Diaz v. Grady

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 9, 2020
Docket7:20-cv-00645
StatusUnknown

This text of Diaz v. Grady (Diaz v. Grady) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Diaz v. Grady, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK “MIGUEL DIAZ, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-0645 (CS) WILLIAM GRADY, Dutchess County ORDER TO AMEND District Attorney Office, Defendant. CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant, the District Attorney (“DA”) of Dutchess County, violated his rights. By order dated February 18, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.' For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint.

. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis cornplaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v, Dixon, 480 F.3d

| Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12¢h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v, Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits —

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 US. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible — not merely possible — that the pleader is entitled to relief. Jd. BACKGROUND The following facts are taken from the complaint: on an unspecified date, Defendant William Grady, the Dutchess County DA, “trfiJed to obtain [Plaintiffs] finger prints for a B/S E- felony,” but Plaintiff refused to provide his prints. (ECF No. 2 at 4.) Grady, who was unable to

obtain the prints from a “force order[,] .. . became upset and charged [Plaintiff] with obstruction of government justice.” (/d.) Grady then put in a force order . . . when they shipped [Plaintiff] to Dutchess County Court on 12/13/19.” dd.) On December 18, 2019, correctional staff did not produce Plaintiff to appear on the obstruction charge. And in January 2020, the DA’s Office “didn’t put the order of force in ‘apain,’ which shows the [malicious] intent in putting these charges in on me the first time they did it!” Ud} Plaintiff argues that the “fake obstruction charge was falsely drawn up in a[n] attempt to obtain [his] prints [and] put the B/S E-felony on [him] at the same time!” Plaintiff also states that in January 2020, the DA’s Office “stopped trying” to charge him “on two charges.” (/d.) He seeks money damages.

On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff filed an affidavit where he states that on J anuary □□□ 2020, at the Fishkill Town Court, his lawyer told him “that [he] was tru[]ly there for a[n] offer of

a ‘violation offer on a different matter’ and that the obstruction charge is being dismissed!”” (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiff also states in his affidavit that “any computer justice system” will confirm that the charges were dismissed. (/d.)

According to publicly available records from the New York State Department of Corrections (DOCCS), DOCCS received Plaintiff into its custody on July 6, 2018, after his Bronx County conviction for first-degree reckless endangerment and sentence of 34-7 years’ incarceration.

DISCUSSION A, Malicious Prosecution Because Plaintiff alleges that Grady charged him with obstruction of justice after Plaintiff refused to be fingerprinted, the Court construes these allegations as asserting a malicious prosecution claim. The tort of malicious prosecution “remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S, 384, 389- 90 (2007). To state a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) that the defendant initiated or continued a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant lacked probable cause to commence the proceeding or believe the proceeding could succeed; (3) that the defendant acted with malice; and (4) that the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff's favor. See Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 2002). Because favorable termination is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff cannot state such a claim if his criminal proceeding is pending. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394. Federal law defines the elements of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, and a State’s tort law serves only as a source of persuasive authority. Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2018). Under federal law, “a plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must... show that the underlying criminal proceeding ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence.” /d. Thus, “where a dismissal in the interest of justice leaves the question of guilt or innocence unanswered, . . . it cannot provide the favorable termination required as the basis for [that] claim.” Thompson v. Clark, 364 F. Supp.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Imbler v. Pachtman
424 U.S. 409 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein
555 U.S. 335 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Alvin Fulton Jr. v. Laurie Robinson
289 F.3d 188 (Second Circuit, 2002)
Simon v. City of New York
727 F.3d 167 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Thompson v. Clark
364 F. Supp. 3d 178 (E.D. New York, 2019)
Lanning v. City of Glens Falls
908 F.3d 19 (Second Circuit, 2018)

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Diaz v. Grady, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/diaz-v-grady-nysd-2020.