66 Plaintiff’s other claim of prejudice, that the video was not timely disclosed, is meritless.
Defendant disclosed in answers to interrogatories that Dr. LaBarge would testify to the different
methods of performing a circumcision, expressly identifying both the Mogen clamp and the
Gomco clamp among those methods. The defense even disclosed that Dr. LaBarge might use
demonstrative evidence in doing so—a disclosure that went beyond what Supreme Court Rule 213
requires, according to the Committee Comments to the rule, which expressly provide that it does
not apply to demonstrative evidence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 213, Committee Comments (adopted March
28, 2002). If this argument is the “213 issue” plaintiff’s trial counsel mentioned during Dr.
LaBarge’s testimony, plaintiff did not adequately explain it at trial and forfeited it by not raising
it in her posttrial motion. Gillespie, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 546. Her claim that the video was not
disclosed is at odds with the record and has no legal merit.
¶ 67 C. Jury Instruction
¶ 68 Plaintiff argues the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil, No. 11.04 (hereinafter IPI Civil No. 11.04) regarding the nonexistence of
contributory negligence of Sean’s parents, contending that defendant repeatedly pointed out at trial
that Sean’s parents failed to observe or report evidence of a urethral fistula for over two years.
Plaintiff argues defendant improperly insinuated to the jury that Sean’s parents were somehow at
fault and invited the jury to decide the case based on acts of non-defendants rather than based on
what the defendant saw and did in a case where contributory negligence was not an issue.
¶ 69 According to plaintiff, defendant used Sean’s parents’ failure to observe the abnormality
to suggest that Dr. Feldstein did not breach the standard of care when he failed to observe the
abnormality before the circumcision and to suggest that he did not cause the fistula because no
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abnormality was apparent after surgery. Plaintiff argues that it is not appropriate to defend a
medical malpractice case on the basis of what others did or did not do, and the proper question for
the jury was whether Dr. Feldstein, not Sean’s parents, deviated from the standard of care by failing
to observe the abnormality. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s argument improperly shifted the
burden to disprove contributory negligence to plaintiff and interjected a misleading and prejudicial
theory that was at direct odds with the testimony of defendant’s own expert. Plaintiff asserts that,
given the manner in which defendant used the evidence and argued this theory to the jury, the trial
court’s failure to instruct the jury that the contributory negligence of Sean’s parents was not an
issue in the case was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 70 Defendant responds that he made no argument and elicited no evidence that Sean’s parents
caused or contributed to cause what the defense maintained was a congenital defect, and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that contributory negligence was
not an issue in the case.
¶ 71 Whether to provide a particular jury instruction is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and the court’s decision will be reversed only where the trial court abused its discretion.
York v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center, 222 Ill. 2d 147, 203 (2006). “ ‘The standard
for determining an abuse of discretion is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions are sufficiently
clear so as not to mislead and whether they fairly and correctly state the law.’ ” Studt v. Sherman
Health Systems, 2011 IL 108182, ¶ 13) (quoting Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 505
(2002)); Bailey v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, 2021 IL 126748, ¶ 42 (review of the refusal
of a jury instruction does not require reversal unless the trial court has abused its discretion and
caused prejudice to the complaining party).
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¶ 72 The trial court was within its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury that the
contributory negligence of the parents was not an issue, refusing plaintiff’s tendered IPI Civil No.
11.04. Our review of the record shows no reason to think the jury needed to be disabused of the
notion that contributory negligence was at issue, because no evidence or argument suggested that
the abnormality was caused by anything Sean’s parents did or failed to do, negligently or
otherwise. No argument even implicitly criticized the parents for not noticing the abnormality or
reporting it to Sean’s pediatrician sooner than they did. To the contrary, defense expert witness
Cendron stated and defense counsel argued that Sean was born with the fistula, a congenital
anomaly that was no one’s fault and went unnoticed by all the doctors, including defendant,
because the opening was too small to see. This argument did not suggest that the parents were
contributorily negligent and did not require an instruction not to consider that issue. The refusal of
that instruction does not require a new trial.
¶ 73 Plaintiff also argues that “defendant also used Sean’s parents’ failure to identify the
abnormality to imply that Dr. Feldstein did not deviate from the standard of care.” That argument
does not relate to contributory negligence. Nor does plaintiff’s account bear any resemblance to
the events of trial. Although plaintiff complains about what defendant “implied” about the
abnormality and the “notion” he “managed to advance,” plaintiff identifies no evidence or
argument to which she objected, let alone anything the trial court allowed over an objection.
¶ 74 The trial court was within its discretion to refrain from instructing the jury that contributory
negligence was not an issue. Without any suggestion in the evidence or argument that the parents
caused the fistula, the trial court reasonably concluded the jury was unlikely to find them
contributorily negligent. By contrast, raising the issue of contributory negligence solely for the
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purpose of telling the jury that it was not an issue could have caused confusion. The trial court’s
refusal of an instruction emphasizing a non-issue was well within its discretion and is no reason to
disturb the jury’s verdict.
¶ 75 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 76 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 77 Affirmed.
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