Doerr v. Universal Engineering Division, Houdaille Industries, Inc

Michigan Court of Appeals

Doerr v. Universal Engineering Division, Houdaille Industries, Inc

282 N.W.2d 352, 90 Mich. App. 455, 1979 Mich. App. LEXIS 2181

CourtMichigan Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 5, 1979

DocketDocket 78-389

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 282 N.W.2d 352 (Doerr v. Universal Engineering Division, Houdaille Industries, Inc) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Doerr v. Universal Engineering Division, Houdaille Industries, Inc, 282 N.W.2d 352, 90 Mich. App. 455, 1979 Mich. App. LEXIS 2181 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).

Pincite

Opinions

V. J. Brennan, J.

The facts giving rise to the present controversy are set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge Bashara. The question to be resolved is whether the unemployment of the plaintiffs at bar was the result of a labor dispute in active progress.

As Judge Bashara points out, the pertinent inquiry concerns the "efficient cause” of the unemployment. Accordingly, if the primary or controlling reason for the lockout is adverse economic conditions, then the resultant unemployment is not "due” to a labor dispute. As stated by Judge Bashara this is a question of fact. However, upon my review, the record sufficiently indicates that the lockout was prompted almost entirely by economic factors. Thus the Board’s decision is not supported by "competent, material and substantial evidence”.

The collective bargaining agreement in effect prior to the lockout provided it was to remain in force:

"until June 1, 1971 and thereafter for successive periods of sixty (60) days unless either party shall, on or before the 60th day prior to expiration, serve written notice on the parties of the desire to terminate.”

On April 1, 1971, the employer served notice to terminate and proposed a meeting to "discuss the terms and conditions for the new agreement”. At the first of some 20 meetings the union made clear its willingness to continue work under the terms of the prior contract. Throughout the negotiations, the employer painted a rather bleak economic picture of the industry with decreasing sales, in[462]*462creasing competition from abroad and a declining profit level. This was emphasized repeatedly as was the fact that the employer had fallen to a loss position.

The union restated its willingness to work without a new contract with the "understanding” that any new agreement be retroactive. The union again made it clear that it had no intention to strike. Judge Bashara interprets the retroactivity aspect of the new agreement as a demand conditioning the union’s offer to work without a contract. The record is unsupportive of this interpretation, and the union’s communication is more readily interpreted as a mere optimistic assertion as to the retroactivity of any new contract. The fact that the new agreement as entered into was not retroactive is equally indicative of the nóndemand nature of the retroactivity.

In any event the factual determination as to the cause of the unemployment involves a balancing of the various factors mentioned above. The union’s mere assertion of retroactivity, which occurred only once and was never mentioned by the employer as precipitating the lockout, is clearly outweighed by the fact that the employer, during an economic slowdown, terminated the contract and repeatedly emphasized the general adverse economic position of the industry. Upon due consideration of the above, I conclude that the lockout was really a disguised layoff and not the result of a labor dispute. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to MESC benefits.

I concur in Judge Bashara’s opinion relating to constitutionality and the rights of the states to enact their own unemployment compensation acts.

I will reverse.

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V. J. Brennan, J.

The facts giving rise to the present controversy are set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge Bashara. The question to be resolved is whether the unemployment of the plaintiffs at bar was the result of a labor dispute in active progress.

As Judge Bashara points out, the pertinent inquiry concerns the "efficient cause” of the unemployment. Accordingly, if the primary or controlling reason for the lockout is adverse economic conditions, then the resultant unemployment is not "due” to a labor dispute. As stated by Judge Bashara this is a question of fact. However, upon my review, the record sufficiently indicates that the lockout was prompted almost entirely by economic factors. Thus the Board’s decision is not supported by "competent, material and substantial evidence”.

The collective bargaining agreement in effect prior to the lockout provided it was to remain in force:

"until June 1, 1971 and thereafter for successive periods of sixty (60) days unless either party shall, on or before the 60th day prior to expiration, serve written notice on the parties of the desire to terminate.”

On April 1, 1971, the employer served notice to terminate and proposed a meeting to "discuss the terms and conditions for the new agreement”. At the first of some 20 meetings the union made clear its willingness to continue work under the terms of the prior contract. Throughout the negotiations, the employer painted a rather bleak economic picture of the industry with decreasing sales, in[462]*462creasing competition from abroad and a declining profit level. This was emphasized repeatedly as was the fact that the employer had fallen to a loss position.

The union restated its willingness to work without a new contract with the "understanding” that any new agreement be retroactive. The union again made it clear that it had no intention to strike. Judge Bashara interprets the retroactivity aspect of the new agreement as a demand conditioning the union’s offer to work without a contract. The record is unsupportive of this interpretation, and the union’s communication is more readily interpreted as a mere optimistic assertion as to the retroactivity of any new contract. The fact that the new agreement as entered into was not retroactive is equally indicative of the nóndemand nature of the retroactivity.

In any event the factual determination as to the cause of the unemployment involves a balancing of the various factors mentioned above. The union’s mere assertion of retroactivity, which occurred only once and was never mentioned by the employer as precipitating the lockout, is clearly outweighed by the fact that the employer, during an economic slowdown, terminated the contract and repeatedly emphasized the general adverse economic position of the industry. Upon due consideration of the above, I conclude that the lockout was really a disguised layoff and not the result of a labor dispute. The plaintiffs are therefore entitled to MESC benefits.

I concur in Judge Bashara’s opinion relating to constitutionality and the rights of the states to enact their own unemployment compensation acts.

I will reverse.

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Bluebook (online)

282 N.W.2d 352, 90 Mich. App. 455, 1979 Mich. App. LEXIS 2181, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/doerr-v-universal-engineering-division-houdaille-industries-inc-michctapp-1979.

Opinions

V. J. Brennan, J.

I will reverse.

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