Ideal Stopper Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.

131 F. 244, 65 C.C.A. 436, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4291
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJuly 12, 1904
DocketNo. 517
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 131 F. 244 (Ideal Stopper Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ideal Stopper Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 131 F. 244, 65 C.C.A. 436, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4291 (4th Cir. 1904).

Opinion

BRAWLEY, District Judge.

The patent in controversy is that which was considered by this court in Crown Cork & Seal Company v. Aluminum Stopper Company, 108 Fed. 847, 48 C. C. A. 72. Of that decision the learned counsel for appellants say:

“We assent absolutely to every legal doctrine stated and applied in that decision, and find in it the full sanction and authority for every proposition upon which we rely. The sound principles and logical reasoning of that decision, applied to the state of facts as they are presented, led necessarily to the upholding of the patent. Applied to the actual state of facts, embracing the Young patent as part of the prior art, they lead of necessity to the opposite conclusion.”

It thus appears that the single question presented by this appeal is whether the Young British patent discloses and anticipates the alleged invention of the Painter patent. It was decided adversely to the de[245]*245fendants in the court below. We-held in the former case that Painter’s patent was—

“A distinctly original conception, so essentially unlike anything in the prior art that nothing earlier has been presented to us out of which the defendants could read the invention of the patent or either claim of it. There was no known device which could be converted into the Painter invention by any improvement short of rejection of the entire plan. The answer of defendants, it is true, stated that this patent was void for want of novelty, and referred to the prior invention of Young in Great Britain in 1848. This was urged by Hall’s attorneys upon the attention of the officials of the Patent Office in opposition to the granting of the reissue, and was held by the board of examiners in chief not to exhibit the Painter invention; and the defendants’ own expert, Lorenz, testified that the Young patent was not a practical or operative device, and seems so far to have satisfied the learned counsel for defendants on that point that Young’s patent was not introduced in evidence.”

Young’s patent is now before us, and the appellants’ case rests upon the proposition that there is “substantial identity of the inventive idea of the Young patent with that of the Painter patent,” and the argument of the appellant is that every element or feature of the Painter device is found in the Young patent. If that is true, Painter is not entitled to be considered as a pioneer, as having disclosed a primary invention, and the decision of the court below should he reversed; for the evidence shows that the appellee company, the assignee of Painter, has a practical monopoly of certain bottle-stopping devices, and it would be unjust in principle and highly injurious in its consequences to the public to sustain its exclusive privilege, unless it is clearly established that Painter was the pioneer in this art, for this would tend rather to obstruct than to stimulate invention, which is the great object of the patent laws. If the original conception of that method of stopping bottles, for which his patents were granted, was not his; if the principle of the alleged invention, with all its undeveloped possibilities, is found in previous patents or rested in public knowledge, and he has done no more than extend the original thought by a change only in form, proportion, and degree; if he has carried forward another’s conception bv a new and more extended application of it; and if the essence of his patents is in doing substantially the same thing in substantially the same way, only providing such improvements or modifications as a mechanic conversant with the art could effect by skill or ingenuity — it would follow that he would be entitled only to patents upon his improvements, and would not be entitled to shut out others from the enjoyment of those improvements which the same or greater skill may have achieved. In other words, if the inventive idea was Young’s, and not Painter’s, and Painter had simply improved upon Young’s conception, and if any skilled mechanic could take Young’s patent and by a combination of the same elements, differing merely in degree or in detail, or in the substitution of equivalents, could produce a bottle stopper substantially the same as Painter’s, merely varying the form of mechanism, but without involving any of Painter’s ideas, then it would follow that Young was the pioneer in this art, and not Painter. But if the entire scheme of Painter is radically different from that of Young, and if, in construction, operation, purpose, and result, the invention set forth in Painter’s patent is not responsive in terms or substance to the Young construction, and the same or nonequivalent elements are not used in substan[246]*246tially the same way to produce the same result, and no mechanical skill working upon Young’s plan could ever produce the same result that Painter accomplished, then it would follow that the inventive idea was different, and any modification or improvements worked out upon Painter’s idea must be tributary to it. The question to be decided is mainly one of fact, and, whatever doubt there may be as to the correctness of our conclusion, there is no doubt as to the legal principle which should govern it.

Robinson, in his work on Patents (sections 272, 892, 893, 894, and cases cited), states the principle:

The test of the question of identity in the inventive idea is whether “the compared inventions perform the same functions by the same modes of operation. If the effects produced are substantially different, there is no identity. If the effects are the same, and the functions are essentially distinct, there Is no identity. If the functions are the same, and the modes of operation by which they are performed are radically unlike, there is no identity. Contrariwise, where the effects are identical, the functions identical, and the modes of operation identical, the ideas embodied in the two inventions must also be identical.”

In determining the question of identity of the inventive idea, it is not a sufficient answer to say of any alleged anticipation that it was a mere paper patent, and that the same had not been operative or commercially successful; for prior existing conditions might not have stimulated full development. To discover the inventive idea that was in Young’s mind, we naturally look to his staten .¡it of invention and to the drawings intended to illustrate it, for that is supposed to embody his ideas. We do not mean that Young’s invention is necessarily limited to his own conception of its possibilities. Columbus would not be the less entitled to be considered to have discovered America because, when he set out on his voyage his object was, not to discover a new continent, but a new route to an old one; and if Young gave to the world an invention which was intended for one purpose only, yet which so clearly suggested the thought which afterwards bore fruitage in Painter’s invention and which required only a more deft mechanic to develop it, then Young might justly be considered the pioneer in the art of inventing bottle stoppers, and Painter would be entitled only to such improvements as his mechanical skill wrought upon Young’s invention.

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Bluebook (online)
131 F. 244, 65 C.C.A. 436, 1904 U.S. App. LEXIS 4291, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ideal-stopper-co-v-crown-cork-seal-co-ca4-1904.