Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WYNN wrote the opinion, in which Judge JOHNSTON joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a dissenting opinion.
WYNN, Circuit Judge:
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), held that “the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole” for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that States must provide juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id at 75,130 S.Ct. 2011.
Nearly a decade before the Supreme Court decided 'Graham, Respondent, the Commonwealth of Virginia, sentenced Petitioner Dennis LeBlanc to life imprisonment without parole for a nonhomicide offense he committed at the age of sixteen. In light of Graham, Petitioner sought post-conviction-relief from his sentence in Virginia state courts. The state courts denied Petitioner relief, holding that Virginia’s geriatric release program—which was adopted more than fifteen years before the Supreme Court decided Graham and will allow Petitioner to seek release beginning at the age of sixty—provides the “meaningful opportunity” for release that Graham requires.
Mindful of the deference we must accord to- state court decisions denying state prisoners postconviction relief, we nonetheless [260]*260conclude that Petitioner’s state court adjudication constituted an unreasonable application of Graham. Most significantly, Virginia courts unreasonably ignored the plain language of the procedures governing review of petitions for geriatric release, which authorize the State Parole Board to deny geriatric release for any reason, without considering a juvenile offender’s maturity and rehabilitation. In light of the lack of governing standards, it was objectively unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that geriatric release affords Petitioner with the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” Graham demands. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to relief from his unconstitutional sentence.
I.
On July 15, 2002, a Virginia state trial court found Petitioner guilty of rape and abduction. Petitioner committed the offenses on July 6, 1999, when he was sixteen years old. The court sentenced Petitioner to two terms of life imprisonment. Petitioner was ineligible for parole pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-165.1, which abolished parole for individuals convicted of a felony committed after January 1, 1995. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
In 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence in state trial court. The motion argued that Graham rendered Petitioner’s life sentence invalid. In opposition, Respondents asserted that, notwithstanding Virginia’s abolition of parole, Petitioner’s life sentence did not violate Graham because Virginia allows for conditional release of “geriatric prisoners,” Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01 (“Geriatric Release”).
At a hearing on August 9, 2011, the state trial court orally denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate. In rendering its decision, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Angel v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 248, 704 S.E.2d 386 (2011), which held that Geriatric Release provides juveniles sentenced to life in prison a “meaningful opportunity for release” and therefore complies with Graham’s parole requirement. J.A. 157. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which summarily denied his petition for appeal.
On June 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. A federal magistrate judge reviewed the petition and recommended that the district court deny it. LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12-ev-340, 2013 WL 10799406, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 24, 2013). Petitioner filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report. Finding the objections well-taken, the district court granted Petitioner’s habeas petition, holding that his state court adjudication was contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Graham. LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 WL 4042175, at *9 (E.D. Va. July 1, 2015). In particular, the district court concluded that Geriatric Release does not offer juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment, like Petitioner, the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” required by Graham. Id. at *9, *11-18. The district court further concluded that Geriatric Release did not comply with Graham’s dictate that state penal systems reflect the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders, explaining that Geriatric Release “treats children worse” than adult offenders. Id. at *14 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the district court remanded Petitioner’s case to the state court for resentencing in accordance with Graham. Id. at *19.
[261]*261Respondents filed a timely appeal, and the district court stayed its judgment pending resolution of that appeal.
II.
A.
The Virginia General Assembly established Geriatric Release in 1994—more than 15 years before the Supreme Court decided Graham—as part of its “truth-in-sentencing” reform package. J.A. 169. The primary goal of truth-in-sentencing reform was to close the gap between prisoners’ original sentences and the amount of time they actually served. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Truth-in-Sentencing in Virginia 17-20 (April 5, 2001), available at https://www. ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/187677.pdf. The centerpiece of the reform package was the elimination of parole for all offenders who committed felonies on or after January 1,1995. Id.
The statutory provision governing Geriatric Release, as amended,1 provides, in its entirety:
Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a conviction for a felony offense, other than a Class 1 felony, (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five or older and who has served at least five years of the sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of sixty or older and who has served at least ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the Parole Board for conditional release. The Parole Board shall promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of this section.
Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-40.01. Unlike with other components of the truth-in-sentencing reform package,2 we have identified no evidence in the contemporaneous legislative record speaking to the General Assembly’s goal in enacting Geriatric Release or providing guidance regarding the implementation of Geriatric Release.
The Virginia Parole Board is responsible for deciding whether to grant petitions for Geriatric Release. Section 53.1-40.01 directs the Parole Board to promulgate regulations necessary to implement the statute. Pursuant to that authority, the Parole Board established administrative procedures governing implementation of the Geriatric Release provision (the “Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures”).
The Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures set forth a two-stage review process for Geriatric Release petitions. At the “Initial Review” stage, the Parole Board reviews a prisoner’s petition—which must provide “compelling reasons for conditional release”—and the prisoner’s “central file and any other pertinent information.” J.A. 287. The Parole Board may deny the petition at the Initial Review stage based on a majority vote. Neither the statute nor the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures states what constitute “compelling reasons for conditional release,” nor does either document require the Parole Board to consider any particular factors in conducting the Initial Review, nor does either document set forth [262]*262any criteria for granting or denying a prisoner’s petition at the Initial Review stage.
If the Parole Board does not deny a petition at the Initial Review stage, the petition moves forward to the “Assessment Review” stage. As part of the Assessment Review, a Parole Board member or designated staff member interviews the prisoner. During that interview, the prisoner may present written and oral statements as well as any written material bearing on his case for parole. The interviewer then drafts a written assessment of the- prisoner’s “suitability for conditional release” and, based on that assessment, recommends whether the Parole Board should grant the petition. J.A. 288. In order to grant Geriatric Release to a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment, at least four members of the five-member Parole Board must vote in favor of release.
In engaging in the Assessment Review, Parole Board members should consider “[a]ll factors in the parole consideration process including Board appointments and Victim Input.” Id. The Virginia Parole Board Policy Manual includes a long list of “decision factors” to be considered in the parole review process. J.A. 297. These factors include: public safety, the facts and circumstances of the offense, the length and type of sentence, and the proposed release plan. The Parole Board also should consider certain characteristics of the offender, including “the individual’s history, physical and mental condition and character, ... conduct, employment, education, vocational training, and other developmental activities during incarceration,” prior criminal record, behavior while incarcerated, and “changes in motivation and behavior.” J.A. 297-99. Finally, the Parole Board should consider impressions gained from interviewing the prisoner as well as information from family members, victims, and other individuals.
B.
There are several key ways in which Geriatric Release differs from Virginia’s parole system, which remains in place for prisoners who committed their offenses before January 1, 1995. The first—and most obvious—is the age limitation. In order to seek Geriatric Release, an inmate must be at least sixty years of age. By contrast, most parole-eligible inmates serving a life sentence will be considered for parole for the first time after serving fifteen years of their sentence. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C). Other prisoners will be considered for parole when they serve a certain percentage of their sentence. Id. § 53.1-151(A). Accordingly, whereas Petitioner would have been considered for parole after serving twenty years of his sentence, Petitioner cannot apply for Geriatric Release until roughly twenty years later.
The second difference is that an inmate must actively petition for Geriatric Release once he or she becomes eligible, whereas the Parole Board automatically considers, on an annual basis, whether to release each parole-eligible inmate.
A third difference is that, unlike with parole, the Parole Board may deny a petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage without considering any of the “decision factors” enumerated in the Parole Board Policy Manual. Indeed, unlike the parole system, which has established criteria that the Parole Board must consider in granting or denying parole, Geriatric Release affords the Parole Board unconstrained discretion to deny a petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage. Relatedly, in their petition, prisoners must “identify compelling reasons” why they should receive Geriatric Release, notwithstanding that the “compelling reasons” requirement has no statutory basis and thát the Geriatric Release Administra[263]*263tive Procedures do not provide any guidance regarding what constitutes a “compelling reason.” J.A. 287. By contrast, there is no requirement that a parole-eligible inmate demonstrate “compelling reasons” in order to obtain parole.
Fourth, the Parole Board or its designee interviews prisoners undergoing parole review as a matter' of course. By contrast, the Parole Board can deny a petition for Geriatric Release' at the Initial Review stage “on a review of' the record,” without interviewing the inmate. J.A. 287.
A final notable difference is that four members of the five-member Parole Board must approve Geriatric Release of inmates sentenced to life imprisonment. By contrast, only three members of the Parole Board must approve parole of parole-eligible prisoners. .
III.
We review the district court’s decision to grant Petitioner’s habeas petition de novo. Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which accords deference to final judgments of, state courts, circumscribes our review. Nicolas v. Att’y Gen. of Md., 820 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 2016). Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, like Petitioner, if the prisoner’s state court adjudication “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2264(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding,” id. § 2264(d)(2).
Respondents contend that the Virginia courts’ conclusion that Geriatric Release complies with Graham’s parole requirement amounted to a finding of fact, and therefore that the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2264(d)(2) applies. Federal courts review habeas petitions raising questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact under Section 2254(d)(1). Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 246-52 (4th Cir. 2014) (analyzing habeas petition raising mixed question of law and fact under Section 2254(d)(1)). By contrast, Section 2254(d)(2) applies to questions of historical fact. Weaver v. Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 963 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he special prophylaxis of section 2254(d)(2) applies only to determinations of basic, primary, or historical facts.” (internal quotation omitted)).
Here, the Virginia courts’ evaluation of whether Geriatric Release complies with Graham’s parole requirement implicates questions of law, and therefore is subject to review under Section 2254(d)(1). See, e.g., Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1191 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a state court decision was contrary to clearly established law when it held that Graham did not bar a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s sentence under which he would be eligible for parole in 127 years); Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2012) (analyzing whether 89-year sentence was functional equivalent of life sentence for purposes of Graham under Section 2254(d)(1)). Therefore, we must determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established” Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
In assessing a state prisoner’s habeas claims, we review the “last reasoned” state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corrs., 813 F.3d 517, 525 (4th [264]*264Cir. 2016). “Unless a state-court opinion adopts or incorporates the reasoning of a prior opinion, AEDPA generally requires federal courts to review one state decision.” Woolley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 421 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). However, “[i]f the last reasoned decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, we may consider both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.” Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted); Brian R. Means, Federal Habeas Manual § 3:7 (2016) (“[W]here the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous decision, it is acceptable for the federal court to look at both state court decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.”).
The Supreme Court of Virginia summarily affirmed the trial court’s oral denial of Petitioner’s motion to vacate. Accordingly, the trial court decision constitutes the last reasoned decision for purposes of our analysis. Nicolas, 820 F.3d at 129. The trial court relied on Angel’s reasoning regarding the Geriatric Release provision’s compliance with Graham’s parole requirement. Accordingly, we must consider both the trial court’s decision and Angel in determining whether Petitioner’s state court adjudication was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of’ Graham—the question to which we now turn.
IV.
The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const, amend. VIII; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). “To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’ ” Graham, 560 U.S. at 58, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)). The Eighth Amendment “prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983).
Graham rests on a long line of Supreme Court decisions addressing the constraints imposed by the Eighth Amendment on the punishment of juvenile offenders. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838, 108 S.Ct 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for offenders who committed their crimes before the age of sixteen. The Court grounded its decision on the principle “that punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.” Id. at 834, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987)). “[Ajdolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults,” the Court explained. Id “Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.” Id. at 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687. Accordingly, a juvenile’s transgression is “not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Id. Because juvenile offenders are not as personally culpable as adult offenders, juvenile offenders should not receive punishments as severe as those [265]*265inflicted on adult offenders, the Court held. Id. at 834, 108 S.Ct. 2687.
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court again emphasized the unique characteristics of youth when it extended Thompson’s bar on the death • penalty to all individuals who committed their offenses before the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Like Thompson, the Roper Court highlighted juveniles’ “lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility” and propensity for “reckléss behavior.” Id. at 569, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (citations omitted). Roper further noted that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult” and juveniles’ “personality traits are more transitory, less fixed.” Id. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183. As a result, “it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.” Id. “Indeed, ‘[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.’ ” Id (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993)).
Against this backdrop, Graham held that “for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.” 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011. The Court explained that “[t]his clear line is necessary to prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.” Id (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court again highlighted the “lessened culpability” of juveniles, noting that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence.” Id. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Moreover, “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of an ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults.” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183).
Graham explained that life without parole is “the second most severe penalty permitted by law,” behind only the death penalty, because it “deprives the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.” Id. at 69-70, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (citations omitted). If a juvenile is sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, he or she has “no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation with society, no hope.” Id. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
Additionally, “[b]y denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.” Id. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Accordingly, the sentence of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender will always be “disproportionate” under the Eighth Amendment because it always relies on a judgment “made at the outset” that the defendant is incorrigible. Id. at 73, 130 S.Ct. 2011. And while some juvenile offenders may ultimately prove to pose a risk to society for the rest of their lives, “[a] life without parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity” later in life. Id. at 73, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (emphasis added).
[266]*266Although Graham left it to “the State[s], in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms” to comply with its dictates, id, at 75,130 S.Ct. 2011, the decision established at least three minimum requirements for parole or early release programs for juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment, like Petitioner.3
First, Graham held that such offenders must have the opportunity “to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (emphasis added). Put differently, the juvenile offender must have a “chance to later demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society” and that “the bad acts he commit ted as a teenager are not representative of his true character.” Id. at 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011. To that end, a parole or early release system does not comply with Graham if the system allows for the lifetime incarceration of a juvenile nonhomicide offender based solely on the heinousness or depravity of The offender’s crime. Id. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (“[The Eighth Amendment] prohibits] States from making the judgment at .the outset that [juvenile nonhomicide offenders] never will be fit to reenter society.”); id. at 76, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (stating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits courts “from sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without parole based on a subjective judgment that the defendant’s crimes demonstrate an ‘irretrievably depraved character’” (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183)).
Second, Graham held that the opportunity to obtain release must be “meaningful,” which means that the opportunity must be “realistic” and more than a “remote possibility.” Id. at 70, 75, 82, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Graham’s “meaningful[ness]” requirement reflects the Supreme Court’s long-standing characterization of “[p]arole [a]s a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of cases.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-03, 103 S.Ct. 3001, Because parole is the “normal expectation,”- it should be “possible to predict, at least to some extent, when parole might be granted.” Id. (holding that, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, executive clemency is not a substitute for parole because clemency is an “ad hoc” process that provides inmates with nothing more than a “bare possibility” of release). To that end, Graham held that the availability of executive clemency did not satisfy the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” requirement. 560 U.S, at 69-70, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
Third, Graham held that a state parole or early release program must account for the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders: “An offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Id. at 76, 130 S.Ct. 2011; see also Miller v. Alabama, — U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2465-66, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (explaining that Graham’s “foundational principle” is “that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children”).4 Accordingly, a state parole or early release system that subjects juvenile [267]*267offenders to more severe, punishments than their adult counterparts necessarily violates Graham.
With these three principles in mind—(1) that juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment must have the “opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” (2) that this opportunity must be “meaningful,” and (3) that the early release or parole system must take into account the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders—we must determine whether the conclusion' of the1 trial court and Angel that Geriatric Release complies with Graham’s parole requirement was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of” Graham.5
1.
A state court adjudication is contrary to clearly established law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached, by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at [the opposite] result.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 453-54 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, Angel, upon which the state trial court entirely relied, correctly identified Graham as controlling and recognized each of the three minimum requirements set forth above for a parole or early release program for juvenile nonhomicide , offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. In particular, Angel, repeatedly stated that Graham requires that juvenile offenders be afforded an opportunity for “release based on maturity and rehabilitation.” 704 S.E.2d [268]*268at 402. Likewise, the Angel court acknowledged that the opportunity for release must be “meaningful.” Id.6 And Angel recognized that Graham demands that state penal systems account for the “limited moral culpability of juvenile offenders.” Id. at 401. Accordingly, Petitioner’s state court adjudication was not “contrary to” Graham. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (holding that state court adjudication that “correctly identified the principles announced [by the Supreme Court] as those governing the analysis ... was [not] contrary to ... clearly established law”).
2.
Petitioner, therefore, may obtain relief only if his state court adjudication amounted to an “unreasonable application” of Graham. A state court decision amounts to an “unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “ ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of the prisoner’s case.” Grueninger, 813 F.3d at 524 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520, 123 S.Ct. 2527). To satisfy this standard, the state court adjudication must be “more than incorrect or erroneous;” it must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). That being said, to reach a decision that constitutes an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent, a state court need not address an identical factual or legal scenario to that previously addressed by the Supreme Court: “even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007).
For several reasons, we agree with Petitioner that his state court adjudication constituted an “unreasonable application” of Graham.
First, Geriatric Release does not necessarily provide Petitioner—or any other inmate, juvenile or otherwise—the opportunity to obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” as Graham requires. In concluding that Geriatric Release satisfied this requirement, Angel emphasized that “if the prisoner meets the qualifications for consideration contained in the statute, the factors used in the normal parole consideration process apply to conditional release decisions under this statute.” 704 S.E.2d at 402. Assuming arguendo the “decision factors” used in the normal parole consideration process adequately account for a juvenile offender’s “maturity and rehabilitation,”7 this conclusion ignores the Parole Board’s authority to deny Geriatric Release for any reason—and without consideration of the “decision factors”—and therefore is objectively unreasonable.
[269]*269Under the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures, the Parole Board must consider the “decision factors”—the “factors used in the normal parole consideration process”—during the Assessment Review stage. But the Parole Board may deny a petition for Geriatric Release for any reason—without consideration of the “decision factors”—at the Initial Review stage. It was objectively unreasonable to conclude that Geriatric Release satisfied Graham’s requirement that juvenile offenders be able to obtain release “based on maturity and rehabilitation,” when, under the plain and unambiguous language of the governing procedures, the Parole Board can deny every juvenile offender Geriatric Release for any reason whatsoever.8
Like Respondents, the dissent seeks to insulate Angel from collateral review by claiming that “the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion that Virginia law requires consideration of ‘normal parole factors’ such as rehabilitation and maturity is one of state law and thus is binding on this court.” Post at 282. But, contrary to Respondents’ and the dissent’s characterization, Angel does not hold that the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures “require” consideration of the “decision factors.” Rather, Angel states that the “decision factors” “apply to conditional release decisions,” but never addresses whether— much less holds that—the Parole Board must consider the “decision factors” in reviewing every petition for Geriatric Release. 704 S.E.2d at 402 (emphasis added).
Indeed, by reading Angel as “re-quirting]” consideration of the “decision factors,” the dissent puts Angel into direct conflict with the plain language of the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures, which permit the Parole Board to deny a petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage for any reason, and without consideration of the “decision factors.” See supra Part II. But in predicting how state courts would resolve an unsettled issue of state law, we must reject, if at all possible, predictions that would ascribe absurd or irrational conclusions to state courts. See, e.g., Pena v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103, 1134 (D.N.M. 2015) (refusing to predict that state court would resolve unsettled issue of state law in a way that “would produce absurd results”); Union Cnty. Ill. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 920 F.Supp.2d 923, 931 (S.D. Ill. 2013) (adopting prediction of state law that was “[t]he only non-absurd, non-inconvenient way to read the language of the law itself and the language of Illinois appellate courts”); Jakomas v. McFalls, 229 F.Supp.2d 412, 424 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting plaintiffs contention that state court would interpret state law in a way that would lead to an “absurd result”). Accordingly, we refuse to read Angel’s description of the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures as “applying]” the “decision factors” as requiring that the Parole Board consider those factors at the Initial Review stage, as the dissent proposes.
Contrary to the dissent’s position, Angel’s error is not that it irrationally interpreted the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures as requiring consideration of the “decision factors.” Rather, Angel, unreasonably concluded that the potential for consideration of maturity and rehabilitation at the As[270]*270sessment Review stage is adequate to comply with Graham’s requirement that States afford juvenile nonhomicide offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, when the Procedures allow the Parole Board to deny Geriatric Release for any reason at the Initial Review stage and therefore provide no guarantee that the Parole Board will consider a juvenile offender’s maturation and rehabilitation—a question of federal constitutional law. Indeed, under the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures, the Parole Board could allow Petitioner to die in prison without ever having considered whether Petitioner had matured or was rehabilitated. Graham does not countenance such a possibility. 560 U.S. at 74, 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (rejecting sentences of life without parole for juvenile non-homicide offender because such a penalty “guarantee^ [the offender] will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity to . obtain release” and “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal”).
Geriatric Release also fails to comply with Graham’s requirement that juvenile offenders have the opportunity to obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” because it allows for the lifetime incarceration of a juvenile non-homicide offender based solely on the heinousness or depravity of the offender’s crime. Data provided by the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission shows that, to date, 95.4 percent of the denials of Geriatric Release have been based on the “serious nature of the crime.” J.A. 178.9 Accordingly, the Parole Board denies Geriatric Release petitions in nearly every case on grounds that the petitioners’ “crimes demonstrate an ‘irretrievably depraved character’ ”—directly contrary to Graham’s instruction that state penal regimes take into account a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s greater “capacity for change” relative to his adult counterparts by giving such offender the opportunity “to- demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his true character.” 560 U.S. at 73, 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
For this reason, the dissent misconstrues Graham when it appeals to the conduct giving rise to Petitioner’s conviction and Petitioner’s conduct at sentencing to justify its position. Post at 276. Rather, Graham forbids States from making a “judgment ... at the outset” that a juvenile offender is “incorrigible” because juvenile offenders have a “capacity for change.” 560 U.S. at 73, 79, 130 S.Ct. 2011.
A second reason Petitioner’s adjudication was objectively unreasonable is that the Geriatric Release program does not offer juvenile nonhomicide offenders the “meaningful” opportunity for release traditionally afforded by parole. Tellingly, when analyzing whether Geriatric Release complied with Graham, the Angel court said that “the effect of [the juvenile defendant’s [271]*271life] sentences is that [he] will spend the rest of his life confined in the penitentiary.” 704 S.E.2d at 401 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Virginia, therefore, expected the defendant in Angel—who was 17 when he -committed -his offenses and less than 4 years older when the Supreme Court of Virginia decided his appeal— would spend his life .jail, notwithstanding the availability of Geriatric Release and that the defendant had had only four years to “grow[] and matur[e].” Graham, 560 U.S. at 73,130 S.Ct. 2011. But under clearly established Supreme Court precedent-precedent repeatedly relied on by Graham, id. at 70, 130 S.Ct. 2011—“parole” should be the “normal expectation in the vast majority of cases,” Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-03, 103 S.Ct. 3001. It was objectively unreasonable, therefore, for the Supreme Court of Virginia to take the position that a penal regime under which it concedes early release is the exception, rather than the expectation, complies with Graham’s meaningfulness requirement.
Relatedly, Geriatric Release also fails to satisfy the “meaningful” opportunity requirement because there are no standards governing the denial of Geriatric Release petitions. In the context of determining whether .a life sentence without parole complied with the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he law generally specifies when a prisoner will be eligible to be considered for parole, and details the standards and pro-eedures applicable at that time,” allowing prisoners “to predict, at least to some extent, when parole might be granted ” Id. at 300-01, 103 S.Ct. 3001. By contrast, mechanisms that allow a decision-maker to grant or deny early release “for any reason without reference to any standards,” offer inmates nothing more than a “bare possibility” of release and therefore do not constitute “parole” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.10 Id. at 301, 103 S.Ct. 3001.
, As explained above, the Geriatric Release statute does not provide the Parole Board with any guidance regarding what factors it must. consider in deciding whether to release a geriatric prisoner. See supra Part II.A. And, as Petitioner correctly notes, the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures authorize the Parole Board to deny a petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage for any reason. Without any statutory or administrative guidance regarding what constitutes a “compelling reason” warranting release or setting forth the criteria for denying a juvenile offender’s petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage, it is impossible to predict whether and when—if at all—the Parole Board will grant Geriatric Release. Accordingly, Geriatric Release does not afford juvenile nonhomieide offenders the “meaningful” opportunity to obtain release to which Graham entitles them. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 69-70, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (holding that [272]*272executive clemency, which the Supreme Court has recognized lacks governing standards, did not constitute “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” for juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment).
Third, the state courts unreasonably concluded that the Geriatric Release program complies with Graham’s dictate that state punishment regimes account for the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders. In particular, even if the Parole Board was required to consider the “decision factors” in deciding whether to grant a petition for Geriatric Release—which it is not—a prisoner’s youth at the time of his offense is not among those decision factors. Therefore, neither the Geriatric Release statute nor the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures require'that the Parole Board consider the “special mitigating force of youth,” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834, 108 S.Ct. 2687, as Graham requires.
More significantly—and as the district court correctly noted—Geriatric Release treats juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment “worse” than adult offenders receiving the same sentence because juvenile offenders “must serve a larger percentage of their sentence than adults do before eligibility to apply for geriatric release.” LeBlanc, 2015 WL 4042175, at *14. For example, under Geriatric Release, a fifty-year-old sentenced to life in prison will be eligible to apply for Geriatric Release in ten years, but a sixteen-year-old will have to serve forty-four years before receiving his first opportunity to apply for Geriatric Release. Graham emphasized that a life sentence is “especially harsh” for a juvenile offender relative to an adult offender because, under such a sentence, the “juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult offender.” 560 U.S. at 70, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Given that (1) the Supreme Court specifically held that sentencing systems that require juvenile offenders to serve more years and/or a greater percentage of their lives relative to adult offenders violate the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle and that (2) Geriatric Release subjects juvenile offenders to longer—and proportionately longer—sentences, it was objectively unreasonable to conclude that Geriatric Release complied with Graham.
3.
The dissent does not dispute that the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures permit the Parole Board to deny a petition for Geriatric Release for any reason at the Initial Review stage, without consideration of the “decision factors,” post at 282-83, contrary to Graham’s holding that juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment must have an opportunity “to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (emphasis added). And the dissent does not dispute that Geriatric Release subjects juvenile offenders, on average, to longer—and proportionately longer—sentences, post at 283, contrary to Graham’s dictate that state penal regimes account for the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders, 560 U.S, at 76, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Nonetheless, the dissent maintains that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because we fail to afford his state court adjudication the level of deference Section 2254(d)(1) requires, as the Supreme Court interpreted that provision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). We disagree.
In Harrington, the petitioner claimed that his state court adjudication amounted to an unreasonable application of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). [273]*273Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 131 S.Ct. 770. In rejecting the petition,, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he standards created by Strickland.and-§ 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ ... and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so” Id. at 105, 131 S.Ct. 770 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)).
Notably, Harrington further explained that “evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable [for purposes of Section 2254(d)(1)] requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Id. at 101, 131 S.Ct. 770 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004)). The Court held that the Strickland standard “is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial.” Id at 105, 131 S.Ct. 770 (citing Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123, 129 S.Ct. 1411). This echoes the Court’s earlier pronouncement in Yar-borough, upon which the dissent also relies: “If a legal rule is specific ... Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment.” 541 U.S. at 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140; see post at 279. Thus, determining whether a state court’s decision was “unreasonable” for purposes of Section 2254(d)(1) depends on the specificity of the constitutional rule the state court applied.
A court applying Strickland must determine two things: 'that the defendant’s counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that the deficient performance was “prejudicial to the defense:” 466 U.S. at 687-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. By contrast, Graham set forth a categorical rule barring sentences of life without parole for juvenile nonhomi-cide offenders. 560 U.S.- at 77-79,130 S.Ct. 2011. And Graham clearly established that parole or early release programs for such offenders must (1) provide an opportunity to obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and (2) account for the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders. See supra Part III A. The Court characterized these minimum requirements as establishing a “boundary]” on state courts’ authority to make “ease-by-case” sentencing determinations. 560 U.S. at 77, 130 S.Ct. 2011. Accordingly, Graham’s categorical rule and its minimum requirements for parole or early release programs do not afford state courts the same “leeway” that the “reasonableness” and “prejudice” components of Strickland permit. Indeed, the dissent misconstrues Harrington when it affords the same “doubly” deferential review to Petitioner’s state court adjudication as federal courts apply in reviewing state court decisions applying Strickland.
Contrary to the dissent, we do not engage in de novo review. Rather, we hold that the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Graham when it acknowledged Graham’s minimum requirements for parole or early release programs for juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment but concluded that Geriatric Release—which permits the Parole Board to deny petitions for Geriatric Release without ever considering a petitioner’s maturity or rehabilitation and which treats juvenile offenders worse than adult offenders—complied with those requirements.
V.
Nevertheless, Respondents and the dissent seek refuge in Supreme Court’s state[274]*274ment that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with Graham’s requirements. Appellants’ Br. at 24, 38, 42-43; post at 274-75. According to Respondents and the dissent, this single sentence effectively immunized Petitioner’s sentence—and those of all other juvenile non-homicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment eligible for any form of early release other than executive clemency— from collateral review.
But the Supreme Court’s proper regard for States’ independent judgment regarding how best to operate their penal systems does not, “[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, ... imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). This is particularly true when, as here, the Supreme Court clearly sets forth minimum constitutional requirements to guide state courts’ and policymakers’ decisions—requirements that the Supreme Court of Virginia readily determined from the plain language of Graham.
In sum, we hold that notwithstanding its recognition of Graham’s “governing legal principles,” the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably concluded that Geriatric Release—a program that predated Graham by more than 15 years, that permits the Parole Board to deny release for any reason whatsoever, and that treats juvenile offenders worse than adult offenders-complies with Graham’s parole requirement. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision and remand so that the Petitioner can be resentenced in accordance with Graham and the Eighth Amendment.
AFFIRMED