OPINION
FLAHERTY, Justice.
“Tree at my window, window tree, My sash is lowered when night comes on; But let there never be curtain drawn Between you and me.”
—Robert Frost
In the matter before us, four western arborvitae trees are at the plaintiffs window. Sadly, however, the curtains between the neighboring parties have long since been drawn, forever dividing what was once an amicable relationship between them. The fate of the offending trees now hangs in the balance.
The plaintiff, Cheryl Dowdell, brought this action in Superior Court alleging that the defendant, Peter Bloomquist, planted four western arborvitae trees on his Charlestown property solely to exact revenge against her, to retaliate by blocking her view, and in violation of the spite fence statute, G.L.1956 § 34-10-20.1 She sought legal and equitable relief. After considering the testimony and evidence presented at a nonjury trial,2 the presiding Superior Court justice found that the trees were planted to satisfy defendant’s malicious intent, not his pretextual desire for privacy, and that defendant had violated § 34-10-20. The trial justice granted plaintiff in-junctive relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial justice.3
The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows. The parties’ homes are on adjoining lots in a subdivision of Charlestown, each approximately one acre in size. Dow-[829]*829dell’s home sits at a higher elevation than Bloomquist’s and has a distant view of the ocean over the Bloomquist property. In June 2000, defendant acquired the home from his mother, Lorraine Bloomquist. Prior to that time, the Dowdell family had an amicable relationship with defendant’s mother. Change was in the wind in the fall of 2000, however, when defendant petitioned for a zoning variance from the Charlestown zoning board seeking permission to build a second-story addition to his home. The plaintiff expressed concern about the petition, anxious that the addition would compromise her view of the Atlantic Ocean. For six months the parties argued before the Charlestown Zoning Board of Review as to the merits of the addition. As a result, the relationship between the neighbors became less than friendly. In March 2001, defendant began clearing land and digging holes to plant the disputed trees in a row between their homes. In April, defendant’s counsel sent a letter to plaintiff warning him against trespass onto the Bloomquist property. In May, one day after the zoning board closed its hearing on defendant’s variance request,4 defendant began planting the four western arborvitae trees that now stand in a row bordering the property line.5 Although the forty-foot-high trees enabled little light to pass into Dowdell’s second- and third-story picture windows, testimony at trial evidenced that the vegetation was not a bar to the unkind words between the neighbors.
After the trial justice heard four days of testimony and viewed the property, he made a finding that the row of trees were a fence, based on the language of § 34-10-l.6 He further found that the objective of privacy claimed by defendant was “no more than a subterfuge for his clear intent to spite his neighbors by erecting a fence of totally out of proportion trees.” Hence, the trial justice found that the trees constituted a spite fence in violation of § 34-10-20. He noted testimony that plaintiffs real estate values had depreciated by as much as $100,000. Nonetheless, he found that money damages could not adequately compensate her and that equitable relief was more appropriate. Bloomquist was ordered “to cut the four Western Arborvitae to no more than 6' in height and keep them at that level or remove them entirely with no more Western Arborvitae to be planted.”7
[830]*830The defendant timely appealed to this Court. In his appeal, defendant asserts that the offending trees do not constitute a fence. Moreover, defendant contends that even if the trees were considered a fence, the trial justice erroneously granted relief in the face of testimony that the trees serve a useful purpose of privacy for defendant. To support that contention, defendant relies on Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255, 259-60, 75 A.2d 175, 177-78 (1950), for the proposition that when a fence is erected for a useful purpose, despite spiteful motive, no relief may be granted. Moreover, defendant alleges that the trial justice lacked the authority to award injunctive relief based on the holding of Musumeci as well as the specific language of the spite fence statute, which states that one “may have an action to recover damages for the injury.” Section 34-10-20. Additionally, defendant urges that the trial justice erred by granting relief that amounted to'an easement for light or view where no such remedy exists at common law.
Not surprisingly, plaintiff defends the lower court ruling. She asserts that the trial justice had ample authority to award injunctive relief and correctly exercised this authority based on his well-supported finding that the four trees constituted nothing more than a fence erected out of spite.
The trial justice found a violation of the spite fence statute based on his careful and deliberate findings of fact and on his credibility assessment of the testimony at trial. We are mindful that factual findings “are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed by this Court absent proof that they are clearly wrong or that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 350 (R.I.2003) (per curiam); Perry v. Garey, 799 A.2d 1018, 1022 (R.I.2002). We grant the same level of deference to a trial justice’s determination of credibility. See Bogosian v. Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1120 (R.I.2003). Based on this standard, we decline to disturb the trial justice’s findings that the four arborvitae trees planted in a row constitute a fence and that defendant planted them with spiteful intentions. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material evidence with respect to his findings of fact or credibility.
This is the first occasion this Court has had to address the issue of whether a row of trees may be considered a fence within the meaning of the spite fence statute, § 34-10-20. We believe the trial justice properly referred to the definition of “lawful fences” found in § 34-10-1 to understand the simple meaning and legislative intent behind its use of the word “fence.” Based upon the language of § 34-10-1, a fence clearly includes a hedge. And based upon the expert testimony relied on by the trial justice, a row of western arborvitae trees may constitute a hedge. However, even if the trees were not a hedge per se, the spite fence statute refers to “[a] fence or other structure in the nature of a fence.” The trial justice considered the proximity of the four trees that touched one another, and the broad span of sixty feet across which they spread, and rationally interpreted that the trees were a fence.
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OPINION
FLAHERTY, Justice.
“Tree at my window, window tree, My sash is lowered when night comes on; But let there never be curtain drawn Between you and me.”
—Robert Frost
In the matter before us, four western arborvitae trees are at the plaintiffs window. Sadly, however, the curtains between the neighboring parties have long since been drawn, forever dividing what was once an amicable relationship between them. The fate of the offending trees now hangs in the balance.
The plaintiff, Cheryl Dowdell, brought this action in Superior Court alleging that the defendant, Peter Bloomquist, planted four western arborvitae trees on his Charlestown property solely to exact revenge against her, to retaliate by blocking her view, and in violation of the spite fence statute, G.L.1956 § 34-10-20.1 She sought legal and equitable relief. After considering the testimony and evidence presented at a nonjury trial,2 the presiding Superior Court justice found that the trees were planted to satisfy defendant’s malicious intent, not his pretextual desire for privacy, and that defendant had violated § 34-10-20. The trial justice granted plaintiff in-junctive relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial justice.3
The facts pertinent to this appeal are as follows. The parties’ homes are on adjoining lots in a subdivision of Charlestown, each approximately one acre in size. Dow-[829]*829dell’s home sits at a higher elevation than Bloomquist’s and has a distant view of the ocean over the Bloomquist property. In June 2000, defendant acquired the home from his mother, Lorraine Bloomquist. Prior to that time, the Dowdell family had an amicable relationship with defendant’s mother. Change was in the wind in the fall of 2000, however, when defendant petitioned for a zoning variance from the Charlestown zoning board seeking permission to build a second-story addition to his home. The plaintiff expressed concern about the petition, anxious that the addition would compromise her view of the Atlantic Ocean. For six months the parties argued before the Charlestown Zoning Board of Review as to the merits of the addition. As a result, the relationship between the neighbors became less than friendly. In March 2001, defendant began clearing land and digging holes to plant the disputed trees in a row between their homes. In April, defendant’s counsel sent a letter to plaintiff warning him against trespass onto the Bloomquist property. In May, one day after the zoning board closed its hearing on defendant’s variance request,4 defendant began planting the four western arborvitae trees that now stand in a row bordering the property line.5 Although the forty-foot-high trees enabled little light to pass into Dowdell’s second- and third-story picture windows, testimony at trial evidenced that the vegetation was not a bar to the unkind words between the neighbors.
After the trial justice heard four days of testimony and viewed the property, he made a finding that the row of trees were a fence, based on the language of § 34-10-l.6 He further found that the objective of privacy claimed by defendant was “no more than a subterfuge for his clear intent to spite his neighbors by erecting a fence of totally out of proportion trees.” Hence, the trial justice found that the trees constituted a spite fence in violation of § 34-10-20. He noted testimony that plaintiffs real estate values had depreciated by as much as $100,000. Nonetheless, he found that money damages could not adequately compensate her and that equitable relief was more appropriate. Bloomquist was ordered “to cut the four Western Arborvitae to no more than 6' in height and keep them at that level or remove them entirely with no more Western Arborvitae to be planted.”7
[830]*830The defendant timely appealed to this Court. In his appeal, defendant asserts that the offending trees do not constitute a fence. Moreover, defendant contends that even if the trees were considered a fence, the trial justice erroneously granted relief in the face of testimony that the trees serve a useful purpose of privacy for defendant. To support that contention, defendant relies on Musumeci v. Leonardo, 77 R.I. 255, 259-60, 75 A.2d 175, 177-78 (1950), for the proposition that when a fence is erected for a useful purpose, despite spiteful motive, no relief may be granted. Moreover, defendant alleges that the trial justice lacked the authority to award injunctive relief based on the holding of Musumeci as well as the specific language of the spite fence statute, which states that one “may have an action to recover damages for the injury.” Section 34-10-20. Additionally, defendant urges that the trial justice erred by granting relief that amounted to'an easement for light or view where no such remedy exists at common law.
Not surprisingly, plaintiff defends the lower court ruling. She asserts that the trial justice had ample authority to award injunctive relief and correctly exercised this authority based on his well-supported finding that the four trees constituted nothing more than a fence erected out of spite.
The trial justice found a violation of the spite fence statute based on his careful and deliberate findings of fact and on his credibility assessment of the testimony at trial. We are mindful that factual findings “are entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed by this Court absent proof that they are clearly wrong or that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence.” Tavares v. Beck, 814 A.2d 346, 350 (R.I.2003) (per curiam); Perry v. Garey, 799 A.2d 1018, 1022 (R.I.2002). We grant the same level of deference to a trial justice’s determination of credibility. See Bogosian v. Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1120 (R.I.2003). Based on this standard, we decline to disturb the trial justice’s findings that the four arborvitae trees planted in a row constitute a fence and that defendant planted them with spiteful intentions. Based on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that he overlooked or misconceived material evidence with respect to his findings of fact or credibility.
This is the first occasion this Court has had to address the issue of whether a row of trees may be considered a fence within the meaning of the spite fence statute, § 34-10-20. We believe the trial justice properly referred to the definition of “lawful fences” found in § 34-10-1 to understand the simple meaning and legislative intent behind its use of the word “fence.” Based upon the language of § 34-10-1, a fence clearly includes a hedge. And based upon the expert testimony relied on by the trial justice, a row of western arborvitae trees may constitute a hedge. However, even if the trees were not a hedge per se, the spite fence statute refers to “[a] fence or other structure in the nature of a fence.” The trial justice considered the proximity of the four trees that touched one another, and the broad span of sixty feet across which they spread, and rationally interpreted that the trees were a fence. Although defendant argues that he presented expert testimony that the western arborvitae is not a hedge plant, we nonetheless believe that the trees, when taken as a whole, fall well within the statutory definition of a “structure in the nature of a fence.” This , may not be the most optimal species for the creation of a hedge owing to their enormous stature and girth. However, it is [831]*831specifically because of their towering presence, as well as their relative positioning on defendant’s land, that we can consider the trees nothing less than a fence. We are not alone in this assessment. Recently, a California appellate court found a row of evergreen trees to be a fence within the meaning of the California spite fence statute.8 Wilson v. Handley, 97 Cal.App.4th 1301, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 (2002). That court stated,
“In light of this statutory purpose, a structure need not be built to prevent intrusion from without or straying from within to be a ‘fence or other structure in the nature of a fence’ within the meaning of the spite fence statute. Instead, the structure need only be built to separate or mark the boundary between adjoining parcels — albeit, in an unnecessarily high and annoying manner.” Id. at 269.
We next consider defendant’s contention that the trial justice erroneously discounted defendant’s testimony that the trees were erected for the beneficial purpose of privacy. We recognize that some useful purpose for a fence may render the victim of one even maliciously erected without a remedy. In Musumeci, this Court determined that a fence served the useful purpose of preventing water from entering the premises of the first floor of the complainant’s house. Hence, because the purpose of the fence was not wholly malicious, it was not enjoined as a private nuisance. Musumeci, 77 R.I. at 258-59, 75 A.2d at 177 (citing Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888) (one of the first cases announcing the new American rule on spite fences, now considered to embody the prevailing modern view)). However, based on the turbulent history between the parties, the provocative statements made by defendant, the notice of trespass letter sent to plaintiff, and the size, timing, and placement of the trees, we cannot say that the trial justice was wrong to give defendant’s testimony little weight and to find his claim that the fence was installed to enhance his privacy lacked credibility. In the circumstances of this case, we agree with the trial justice that defendant needed to provide more than just privacy as justification for the fence. This is especially true when a row of smaller arborvitae already stood between the homes. As the trial justice noted, “Accepting privacy alone would simply result in the statute being rendered meaningless and absurd.” The very nature of a fence is such that privacy could always be given as the reason for erecting it. In an egregious case such as this, where evidence of malicious intent plainly outweighs the discounted benefit claimed by defendant, the court correctly found defendant’s actions to violate the spite fence statute.
That said, the final issue to be determined is whether injunctive relief was an appropriate remedy for the aggrieved plaintiff. The defendant relies on Musumeci for the proposition that plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because the loss of light and view that she alleges is not a private nuisance that equity will enjoin. Moreover, he maintains that the spite fence statute provides only for a monetary damages remedy. However, [832]*832upon careful review of the language of § 34-10-20, this Court’s discussion in Mu-sumeci, and the law of private nuisance, we believe that injunctive relief is an available remedy for a violation of the spite fence statute. Consequently, we affirm the remedy ordered by the trial justice that the offending western arborvitae trees be topped off at six feet, or otherwise removed entirely.
The defendant mischaracterizes Musumeci as both relevant and conclusive authority on remedy in the instant case. In Musumeci, it was determined that a wall standing less than six feet tall and which served a useful purpose of blocking water run off onto the plaintiffs property was not a spite fence and therefore not governed by G.L.1938 ch. 645, § 20,9 the predecessor to the present spite fence statute, § 34-10-20. The Court then said that “a fence erected on one’s own land for the purpose of shutting off light and air to an adjacent owner is not unlawful unless it violates G.L.1938, chap. 645, § 20.” Musumeci, 77 R.I. at 259-60, 75 A.2d at 177. Having found no statutory violation, the Musumeci Court addressed the issue of whether an equitable remedy was available to the aggrieved party for the shutting off of light and air out of malice, notwithstanding the inapplicability of the spite fence statute. The Court held that absent a tangible violation to the adjacent landowner’s rights, the fence could not be enjoined as a private nuisance because under the common law he has no right to light and air coming across the land. Hence, there was no nuisance. Id. at 260, 75 A.2d at 177-78. We distinguish Musumeci from the instant case based on the factual and legal distinctions at play in each case. Although Musumeci confirms that there is no common law right to light and air, it does not preclude equitable relief for erection of a spite fence. When the spite fence statute is violated, which was not the case in Musumeci, the offending action is deemed a “private nuisance.” See § 34-10-20. Under private nuisance law, equitable relief is an appropriate remedy. See Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321 (R.I.1995) (private nuisance of emission of noises, odors, and vibrations by sewer-processing facility pumping station onto neighboring residential property warranted injunctive relief, in addition to monetary damages); Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824 (R.I.1985) (noxious smells and flies emanating from dairy farm operations more suitably classified as a private nuisance rather than negligence action; case remanded for new trial with presumption that equitable relief would be an appropriate remedy had the farm not already ceased operations by this time); DeNucci v. Pezza, 114 R.I. 123, 329 A.2d 807 (1974) (injunctive relief properly granted upon trial justice’s finding that noise from freight trucks hitching and unhitching in parking lot during early morning hours was unreasonable private nuisance interfering with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his residential property).
We look to the case of Wilson for additional support that a spite fence that blocks light, air, or view is properly considered an actionable private nuisance because the statute defines it as such. In [833]*833Wilson, the court held that a row of trees blocking the plaintiffs view of Mt. Shasta may be considered a violation of the statute even though the fence interfered with nothing more than light and air. The court acknowledged that although interference with light and air was not considered a nuisance under the general definition of “nuisance,” the spite fence statute never specified that the fence need interfere with more than light and air for it to be considered a nuisance. The court concluded that “we are not at liberty to read any such additional requirement into the statute.” Wilson, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d at 270. We agree. What makes a spite fence a nuisance under § 84-10-20 is not merely that it blocks the passage of light and view, but that it does so “unnecessarily” for the malicious purpose of “annoyance.” This is a notable distinction.
Finally, defendant correctly asserts that the statute specifically allows for “an action to recover damages.” Specifically, the statute states that one who is injured by a spite fence “may have an action to recover damages for the injury.” Section 34-10-20. (Emphasis added.) However, contrary to defendant’s assertion, we believe this language merely sanctions the additional remedy of damages, but does not exclude injunctive relief, which is a remedy logically rooted in the nature and purpose of the statute. To support this holding, we look to the remedial practice in other states that recognize the erection of a spite fence as actionable. Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, and South Dakota all allow injunctive relief for violations of spite fence law.10 Especially illustrative is the law as it stands in Massachusetts, whose statute is strikingly similar to § 34-10-20. The Massachusetts statute provides:
“A fence or other structure in the nature of a fence which unnecessarily exceeds six feet in height and is maliciously erected or maintained for the purpose of annoying the owners or occupants of adjoining property shall be deemed a private nuisance. Any such owner or occupant injured * * * may have an action of tort for damages * * *.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 49, § 21 (West 1994).
In interpreting this law, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized that despite the lack of explicit language, the court had the authority to order a spite fence to be “abated,” in addition to damages and costs. Rice v. Moorehouse, 150 Mass. 482, 23 N.E. 229 (1890) (trial justice properly ordered abatement of so much of a spite fence as exceeded six feet in height). The Court relied on the law of nuisance as the basis for its decision, just as we do today.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court.
Justice GOLDBERG did not participate.