Diaz v. Grady

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 29, 2020·No. 7:20-cv-00645·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------x MIGUEL DIAZ,

Plaintiff, SECOND ORDER TO AMEND - against - No. 20-CV-645 (CS) WILLIAM GRADY, Dutchess County District Attorney,

Defendant. -------------------------------------------------------------x

Seibel, J. Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Southport Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant violated his rights when charging Plaintiff with obstruction of justice. By order dated February 18, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 (Doc. 5.) On March 9, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, (Doc. 8), which Plaintiff timely filed on April 2, (Doc. 10). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty-two days from the date of this Order – that is, November 30, 2020 – to file a second amended complaint. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in.forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the “special solicitude” in prose cases, id. at 475, has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. at 678. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 678-79. II. BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint. On an unspecified date in or around December 2019, Defendant William Grady, the Dutchess County District Attorney, “filed an obstruction of governmental justice charge” against Plaintiff. (Doc. 10 at 2.) Grady

then “[p]ut a force order in with DOCCS, only to have [Plaintiff] brought to court, and dismiss the charge.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Grady “never had any reason” to charge Plaintiff with obstruction and that Grady did it only “to offer [Plaintiff] a violation on a diff[e]rent matter.” (Id. at 3.) On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed an affidavit in which he states that on January 22, 2020, at the Fishkill Town Court, his lawyer told him “that [he] was tru[]ly there for a[n] offer of a ‘violation offer on a different matter’ and that the obstruction charge is being dismissed!’” (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff also states in his affidavit that “any justice computer system” will confirm that the charges were dismissed. (Id.) According to publicly available records from the New York State Department of

Corrections (DOCCS), DOCCS received Plaintiff into its custody on July 6, 2018, after he was convicted in Bronx County for first-degree reckless endangerment and sentenced to three-and-a- half-to-seven-years’ incarceration. III. DISCUSSION Malicious Prosecution Plaintiff describes his claim as one for malicious prosecution, and given that he alleges that Grady charged him with obstruction of justice for no reason or for reasons related to a different violation, the Court construes his claim as such. (See Doc. 10 at 3.) The tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Wallace v. Karo, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007) (emphasis omitted). To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that the defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to commence the proceeding or believe the proceeding could succeed;

(3) that the defendant acted with malice; and (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002). Because favorable termination is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff cannot state such a claim if his criminal proceeding is pending. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94. Federal law defines the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, and a State’s tort law serves only as a source of persuasive authority. Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2018). Under federal law, “a plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must . . . show that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence.” Id. at 22. Thus, “[w]here a dismissal in the interest of justice leaves the question of guilt or innocence unanswered, it cannot provide the favorable

termination required as the basis for that claim.” Thompson v. Clark, 364 F. Supp. 3d 178, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

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