Cole, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Eldridge and Davidson, JJ., concurred in Case No. 108 and dissented in Case No. 107. Eldridge, J., filed a dissenting and concurring opinion at page 637 infra, in which Davidson, J., concurs.
[611]*611We consolidated for purposes of this appeal the two cases of Director of Finance of Prince George’s County, Maryland, et al. v. Richard D. Cole, et al. and Director of Finance of Prince George’s County, Maryland, et al. v. Leonard H. Goldberg. In both cases we are asked to render an interpretation and construction of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 264. There are certain procedural obstacles precluding the Court from complying with this request in Goldberg. However, in Cole we shall address the issue of whether a trial court, as part of its criminal proceedings, can order the return of money seized pursuant to an arrest for gambling violations covered by Article 27, § 264.
THE GOLDBERG CASE
In the afternoon of December 7, 1979, Leonard H. Goldberg was arrested at a Contee Road address in Laurel, Maryland, while allegedly taking sports bets over the telephone. The arrest was made pursuant to a search and seizure warrant and $501.00 was seized from Goldberg’s person at the time of his arrest. At about the same time the search was being conducted on Contee Road, other officers were executing a search and seizure warrant at Goldberg’s home where records of gambling and $3,562.00 in cash were seized.
On May 7, 1980, Goldberg was brought to trial in the District Court of Prince George’s County. He pleaded guilty to a gambling violation and received a $1,000 fine and probation before judgment under Maryland Code (1957, 1978 Repl. Vol., 1980 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, § 641. Subsequent to that determination, on August 20, 1980, the County Attorney for Prince George’s County informed Goldberg, that pursuant to Article 27, § 264 (d), he must make application to the county to be reimbursed for the money seized as a result of his arrest. On August 26, Goldberg’s attorney wrote to the county requesting the return of the money plus interest. On September 5,1980, the County Attorney denied the request.
[612]*612Thereafter, Goldberg filed a motion for the return of his money in the District Court in which his criminal case had been heard. No notice was given to the Prince George’s County Attorney nor to the Director of Finance of Prince George’s County, William R. Brown, Jr., who was the local official who had custody of the money seized. On October 8, 1980, a hearing was held in the District Court at which neither the Prince George’s County Attorney nor Mr. Brown was present. The result of the hearing was a determination that Goldberg was entitled to recover the money seized; therefore, the District Court judge ordered Brown to return to Goldberg the $4,063.00 held by the county. No appeal was taken from this order.
On November 21,1980, the District Court order, requiring the Director of Finance to return the money seized from Goldberg, was served on Brown, and on January 27, 1981, Goldberg filed a rule to show cause against Brown in the same criminal case. On February 3, 1981, Brown answered the rule to show cause and Brown and the county filed a motion to revise the order of October 8 under M.D.R. 625. However, Prince George’s County and the Director of Finance filed no motion to intervene in this case. On April 3, 1981, the District Court heard the criminal case. At this proceeding, Goldberg argued that, because the county was not a party to the criminal case, the county and its Director of Finance had no standing to file the motion to revise. Goldberg also argued that the October 8 order had not been appealed and thus had become final. In addition, the State’s Attorney opposed the presence of the County Attorney, saying that the representation by the State at the October 8 proceeding adequately protected the county’s interests. The trial judge orally held the Director of Finance, Brown, in contempt of court for failing to pay Goldberg the money seized, although mentioning no sanction or prescribing a means by which Brown could purge himself of the contempt. The trial court further held that Prince George’s County had no standing in the case because it was not a party to the criminal cause.
[613]*613The clerk of the District Court noted on the docket as of April 2, 1981, that "Motion to revise judgment denied and Mr. Brown held in contempt per Judge DiTrani.” However, the District Court judge did not sign a formal order of contempt until April 3, 1981.
On April 2, 1981, Prince George’s County and Brown appealed from the District Court denial of the motion to revise and Brown appealed from the order holding him in contempt to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. In September, 1981, the circuit court affirmed the District Court order and directed that the money involved be paid to Goldberg. The Director of Finance of Prince George’s County and Prince George’s County filed a petition for certiorari which we granted.
That petition presented the following issue:
In a Criminal Gambling Case Where Money Was Seized, Was the Trial Court Authorized To Order the Payment of That Money to the Criminal Defendant, Who Pleaded Guilty and Received Probation Prior to Judgment, Without (a) Notice to the Seizing Jurisdiction, or (b) Trial of the Issue Whether the Money Was Contraband?
However, having closely examined the course this action has taken in the District Court, we now conclude that certain jurisdictional and procedural principles preclude us from addressing this issue.
Two separate appeals were presented in the Goldberg case — one from the contempt order and one from the denial of the motion to revise. However, both of these appeals should have been dismissed by the circuit court.
An appeal from the contempt "order” is improper because the appeal was noted on April 2, 1981 — before there was a completed written contempt order. The trial judge’s oral ruling and the docket entry evidencing the same do not constitute a contempt order from which an appeal may properly be taken. At that time, the court noted no sanction or purging provision, both essential elements of a valid con[614]*614tempt order. See Elzey v. Elzey, 291 Md. 369, 374, 435 A.2d 445 (1981); see generally State v. Roll and Scholl, 267 Md. 714, 298 A.2d 867 (1973). Thus, Brown could not appeal from the contempt order as of April 2, 1981.
The only appealable contempt order was signed by the trial judge on April 3,1981. This order did contain a sanction and proper purging provision. However, the only order of appeal was filed on April 2, 1981. Because the appeal was premature, being filed before the final judgment, the appeal must be dismissed. See Merlands Club v. Messall, 238 Md. 359, 208 A.2d 687 (1965); Md., Del. & Va. Rwy. Co. v. Johnson, 129 Md. 412, 99 A. 600 (1916).
There also has been no proper appeal taken from the original judgment entered in the criminal case on October 8, 1980. The county and its Director of Finance did attempt to appeal from the trial court’s refusal to revise this order; however, this motion to revise was never properly before the District Court. Neither the county nor Mr. Brown could petition the court to revise its order because they were never parties in the criminal case. At no time did either file a motion to intervene in the case even though the proper role of the county in the proceeding was argued at the April 2nd hearing. Because the county and Mr. Brown are not now, and never have been, parties to this case, they were not entitled to file a motion to revise under M.D.R. 625.1 Consequently, they could not appeal from the denial of the motion. Therefore, we must vacate the order of the circuit court and remand the case to that court with instructions to dismiss the appeals.
THE COLE CASE
Richard D. Cole and several other persons were arrested on gambling charges in College Park, Maryland on October 31, 1977. At the time of the arrest, which was conducted by [615]*615Prince George’s County Police acting pursuant to search warrants, evidence of gambling and a sum of $15,500.00 were seized. Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Cole in a one-count charging document in the District Court for Prince George’s County. Cole prayed a jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. In the circuit court the State filed a motion to amend the charging document under which Cole was charged. The motion was denied. The State thereupon brought a seven-count criminal information against Cole in the District Court for Prince George’s County. Thereafter, the State moved to voluntarily dismiss its charges in the circuit court and the motion was granted. In the District Court Cole filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized. The motion was granted and the State subsequently nol prossed its charges in January, 1980.
On March 21,1980, within ninety days of the State’s entry of nol pros in the District Court, Prince George’s County filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County to forfeit the monies seized from Cole purportedly in conformance with Article 27, § 264. Cole demurred to the petition and requested the circuit court to return to him the money seized. The circuit court sustained the demurrer and ordered the county to pay the money to Cole. This order requiring payment was entered without hearing testimony, receiving evidence, or making findings of fact. It was based on the fact that Cole was not convicted in the criminal proceeding. The county appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, which held that Article 27, § 264 did not authorize the county to petition for forfeiture, because there had been no conviction, and further held that the circuit court erred in ordering the return of the money. Director of Fin., Pr. Geo’s Co. v. Cole, 48 Md. App. 633, 428 A.2d 1227 (1981).
While the appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, Cole filed a motion for appropriate relief with the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on May 6,1980 (in the one-count criminal appeal which had been voluntarily dismissed by the State in 1979), contending that the nol pros [616]*616entered entitled that court to order the return of his money. Prince George’s County sought and obtained intervention in the circuit court proceedings on June 6, 1980. The circuit court held a hearing on Cole’s motion and decided to postpone its decision pending results of the appeal in the Court of Special Appeals.
On June 23, 1981, after the result of the appeal in the Court of Special Appeals had been obtained, the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County ordered Prince George’s County to return the money it had seized from Cole in the case nol prossed in that court. Prince George’s County filed a motion for reconsideration that was heard on August 4, 1981, and was denied. We granted certiorari in the case prior to its consideration by the Court of Special Appeals.
We shall examine the issue as framed by the petitioner:
In a Criminal Gambling Case Where Money was Seized, Charges Were Terminated By Voluntary Dismissal by the State; New Charges Were Brought; and Charges in the Second Criminal Case Were Ultimately Terminated by Nolle Prosequi. Under These Circumstances, Was The Trial Court in the First Criminal Case Authorized to Order Payment of the Seized Money to the Criminal Defendant Without Trying the Issue Whether the Money was Contraband?
Analyzing this issue requires an extensive interpretation and construction of the provisions of Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 264, relating to the forfeiture and disposition of money seized in arrests for gambling violations. Before beginning our discussion of the statute, however, a digression into the history and nature of forfeiture provisions in general will afford us a background against which to analyze the specific forfeiture provisions of Article 27, § 264 and an opportunity to discern the legislative intent in enacting the statute.
The concept of forfeiture began as a feature of the common law of England. Prior to the American Revolution, the [617]*617common law required forfeiture on two occasions; any inanimate object causing someone’s death was forfeited to the Crown as a "deodand” and a conviction for felony or treason caused the forfeiture of the lands and goods of the one convicted. Neither of these two customs was ever integrated into the American common law but their effects remain with us today. For that reason, a short discussion of each is in order.
Deodand is derived from the Latin Deo dandum, a thing to be given to God. Black’s Law Dictionary 392 (5th ed. 1979). Supposedly having its origins in the Mosaic Law,2 any personal chattel whether animate or inanimate, which was the immediate cause of death of one of the King’s subjects, was forfeited to the King for sale and distribution of the proceeds to the poor by the high almoner to appease God’s wrath. At the base of the doctrine was the implication that the instrumentality of death was affected from having caused the death. "So far was this the case that Blackstone says that the forfeiture applied, even though the offending [instrument] belonged to the person killed. 1 Blacks. Com., 301; Holmes, Common Law, 24; 2 Pollock & Mait., History of English Law (2d Ed.), 473.” Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 514, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916).
As times changed so did the practice of the deodand. The proceeds of the forfeiture ceased to be applied to religious or eleemosynary purposes and the deodand became a source of Crown revenue, being justified as a penalty for carelessness. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974). It was eventually abolished in 1846, with the passage of Lord Campbell’s Act, which created a cause of action for wrongful death. Id. at 681 n. 19.
The second type of forfeiture at English common law was the forfeiture of goods and chattels and the escheat of lands [618]*618upon conviction for felony or treason. See The Palymyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14, 6 L.Ed. 531 (1827); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., supra. "The basis for these forfeitures was that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King’s peace, which was felt to justify denial of the right to own property.” Id. at 682.
These common law forfeitures were never practiced in this country. Farley v. $168,400.97, 55 N.J. 31, 259 A.2d 201, 204 (1969). However, the act of forfeiture and the practice of seizing goods was carried on pursuant to statute. See C. J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 63 S.Ct. 499, 87 L. Ed. 663 (1943). At an early stage in enforcing these statutes, Chief Justice Marshall noted a distinction between common law and statutory forfeitures. In United States v. Grundy and Thornburgh, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 337, 2 L.Ed. 459 (1806), he observed that at common law no rights in the thing seized vested in the government until some legal step was taken for the assertion of the government’s interest. A forfeiture conducted pursuant to statute, however, dispensed with the common law rules and the government’s rights in the thing forfeited vested immediately or on the performance of some particular act, whichever was the will of the Legislature. Id. at 350-51. See also United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 244, 33 L.Ed. 555 (1890); Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 8 S.Ct. 846, 31 L.Ed. 743 (1888); Henderson’s Distilled Spirits, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 44, 20 L.Ed. 815 (1872); United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 3 L.Ed. 602 (1814).
Despite the distinction between common law and statutory forfeitures as to when rights in the goods vest, the rationale of the common law, i.e., that the forfeiture was against the offending article and a penalty for carelessness, continued. See Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971); State v. Thirty-Six (36) Pinball Machines, 222 Kan. 416, 565 P.2d 236 (1977). This is demonstrated by the in rem character of forfeiture proceedings and the development of the rule that the'innocence of the owner of the property is no defense. State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, [619]*619284 A.2d 233 (1971). In the same vein it has been held that the property is treated as the offender, Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra; State v. Thirty-Six (36) Pinball Machines, supra; that the forfeiture itself is not considered part of the punishment for the offense, Origet v. United States, supra; that as a civil in rem proceeding the forfeiture is in no way dependent upon a criminal proceeding, One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972); People v. Kapande, 23 Ill.2d 230, 177 N.E.2d 825 (1961); State v. Rumfolo, 545 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1976); and that indeed, the forfeiture is a civil proceeding completely separate and apart from the criminal proceeding. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, supra; Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra. The result of the civil proceedings either perfects the government’s interest in the goods, Caldwell v. United States, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 366, 12 L.Ed. 1115 (1850); United States v. Stowell, supra, or results in a determination that they are not contraband and should be returned.
The items proceeded against in a forfeiture proceeding are characterized, at least for our purposes, as contraband. In this regard, there are two types of contraband: contraband per se (property which is inherently illegal to possess) and derivative contraband (property which is legal to possess except for the circumstances, which make it illegal). See Comment, Forfeiture Seizures and the Warrant Requirement, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 960, 962 n. 17 (1981). Contraband per se, of course, requires no proceeding for forfeiture. Derivative contraband, on the other hand, does require some kind of showing that the property was used illegally. See State v. Rumfolo, supra.
The leading Maryland cases on forfeiture are State v. Greer, supra; Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra; and Gatewood v. State, 264 Md. 301, 285 A.2d 623 (1972). These cases provide some foundation for the decision in this case so we shall pause to discuss their facts and rationale to better understand the instant proceedings.
[620]*620In State v. Greer, supra, the State appealed a circuit court decision that returned to the owner possession of a car that had been seized by Montgomery County Police as the result of narcotics violations pursuant to Article 27, § 297.3 The owner of the car had not been connected with the illegal activity in any way. The circuit court’s order was issued without notifying the State or Montgomery County of the proceeding.
This Court reversed the decision of the circuit court based on three principles. First, the Court determined that forfeiture, unless specified otherwise, is a civil in rem proceeding. It was of little significance, therefore, that the owner of the car was not culpable for the criminal behavior that justified the forfeiture. Id. at 694. Second, the applicable statute, Article 27, § 297 (c), provided that custody of the seized vehicle is in the person who seized the property. Therefore, the seizing jurisdiction was a necessary party to the action. Id. at 694. Lastly, the Court held that because neither the State, the seizing jurisdiction, nor any other interested party received notice of the proceeding, such proceeding violated due process. Id. at 695.
[621]*621In Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra, a cab belonging to the Blue Bird Cab Company, Inc. was seized by Prince George’s County Police pursuant to Article 27, § 297 as having been used by a cab driver as a vehicle from which to distribute heroin. The cab company complained that an express provision contained in Article 27, § 297 applied to it and forbade forfeiture. In rejecting the cab company’s contentions, we set the tone for future forfeiture cases. This Court noted that forfeiture is a civil in rem proceeding, "grounded in the legal fiction that an inanimate object can be guilty of a crime,” id. at 658 (citations omitted), that the burden of proof necessary to sustain the forfeiture is a mere preponderance of the evidence and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the innocence of the owner is of no consequence. Id. at 659-62.
Perhaps the most significant Maryland case as far as our decision here is concerned is Gatewood v. State, supra. Gatewood pleaded guilty to a violation of the lottery laws. At the time of his arrest police had seized $6,182.00 from Gatewood’s pocket. After being convicted, Gatewood applied to the court that heard the criminal case for the return of the money seized. He was initially successful. However, the court had a change of heart and he was required to pay the money back. Gatewood appealed. This Court held that the forfeiture proceeding mandated by Article 27, § 264 was a civil proceeding, and therefore, Gatewood’s application to the Criminal Court of Baltimore, which did not have civil jurisdiction, was a nullity. Id. at 304-05.
With this background we turn to discuss the forfeiture statute at issue. Article 27, § 264 was first enacted in 1951 as Article 27, § 307A, an adjunct to Article 27, § 307. 1951 Md. Laws, Ch. 299. Its purpose, stated in the preamble, was to provide a mechanism for "the confiscation in certain counties of money, currency or cash seized or captured in connection with any arrest for illegal gambling or operation of any lottery.” Section 307A (a) required that all money seized
[622]*622in connection with any arrest for the playing or operation of any lottery, game, table, or gaming device ... shall be deemed prima facie to be contraband of law as a gambling device or as part of a gambling operation. No such money, currency or cash shall be returned to any person claiming the same, or to any other person, except in the manner hereinafter in this section provided.
Section 307A (b) directed that the money be "deposited with, and accounted for by the County Treasurer of the County,” pending trial or ultimate disposition of the charges.
Once there had been a final determination on the criminal charges, § 307A (c) and (d) swung into effect. Section 307A (c) pertained to records of conviction and stated that in such cases the County Treasurer
may after one month from the date of the record of the entry of such conviction ... make application to the Circuit Court of the County, for an order declaring and ordering that such money, currency or cash in the custody of the County Treasurer shall be forfeited to the sole use and gain of the said county.
The statute further required the circuit court to determine whether there was any other cláimant to the money. In cases where the result of the criminal proceeding was an "acquittal or other final determination of such proceedings in favor of the person or persons so arrested” the money was to be "returned to the person from whom taken on the expiration of ninety days from such acquittal or other final determination,” unless someone else asserted a claim to the money, in which case the court was to adjudicate that claim.
From 1951 to 1974 the act was amended several times. However, the changes, with one exception, merely renumbered § 307A as § 264 and added jurisdictions to the , list of those covered by the act. In 1967 the list of offenses covered was expanded and "bookmaking, betting and wagering on horses or athletic events” were included among [623]*623the group of gambling violations to which the act applied.
In 1974 the Legislature made sweeping changes, several of which are significant in the instant circumstances. The purpose of the 1974 amendments, as stated in the preamble to the legislation, was to set "forth rights and procedures respecting money and other property seized in connection with gambling and controlled dangerous substances laws.” 1974 Md. Laws, Ch. 666 (emphasis supplied).
The 1974 legislation also cleared up any doubt there may have been as to when title to seized money vested in the government. Following the provision contained in § 264 (a), that the seized money is prima facie contraband, the Legislature further added that "[a]ll rights, title and interest in and to such money, currency or cash shall immediately vest in and to the local governments of the city and counties.. ..” [Emphasis supplied.] Because it is within the power of the legislature to determine when the transfer of rights to seized goods takes place, United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, supra, the Maryland Legislature has fixed the point at the moment the seizure occurs. At this time the money is prima facie contraband and belongs to the jurisdiction whose authorities consummate the seizure.
The Legislature also made alterations to § 264 (c) concerning disposition of the money where the criminal proceeding resulted in a record of conviction. Up to this time, the statute provided that the County Treasurer or Director of Finance "may, after one month” from the date of the entry of conviction, apply for forfeiture. Chapter 666 of the Laws of Maryland of 1974 changed this to read that he "shall within ninety days” make the application. Thus, the Legislature made what had been a permissive application mandatory and set a statutory time limit within which the County Treasurer or Director of Finance must apply for forfeiture, thereby dispelling any doubt as to who had interest in the money at what time. Cf. United States v. Baltimore, 564 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1977) (the permissive features of the pre-1974 enactment were heavily relied upon by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to opine that until a judicial order [624]*624of forfeiture was made the money was still the property of those from whom it was seized).
The 1974 Legislature also modified subsection (d) of § 264, relating to disposition of the money in the event of acquittal or other final determination in favor of the person arrested. The language pertaining to "other final disposition” was struck and replaced with "dismissal.” This restricted and defined the pertinent dispositions, making subsection (d) applicable to acquittals and dismissals only, and eliminating other arguably favorable dispositions such as stet, nolle prosequi, and probation before judgment.
Not satisfied with the major modifications wrought in 1974, the Legislature again revised the statute in 1977. See 1977 Md. Laws, Ch. 720.4 It hardly needs mentioning that "in Maryland there usually is little prepassage evidence of intent.” Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund v. Hamilton, 256 Md. 56, 57, 259 A.2d 303 (1969). However, with this particular bill we are provided with a note contained in the files of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, author unknown, to the effect that "most forfeitures involve less than $100 and at present there are over 5,000 forfeiture cases backed up in Baltimore City because of problems with the present law.” The modifications contained in the 1977 enactment, therefore, were intended to streamline and clarify the procedure for forfeitures in order to alleviate the overburdening experienced by the court system.
The first relevant change made by Chapter 720 was in § 264 (a). The Legislature added to, and in so doing clarified, the provision vesting title immediately in the local government to include the provision that if the money was seized by State authorities, such title would vest in the State.
Subsection (d) was completely rewritten. The ultimate dispositions that were favorable to the accused and to which the subsection applied were expanded from acquittal and [625]*625dismissal to include stet and nolle prosequi. Further, the previous statute had provided, since 1951, that within ninety days from the date of the favorable disposition the money was to be returned to the accused unless another party had asserted a claim to the money. The new language was that
any person claiming that all or any of the seized money ... is not contraband of law under (a) and should be returned to the claimant, within one year after the date the judgment or order was entered or the action was taken which constituted the ultimate disposition, may make application on giving ten days’ prior written notice to the State Treasurer, Custodian County Treasurer or Director of Finance, to the appropriate court for a determination that the money ... is the property of the claimant and for an order that it be returned. [1977 Md. Laws, Ch. 720, § 264 (d) (1).]
The Legislature thereby removed the burden of evaluating conflicting claims, as in the case where two persons arrested at the same time both claimed an interest in the money, from the local government authority who had possession of it and provided that a judicial determination must be made in all cases regardless of the outcome.
To assist the court in the determinations to be made regarding conflicting interests in seized money, the Legislature enacted a series of statutory presumptions in subsection (d) (2). An acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi constituted prima facie evidence that the money was not contraband. A conviction, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and a probation before judgment were prima facie evidence that the money was contraband. The entry of stet gave rise to no presumptions either way.
To finalize the proceedings, subsection (d) (3) provided that where the claimant either failed to file a timely petition or received a judicial decision that the money was contraband, the seized money was forfeited to the custodian without [626]*626further judicial action. Subsection (d) (4) required that timely notice must be given to any known claimants.
Subsection (e) of this legislation provides one leg of the appellees’ claims in this case. After defining "ultimate disposition” and "record of conviction,” (e) (4) provided that "[t]his section does not prohibit the trial judge after an acquittal or dismissal from ordering immediate return of all property seized.” This provision continues unchanged in the present Article 27, § 264 (e) (4) and its scope and meaning will be discussed later.
In 1979, the Legislature again responded to a problem in the law being experienced by Baltimore City.5 Carl [627]*627Berenholtz, Assistant City Solicitor for Baltimore City, testified at a hearing before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, informing that body that
[628]*628there was a gray area [under the old law] as to who had the burden of filing the petition for forfeiture when a criminal defendant had received probation before verdict.
We are trying to clear up any ambiguity which may have existed in the old law in order to be clear as to who has the burden of filing the petition for forfeiture and who has the burden of going forward with the court case. The eventual court hearing could be held to determine whether or not the money confiscated by members of the Baltimore City Police Department in connection with the defendant’s criminal arrest was, in fact, contraband of law under the provisions of Article 27, Section 264 (a) and (d) (2).
Section 264 (c) of the 1977 enactment had directed that in cases where there was a record of conviction (defined to include pleas of guilty and nolo contendere, Article 27, § 264 (e) (3)) the County Treasurer or Director of Finance was to petition for forfeiture and that in cases where there was an acquittal, dismissal, stet, or nolle prosequi it was up to the claimant to petition for return of the money. Article 27, § 264 (d) (1). The 1979 Amendment merely includes "probation under the provisions of section 641 [probation before judgment]” among the group of favorable dispositions in § 264 (d) (1), thus mandating that it was the claimant’s responsibility in such cases to petition to get his money back. Further, § 264 (d) (2) was amended to include probation before judgment among those dispositions where the disposition is prima facie evidence that the money is contraband. See 1979 Md. Laws, Ch. 123.
[629]*629It is clear then that as § 264 has legislatively evolved it has responded to perceived needs experienced by the judicial machinery administering its provisions and has become a comprehensive enactment detailing the procedures to be followed where money has been seized as the result of arrests for gambling violations. Having provided such a detailed procedure, the Legislature has admonished those responsible for its administration in unmistakable and compelling terms that no money seized pursuant to gambling arrests "shall be returned to any person claiming the same, or to any other person, except as provided by this section.” Article 27, § 264 (a) (emphasis supplied).
Having explored at length the history and general characteristics of forfeiture proceedings and the history and specific provisions of Article 27, § 264, we believe it advisable to summarize and explain the pertinent mechanics of § 264 in light of this development, prefatory to an application of the law to the facts of the case at bar.
Seizure of money pursuant to gambling violations, by legislative determination, transforms that money into prima facie contraband. Article 27, § 264 (a). Until evidence is presented to rebut this statutory inference, it is illegal for anyone other than the seizing authority to possess the money. Section 264 (a) vests all rights, title, and interest in the money at the moment of seizure in the seizing jurisdiction.
The proceeding to determine whether the money shall be forfeited or returned to its claimant is a civil in rem proceeding where the money itself is the thing proceeded against and which is unconnected with any criminal proceeding. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, supra; Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra. The standard of proof, therefore, is the preponderance of the evidence standard. Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra. The result of any criminal proceeding does, however, raise certain statutory presumptions. Article 27, § 264 (d) (2).
[630]*630If the result is a conviction of record, then there is a presumption that the money is contraband, § 264 (d) (2), and the seizing jurisdiction has ninety days within which to apply to a court to have the money forfeited. However, the Legislature in enacting § 264 (d) seems to have modified our holding in United States Coin & Currency v. Dir., 279 Md. 185, 367 A.2d 1243 (1977), that the seizing jurisdiction’s untimely filing caused it to lose its claim to the money. Under § 264 (d) the claimant does not become entitled to the money merely because the governmental entity fails to file for forfeiture within ninety days. The claimant still must apply for its return and he must do so within one year after the date of the judgment of conviction. He then must also overcome the presumption that the money is contraband. Failing either condition, § 264 (d) (3) would forfeit the seized money to the custodian.
Similarly, if the ultimate disposition is the result of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or results in probation under the provisions of Article 27, § 641, then the money is presumptively contraband, Article 27, § 264 (d) (2), and any claimants must apply for its return within one year and prove that it was not used illegally. Article 27, § 264 (d) (1). If the ultimate disposition is an acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi then the money is presumptively not contraband, Article 27, § 264 (d) (2), and any claimant must apply to the court for an order that it be returned, Article 27, § 264 (d) (1), during which proceeding the burden is on the State, if it is able, to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was used as part of a gambling violation. See Pr. George’s Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, supra.6
[631]*631Having developed the relevant law we proceed to apply it to the facts of the case before us. Here when the money was seized it was deemed prima facie contraband as a matter of law and all rights, title, and interest in the money vested in Prince George’s County. The State filed a one-count charging document in the District Court, which was transferred to the circuit court when Cole prayed a jury trial. The State ultimately moved to dismiss that prosecution but before doing so it filed a seven-count criminal information in the District Court. The second attempt at prosecution was subsequently nol prossed by the State.
Throughout the pendency of these proceedings the character and status of the money seized did not change one whit. Once an ultimate disposition of nol pros was reached there was prima facie evidence that the money was not contraband. Article 27, § 264 (d) (2). However, all rights, title, and interest still had vested in the county and until a civil proceeding was held to determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the money had in fact been part of a gambling operation, all rights, title, and interest would remain in the county.
Within ninety days of the State’s entry of nol pros Prince George’s County filed a petition for forfeiture of the funds seized. This petition was demurred to in a civil proceeding and the demurrer was properly sustained by the trial judge because there had been no conviction forming a basis for the State’s application. See Director of Fin., Pr. Geo’s Co. v. Cole, supra. Nonetheless, custody of the money was still vested in Prince George’s County.
[632]*632On May 6, 1980, Cole filed a motion for return of the money in the criminal appeal which had been voluntarily dismissed on February 8, 1979, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. This action was clearly more than one year after the ultimate disposition in that case and is governed by § 264 (d) (3) resulting in an automatic forfeiture to the county.
However, even assuming arguendo that the proceeding initiated by the county somehow tolled this limitations period for Cole, there still has been no proceeding held in conformance with Article 27, § 264 (d). The motion filed was done in the criminal case. As we said earlier, the forfeiture proceeding is a separate civil action that has nothing to do with the criminal proceeding other than the presumptions to which the ultimate disposition in the criminal case gives rise. At the hearing on the motion the Assistant County Attorney for Prince George’s County continually bemoaned the fact that he had not and was not allowed to offer evidence that the money was contraband. The judge proceeded on the premise that the criminal proceeding had sufficiently determined this question and ruled accordingly. This quite clearly contravened the language and purpose of § 264 and fell far short of the requirements of the statute.
Finally, it is Cole’s contention, concurred in by the lower court, that Article 27, § 264 and Article 27, § 551 provide an alternate means for returning the money. Rather than treating Cole’s request for return of his money as a separate civil proceeding, the trial court assumed it had the authority to order the county to give up the money. To justify its decision the court concluded, construing Article 27, § 264 (e) (4) together with Article 27, § 551, that these two sections empowered the trial court, as part of its jurisdiction over the criminal case, to order the custodian of seized money to return that money. This rationale enabled the lower court to hold that, because neither Prince George’s County nor the Director of Finance for Prince George’s County were parties to the criminal proceeding, there was no requirement that they be represented at the proceeding to determine the [633]*633status of the money. This rationale is inapplicable in this case and, as we shall see, it is also entirely unsound as a general proposition.
Sections 264 (e) (4) and 551 simply do not apply. First, these sections are inapplicable because Cole’s funds already had been forfeited to the county pursuant to § 264 (d) (3). Under § 264 (d), if a petition for the return of seized money is not properly filed within one year from the date of the ultimate disposition of that case, the seized moneys are "forfeited to the custodian without further judicial action.” Cole filed his motion seeking the return of the seized money on May 6, 1980, in the original criminal case, which had been transferred to the circuit court and was voluntarily dismissed on February 8, 1979. Cole’s motion was filed over a year after the ultimate disposition of the criminal case in which he sought the return of his money; therefore, his action was ineffective. Section 264 (d) (3) in effect acts as a statute of limitations. Even if the defendant could petition the criminal court for return of his money, he could not do so more than a year after the ultimate disposition of that criminal case.
Furthermore, neither § 264 (e) (4) nor § 551 (b) even applied to the facts in Cole. Section 264 (e) (4) applies only where there has been "an acquittal or dismissal.” These terms refer to actions taken by the trial court terminating the proceedings favorably to the accused. The docket entry evidencing the termination of this criminal proceeding indicates that the case was "dismissed by the State.” This disposition was not a dismissal as that term is used in § 264 (e) (4), but rather a nolle prosequi. See Hooper v. State, 293 Md. 162, 168, 443 A.2d 86 (1982). Therefore, § 264 (e) (4) did not authorize Cole to proceed in the criminal case. Absent any application of § 264 (e) (4), § 551 is clearly irrelevant. Section 264 (a) provides that no money shall be returned to any person except as provided in this section. This clearly preempts any application of § 551 unless it is used in concert with § 264 (e) (4). Because subsection (e) (4) does not apply in Cole, § 551 also could not apply.
[634]*634Finally, even if the trial court arguably acted pursuant to § 551 (b), the express requirements of this section were not met. This section provides for the return of all property "except contraband.” Section 264 (a) clearly states that money seized in connection with a gambling arrest is "deemed prima facie to be contraband of law.” Because this money was deemed contraband, § 551 (b) expressly precluded its return to the defendant. Although the trial judge ordered the return of the money, he never found that the money was not in fact contraband. The trial judge simply reasoned that if the property was not contraband per se and if the State could not prove in the criminal court that it was seized pursuant to a gambling operation, then the county could not keep the money. This analysis cannot logically be construed as a factual determination that money was not contraband, thus overriding the § 264 (a) presumption that it was contraband. Therefore, because the money was presumptively contraband, § 551 could not apply.
For these reasons, we hold that the trial judge erred in relying on these provisions as authorization for ordering the county to return money to Cole. Furthermore, we conclude that in general these provisions do not provide an alternative procedure to that outlined in detail in § 264.
Article 27, § 264 (e) (4) provides that the provisions of § 264 do "not prohibit the trial judge after an acquittal or dismissal from ordering immediate return of all property seized.” This section, as we have observed, became a part of § 264 in 1977. 1977 Md. Laws, Ch. 720. It was part of the effort to eliminate confusion and facilitate the rapid and smooth disposition of seized money that characterized this legislation. It hardly seems logical that the purpose would be served, however, by tacking on a section at the end of § 264 that would abrogate the elaborate procedure of the statute by allowing the return of money absent a consideration of the prevailing presumptions and character of the money.
Sections 264 (a) through (d) outline a clear civil procedure logically dealing with the disposition of money seized pursuant to gambling arrests. Subsection (e) (4) merely makes [635]*635a general statement that this section does not prohibit the trial judge from ordering an immediate return of all property seized. Subsection (e) (4) establishes no procedures to be followed, makes no provision for the local government holding the funds to be represented, and does not address the appropriate procedure if there are conflicting claims to the money. This provision is simply a general statement that cannot easily be reconciled with the detailed procedure outlined in the rest of the statute. Giving it the effect suggested by the lower court would totally abrogate the obvious purposes of this act, again creating confusion and uncertainty in the disposition of this money. It is well established that a specific, well-defined portion of a statute will control a general, uncertain provision of the same statute. See State Dep’t v. Ellicott-Brandt, 237 Md. 328, 335-36, 206 A.2d 131 (1965); Maguire v. State, 192 Md. 615, 623, 65 A.2d 299 (1949); see also 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 46.05 (4th ed. Sands 1973) (stating that "[wjhere there is inescapable conflict between general terms or provisions of a statute and other terms or provisions therein of a specific nature, the specific will prevail and be given effect over the general”). Therefore, when the money seized in a gambling case is presumptively contraband at the time of seizure § 264 (e) (4) has no application and the judge in the criminal proceeding has no authority to order return of the money.
Finally, we note that Article 27, § 551 is a general search and seizure statute.7 It provides that where there has been [636]*636an entry of nol pros, dismissal, or acquittal "all property of the person, except contraband ...,' may be returned to the person to whom it belongs without the necessity of that person instituting an action for replevin or any other legal proceeding. ...” Article 27, § 551 (b) (emphasis supplied). The contraband exception was added by Chapter 704 of the 1975 Laws of Maryland, significantly, perhaps, just one year after the embellishments of Chapter 666 in 1974, noted above. It is obvious, especially in light of the language of § 264 (a), which provides that no money is to be returned except as provided by § 264, that the Legislature did not intend that § 551 should have any impact upon the disposition of money seized pursuant to gambling violations, which is prima facie contraband.
[637]*637We hold, therefore, that money seized for gambling violations covered by Article 27, § 264 (a) cannot be returned to its claimant through any means other than those provided for in Article 27, § 264. In the instant case, in which there was no civil proceeding nor any adjudication of whether the money was contraband, Article 27, § 264 was not complied with and Prince George’s County cannot be compelled to release the money.
In No. 107 — Director of Finance v. Cole> judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County reversed.
Cole to pay the costs.
In No. 108 — Director of Finance v. Goldberg, judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County vacated and case remanded to that Court for dismissal of appeals.
Prince George’s County to pay the costs.