Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. Burke

4 F.2d 118, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 917
CourtDistrict Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJanuary 6, 1925
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 4 F.2d 118 (Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. Burke) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Detroit Motor Appliance Co. v. Burke, 4 F.2d 118, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 917 (mnd 1925).

Opinion

BOOTH, District Judge.

The above-entitled cause came regularly on, and was duly heard and submitted upon bill, answer, and proof. The suit is for an injunction and for an accounting, for damages and profits on account of alleged infringement of United States patent No. 1,114,246, to F.. N. Furber, entitled “temperature controlling apparatus for internal combustion engines.”

The patent was issued October 20, 1914; application filed March 31, 1914. Plaintiff became the owner of said patent by mesne assignments from the inventor. One of the purposes or aims of the alleged invention is stated in the specification as follows:

“When an automobile is operated in cold weather, it is found that the cooling system carries the heat away from the engine so rapidly that its temperature is reduced below the point at which it can operate at its highest- efficiency. * * s The present invention has for its primary object to devise means for controlling, automatically, the rate of radiation of heat by the water-cooling system in such a manner as to maintain the engine at' substantially all times during its operation, at an efficiently operative temperature.”

There are eight claims in the patent, all of which are relied upon, excepting the seventh, which was withdrawn during the trial. The second claim, which is fairly typical of the first four, reads as follows:

“In an automobile,, the combination with an internal combustion engine and a water-cooling system therefor, including a radiator, of means adjustable to obstruct more or less the flow of air through the radiator and mechanism for adjusting said means automatically in accordance with the temperature of the water in said system.”

The sixth claim, which is typical of the remaining ones, reads as follows:

“In an automobile, the combination with an internal combustion engine and a water-cooling system therefor, including a radiator, of a series of adjustable shutters arranged to obstruct more or less the flow of air through the radiator, depending upon their adjustment, and a thermostat in said cooling system, connected with said shut■ters, to adjust them in accordance with changes in the temp era tare of the water in said system.”

The elements involved are: (1) An internal combustion engine. (2) A water cooling system therefor. (3) A radiator (being part of the cooling system). (4) Shutters, which are adjustable, to regulate the flow of air through the radiator. (5) The thermostat, which is controlled by the temperature of the cooling water, and which in turn controls the adjustment of the shutters. All of these elements are to be combined in an automobile.

It is apparent that each of the claims are combination claims. It is therefore presumed that all of the elements are old or not patentable. Richards v. Chase Elev. Co., 159 U. S. 477, 486, 16 S. Ct. 53, 40 L. Ed. 225; Hay v. Heath Cycle Co., 71 F. 411, 413, 18 C. C. A. 157; Campbell v. Conde Imp. Co. (C. C.) 74 F. 745.

But the fact that all of the elements are old is not conclusive against patentable novelty. Allen v. Grimes (C. C.) 89 F. 869. Nor does the fact that all of the elements are old preclude the possibility of invention. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, 381, 29 S. Ct. 652, 53 L. Ed. 1034; Steiner, etc., Co. v. Tabor Co. (C. C.) 178 F. 831, 839; St. Louis Street Flushing Co. v. American Street Flushing Co., 156 F. 574, 84 C. C. A. 340. In the last cited case, the court said:

“To accomplish a new and useful result within the moaning of the patent law (section 4886, Rev. St. [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3382]), it is not necessary that a result before unknown should be brought about, but it is sufficient if an old result is accomplished in a new and more effective way. If the value and effectiveness of a machine are substantially increased, the new combination of old elements, which does it, is patentable.”

The issuance of the patent raises the presumption that it is valid; that the device possesses utility and embodies invention. Lehnbeuter v. Holthaus, 105 U. S. 94, 26 L. Ed. 939; Wilkins Shoe-Button Fastener Co. v. Webb et al. (C. C.) 89 F. 982.

The foregoing principles are elementary and should be borne in mind in considering the defenses. The answer sets up three main defenses: (1) Anticipation. (2) Want of invention in view of the prior art. (3) Non-infringement.

Anticipation.

The anticipation relied upon is by three prior patents, viz.: Patent No. 46, 898, Hammond, March 21, 1865; patent No. 1,079,765, Hoiland, November 25, 1913; French letters patent No. 317,521, Fouehe and Bochet, published September 8, 1902. Inasmuch as both anticipation and lack of *120 invention are set up as defenses, it will be assumed that the term "anticipation” is used in its strict sense/ and that by it is meant the disclosure in the prior art of" a'thing which is substantially'identical with the device against which it is cited.

Hammond, No. 46,898, March 21, 1865.

This is a device for regulating a house ventilator. There is no internal combustion engine, no water cooling system, and no shutters to regulate the flow of air through a radiator. The main similarity between Hammond and Furber is that both make use of a thermostatic element for the operation of levers. Such an element, however, is coneededly old in the prior art; but the particular art to which the Hammond patent relates is entirely different from the art to which the Furber patent relates, and the structures are entirely dissimilar.

Hoiland, No. 1,079,765, November 25, 1913.

This is a patent fqr a wind shield for an automobile radiator. It is in the same art as the Furber patent. Tt differs, however, from Furber in many respects:

(1) 'It has no independent thermostatic element, but makes use of the whole volume of water in the cooling system, in lieu of such independent thermostatic element. The expansion of this water, caused by being heated by the .engine, operates a piston, which in turn operates a shutter in front of the automobile radiator.
(2) Hoiland is dependent on the volume of water, so far as it is operative as a thermo-motor device. When the volume of water decreases slightly, Hoiland can operate only as a steam pressure device.
(3) Hoiland will not operate with a leaky radiator. This is expressly stated in the specifications.
(4) Hoiland has no vent, but the cooling system is a closed one.

According tó the testimony of experts in .the case, this makes the Hoiland device impracticable to use in the modern automobile, owing to the danger of causing the radiator to explode or collapse. The evidence shows that the radiators of all modern automobiles have vents.

French Patent No. 317,521, Eouche and Bochet, 1902.

This is described as a new system of regulating the temperature of a fluid by means of a surface heat changer.

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4 F.2d 118, 1925 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 917, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/detroit-motor-appliance-co-v-burke-mnd-1925.