DOZIER v. WATSON

305 Ga. 629

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: April 15, 2019
• Docket: S19A0027
• Status: Published

Opinion

305 Ga. 629 FINAL COPY

S19A0027. DOZIER et al. v. WATSON.

ELLINGTON, Justice.

The Superior Court of Jenkins County granted Jeffrey

Watson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus and set aside his

convictions for family violence aggravated battery based on its

finding that Watson’s plea counsel provided him with ineffective

assistance in connection with the entry of his guilty plea. The

Warden appeals, arguing that the habeas court applied an incorrect

standard in evaluating Watson’s claim of ineffective assistance. For

the reasons explained below, we vacate the order and remand the

case to the habeas court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

A conviction based on a guilty plea may be challenged on the

ground that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 58-59 (106 SCt 366, 88 LE2d 203)

(1985). To prove his claim, Watson was required to show that his

counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, that no reasonable

attorney would have done what his lawyer did, or failed to do what

his lawyer did not. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687-

689 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); State v. Worsley, 293 Ga.

315, 323 (3) (745 SE2d 617) (2013). He was also required to

demonstrate prejudice, that is, “that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U. S. at

59. In reviewing the grant or denial of a petition for habeas corpus,

this Court accepts the habeas court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

independently apply the law to the facts. See Schofield v. Meders,

280 Ga. 865, 866 (632 SE2d 369) (2006).

The record shows that Watson was indicted by a Jackson

County grand jury on May 9, 2016, for criminal attempt to commit

malice murder, two counts of family violence aggravated battery, and family violence aggravated assault in connection with the

stabbing of his father. With the assistance of counsel, Watson

pleaded guilty to both counts of aggravated battery and to one count

of aggravated assault. The State agreed to enter an order of nolle

prosequi on the attempted murder count. The superior court

sentenced Watson as a recidivist, imposing twenty years’

imprisonment on the first count of aggravated battery and a

consecutive ten-year term of probation on the second count. The

court merged the aggravated assault count.

In November 2017, Watson filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, alleging, inter alia, that plea counsel was ineffective for

failing timely to advise him that he would be sentenced as a

recidivist pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) and that he would be

ineligible for parole. An evidentiary hearing was held on April 17,

2018. Watson and his plea counsel testified and the Warden

introduced into evidence a copy of Watson’s plea hearing transcript.

The transcript of the plea hearing shows that, after the

superior court had accepted Watson’s plea, the State recommended that Watson be sentenced as a recidivist. Defense counsel objected,

arguing that the State had not provided the required notice of its

intent to seek recidivist punishment. After finding the State’s notice

in an e-mail that had been forwarded to him from his former law

firm, counsel acknowledged that the State had indeed sent the

notice, although to an old address. Counsel then explained the

State’s sentencing intentions to Watson. During the hearing on

Watson’s habeas petition, plea counsel testified that he had a brief,

whispered discussion with Watson about the consequences of

recidivist punishment and his option to withdraw his guilty plea

before the court imposed sentence. Counsel testified that, if he

thought that Watson did not understand what they had discussed,

he would have asked the court to delay the proceeding. Watson,

however, testified that plea counsel did not discuss recidivist

punishment with him and that, if he had understood the

consequences of the recidivist punishment sought by the State, he

would not have pleaded guilty.

On June 22, 2018, the habeas court entered a brief, written order finding that counsel’s performance was deficient because he

“failed to adequately advise [Watson] that he would be sentenced as

a recidivist until after his plea was already entered.” The habeas

court did not evaluate whether counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced Watson. Rather, the court concluded that prejudice was

“apparent because [Watson] was deprived of constitutionally

sufficient performance.”

The Warden does not challenge the habeas court’s findings

concerning plea counsel’s deficient performance. Rather, the

Warden contends only that the habeas court, by “conflating”

deficient performance and prejudice, failed to properly analyze

whether Watson was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.

The deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland

test are two separate inquiries, and the habeas court was, indeed,

required to determine whether Watson had shown “that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill,

474 U. S. at 59. We cannot, as Watson argues, simply uphold the grant of

habeas corpus relief because it is “the right decision.” Because the

habeas court failed to properly analyze the prejudice prong, its order

lacks a factually supported legal conclusion essential to its ruling on

Watson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and essential to our

appellate review of that ruling. Therefore, we vacate the habeas

court’s judgment and remand this case to the habeas court with

instruction to enter a new order consistent with this opinion and

containing the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law. See

OCGA § 9-14-49; Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 327, 328 (2) (667 SE2d

375) (2008), overruled on other grounds, Crosson v. Conway, 291 Ga.

220, 222 (728 SE2d 617) (2012).

Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the

Justices concur. Decided April 15, 2019.

Habeas corpus. Jenkins Superior Court. Before Judge Peed.

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway

Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, Matthew D. O’Brien, Matthew B. Crowder,

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.

Troy R. Millikan, for appellee.