Steele Hays, Justice.
The issue presented on appeal is the constitutionality of the current statutory method of financing public schools in Arkansas under Act 1100 of 1979, the Minimum Foundation Program and vocational funding under § 7 of Act 1004 of 1975 (authorized under Act 363 of 1967). Appellees, eleven school districts1, brought this class action suit against appellants, Jim DuPree and other members of the Arkansas State Board of Education (also joined by other districts2), charging that the present system violates the state constitution’s guarantee of equal protection (Art. II, §§ 2, 3, 183) and its requirement that the state provide a general, suitable and efficient system of education (Art. XIV § 24). The appellees’ basic contention is the great disparity in funds available for education to school districts throughout the state is due primarily to the fact that the major determinative of revenue for school districts is the local tax base, a basis unrelated to the educational needs of any given district; that the curent state financing system is inadequate to rectify the inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax bases, and actually widens the gap between the property poor and property wealthy districts in providing educational opportunities. The trial court found the present system to be in violation of the constitutional provisions in question, which decision we affirm. We will first comment on the trial court’s finding and then address the points raised on appeal.
The funding for Arkansas schools comes from three sources: state revenues provide 51.6%, local revenues 38.1%, and federal revenues 10.3%. The majority of state aid is distributed under the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP). In 1978-79 MFP constituted 77.1% of all state aid. Act 1100 of 1979, the current MFP program, is similar to prior MFP programs and consists of two major elements: base aid and equalization aid. The base aid program originated under the Minimum School Budget Law of 1951. The formula was based on a calculation of teacher and student population per district. The base aid program contained a “hold-harmless” provision which guaranteed that no district would receive less aid in any year than it received the previous year. As a result, a district with declining enrollment would over the years get continually higher aid per; pupil. While Act 1100 eliminates the district “hold-harmless” provision, it still contains a pupil “hold-harmless” provision which has no bearing on educational needs or property wealth; the base aid year is permanently held at the 1978-79 level, and the inequities resuting from thirty years of the district “hold-harmless” provision are being carried forward without compensating adjustments.
The funds remaining after allocation for base aid are distributed under “equalization aid”. Under this section of the act, half of the remaining funds are distributed under a flat grant on a per pupil basis. Districts receive the same amount of aid under this provision irrespective of local property wealth and revenue raised. The remaining funds under the equalization provision are then distributed under a formula directed at equalizing the disparity between the poor and wealthy districts. Of the total allocated under this program in 1979-80, this accounted for only 6.8% of MFP aid.
The other area of contention is the distribution of funds for vocational education. In order for a school district to institute a program of vocational education approved for state funding, it must first establish a program with local funds. The state will consider funding a portion of the program only if the program is already operational. Obviously, this requirement works to the advantage of the wealthier school districts which can raise the funds and to the disadvantage of the poorer districts which lack the resources for such programs.
Against this backdrop of funding is the undisputed evidence that there are sharp disparities among school districts in the expenditures per pupil and the education opportunities available as reflected by staff, class size, curriculum, remedial services, facilities, materials and equipment. In dollar terms the highest and lowest revenues per pupil in 1978-79 respectively were $2,378 and $873. Disregarding the extremes, the difference at the 95th and 5th percentiles was $1,576 and $937. It is also undisputed that there is a substantial variation in property wealth among districts. The distribution of property wealth, measured as equalized assessed valuation per pupil in average daily attendance (ADA) in 1978-79, ranged from $73,773 to $1,853. These wealth disparities are prevalent among both large and small districts. As the system is currently operating, the major determinative of local revenues is district property wealth and the amount a school district can raise is directly related to its property wealth.
The range in revenues among school districts in Arkansas is not limited to the extremes. There are a substantial number of children affected by the revenue disparities. In 1978-79, only 7% of the pupils resided in school districts with over $1,500 per pupil in state-local revenues, while over 21% resided in districts with less than $1000 in state-local revenues, and 55% of the districts were below the state mean. This great disparity among the districts’ property wealth and the currentstate funding system as itis now applied does not equalize the educational revenues available to the school districts, but only widens the gap.
The appellants devote little attention to the constitutional provisions in question, but contend that there is no requirement of uniformity of educational opportunities throughout the state, that the constitution only requires that all children receive a “general, suitable and efficient” education. Appellants point to cases from other jurisdictions finding no violation of equal protection clauses under similar funding systems, decisions based primarily on the legitimate state interest of promoting local control. See Board of Education v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981). The arguments are not persuasive.
Most cases finding similar state financing systems unconstitutional have found their state’s equal protection clause to be applicable and to require equal educational opportunities. See Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976). In at least one jurisdiction, the court found its constitution demanded an equal education opportunity based solely on an education clause similar to ours. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
There is no sound basis for holding the equal protection clause inapplicable to the facts in this case.
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Steele Hays, Justice.
The issue presented on appeal is the constitutionality of the current statutory method of financing public schools in Arkansas under Act 1100 of 1979, the Minimum Foundation Program and vocational funding under § 7 of Act 1004 of 1975 (authorized under Act 363 of 1967). Appellees, eleven school districts1, brought this class action suit against appellants, Jim DuPree and other members of the Arkansas State Board of Education (also joined by other districts2), charging that the present system violates the state constitution’s guarantee of equal protection (Art. II, §§ 2, 3, 183) and its requirement that the state provide a general, suitable and efficient system of education (Art. XIV § 24). The appellees’ basic contention is the great disparity in funds available for education to school districts throughout the state is due primarily to the fact that the major determinative of revenue for school districts is the local tax base, a basis unrelated to the educational needs of any given district; that the curent state financing system is inadequate to rectify the inequalities inherent in a financing system based on widely varying local tax bases, and actually widens the gap between the property poor and property wealthy districts in providing educational opportunities. The trial court found the present system to be in violation of the constitutional provisions in question, which decision we affirm. We will first comment on the trial court’s finding and then address the points raised on appeal.
The funding for Arkansas schools comes from three sources: state revenues provide 51.6%, local revenues 38.1%, and federal revenues 10.3%. The majority of state aid is distributed under the Minimum Foundation Program (MFP). In 1978-79 MFP constituted 77.1% of all state aid. Act 1100 of 1979, the current MFP program, is similar to prior MFP programs and consists of two major elements: base aid and equalization aid. The base aid program originated under the Minimum School Budget Law of 1951. The formula was based on a calculation of teacher and student population per district. The base aid program contained a “hold-harmless” provision which guaranteed that no district would receive less aid in any year than it received the previous year. As a result, a district with declining enrollment would over the years get continually higher aid per; pupil. While Act 1100 eliminates the district “hold-harmless” provision, it still contains a pupil “hold-harmless” provision which has no bearing on educational needs or property wealth; the base aid year is permanently held at the 1978-79 level, and the inequities resuting from thirty years of the district “hold-harmless” provision are being carried forward without compensating adjustments.
The funds remaining after allocation for base aid are distributed under “equalization aid”. Under this section of the act, half of the remaining funds are distributed under a flat grant on a per pupil basis. Districts receive the same amount of aid under this provision irrespective of local property wealth and revenue raised. The remaining funds under the equalization provision are then distributed under a formula directed at equalizing the disparity between the poor and wealthy districts. Of the total allocated under this program in 1979-80, this accounted for only 6.8% of MFP aid.
The other area of contention is the distribution of funds for vocational education. In order for a school district to institute a program of vocational education approved for state funding, it must first establish a program with local funds. The state will consider funding a portion of the program only if the program is already operational. Obviously, this requirement works to the advantage of the wealthier school districts which can raise the funds and to the disadvantage of the poorer districts which lack the resources for such programs.
Against this backdrop of funding is the undisputed evidence that there are sharp disparities among school districts in the expenditures per pupil and the education opportunities available as reflected by staff, class size, curriculum, remedial services, facilities, materials and equipment. In dollar terms the highest and lowest revenues per pupil in 1978-79 respectively were $2,378 and $873. Disregarding the extremes, the difference at the 95th and 5th percentiles was $1,576 and $937. It is also undisputed that there is a substantial variation in property wealth among districts. The distribution of property wealth, measured as equalized assessed valuation per pupil in average daily attendance (ADA) in 1978-79, ranged from $73,773 to $1,853. These wealth disparities are prevalent among both large and small districts. As the system is currently operating, the major determinative of local revenues is district property wealth and the amount a school district can raise is directly related to its property wealth.
The range in revenues among school districts in Arkansas is not limited to the extremes. There are a substantial number of children affected by the revenue disparities. In 1978-79, only 7% of the pupils resided in school districts with over $1,500 per pupil in state-local revenues, while over 21% resided in districts with less than $1000 in state-local revenues, and 55% of the districts were below the state mean. This great disparity among the districts’ property wealth and the currentstate funding system as itis now applied does not equalize the educational revenues available to the school districts, but only widens the gap.
The appellants devote little attention to the constitutional provisions in question, but contend that there is no requirement of uniformity of educational opportunities throughout the state, that the constitution only requires that all children receive a “general, suitable and efficient” education. Appellants point to cases from other jurisdictions finding no violation of equal protection clauses under similar funding systems, decisions based primarily on the legitimate state interest of promoting local control. See Board of Education v. Nyquist, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 285 S.E.2d 156 (1981). The arguments are not persuasive.
Most cases finding similar state financing systems unconstitutional have found their state’s equal protection clause to be applicable and to require equal educational opportunities. See Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976). In at least one jurisdiction, the court found its constitution demanded an equal education opportunity based solely on an education clause similar to ours. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
There is no sound basis for holding the equal protection clause inapplicable to the facts in this case. The constitutional mandate for a general, suitable and efficient education in no way precludes us from applying the equal protection clause to the present financing system, in fact under the interpretations of such cases as Robinson, supra, that clause only reinforces the decision that the equal protection clause applies.
We can find no legitimate state purpose to support the system. It bears no rational relationship to the educational needs of the individual districts, rather it is determined primarily by the tax base of each district. The trial court found the educational opportunity of the children in this state should not be controlled by the forfuitous circumstance of residence, and we concur in that view. Such a system only promotes greater opportunities for the advantaged while diminishing the opportunities for the disadvantaged.
Those jurisdictions finding no equal protection violation in a system based on district wealth generally uphold the system of funding by finding a legitimate state purpose in maintaining local control. We find, however, two fallacies in this reasoning. First, to alter the state financing system to provide greater equalization among districts does not in any way dictate that local control must be reduced. Second, as pointed out in Serrano, supra, at 948, “The notion of local control was a ‘cruel illusion’ for the poor districts due to limitations placed upon them by the system itself. . . . Far from being necessary to promote local fiscal choice, the present system actually deprives the less wealthy districts of the option.” Consequently, even without deciding whether the right to a public education is fundamental, we can find no constitutional basis for the present system, as it has no rational bearing on the educational needs of the district.
We come to this conclusion in part because we believe the right to equal educational opportunity is basic to our society. “It is the very essence and foundation of a civilized culture; it is the cohesive element that binds the fabric of our society together.” Horton at 377, Bogdanski, J. cone. Education becomes the essential prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively realize their established rights. The opening phrase to our constitutional mandate for a public school system underscores the truth of the principle.
Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty and bulwark of a free and good government, the State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools . . . (Art. 14 § 1)
The appellants’ arguments are wide of the mark in this case. They concede the disparities that exist among the school districts, but they offer no legitimate state purpose to support it. Rather, their attack comes from an oblique standpoint. They assert that the constitution only requires a suitable, effective education and that the appellees have failed to prove that is not true in their districts. The evidence offered may have shown that the appellee districts offered the bare rudiments of educational opportunities, but we are in genuine doubt that they were proved to be suitable and efficient. However, even were the complaining districts shown to meet the bare requirements of educational offerings, that is not what the constitution demands. For some districts to supply the barest necessities and others to have programs generously endowed does not meet the requirements of the constitution. Bare and minimal sufficiency does not translate into equal educational opportunity. “Equal protection is not addressed to minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action.” San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1972). Marshall, J., dissenting.
Appellants also submit that the reason appellees are lacking in funds is not that they are property poor but that they under assessed. The individual school districts, however, have only limited control over the assessment procedure. The assessment is done on a county wide basis and all school boards in the county are represented on the county equalization boards as a minority. Appellants’ argument is additionally weakened by the evidence presented that all counties are presently under assessed and that there are instances where appellee and appellant districts are in the same county and consequently are subject to the same assessment practices.
Appellants contend that once the appellee districts are properly assessed at the mandated level (per Public Service Commission v. Pulaski County Equalization Board, 266 Ark. 64, 582 S.W.2d 942 [1979]) they will have sufficient revenues to provide a suitable education. However, the trial court found otherwise and the evidence does not convince us to the contrary. Too, it misses the main issue. When all counties are assessed at the proper level, the gap will still exist between the poor and wealthy districts and the mandate of the constitution will remain unfulfilled. The appellants’ amicus brief presents a similar point, arguing that the trial court’s ruling was premature and a decision should be deferred until reassessment is completed. This argument ignores the trial court’s findings, which we find convincing, that reassessment will not improve the plight of the property poor districts. The argument also ignores the fact that regardless of the result of reassessment, the fatal flaw in the distribution method under the present system would still exist.
Appellants point out that the appellee districts are not voting the same level of millage as the appellant districts. The record shows otherwise, however, and the average millage of the appellee districts is equal to and in some cases higher than that of the appellant districts. Appellants contend that the income level of appellee districts is higher and they would need to raise their millage level considerably to put them at the same “pain threshold” as that of the appellant districts. Appellants also point to Amendment 405 of the constitution which they claim requires all districts to levy taxes for needed funds before the district can request additional aid from the state. The appellees, they claim, have not first met this burden.
Appellants’ claim that the complaining districts are all of higher income levels is unsustained except for general allegations and unsupported by any statistical proof.' We would also have to assume that this was the case with all property poor districts throughout the state and such speculation has no place in this issue. The same argument was addressed in Serrano, supra. That court responded that the constitutional provision that “specifically authorizes local districts to levy school taxes, in no way implies that that section authorizes a system in violation of the requirements of equal protection.” Serrano at 955. We find that reasoning disposes of the issue.
We have discussed the two major problems faced in financing our state’s educational system. The first is the obvious disparity in property wealth among districts. That wealth is what primarily dictates the amount of revenue each district receives and the quality of education in that district. The second problem is the manner in which the state determines how the state funds are distributed, and as we have said, the current system is not a rational one. The end result is a violation of the mandates of our constitution. Ultimately, the responsibility for maintaining a general, suitable and efficient school system falls upon the state. “Whether the state acts directly or imposes the role upon the local government, the end product must be what the constitution commands. [When a district falls short of the constitutional requirements], whatever the reasons for the violation, the obligation is the state’s to rectify it. If local government fails, the state government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the state must itself meet its continuing obligation. ’ ’ Robinson, supra, at 295 and cited with approval in Pauley, supra at 873. Serrano in.addressing the same problem notes also the limits of judicial interpretation on this issue. The comments are worth repeating:
The dispositive answer to the above arguments is simply that this court is not now engaged in — nor is it about to undertake — the “search for tax equity” which defendants prefigure. As defendants themselves recognize, it is the Legislature which by virtue of institutional competency as well as constitutional function is assigned that difficult and perilous quest. Our task is much more narrowly defined: it is to determine whether the trial court committed prejudicial legal error in determining whether the state school financing system at issue before it was violative of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws insofar as it denies equal educational opportunity to the public school students of this state. If we determine that no such error occurred, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment, leaving the matter of achieving a constitutional system to the body equipped and designed to perform that function. Serrano at 946.
The trial judge was assigned specially to this case. He heard thirty-nine witnesses and reviewed 287 exhibits resulting in over 7400 pages of transcript. His conclusions of fact and law were extensive and detailed, and obvious time and study went into the final decision. We will not overturn the decision below unless we find it clearly erroneous. (ARCP 52). After our own review of the trial court’s findings, the arguments presented by both sides and the decisions of other jurisdictions, we conclude that the findings are not clearly erroneous and, accordingly, the decree is affirmed.
Appellees’ motion to tax costs against appellants pursuant to Rule 9 (e) is denied. We concede the abstract is abbreviated, to say the least, but this is an exceptional case, involving issues and concepts of the broadest possible scope, and we are satisfied appellants have made a good faith effort to give an adequate, if concise, abridgement of the record.
Adkisson, C.J., dissents. Hickman and Purtle, JJ., concur.