DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 14, 2024
Docket1:17-cv-04576
StatusUnknown

This text of DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd (DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DoubleLine Capital LP v. Odebrecht Finance, Ltd, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ah. FILED SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK | DATE aD □ DOUBLELINE CAPITAL LP, et al., Plaintiffs, 17-CV-4576 (DEH) (BCM) -against- OPINION AND ORDER ODEBRECHT FINANCE, LTD., et al., Defendants.

BARBARA MOSES, United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiffs DoubleLine Capital LP, DoubleLine Income Solutions Fund, and DoubleLine Funds Trust (collectively "plaintiffs" or "DoubleLine") allege that misstatements and omissions made by defendants Odebrecht, S.A. — Em Recuperacao Judicial ("OSA"),! Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, S.A. ("CNO"), and Odebrecht Engenharia e Construgado S.A. ("OEC") (collectively "defendants" or "Odebrecht") induced DoubleLine to purchase Odebrecht bonds at inflated prices. DoubleLine has pleaded claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78)(b), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, against CNO and OEC; under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), against OSA; and under state law, for fraud against CNO and OEC and for negligent misrepresentation against all defendants. See Third Amended Complaint ("TAC") (Dkt. 61) 9] 302-27; DoubleLine Cap. LP v. Construtora Norberto Odebrecht, S\A., 413 F. Supp. 3d 187, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ("DoubleLine IT"). During discovery, plaintiffs proffered the Expert Report of Sanjay Unni, Ph.D. (the "Unni Report") (Dkt. 293-1) concerning loss causation and damages. Dr. Unni conducted an event study, from which he concludes that breaking news implicating Odebrecht in the long-running international bribery scheme underlying this action caused the prices of plaintiffs’ Odebrecht bonds

' OSA is now known as Novonor S.A., but for the sake of consistency I continue to refer to it as OSA, as in past opinions.

to drop, thus establishing loss causation, and that the price declines attributable to those revelations are a reliable measure of the price inflation caused by the fraud, thus establishing plaintiffs' damages. See Unni Rep. at 3, ¶¶ 1-3.2 Now before the Court is defendants' motion (Dkt. 291) to exclude Dr. Unni's report and testimony. After careful review of the parties' arguments, I conclude that the Unni Report meets the standards set out in Fed. R. Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Consequently, the motion will be denied. I. BACKGROUND A. Facts 1. The Parties Defendant OSA is a Brazilian holding company whose subsidiaries "conduct business in the construction, engineering, infrastructure, chemicals, utilities and real estate businesses in Brazil and throughout 27 other countries, including the United States." TAC ¶ 30. Defendant CNO, an OSA affiliate, was Latin America's "largest engineering and construction company," and "one of the largest such companies in the world." Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiffs are a group of affiliated investment advisors and funds in the United States. Id. ¶ 12-14. Between May 2013 and March 2015, plaintiffs

purchased two debt securities issued by defendants' affiliate Odebrecht Finance, Ltd. and guaranteed by CNO, at prices close to par, TAC ¶¶ 12-14, 25-26, 230, namely, 7.125% notes due June 26, 2042 (referred to by Dr. Unni as the "7.125% Bond"), and 7.50% perpetual notes (the "7.50% Bond"; collectively, the "Subject Bonds"). Id. ¶¶ 25-26; Unni Rep. ¶¶ 14-15. 2. The Underlying Bribery Scheme Between 2006 and 2014, defendants paid "at least $3.3 billion in bribes to government

2 The Unni Report re-uses paragraph numbers 1-7. After the second ¶ 7, the numbering is consecutive. officials in Brazil and at least 12 other countries" in order to win lucrative construction contracts. TAC ¶ 62. The then-CEO of OSA, Marcelo Odebrecht, later admitted that "between 0.5% and 2.0% of [OSA's] revenue was directed to illicit bribes." Id. ¶¶ 66-67. To further the scheme, defendants created a standalone OSA division "for the sole purpose of functioning as a 'bribe department' that made illicit payments to governmental officials in exchange for the receipt of

lucrative public contracts by CNO." Id. ¶¶ 63-64. The "bribe department" concealed the payments for years, omitting them from CNO's and OSA's formal accounting records, where they would have been reflected in Odebrecht's financial results and reported to auditors. Id. ¶¶ 68-69. 3. Disclosure of the Scheme In or around 2014, Brazilian authorities began investigating suspected corruption of another Brazilian multinational corporation, Petróleo Brazileiro S.A., better known as Petrobras. TAC ¶ 81. The investigation, initially covert, was called "Lava Jato" ("Operation Carwash"). Id. The authorities did not originally focus on Odebrecht. However, on June 19, 2015, Brazilian police arrested Marcelo Odebrecht, and "the fraud began to unravel." Id. ¶ 231. Plaintiffs allege that as a "direct result" of the "shocking news" of the arrest, the market price of Odebrecht's bonds declined

sharply, id. ¶ 233, and kept falling (despite Odebrecht's efforts to mitigate the price damage by minimizing its culpability) as more facts emerged concerning the bribery scheme; prosecutors in other jurisdictions (including the United States) opened criminal investigations; Marcelo Odebrecht was criminally charged, resigned as OSA's CEO, and was sent to prison; and the bonds were downgraded by the major ratings agencies. Id. ¶¶ 239-64. Finally, on May 6, 2016, the Brazilian press reported that Marcello Odebrecht was "formally indicted" for his role in the bribery scheme, causing a further decline in the market price of plaintiffs' Odebrecht bonds. Id. ¶¶ 365-66. As of June 18, 2015 – the day before Marcelo Odebrecht was arrested – DoubleLine held "a position of $37.000 million in face value of the 7.125% [B]ond," and "a position of $11.350 million in face value" of the 7.5% Bond. Unni Rep. ¶¶ 16-17. DoubleLine did not trade in either bond between June 19, 2015, and May 6, 2016. Id. Over that period, the price of the 7.5% Bond declined from $88.03 on June 18, 2015, to $29.75 on May 6, 2016 (a total decline of $58.28, or 66.2%). Id. ¶ 18. The price of the 7.125% Bond fell from $86.25 to $26.75 over the same period (a decline of $59.50, or 69.0%). Id. ¶ 19. DoubleLine sold all of the Subject Bonds by June 27,

2019. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. B. Procedural History Plaintiffs brought this action on June 17, 2017, alleging that defendants violated the federal securities laws and state law by selling bonds to United States investors, including DoubleLine, without disclosing Odebrecht's involvement in the bribery scheme or the ways in which it had falsified its books to conceal the scheme. On September 7, 2018, plaintiffs filed the TAC, which – as limited by DoubleLine II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 224 – remains their operative pleading. The elements of a private cause of action for violation of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 are: a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, a connection with the purchase

or sale of a security, reliance, loss causation, and damages. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); accord DoubleLine II, 413 F. Supp. 3d at 205 (citing Kleinman v. Elan Corp., plc, 706 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 2013)).

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