Justice BENDER
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program ("Pilot Program" or "the program"), sections 22-56-101 to -110, TA C.R.S. (2003), violates the local control provisions of article IX, seetion 15 of the Colorado Constitution.
[935]*935The program was challenged in the district court by eight parents on behalf of their children as well as several concerned individuals and institutions (collectively "plaintiffs"). They are supported on this appeal by the Colorado Association of School Boards as amicus curiae. The program was defended by Bill Owens in his official capacity as Governor and twelve parents who intervened because they wanted their children to participate in the program (collectively "defendants").
The trial court found the Pilot Program interferes with the local school districts' discretion to allocate their funding, and therefore violates the local control requirement of article IX, section 15. The trial court also concluded that it could not interpret the program in a constitutional manner without effectively reading section 15 out of the constitution. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the program was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendants appeal to this Court, arguing that the General Assembly has plenary authority to guide and implement educational policy.1 Pursuant to this authority, the General Assembly has determined that the Pilot Program best serves the needs of children who "simply are not succeeding in the traditional school district setting."
The defendants contend that the local control provisions of article IX, section 15 do not place any impediment in the way of the General Assembly's power to enact the Pilot Program. First, the defendants argue that the program does not disturb the districts' authority over instruction in any way because students who participate in the program leave the district. Thus, the district retains control over instruction of those students who remain in the district.
Second, the defendants argue that school finance and educational policy have evolved significantly since this Court was first called upon to construe article IX, section 15. Today, the state provides the majority of funding to the public schools and regulates education far more comprehensively than it did when article IX was adopted. These changes in the practical management of the public schools, the defendants argue, have rendered the meaning of local control flexible enough to admit a program such as the Pilot Program into the management of the public schools.
Our task is to assess the constitutionality of the Pilot Program. We question neither the merits nor the wisdom of the policy decisions made by the General Assembly and embodied in this legislation. The defendants are correct that funding of the public schools has changed dramatically since article IX was adopted, and that the General Assembly has significant authority to guide and implement educational policy. However, article IX, section 15 creates and requires a structure of school governance that has remained unchanged since statehood despite these changes in school funding, and the Pilot Program does not comport with this constitutional structure.
Through article IX, section 15, the framers created a representative body to govern instruction in the public schools. The qualified electors of each district elect local school boards, who in turn "shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts." - Beginning with Belier v. Wilson, 59 Colo. 96, 147 P. 355 (1915), this Court has consistently construed this provision to mean that local school districts must retain control over any instruction paid for with locally-raised funds. Indeed, more recently, in Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.1982), we held that our state-wide system of school finance is designed to preserve local control over locally-raised tax revenues, and that control over these funds is essential to maintain the democratic framework created by our state constitution. Control over locally-raised funds allows local electors to tailor educational policy to suit the needs of the individual districts, free from state intrusion. Without control over locally raised funds, the representative body mandated by our state [936]*936constitution loses any power over the man-agément of public education.
Given the mandates of article IX, section 15, we hold that the Pilot Program violates the local control requirements of our state constitution because it directs the school districts to turn over a portion of their locally-raised funds to nonpublic schools over whose instruction the districts have no control. Irrespective of the fact that the goals of the program and the policy considerations underlying it are laudable, we see no way to reconcile the structure of the program with the requirements of the Colorado Constitution. To hold otherwise would render the local control provisions of article IX, section 15 meaningless.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Facts and Proceedings Below
The Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program is designed to meet the "educational needs of high-poverty, low-achieving children in [Colorado's] highest-poverty public schools." § 22-56-102(1)(a), 7A C.R.S. (2008). Participation in the program is mandatory for any school district that, "for the 2001-02 school year, had at least eight schools that received an academic performance rating of 'low' or 'unsatisfactory' pursuant to section 22-7-604(5), and which ... continues to operate said schools in the 2008-04 school year."2 § 22-56-108(10)(a)(I). Other school districts may voluntarily participate in the program. § 22-56-104(1)(b).
The program is available to low-income, low-achieving children who atterd public sehool in a participating school district. Only those children who are eligible to receive free or low-cost lunch under the National School Lunch Act may participate. § 22-56-104(2)(a). Academic criteria vary according to the child's age. A child in grades four through twelve may participate if the child was enrolled in public school during the previous year and performed at an "unsatisfactory" level in at least one academic area on the Colorado Scholastic Assessment Program (CSAP) or in reading, writing, or mathematics on the ACT college admission test. § 22-56-104(2)(b)(D(A)-(B). A child in grades one through three may participate if the child lacks "overall learning readiness" due to at least three family risk factors as defined in section 22-28-106 and resides in a district in which the neighborhood school has been rated "low" or "unsatisfactory." § 22-56-104(2)(b)(ID)(A)~(C).
If'a child is eligible to participate in the program and has been accepted by a qualified nonpublic school, the child's parents may enter into a contract with the school district in which the child is enrolled. § 22-56-107(1). The school district is then required to make four assistance payments to the parents, who in turn must endorse the check "for the sole use of the participating nonpublic school." § 22-56-108(8) and (4)(a). The school district is required to pay the lesser of "the participating nonpublic school's actual educational cost per pupil," or a percentage of the school district's per pupil operating revenues. § 22-56-108(2)(a)-(b)(I-II1).
As the program is currently enacted, enrollment is subject to statutory caps. During the 2004-05 school year, enrollment is limited to one percent of a participating school district's total student population. That percentage increases to two percent during the 2005-06 school year, four percent during the 2006-07 school year, and finally to six percent from the 2007-08 school year onward. See § 22-56-104(b)(a)(T)-(IV).
The plaintiffs challenged the program on several grounds, including that the program is special legislation in violation of article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution, and that the program violates the local control provisions of article IX, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution.3 The plaintiffs moved [937]*937for judgment on the pleadings on these two issues, and, in response, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment dismissing these issues.
The trial court first found that the program is not special legislation in violation of article V, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution and therefore dismissed that cause of action.4 The court then turned to the question whether the program violates the local control provisions of article IX, section 15, and found the program unconstitutional.
Article IX, section 15 mandates the creation of school districts and provides a broad sketch of the districts' powers:
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.
After an extensive review of our case law interpreting and applying section 15, the trial court concluded section 15 "mandates that the local district must have discretion over how money is spent to provide instruction for students who live in the district." The court then stressed that a substantial amount of funding for the program would come from local tax revenues, which have long been considered essential to effectuating local control over public education. The court found that implementation of the program is governed completely by statute and leaves the local school districts without discretion to determine which nonpublic schools or which students may participate.
The trial court concluded that because the school districts have no control over how locally-raised funds are spent or how the program is implemented, the program runs afoul of the local control requirement of article IX, section 15. The court found that it could not construe the program in a constitutional manner without interpreting section 15 "as being of so little import that the state can exert total control over a certain segment of instruction." Hence, the court concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the program was unconstitutional.
The defendants now appeal to this Court, and urge us to hold that the Pilot Program comports with the mandates of article IX, section 15.
Analysis
The defendants advance two arguments in support of the program. First, the defendants contend that the program does not impact a school district's control over instruction because students participating in the program leave the district to attend private school. The defendants interpret seetion 15 to require school district control only over instruction per se in the public schools. When a student leaves the district, the district no longer has any constitutional obligation regarding the instruction of that student, and therefore the district is no longer [938]*938accountable to those students who participate in the program.
Second, the defendants submit that the source of funds for the program is not relevant to an assessment of the program's constitutionality. The defendants emphasize the significant changes in "school finance and educational choice" since article IX, section 15 was adopted, and point to the failure of the school districts to meet the needs of the lowest-income, lowest-achieving students in the public schools. The defendants urge us to recognize that the General Assembly's supervisory powers over education are broad enough, and our constitution flexible enough, to permit the legislature to address this failure though enactment of the Pilot Program.
Our review of the history of article IX, section 15 and our case law construing it leads us to conclude that to accept these arguments would effectively delete the local control requirement from our state constitution. Because we see no way to reconcile the requirements of section 15 with the Pilot Program as it is currently enacted, we hold that the program is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Local Control
The principle of local control has deep roots in Colorado's constitutional history. The Colorado Constitution was adopted in 1876 in an atmosphere of deep distrust of centralized authority. See Dale A. Oesterle & Richard B. Collins, The Colorado State Constitution: A Reference Guide 1 (2002). The document ultimately adopted was designed to "protect citizens from legislative misbehavior," and thus, while the delegates recognized that a legislature must inevitably be created, they "assiduously wrote provisions that took away much of [the General Assembly's] discretionary authority." Id. at 1-2.
The provisions governing education reflect the delegates' ambivalence about legislative power. Article IX, section 2 empowers the General Assembly to create and maintain a public school system:
The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.
Article IX, section 15 then provides that control over instruction in the public schools shall devolve to local school boards, whose members are elected by the residents of the school districts:
The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be established a board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be elected by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.
As it was initially drafted, however, article IX vested responsibility for public school instruction in the state board of education. See Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention for the State of Colorado 185 (1907). This draft prompted considerable debate, which focused on the wisdom of investing control over the public schools in a political entity. As one delegate put it, the fear was that article IX "gave the [State] Board the direction of the schools, therefore making the whole thing a political affair; there ought to be no possibility of a suspicion that politics should run the schools of the territory." Constitutional Convention, Denver Daily Times, Feb. 12, 1876.
This distrust of the political character of the state board was voiced in many ways. For example, several delegates expressed distrust of the state board's ability to resist political corruption in the area of text book selection, which they feared exposed the state board to "a mine of bribery and corruption." Id. These delegates urged that control over decisions such as text book selection "should be taken entirely out of politics, and put as near the people as possible." Id. In a similar vein, one delegate opined that allowing the state board to control text book selection would create a system "whereby school officers could line their pockets with money derived from the taxes of the people." The [939]*939Constitutional Convention, Denver Daily Tribune, Feb. 14, 1876. He insisted that the best way to avoid such corruption was to distribute decision making authority "to as small a degree as possible, and bring it home to each district. It should be left to the people at home." Id.
This theme of placing management of the public schools closer to the people was echoed in another aspect of the debate, which focused on the people who would comprise the state board. Some delegates objected to state control over instruction on competence grounds, stating "[the officers whom it was proposed to invest with the management of the schools must of necessity be politicians . and the possibilities are that they would not know much about school affairs." Constitutional Convention, Denver Daily Times, Feb. 12, 1876. Ultimately, the delegates chose to confer responsibility for instruction, not merely text book selection, on the local school districts and entrust the state board of education with "general supervision" of the public schools.5 See Colo. Const. Art. IX, §§ 1, 15, 16; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639, 646-47 (Colo.1999).
With the adoption of article IX, Colorado became one of only six states with an express constitutional local control requirement. See Booth, 984 P.2d at 646. In that provision, the framers made the choice to place control "as near the people as possible" by creating a representative government in miniature to govern instruction. And since its adoption, this Court has consistently emphasized the importance of local control to the state's educational system. See id.
The Belier line of cases
As the defendants point out, nothing in the language of article IX, section 15 connects local control over instruction to control over locally-raised tax revenues. However, beginning with Belter, this Court has had numerous occasions to define the contours of the local control requirement of section 15, and in each case we have held that control over locally-raised funds is essential to effectuating the constitutional requirement of local control over instruction.
In Belier, we held that taxes raised in one school district could not be used to fund a public high school in another district. 59 Colo. at 98, 147 P. at 356. The legislation at issue in Belter allowed contiguous school districts to establish a union high school, which students who resided in either district could attend. Tax revenues raised in both districts were to be used to fund the union high school, while control over instruction would fall to the board of the district in which the union high school was located. We concluded that such a scheme violated the "letter and spirit" of article IX, section 15, because the electors in the paying district had no "voice in the selection of those who manage and control the school" in the receiving district. Id.
That same year, in School District No. 16 v. Union High School No. 1, we considered the constitutionality of a statute that allowed a student who resided in a district without a high school to attend a high school in a reighboring district at the expense of the student's district of residence. 60 Colo. 292, 152 P. 1149 (1915). As in Belfer, we held that funds raised in one district could not be used to pay for public school in another district, and explained that imposing such a requirement on a local school district "clearly interfered with the control of instruction" in the paying district. Id. 60 Colo. at 298, 152 P. at 1149. Essential to this holding was the idea that local control requires a school district to have discretion over any instruction paid for with locally-raised funds. Id. (holding that the school district must retain discretion over "the character of ... instruction the pupils [of the district] shall receive at the cost of the district") (emphasis added); see also Hotchkiss v. Montrose County High Sch. Dist., 85 Colo. 67, 273 P. 652 (1928) (declaring invalid under article IX, section 15 a statute that permits a student to attend a public school in a neighboring district and [940]*940compel her home district to pay tuition to the neighboring district).
Finally, in Craig v. People ex rel. Hazzard, we held that the General Assembly may accomplish inter-district funding without running afoul of article IX, section 15 only by drawing funds exclusively from the state-controlled public school income fund. 89 Colo.. 189, 299 P. 1064 (1981). In that case, we rejected a challenge to a statute that permitted a high school student to attend a public school in a neighboring district in certain circumstances. Under the statute, in the event that a student attended a neighboring district's school, the superintendent of the state public school fund was authorized to withhold from the student's district an amount sufficient to pay the student's tuition and transfer that amount to the neighboring district. We held that this scheme comports with article IX, section 15 because it "only involves the apportionment of the public school fund by the superintendent of public instruction, and does not concern the apportionment, distribution, or expenditure of county or school funds raised by taxation." Craig, 89 Colo. at 147, 299 P. at 1067 (emphasis added).
In the Belter era, we serupulously honored the framers' preference, as expressed in article IX, section 15, for local over state control of instruction, even in the face of legislative efforts to address serious shortcomings on the part of local school districts, These cases confirmed the constitutional status of the local control requirement by stressing the importance of district control of locally-raised funds over and above the legislature's power to guide and implement educational policy.
The defendants frankly acknowledge that from a funding point of view, the General Assembly would have the authority to enact the Pilot Program but for the Belter line of cases, and accordingly they urge us to overturn them. The defendants argue that these cases should be understood as "limited to [their] facts" because they were decided at a time where state involvement in the management and funding of the public schools was far more limited than it is today. Thus, the defendants contend that these cases are simply inapplicable to today's cases involving modern school finance.
We cannot accept this proposition. The Belier line of cases is not, as the defendants argue, relevant only to an archaic system of public school management. We have reaffirmed the vitality of our interpretation of article IX in those cases many times since Belier and its progeny were decided, most recently to reject a constitutional attack posed to our state-wide system of public finance. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1021-22, 1028. If we were to abandon Belier now and uphold the Pilot Program, we would also, as we explain below, abandon the rationale of our public school finance system as we understood it in Lujan.
Lujan
In Lyjan we held that the local control provision of section 15 protects school districts against legislative efforts to require them to spend locally-raised funds on instruction that the district does not control, and preserves the districts' democratic framework.
In that case, we considered whether the Public School Finance Act violates the equal protection provisions of the Colorado Constitution or the mandate of article IX, section 2 that the state provide a "thorough and uniform" system of public schools. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1010. Under the Finance Act, the public schools derive a significant percentage of their operating income from local property tax revenues.6 Because assessed property values vary from district to district, property-rich school districts are able to generate substantially more income from property tax revenues than property-poor school districts, which results in a disparity among [941]*941the income the districts receive. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1013. Thus, for example, at the time Lujan was decided the Frisco School District was able to raise $386.52 per student, while the South Conejos School District raised only $23.60 per student. Id. at 1088 (Lohr, J., dissenting).
Applying rational basis review, we held that this disparity among districts in the amounts raised and spent per pupil does not violate the equal protection guarantees of our state constitution because the financing scheme achieves the important governmental purpose of fostering local control of education, as is required by article IX, section 15. Id. at 1028.
Our interpretation of article IX, section 15 in Belier was essential to this holding. First, we applied rational basis review, rather than strict serutiny, to our analysis of the financing scheme in part because we rejected the argument that residents of poor school districts had been subjected to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment" as a result of disparate funding.7 Relying on Belier, we noted that "[tlhe historical development of public education in Colorado has been centered on the philosophy of local control," and that local taxation has traditionally been the means by which taxpayers in the individual districts participate in the management of public school education. See id. at 1021. Thus, we made explicit what was implicit in Belier: control over instruction is meaningless without control over local funding because local funding provides "the link connecting the local citizenry to their school district." Id. at 1022.
With this interpretation in place, we explained how our public school finance system achieves the important government interest of fostering local control. Allowing a district to raise and disburse its own funds enables the district to determine its own educational policy, free from restrictions imposed by the state or any other entity:
The use of local taxes affords a school district the freedom to devote more money toward educating its children than is otherwise available in the state-guaranteed minimum amount. It also enables the local citizenry greater influence and participation in the decision making process as to how these local tax dollars are spent. Some communities might place heavy emphasis on schools, while others may desire greater police or fire protection, or improved streets or public transportation. Finally, local control provides each district with the opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.
Id. at 1028; see also Booth, 984 P.2d at 648 (holding that local control over instruction means "substantial discretion regarding the character of instruction that students will receive at the district's expense") (emphasis added).
In Lujan we made clear that control over instruction is inextricably linked to control over locally-raised funds. The representative structure created in article IX, section 15 functions by entrusting locally-elected district board members with the discretion to disburse locally-raised tax revenues on education. In this way, district residents are able to tailor educational policy to meet the needs of the individual districts, without state interference.8
Given our analysis in Lyjan, which relies and builds upon Belier, if we were now to [942]*942hold that the constitutional local control requirement does not require control over locally-raised funds, we would undermine the rationale of our state-wide system of public school finance. Such a conclusion would force a reexamination of our public school finance policy and could result in a disruption of the present system.
Booth
'The defendants contend that, notwithstanding the cases discussed above, our decision in this case should be controlled by our analysis in Booth. In that case, we considered the constitutionality of the Charter Schools Act's second-appeal provision. See § 22-30.5-108, TA C.R.S. (2003). Specifically, we considered whether the General Assembly had the power to authorize the state board of education to approve a charter school application that a district board had twice rejected. We held that this scheme was constitutional because it struck an appropriate balance between state and local power in an area that invoked both the State's general supervisory powers under article IX, section 2 and the local districts' control of instruction under article IX, seetion 15. See Booth, 984 P.2d at 656.
In considering whether our analysis in Booth is applicable to this case, it is important to recognize the limited effect of the state board's second-appeal approval power in that case. The state board's decision did not direct the opening of the proposed charter school over the local board's objections. Rather, state approval of the second-appeal application simply required the local board to negotiate in good faith with the proponents of the charter school to resolve the objections that the local board had identified in its orders. denying the charter application. Through such negotiations, the local district and the proponents would arrive at a binding contract that would allow the charter school to open and operate on terms acceptable to the local district. Id. at 658-54. The charter school statute met constitutional requirements because it closely cireumseribed the state board's authority in the appeals process while simultaneously preserving the local board's control of instruction given in the charter school. The very limited nature of the state board's role is illustrated by the fact that we rejected as ultra vires the state board's attempt to order the local board to provide status reports on its future contract negotiations with the proponents. Id. at 655.
In this case, we are not asked to assess whether the state's constitutional authority to supervise education infringes on the local boards' constitutional authority to control instruction. Rather, under the Pilot Program, the local boards do not retain any authority to determine which schools or which students are eligible to participate in the program, the amount of district funds to be devoted to the program, or the character of instruction paid for by those funds. The Pilot Program deprives the school districts of all local control of instruction. Thus, there are no constitutional powers to balance in this case, and therefore Booth does not apply.
The question in this case is whether the Pilot Program satisfies the mandates of the local control requirement of article IX, seetion 15 and whether the Pilot Program fits within those parameters. To answer that question, we now examine the program itself, and our analysis is guided by the language of article IX, section 15 and our case law, cited above, construing that provision.
The Pilot Program
We review the trial court's assessment of the constitutionality of the Pilot Program de novo. Gen. Motors Corp. v. City & County of Denver, 990 P.2d 59, 67 (Colo.1999). We begin with the presumption that the Pilot Program is constitutional, and we must uphold the legislation unless the challenging party proves it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1021-22 (Colo.2004). In addition, we must uphold the statute unless "a 'clear and unmistakable' conflict exists between the statute and a provision of the Colorado Constitution." E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 91 P.8d 1038, 1041 (Colo.2004) (citation omitted).
The defendants argue that nothing in the language of article IX, section 15 ties control over instruction to authority to disburse locally-raised funds. In their view, local con[943]*943trol means control over instruction per se, and does not implicate funding in any way.
This argument simply ignores nearly one hundred years of this Court's precedent clearly linking control over instruction to discretion to spend locally-raised funds. We have consistently held that control over instruction requires the local boards to retain substantial discretion "as to the character of . instruction ... pupils shall receive at the cost of the district." Booth, 984 P.2d at 648 (quoting Sch. Dist. No. 16, 60 Colo. at 294, 152 P. at 1149); see also Belier, 59 Colo. at 98, 147 P. at 356. And in Lyjan we explained that the power to allocate locally-raised tax revenues ensures the districts a measure of democratic freedom from the state. See Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1023. Local authority over locally-raised funds preserves the representative body created by section 15 and gives substance to the constitutional requirement that local boards "shall have control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts."
The Pilot Program violates these principles by requiring the school districts to pay funds-including those derived from locally-raised tax revenues-to parents, who in turn are required to pay those funds to nonpublic schools. § 22-56-108(8) and (4)(a). By denying local districts discretion to allocate their locally-raised funds, the program not only violates the clear mandates of our cases construing article IX, section 15, but also undermines the basic rationale of our state-wide school finance system: effectuating local control over public schools. Lwjan, 649 P.2d at 1023. Thus, in accordance with Lyjon, we hold that control over locally-raised funds is essential to effectuating local control of instruction, and the Pilot Program violates this requirement by stripping local districts of any discretion over the character of instruction participating students will receive at district expense.
The defendants also argue that school finance and "school choice" have evolved significantly since Belter was decided, and thus "[ajpplying the Belter rule is incongruous with today's school finance policy and would limit the General Assembly's authority over educational policy." As evidence, they point to the fact that currently, local tax revenues account for approximately forty percent of public school funds, whereas when the Belier line of cases were decided, nearly ninety-five percent of school funds were derived from local tax revenues.
Implicit in this argument is that with greater state funding comes greater state control over educational policy. This Court has long recognized, however, that the constitutional division of power between the state and local boards is not measured by funding. Hence, in Craig, we held that the state had plenary authority to implement a program that allowed students in one district to attend school in another district because the funds used to pay the transferring student's tuition came exclusively from the state controlled Public School Fund. See Craig, 89 Colo. at 148, 299 P. at 1067. To use the defendants' numbers, Craig was decided at a time when local tax revenues accounted for all but a small fraction of the public schools' operating budget. And yet we recognized that the state's power over its own funds was plenary in nature and did not depend in any way on the overall structure of school finance. See Id. Similarly, the amount of funding derived from local tax revenues as compared to state contributions is immaterial to our analysis of the level of discretion the Colorado Constitution confers on local school boards today.
At base, the defendants argue that the public schools have failed, and the General Assembly should have the power to address that failure through programs such as the Pilot Program. Thus, the defendants contend, the General Assembly has reasonably chosen to confer power over instruction directly upon the parents of public school children and allow them to choose to send their children to private school.
Our task is not to pass judgment on the wisdom of the General Assembly's policy choices. Rather, it is solely to determine whether those policy choices comport with constitutional requirements. Our analysis of article IX, section 15 reveals that the framers sought to empower the electors in each school district, including the parents of public school students, with control over instruction [944]*944through the creation of local school boards which would represent the will of their electorate. If the General Assembly wants to change this fundamental structure, it must either seek to amend the constitution or enact legislation that satisfies the mandates of the Colorado Constitution.
We hold that the Pilot Program as enacted by the General Assembly conflicts clearly and irreconcilably with the Colorado Constitution, and the plaintiffs have met their burden of proving the program is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
For the reasons given above, we hold that the Colorado Opportunity Contract Pilot Program, sections 22-56-101 to -110, violates the local control provisions of article IX, seetion 15 of the Colorado Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and return the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice KOURLIS dissents.