HODGES, Chief Justice.
The trial court declared Colorado’s system of financing public elementary and secondary education unconstitutional. This school finance system is encompassed within the provisions of the Public School Finance Act of 1973, section 22-50-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum.Supp., and is affected by the statutory provisions relating to the capital reserve fund, sections 22-40-102(4) and 22-45-103(l)(c), C.R.S. 1973 and 1981 Cum.Supp., and those provisions pertaining to the bond redemption fund, sections 22-42-104(l)(a) and 22-45-103(l)(b), C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum.Supp.1 Appellants are the Colorado State Board of Education and its members. Intervenors-Appellants are 26 school districts within Colorado who challenge the trial court’s declaration. The appellees are school children residing in 16 of the 181 school districts located within the state, who, as plaintiffs below, sought a ruling that the school finance system was unconstitutional.
The trial court determined that the school finance system, which derives approximately forty-seven percent of its operating income from local property tax levies, violates the equal protection provisions of the United States and the Colorado Constitutions, and also violates the Colorado constitutional mandate that a “thorough and uniform” [1011]*1011system of public schools be provided. Colo. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 2.2 We reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Contrary to the trial court, we hold that Colorado’s school finance system does not violate Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution, nor does it deny equal protection of the law to plaintiffs-appellees, or those similarly situated. We also hold, contrary to the trial court, that Colorado’s method of capital outlay financing is constitutional and rule that this method of capital financing, whereby each local school district is governed by a limitation on its taxing authority, is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
I. Historical Background
By section 7 of the Colorado Enabling Act, the Congress of the United States set aside certain lands in each township of Colorado “for the support of the common schools.” 18 pt. 3, U.S.Stat. at L., 474 (1875).
Since statehood, public schools in Colorado have been financed by locally levied property taxes and state contributions. The state’s contribution was initially limited to the revenue generated through the interest, rentals, and leases on the state-owned school lands. In 1935, the first direct state support of local school districts was enacted. It was challenged and found to be constitutional in Wilmore v. Annear, 100 Colo. 106, 65 P.2d 1433 (1937). Since 1935, a combination of local property tax levies and direct state contributions has been the principal source of financial support for Colorado’s public school system.
In 1952, following a study of the school finance system by a Governor’s committee, the General Assembly passed the first Public School Finance Act. See Colorado Legislative Council, Report to the Colorado General Assembly: State Aid to Schools in Colorado, Research Publ. No. 117 (1966). This Act provided each school district with an equalization “support level” or set amount of money for each district in each calendar year. However, this Act was soon criticized for not eliminating the spending disparities among the school districts. Apparently in response to this criticism, the General Assembly enacted the Public School Finance Act of 1973, sections 22-50-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 [hereinafter PSFA], which was challenged in the trial court and is the subject of this appeal. To understand the nature and substance of the issues before us, it is necessary to examine some of the features of Colorado’s school finance system.
II. The School Finance System
There are currently 181 school districts in Colorado providing a kindergarten through twelfth grade education for 535,085 students. Under the PSFA, the school system is financed primarily from local, state, and federal revenues. As an example, in 1977, local taxes generated forty-seven percent of public school funds, the state general fund provided forty-three percent, federal revenues accounted for six percent, and miscellaneous sources contributed the remaining four percent.
Under statutory provisions for levying taxes for educational purposes, each school district shall certify to the county commissioners the amount of revenue needed for operating its school system. The county commissioners then place a levy against the valuation of taxable property within the district’s boundaries to raise the desired revenue. Sections 22-40-102(1) and (2), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Supp. and 1981 Cum. Supp.). Each school district may expend all such revenue collected within its boundaries, provided it is used strictly for educational purposes.
[1012]*1012The school finance system creates four main components to provide funding for the general educational efforts of a school district. These components are authorized revenue base, state equalization aid, guaranteed yield plan, and capital outlay financing.
A. Authorized Revenue Base
The authorized revenue base (ARB) is a specified dollar amount established annually for each district, and is the maximum annual amount a district may spend in general operating expenses per pupil. The ARB amount was first established for each district in 1974, and was based in part on the amount each district was then spending per pupil. This spending figure was used by the General Assembly as an estimate of what the educational costs were for each district. However, the ARB has been adjusted upwards, especially in the low spending districts, to more accurately reflect the educational needs of the districts. Under S.B. 11, Colo.Sess.Laws 1980, ch. 99, 22-50-105 at 559, the minimum ARB in 1982 will be $2,000 per pupil, or the 1981 ARB level plus $160, whichever amount is greater. Compare, S.B. 25, Colo.Sess.Laws 1978, ch. 69, 22-50-106 at 371-372.
A school district may increase its ARB by one of two ways. First, by requesting an ARB increase from the State School District Budget Review Board. Second, if this request is refused in part or in whole, by holding an election so that the electorate may decide on the increase. Sections 22-50-107 and 108, C.R.S.1973. When an ARB increase is granted under either procedure, the district is responsible for funding the increase for the first year. Thereafter, it is included in the formula determining the state equalization aid.
B. State Equalization Aid
The statutory equalization program, section 22-50-105, C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum. Supp., provides financial support for districts lacking a high tax base or revenue raising capacity. Under this section, a district with low revenue generating capacity will receive aid to bridge the difference between revenues generated by local property tax levies and the statutorily guaranteed amount. For example, in 1977, the General Assembly passed S.B. 138 amending the state equalization program in order that $35.00 per pupil would be guaranteed for each mill levied for the general fund of a school district. Colo.Sess.Laws 1977, ch. 264, 22-50-105.
A formula used in determining whether a district is entitled to equalization aid can be illustrated by applying it to the South Cone-jos School District, a district receiving considerable state equalization aid:
Assessed V aluation (AV)3.$4,772,260.00
Authorized Revenue Base (ARB) . . $ 1,181.08
Attendance Entitlement (AE) .... 782 students
Then it is necessary to apply these figures to the formula to determine the local share per mill4 per pupil:
State Guarantee.$35.00
Local Share.$ 6.10
State Equalization Aid.$28.90/mill/pupil
To determine the mill levy:
With the mill levy being 33.75, the state equalization aid per student is $28.90 X 33.75 = $975.38. Thus, the total State aid to the South Conejos School District in 1978 was $975.38 X 782(AE) = $762,844.00.
Accordingly, the State provided the South Conejos School District with the difference between the state guaranteed amount and the revenue raised by a 1 mill levy. In stark contrast, a 1 mill levy in Rangely School District, a district with higher taxable property values, raised $326.27 per pupil during this same period. The Rangely School District was therefore clearly ineligible for State equalization aid.
[1013]*1013C. Guaranteed Yield Plan
Regardless of a school district’s ability to raise local taxes to meet or exceed the State’s equalization aid of $35/mill/pupil, the guaranteed yield provides each district with a flat grant per pupil per mill. Section 22-50-105(2)(d), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Supp. and 1981 Cum.Supp.). If a district levied in excess of 20 mills, the minimum guarantee was $11.35 per mill per pupil in 1979, $13.35 in 1980, $14.41 in 1981, and will be $15.53 in 1982. If the district levied at less than 20 mills, the minimum guarantee of $11.35 set in 1979 remains in effect through 1982. In effect, the act gives a district the benefit of either the State’s share as calculated by the equalization formula or the minimum guarantee, whichever is greater. As an example, the finance formula as applied to the Englewood School District for 1978, resulted in the following guaranteed yield:
Assessed Valuation.$105,870,300.00
Authorized Revenue Base .$ 1,720.85
Attendance Entitlement. 4,201.80
$105,870,300 x 0.001 = $25.20/mill/pupil 4,201.80
Accordingly, under State equalization aid, the Englewood School District would receive $9.80/mill/pupil ($35.00 minus $25.20). However, because of the minimum guaranteed yield, the minimum this district actually received was $11.35/mill/pupil. Thus, in 1978, the Englewood School District had a financial budget of $36.35/mill/pupil or $1.35/mill/pupil over the $35.00 guaranteed yield.
D. Capital Outlay Financing5
There are two primary methods by which school districts may finance capital construction projects: the capital reserve fund, section 22-45-103(l)(c), C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Supp., and the bond redemption fund, section 22-45-103(l)(b), C.R.S.1973. Both funds are financed entirely out of local property tax revenues.
(1) Capital Reserve Fund. The levy for the capital reserve fund may not exceed four mills in any given year. Section 22-40-102(4), C.R.S.1973. Expenditures from this fund are limited to long-range future programs with purposes such as acquisition of land and the construction of buildings thereon or the construction of additions to existing structures. Section 22-45-103(l)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973.
The trial court found that the present capital reserve fund operates so that high-wealth districts can raise more revenue from the statutory maximum of four mills than a low-wealth district can. The facts support this finding. In 1977, for example, the Frisco School District was able to raise $386.52 per pupil under the four mill levy, while the South Conejos School District was only able to generate $23.60 per pupil.
(2) Bond Redemption Fund. This fund is used for major building projects and is subject to approval by the electorate. It operates under a statutorily imposed debt ceiling equal to 20% of a district’s assessed property valuation. Section 22-42-104(l)(a), C.R.S.1973.
The trial court thus found that high-wealth districts were able to generate far greater revenue within the statutory debt ceiling than were the low-wealth districts. Evidence at trial revealed that in 1977, the school districts in the top 10% of assessed property valuation had an average bond redemption rate of 4.74 mills, generating an average yield of $184.50 per pupil, while school districts in the lowest 10% levied at a rate of 12.56 mills, yielding $98.44 per pupil. The bond redemption fund operated so that, in 1978, for example, the South Conejos School District had a debt ceiling of $954,-452 while the Granby School District’s debt ceiling was $8,173,380.
III. Statement of Positions
In summary, the overall scheme of funding Colorado’s public schools rests in part upon the property values within each district. Because of the differences in assessed valuations of the districts, the amounts raised and spent per pupil vary [1014]*1014among the several districts. Appellants contend that this system is both rationally related to a legitimate State purpose and essential to fostering local control within each school district. Appellees, on the other hand, argue that the school finance system violates the equal protection clause by interfering with their fundamental right to education and by creating a “suspect classification” based on wealth. They argue that the school finance system becomes subject to strict judicial scrutiny, which requires that the school finance system be shown to be necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest. Appellees then submit that the trial court was correct in holding that the school finance system failed to satisfy the strict judicial scrutiny test.
With those facts before us, we must first determine whether Colorado’s school finance system impinges on a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class under the equal protection guarantees found in the United States and Colorado Constitutions. If so, the school finance system is subject to strict judicial scrutiny, which was the view of the trial court. If not, we need to then examine whether the school finance system rationally furthers some legitimate state purpose thereby satisfying the dictates of the equal protection guarantee. Lastly, we must determine whether the school finance system complies with the state’s constitutional mandate to provide a “thorough and uniform” system of free public schools.
IV. Equal Protection Analysis
The first issue presented in this case is whether or not Colorado’s school finance system violates the constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws provided in the United States and the Colorado Constitutions.
The trial court declared that the Colorado school finance system interferes with the “fundamental right” to education, and establishes a wealth-based “suspect” classification, thus requiring the system to be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Consequently, the trial court ruled that both of these effects violated the equal protection guarantee under the Colorado Constitution, since they were not supported by a “compelling state interest,” under the strict judicial scrutiny test. In addressing this issue, we will look to the effect of the school finance system as well as to its form, because legislation may create impermissible classifications through its application though not by its language. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
Appellants contend that education is not a “fundamental right” in Colorado and that wealth-based classifications do not create a “suspect” class. They argue the school finance system need not satisfy the higher standard of a “compelling state interest,” but rather need only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Appellants then submit that the latter standard is clearly met as the General Assembly responded rationally in enacting this finance system for the purpose of allowing local control over the educational and financial needs of each school district in Colorado.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that no state shall deny a person equal protection of the law. Although the Colorado Constitution does not contain an identical provision, it is well-established that a like guarantee exists within the constitution’s due process clause, Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 25, and that its substantive application is the same insofar as equal protection analysis is concerned. See Heninger v. Charnes, Colo., 613 P.2d 884 (1980); People v. Layton, Colo., 612 P.2d 83 (1980); People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100, 198 P.2d 150 (1921).6
As in other jurisdictions, we have come to recognize that the equal protection [1015]*1015guarantee insures that all individuals be treated fairly in their exercise of fundamental rights,7 and that suspect classifications8 based on impermissible criteria be eliminated. People v. Childs, 199 Colo. 436, 610 P.2d 101 (1980). See also J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law (1978) [hereinafter J. Nowak, et a7.,]. Under equal protection analysis, legislative enactments are accorded their usual presumption of validity; however, this presumption disappears when the statutory classification impacts on a fundamental right or a suspect class. In such situations, we will employ a more scrutinizing review when determining the constitutionality of the legislation. In Colorado, we recognize three standards of review within equal protection analysis.
The first standard is invoked where the statutory classification is based on gender. In this situation, the State must show that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that it is substantially related to achievement of those objectives. R. McG. v. J. W., Colo., 615 P.2d 666 (1980). Cf. Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 29; People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973) (where the constitutionality of the rape statute is analyzed under Article II, Section 29 of the Colorado Constitution). See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Since this case does not involve a gender-based classification, no further discussion of this standard of review is necessary.9
The second standard of review occurs where a fundamental right is affected or a suspect classification is created. Here, the state has the burden of establishing that the act is necessarily related to a compelling governmental interest. Heninger v. Charnes, supra. See also San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16, reh’g denied, 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973) [hereinafter Rodriguez]; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed.2d 1234 (1938). While the party asserting this challenge must first demonstrate that a fundamental interest or suspect class is involved, [1016]*1016People v. Sprengel, 176 Colo. 277, 490 P.2d 65 (1971), once successful, the state then has the burden of showing that the act is necessarily related to a compelling governmental interest, and, when applicable, of showing that the classification is specifically fashioned and narrowly tailored to further its legitimate objective. See Rodriguez, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).
The third standard of review applies where no fundamental right, suspect classification, or gender classification is involved. In such instance, we will only inquire whether the state action is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Fritz v. Regents of University of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978).
The next step in equal protection analysis is to assign the proper standard of review by determining whether the right to a free public education is a fundamental right and whether wealth is a suspect class.
A. Education as a Fundamental Right
■ In its equal protection analysis, the trial court found that education is a fundamental right under the Colorado Constitution.
At the outset, we note that Rodriguez holds that education is not afforded explicit or implicit protection under the United States Constitution. Id. 411 U.S. at 35, 93 S.Ct. at 1297. From our analysis of this holding and the accompanying discussion, we conclude that Rodriguez states that education is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitution, and therefore, is not subject to strict judicial scrutiny.10
The United States Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the United States Constitution, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958); and Rodriguez resolves this federal issue. Accordingly, since the facts in this case are essentially identical to those in Rodriguez, its pronouncements clearly negate any claim that the Colorado school finance system interferes with a fundamental right to education under the equal protection provision of the United States Constitution. The issue remaining within this inquiry is whether education is a fundamental right under the Colorado Constitution.11
[1017]*1017In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that whether education is fundamental under the Federal Constitution is determined not by comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing but:
“Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”
Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution explicitly requires the General Assembly to establish “a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state.” Accordingly, if this court were to adopt the “Rodriguez test,” educational opportunity would then arguably be a fundamental interest in Colorado entitled to strict scrutiny. However, we reject the “Rodriguez test.” While the test may be applicable in determining fundamental rights under the United States Constitution,12 it has no applicability in determining fundamental rights under the Colorado Constitution. This is so because of the basic and inherently different natures of the two constitutions as will be briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
The United States Constitution is one of restricted authority and delegated powers. As provided in the Tenth Amendment, all powers not granted to the United States by the Constitution, nor denied to the States by it, are reserved to the States or to the People. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S.Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 609, 132 A.L.R. 1430 (1941). See also U.S. Const. Art. IX.
Conversely, the Colorado Constitution is not one of limited powers where the state’s authority is restricted to the four-corners of the document. People ex rel. Rhodes v. Fleming, 10 Colo. 553, 16 P. 298 (1887). The Colorado Constitution does not restrict itself to addressing only those areas deemed fundamental. Rather, it contains provisions which are both equally suited for statutory enactment, e.g., Mining and Irrigation, Colo.Const. Art. XVI, and Nuclear Detonations, Colo.Const. Art. XXVI; as well as those deemed fundamental to our concept of ordered liberty, e.g., Freedom of Elections, Colo.Const. Art. II, Sec. 5. Thus, under the Colorado Constitution, fundamental rights are not necessarily determined by whether they are guaranteed explicitly or implicitly within the document.
On its face, Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution merely mandates action by the General Assembly — it does not establish education as a fundamental right, and it does not require that the General Assembly establish a central public school finance system restricting each school district to equal expenditures per student.
We recognize unequivocally that public education plays a vital role in our free society. It can be a major factor in an individual’s chances for economic and social success as well as a unique influence on a child’s development as a good citizen and on his future participation in political and community life. See Rodriguez, supra; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954); People [1018]*1018v. Y.D.M., 197 Colo. 403, 593 P.2d 1356 (1979). See also Note, Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065 (1969); F. Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 Colum.L. Rev. 1355 (1971).13 However, we do not accept appellees’ argument that because public education plays such a vital role in our society, any disparate impact resulting from the application of the school finance statutes, amounts to an unjustifiable governmental interference with the individual’s right to speak and to vote. Such an argument was effectively rejected in Rodriguez, supra, and we agree with the United States Supreme Court’s statement that:
“We have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice.” (Emphasis in original.)
While our representative form of government and democratic society may benefit to a greater degree from a public school system in which each school district spends the exact dollar amount per student with an eye toward providing identical education for all, these are considerations and goals which properly lie within the legislative domain. Judicial intrusion to weigh such considerations and achieve such goals must be avoided. This is especially so in this case where the controversy, as we perceive it, is essentially directed toward what is the best public policy which can be adopted to attain quality schooling and equal educational opportunity for all children who attend our public schools. See M. Cox, State Judicial Power: A Separation of Powers Perspective, 34 Okla.L.Rev. 207, 227 (1981).
The method Colorado has chosen for funding public school education is the real focal point of the challenge here. We note that appellees did not allege or prove that they are being denied an educational opportunity. Appellees instead argue that we should accept, amidst a raging controversy, that there is a direct correlation between school financing and educational quality and opportunity. We refuse, however, to venture into the realm of social policy under the guise that there is a fundamental right to education which calls upon us to find that equal educational opportunity requires equal expenditures for each school child. Even if we were to accept appellees’ contention, we would, nonetheless, refuse to adopt their a priori argument whereby a lack of complete uniformity in school funding between all of the school districts of Colorado necessarily leads to a violation of the equal protection laws in this state.
Lastly, a review of the record and case law shows that courts are ill-suited to determine what equal educational opportunity is, especially since fundamental disagreement exists concerning the extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures and the quality of education. See Rodriguez, supra, nt. 86 at 411 U.S. at 43, 93 S.Ct. at 1302; Serrano v. Priest, (Serrano I), 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, supra.
A heartfelt recognition and endorsement of the importance of an education does not elevate a public education to a fundamental interest warranting strict scrutiny. The constitutional mandate which requires the General Assembly to establish “a thorough and uniform system of free public schools,” is not a mandate for absolute equality in educational services or expenditures. Rather, it mandates the [1019]*1019General Assembly to provide to each school age child the opportunity to receive a free education, and to establish guidelines for a thorough and uniform system of public schools.
B. Wealth as a Suspect Classification
The trial court found that the totality of the evidence in this case establishes a wealth-based suspect classification requiring strict judicial scrutiny under equal protection analysis. The court went on to find that the school finance system violated the equal protection clause of both the United States and the Colorado Constitutions by failing to demonstrate that the suspect classification is necessarily related to a compelling governmental interest.
Concerning the United States Constitution, the trial court found that the facts in this case were distinguishable from those in Rodriguez, and thus held that Rodriguez was not controlling. We disagree.
In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court conceded that prior decisions have applied strict scrutiny review to wealth-based classifications; however, the court emphasized that the facts in those cases had two characteristics which distance them from the situation in Rodriguez. First, the plaintiffs in those cases were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit due to their impecunity; and second, as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to exercise a fundamental right. Thus, it was concluded in Rodriguez, where the facts were essentially identical to the facts presented here, that wealth-based distinctions alone do not create a suspect class under the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution, and that strict scrutiny review is applied only where wealth is entwined with a recognized fundamental right.14 Id. 411 U.S. at 20-22, 93 S.Ct. at 1290-1291.
We find that Rodriguez clearly addresses and discards appellees’ wealth based equal protection claim under the United States Constitution. Simply, the Rodriguez court stated:
“... a sufficient answer to appellees’ argument is that, at least where wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.”
Id. 411 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 1291. Other states which have confronted this same issue, have held, as we do here, that Rodriguez establishes that wealth alone in public school finance cases is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. See Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, supra, 606 P.2d at 319; Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), supra, 557 P.2d at 950-951; Robinson v. Cahill, supra, 303 A.2d at 379; Milliken v. Green, supra, 212 N.W.2d at 714.
The issue of whether wealth is a suspect class under the Colorado Constitution is one of first impression. We note at the outset that the relative wealth criterion allegedly [1020]*1020used in the school finance system differs fundamentally from situations where, due to their inability to pay, indigents are totally excluded either from participation in institutions or from exercising their rights. See Franklin v. Dist. Ct. of Tenth Jud. Dist. In and For the County of Pueblo, 194 Colo. 189, 571 P.2d 1072 (1977).15 That is not the situation in this case, and therefore, we limit our review to the issue of whether wealth alone creates a suspect classification under Colorado’s equal protection provisions.
As previously noted, in asserting that legislation unconstitutionally impinges on a suspect class, appellees herein have the burden of establishing that they constitute such a class. People v. Sprengel, supra; Dunbar v. Hoffman, 171 Colo. 481, 468 P.2d 742 (1970). We hold in this case that appellees have failed to prove that they constitute a recognized, distinct class.
Appellees argue that a “suspect class” is present here either as a “class” composed of low-wealth school districts, or as a “class” composed of low-income people. We disagree. The evidence in this case does not demonstrate that the school finance system operates to the peculiar disadvantage of any identifiable, recognized class.
First, the criteria for a suspect class cannot be met by a school district regardless of the merits. As the supreme court emphasized in Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948), the equal protection clause embodies personal rights, and by its very terms is limited to individuals. We find that same restriction to apply in Colorado’s equal protection guarantee. In short, a political body cannot be a suspect class. See Board of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 150 Colo. 198, 372 P.2d 152 (1962), appeal dismissed for want of federal question, 372 U.S. 226, 83 S.Ct. 679, 9 L.Ed.2d 714 (1963).
Second, there is no distinct and insular “class” of poor persons16 as required for equal protection analysis. Under this analysis, we define a “class” as being a group marked by common attributes or characteristics. Here, however, the alleged class of “poor persons,” while possibly linked by their respective income levels, have no common attribute relative to Colorado’s school financing system. The evidence does not show that poor persons in Colorado are concentrated in low-property wealth districts, or that they uniformly or consistently receive a lower quality education, or that the districts in which they reside uniformly or consistently expend less money on education.
For example, evidence at trial shows that Denver has the greatest concentration of school children from low-income families. Yet, Denver, by comparison, is a relatively high property wealth district. Thus, it is incorrect to suggest that poor persons, as a class, receive discriminatory treatment from PSFA. Secondly, a Colorado Department of Education study shows that there is no correlation between low-property wealth districts and low-income residents.17 Indeed, the study suggests that it is more accurate to state that a correlation exists between a district’s property wealth and pupil population. For example, the study [1021]*1021reports that in 1977, the Arapahoe School District in Cheyenne County had an assessed taxable property valuation of $3,785,-270, while South Conejos School District’s valuation was $4,675,100. Yet, due to dis-paraties in pupil population, Arapahoe’s assessed valuation per pupil was $52,940.84, while South Conejos’ valuation per pupil was $5,897.69. Colorado Department of Education, The Impact of the Public School Finance Act — Fifth Year Analysis of the Act — 1978 Budget Year (1978).
Appellees have failed to prove that they compose a class which is identifiably distinct and insular. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). There is no evidence showing a satisfactory statistical correlation between poor persons within the state and low-spending school districts. We find that such a correlation is essential if we are to apply strict judicial scrutiny to an invidious discrimination of a “suspect class.”
Additionally, even though appellees do not constitute a recognized class for equal protection purposes, we find that even if they did, wealth alone would not create a suspect classification in Colorado.
Traditionally, suspect classifications have been restricted to those groups which are readily identifiable by a common racial or lineal trait. One explanation for this is that race and lineage are congenital, unalterable characteristics. See 82 Harv.L. Rev. supra at 1126-1127. Another view points out that discrimination against individuals within suspect classes has been habitual, which in turn, warrants the preferred treatment. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880). Here, however, the alleged “class” of low-income persons constitutes an incredibly amorphous group, a group which changes over time and by context, and which is unable to show the historical pattern of discrimination that traditional “suspect” classes can.
In Rodriguez, the court reiterated the traditional features of suspectness: namely, (1) that the class is either subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment with its attendant disabilities, or (2) it is relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. It is evident in this case that appellees do not satisfy either of these indi-cia of suspectness.
Appellees present no evidence to show that they have been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment. Indeed, a review of Colorado’s school finance system presents a contrary position. Colorado has historically sought equality between the school districts, making a concerted effort to avoid any disparate impact upon the poor. As this court noted in the early case of McCartey v. School Dist. No. 9, 75 Colo. 305, 309, 225 P. 835, 836 (1924):
“It is perfectly clear from an examination of this entire act [providing minimum salaries for Teachers] that its chief purpose is to raise the education standard in the [financially] weaker districts of the state and place the burden incident thereto upon the [financially] stronger districts and, in the case of necessity, upon the state itself.”
The historical development of public education in Colorado has been centered on the philosophy of local control. See Colo. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 15; School Dist. No. 16 v. Union High School No. 1, 60 Colo. 292, 152 P. 1149 (1915); Merrill v. Barr, 73 Colo. 87, 213 P. 576 (1923); People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, 81 Colo. 276, 255 P. 610 (1927). See also Carey v. Board of Education of Arapahoe School District, 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir.1979). Taxation of local property has not only been the primary means of funding local education, but also of insuring that the local citizenry direct the business of providing public school education in their school district.18 This was clearly expressed in [1022]*1022Belier v. Wilson, 59 Colo. 96, 147 P. 355 (1915), where this court held that under Article IX, Section 15 of the Colorado Constitution, the Otero County Commissioners could not levy a tax upon property located within their School District No. 9 for the support of their School District No. 11. To do otherwise, would sever the link connecting the local citizenry to their school district.
In short, we find that appellees have failed to show they have been subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment. Accord, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra; and Rodriguez, supra.
We also find no evidence to show that appellees have been relegated to a position of political powerlessness.19 Appellees assert that their political powerlessness is apparent by the passage of the PSFA which operates against them. This is a circular argument which we refuse to adopt; to do otherwise, would extend the “politically powerless” designation to any group alleging that certain legislation disfavors them.
Lastly, we find that wealth alone is not a suspect classification in Colorado. The Colorado Constitution does not forbid disparities in wealth, nor does it forbid persons residing in one district from taxing themselves at a rate higher than persons in another district. As a primary result of this, we have steadfastly refused to impose strict scrutiny review to actions implementing economic or social policy. See Johnson v. Division of Employment, 191 Colo. 38, 550 P.2d 334 (1976); Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). See also United States v. Kras, supra; Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 92 S.Ct. 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). We reaffirm our adherence to that principle today.
Accordingly, we find that appellees fail to satisfy the requisite elements constituting an identifiable “class”; that they do not meet the traditional features of suspectness; and that wealth alone will not create a suspect classification in Colorado.
C. , Rational Basis Standard of Review
Having concluded that no suspect class or - fundamental right is involved, the remaining step in equal protection analysis is to determine whether the Colorado public school finance system rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 53 L.Ed.2d 484 (1977).20
In instances such as this, a statutory classification is entitled to the usual presumption of validity with the individual bringing the attack having the burden of showing that it fails to rationally further any legitimate state purpose. Harding v. Industrial Commission, supra. Additionally, under the rational basis test, we are obligated to uphold any classification based on facts which can reasonably be conceived as supporting the action. See Rodriguez, supra; Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); Henninger v. Charnes, supra; Fritz v. Regents of University of Colorado, supra.
The first task is to identify the legitimate state purpose which this legislation purportedly furthers. Here, the General Assembly has not expressly declared what the objective of the school finance system is; however, appellants and interve-nor-appellants advance the argument that the objective is that of local control.21 That is, control of the locally elected school board [1023]*1023by the voters in the district. Such control is exercised by influencing the determination of how much money should be raised for the local schools, and how that money should be spent.
We agree with this interpretation for although the objective of local control is not explicit within the school finance system itself, we find it apparent upon reviewing the history of Colorado’s educational system along with selected constitutional provisions and interpretative case law. See, e.g., Colo. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 15 (schools to be controlled and directed by local school district directors); Colo.Const. Art. IX, Sec. 16 (the General Assembly and state board of education are prohibited from prescribing textbooks for the schools); People ex rel. Voll-mar v. Stanley, supra, (parents have inherent civil right to exercise control over the education of their children).
Thus, since local control is the objective of Colorado’s school finance system, the remaining question is whether such objective is rationally furthered by this system.
Every statute is presumed constitutional unless proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be constitutionally invalid. Turner v. Lyon, 189 Colo. 234, 539 P.2d 1241 (1975). We find that utilizing local property taxation to partly finance Colorado’s schools is rationally related to effectuating local control over public schools. The use of local taxes affords a school district the freedom to devote more money toward educating its children than is otherwise available in the state-guaranteed minimum amount. It also enables the local citizenry greater influence and participation in the decision making process as to how these local tax dollars are spent. Some communities might place heavy emphasis on schools, while others may desire greater police or fire protection, or improved streets or public transportation. Finally, local control provides each district with the opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence. See Rodriguez, supra.
Although we recognize that due to disparaties in wealth, the present finance system can lead to the low-wealth district having less fiscal control than wealthier districts, this result, by itself, does not strike down the entire school finance system. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1110, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); ■ Rodriguez, supra. Indeed, a legislative scheme may not be condemned simply because it does not effectuate the state’s goals with perfection. Dandridge v. Williams, supra.
Although all educational financing cases are sui generis in the sense that the alleged deprivation is relative rather than absolute, here, we find no discrimination, invidious or otherwise, in a system that applies a uniform subsidy formula on a statewide basis, while concurrently promoting community control by means of local taxation.
Accordingly, we find the PSFA to be constitutional as rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
We also hold that the statutorily imposed 4-mill levy restriction prescribed for the capital reserve fund, section 22-40-102(4), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Supp.) and the 20% limit on the valuation for assessment of the taxable property for the bond redemption fund, section 22-42-104(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1980 Supp.), are also rationally related to legitimate state purpose, and are therefore declared constitutional.
The capital reserve fund restriction and the bond redemption fund limitation are not accompanied by any legislatively declared purpose. However, an analysis of the school finance system demonstrates that these restrictions or limitations are an important part of the state’s system of financing public services and that they are rationally related to the goals sought to be achieved.
Limitations upon public indebtedness and spending are constitutionally authorized and imposed in Article XI, Sections 3, 5 and 6 of Colorado’s Constitution. Here, the statutory restrictions or limitations as [1024]*1024to both funds are tied to the taxable property valuation in each school district, and serve as an outer limit to the district’s taxing authority. See also section 31-15-302(l)(d), C.R.S.1973 (indebtedness incurred by governing body of municipality shall not exceed three percent of the actual value of the municipality’s taxable property); section 32-l-1101(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1981 Cum. Supp.) (restricts the tax levy imposed in Special Districts to not more than, (I) eight mills for fire protection districts, (II) two mills for hospital districts, and (III) four mills for park and recreation districts). The legislative prerogative of controlling the outer limits of any agency’s taxing authority involves a legitimate and wholly rational state purpose. The purpose of such limitations is essentially to prevent the present pledging of future public funds. See In re Interrogatories by Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350 (1977); In re Senate Resolution No. 2, 94 Colo. 101, 31 P.2d 325 (1933).
In City of Trinidad v. Haxby, 136 Colo. 168, 315 P.2d 204 (1957), this court addressed the issue of constitutionally imposed limitations, and stated:
“If the framers of the Constitution were unnecessarily restrictive in prescribing the constitutional limitation, which many believe was designed to protect the credit of the state and its political subdivisions for the improvident incurring of public debt, the remedy lies with the people who have the power to repeal the limitation at the polls.”
Id. 136 Colo, at 177, 315 P.2d at 208. We embrace that view again here.
The restrictions and limitations found in the capital reserve fund and the bond redemption fund are rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of controlling the public debt. While we may not agree with these legislative determinations, our role here is to review the validity of this legislative action, not to determine social policy. Accordingly, we find these two provisions constitutionally valid as being rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.
V. Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution
The appellees contend that the school finance system violates Article IX, Section 2 of Colorado’s Constitution. In relevant part, this constitutional section states: “The general assembly shall .. . provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state. . . . ”
Appellees’ argument is essentially that the “thorough and uniform” clause requires the state to provide equal educational opportunity to its schoolchildren, and that the present system violates this mandate by creating varying educational opportunities due to revenue differences between the districts.
We have never been called upon to interpret Article IX, Section 2 in any context which would prove helpful to this case although the provision is discussed in many cases.22 Also, we are unable to find any [1025]*1025historical background to glean guidance regarding the intention of the framers.
Nonetheless, this court has previously found that the term “thorough and uniform” does not require complete equality in the sense of providing free textbooks to all students. Marshall v. School District RE # 3 Morgan County, 191 Colo. 451, 553 P.2d 784 (1976). We have also found that the word “uniform” means a pupil residing in a district without a high school is entitled to attend a high school in another district at the former district’s expense. Duncan v. People ex rel. Moser, 89 Colo. 149, 299 P. 1060 (1931); Hotchkiss v. Montrose County High School Dist., 85 Colo. 67, 273 P. 652 (1914). However, we have never interpreted this constitutional provision to require equal expenditures within the districts.
We find that Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution is satisfied if thorough and uniform educational opportunities are available through state action in each school district. While each school district must be given the control necessary to implement this mandate at the local level, this constitutional provision does not prevent a local school district from providing additional educational opportunities beyond this standard. In short, the requirement of a “thorough and uniform system of free public schools” does not require that educational expenditures per pupil in every school district be identical.
We hold that Colorado’s present school financing system does not violate the “thorough and uniform” mandate.23 We note that this mandate is particularly implemented by the following statutes. Section 22-30-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 (one class of school districts is created); section 22-32-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 (creating a uniform system of governance for those districts); section 22-60-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (creating a uniform teacher certification program); section 22-33-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 (insuring the general availability of the public school program); and, section 22-50-101 et seq., C.R.S.1973 (establishing a uniform system of school finance).
While it is clearly the province and duty of the judiciary to determine what the law is, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974), the fashioning of a constitutional system for financing elementary and secondary public education in Colorado is not only the proper function of the General Assembly, but this function is expressly mandated by the Colorado Constitution. Colo.Const. Art. IX, Sec. 2. Thus, whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state’s system. This decision should not be read to indicate that we find Colorado’s school finance system to be without fault or not requiring further legislative improvements. Our decision today declares only that it is constitutionally permissible.
The judgment of the district court is reversed.
ERICKSON, J., specially concurs.
DUBOFSKY and LOHR, JJ., dissent.
QUINN, J., does not participate.