Disability Law Center v. Millcreek Health Center

428 F.3d 992, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 24340, 2005 WL 3008767
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedNovember 10, 2005
Docket04-4268
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 428 F.3d 992 (Disability Law Center v. Millcreek Health Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Disability Law Center v. Millcreek Health Center, 428 F.3d 992, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 24340, 2005 WL 3008767 (10th Cir. 2005).

Opinion

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Disability Law Center (“DLC”) seeks review of a declaratory judgment which interpreted DLC’s right, under various federal statutes, to access the records of a disabled patient under the care of a named public guardian. There is no live case or controversy before this court, and there was no live case or controversy before the district court. The appeal is dismissed and the opinion of the district court is vacated.

II. BACKGROUND

DLC is Utah’s statewide protection and advocacy (“P & A”) agency for Utah citizens with certain disabilities. 1 As such, federal law authorizes DLC to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of such persons when the incidents are reported to DLC or when DLC has probable cause to believe such incidents occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A) (2005). Under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally 111 Individuals Act (“PAMII”), DLC is entitled to access all records of protected persons who do not have legal guardians or for whom the legal guardian is the state. Id. § 10805(a)(4)(B)(ii). If a protected person has a legal guardian that is not the state, DLC’s access to records is more limited; it is entitled to access records only when the guardian fails or refuses to act after DLC contacts and offers assistance to that guardian. Id. § 10805(a)(4)(G)(i)-(iii).

In May of 2004, DLC received a complaint from J.B., a patient at Millcreek Health Center (“Millcreek”) nursing home facility. 2 A DLC representative visited J.B., but was asked to leave by Millcreek’s director of nursing. DLC determined it needed access to J.B.’s records to investigate his complaints. J.B.’s appointed pub- *995 lie guardian, 3 however, did not consent to the release of his records, and Millcreek refused to grant DLC access to the records.

After attempts to secure release of J.B.’s records failed, DLC brought suit against Millcreek for injunctive and declaratory relief, seeking access to J.B.’s records and seeking general monitoring access to the nursing home facility. DLC argued it was entitled to access J.B.’s records because J.B. had a guardian who was designated by Elko County, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada. DLC reasoned when the guardian of a protected person is designated by the state or a political subdivision of the state, that person’s guardian is the “State” for purposes of § 10805(a)(4)(B)(ii) of PAMII.

According to Millcreek, after DLC’s visit, J.B. began to remove his wander guard bracelet and struck a Millcreek employee. Due in part to these problems, J.B.’s guardian moved J.B. from Millcreek to a care facility in Burley, Idaho. After J.B. was transferred to Idaho, DLC withdrew its request for J.B.’s records. Further, Millcreek agreed to allow DLC access to patients and records when PAMII or other federal statutes mandated such access.

In light of these events, the district court concluded DLC’s request for a preliminary injunction was moot. Disability Law Ctr. v. Millcreek Health Ctr., 339 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1286 (D.Utah 2004). Because Millcreek agreed to allow DLC access to other patients and patient records, the dispute about general monitoring access evaporated. Id. The district court did not, however, deem DLC’s request for declaratory relief moot. The court instead determined there was

a concrete dispute about whether the DLC can obtain access to records of persons (like J.B.) for whom a legal guardian has been appointed. To be sure, the DLC. has withdrawn its request for J.B.’s records ... since his move to Idaho. Both sides to this dispute agree, however, that there are other persons in the same position as J.B. was in before his move. Accordingly, the court has before it a specific dispute regarding records access that it will resolve, will [sic] J.B. serving as an illustration of the problem.

Id. at 1284. The district court concluded jurisdiction was proper, and went on to treat the merits of the case by addressing § 10805(a)(4)(B)(ii) of'PAMII. The court disagreed with DLC’s interpretation of PAMII. It concluded the “State” was not the protected person’s guardian when that person, like J.B., had an appointed public guardian. Id. at 1285-86. The court declared PAMII “authorizes the DLC to obtain access to records of persons who have a specific guardian, including a state-appointed guardian, only where the guardian has failed to act.” Id.

DLC raises two issues on appeal. First, DLC argues § 10805(a)(4)(B)(ii) entitles it to access a protected person’s records when that person has a public guardian because, the “State” is .that individual’s guardian for all practical purposes. Second, whether a guardian is public or private, DLC contends § 10805(a)(4)(C)(iii) entitles DLC to access records when the protected person’s guardian refuses to authorize the release of records to DLC and when DLC has received a complaint or has concluded there is probable cause to believe the health or safety of the person is in serious and immediate jeopardy. Mill- *996 creek maintains the case and appeal are moot.

III. ANALYSIS

“Mootness is a threshold issue because the existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.” McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 100 F.3d 863, 867 (10th Cir.1996); see U.S. Const. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. We review de novo the question of mootness. F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1532-33 (10th Cir.1995).

Federal courts may adjudicate only actual controversies. Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). “The controversy must exist during all stages of the appellate review. Once such controversy ceases to exist, the action is moot and this court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.” United States v. Seminole Nation of Okla., 321 F.3d 939, 943 (10th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). “A federal court has no power to give opinions upon moot questions or declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.1997). An abstract, conjectural, or hypothetical injury is not enough to support jurisdiction. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983).

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428 F.3d 992, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 24340, 2005 WL 3008767, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/disability-law-center-v-millcreek-health-center-ca10-2005.