Murphy, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the plaintiff’s motion for amended findings of fact or in the alternative for a new trial. The plaintiff sought to recover the reasonable value [170]*170of labor, material, and supplies furnished to the defendants and to have a lien established for the amount involved against the real property of the defendants. By its order the trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to $1,581.08 from the defendants rather than $5,715.13, the amount claimed. It further held that the plaintiff’s right to a lien was defeated by his act of filing a lien claim in an amount grossly in excess of what was actually due him.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the court below, it establishes that in the fall of 1958 the plaintiff, David M. Delyea, doing business as Wykoff Lumber Company, discussed with the defendant Earl G. Turner, a dairy farmer, the construction of certain buildings and improvements for the defendant’s farm. There were several conferences between the parties. It appears that Mr. Turner, hereinafter called the defendant, proposed to construct upon his premises certain facilities for use in his dairy business which would qualify his milk for a higher grade and consequently a better price. He had acquired an old schoolhouse which he proposed to move to his premises and remodel into a “parlor milker.” The proposed improvements consisted of a pole barn, which was to be a structure enclosed on three sides, the sides and roof being constructed in part of corrugated steel; the remodeling of the schoolhouse; and the construction of a “holding area,” which was to be an open space located next to the milking parlor with 600 square feet of concrete floor enclosed by posts.
Subsequent to their original meeting the plaintiff took the defendant to at least two farms in the neighborhood where modem milking facilities had been constructed and installed. The plaintiff also went to the defendant’s farm and looked over the area and the old schoolhouse the defendant had purchased. He then provided the defendant with a statement setting forth the dimensions of the various buildings to be constructed and a sketchy reference to the installation of footings, stalls, partitions, water system, and other features. The statement did not contain complete details and specifications. The copy of the statement given to the defendant contains the figure $4,000. The plaintiff testified that he told the defendant the job would cost approximately [171]*171$4,000. He handed the defendant the piece of paper with these notations. The paper was not signed. There was no formal written contract. The defendant testified that at the time the paper was given to him there was an oral agreement that the work referred to both in the paper and in the conversation between them would be performed for the sum of $4,000.
Work was commenced about November 15, 1958. While the work was in progress, on February 24, 1959, the defendant paid the plaintiff the sum of $3,000. When the work was completed the plaintiff determined that the reasonable value of materials and labor which went into the job was $8,715.13 and demanded payment of the difference. The defendant refused payment, asserting that the plaintiff was entitled to no more than the agreed amount of $4,000. The plaintiff thereupon filed a lien for the sum of $5,715.13, which allowed for credit of the $3,000 previously paid. The plaintiff sought by this action to secure a judgment for the balance claimed and to enforce a lien therefor.
The case was tried before the court without a jury. The court found that there was a contract entered into by which the plaintiff agreed to perform the work and provide the material for the job for the sum of $4,000. It determined that there was a balance of $1,000 due on the contract. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the parties with reference to extra work performed and materials supplied by the plaintiff not covered by the original agreement, and making allowance for work which was originally included in the contract but not performed, the court determined that there was an additional amount due the plaintiff of $581.08, making a total of $1,581.08.1
[172]*1721. In considering the issues presented we must keep in mind the cardinal rule that' findings of a trial court are entitled to the same weight as those of a jury and will not be reversed unless manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence. Gifford v. Vore, 245 Minn. 432, 72 N. W. (2d) 625; In re Estate of Dahl, 249 Minn. 156, 81 N. W. (2d) 701; Hynan v. First Trust Co. 258 Minn. 118, 103 N. W. (2d) 209; Alsdorf v. Svoboda, 239 Minn. 1, 57 N. W. (2d) 824. The trial court, who heard the evidence, saw the witnesses, and took the trouble to visit the site of the improvement with counsel for both sides, as he had a right to, resolved conflicts in the testimony of the parties in favor of the defendants.
2. The plaintiff argues that the record does not support the court’s finding that a contract in the sum of $4,000 was ever entered into between the parties and that the court should have granted recovery on the basis of the reasonable value of services performed and material furnished. The trial court carefully considered the evidence bearing upon the acts and statements of the parties relating to the agreement. While it is true no written contract was entered into which specifically set forth plans and specifications, it nevertheless satisfactorily appears from the testimony of both parties that most, if not all, of the details with reference to the work to be done and material to be furnished was orally agreed upon in substantially definite terms. In his testimony plaintiff related at some length the specifications of the various kinds of material which were to be used in the work. During the course of his examination, the court inquired:
“The Court: Are you telling how you are building?
“The Witness: How it was supposed to be built, and how it was built, yes.
“The Court: Well, which did you build it, the. way it was supposed to be built?
“The Witness: Yes, right.”
Later in plaintiff’s testimony, after he had described the work and material involved in the project, the court inquired:
[173]*173“The Court: Did he ask you for a bid, did he ask you to bid on it?
“The Witness: No, I approached him, he didn’t approach me, I approached him and asked him if I could have the opportunity of giving an estimate on his pole building.
“The Court: What I am trying to find out is, from your talk,- you gather that he understood you were going to do it for $4,000.00?
“The Witness: I would say that he understood that I was going to do it, what he had figured we’d do.
“The Court: For $4,000.00?
“The Witness: For $4,000.00, yes.
“The Court: And you expected to do what you had figured to do, you had expected to do that for $4,000.00?
“The Witness: Our way, yes.
“The Court: All right,”
There is no contention here that this is a contract required by law to be in writing.
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Murphy, Justice.
This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying the plaintiff’s motion for amended findings of fact or in the alternative for a new trial. The plaintiff sought to recover the reasonable value [170]*170of labor, material, and supplies furnished to the defendants and to have a lien established for the amount involved against the real property of the defendants. By its order the trial court held that the plaintiff was entitled to $1,581.08 from the defendants rather than $5,715.13, the amount claimed. It further held that the plaintiff’s right to a lien was defeated by his act of filing a lien claim in an amount grossly in excess of what was actually due him.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the court below, it establishes that in the fall of 1958 the plaintiff, David M. Delyea, doing business as Wykoff Lumber Company, discussed with the defendant Earl G. Turner, a dairy farmer, the construction of certain buildings and improvements for the defendant’s farm. There were several conferences between the parties. It appears that Mr. Turner, hereinafter called the defendant, proposed to construct upon his premises certain facilities for use in his dairy business which would qualify his milk for a higher grade and consequently a better price. He had acquired an old schoolhouse which he proposed to move to his premises and remodel into a “parlor milker.” The proposed improvements consisted of a pole barn, which was to be a structure enclosed on three sides, the sides and roof being constructed in part of corrugated steel; the remodeling of the schoolhouse; and the construction of a “holding area,” which was to be an open space located next to the milking parlor with 600 square feet of concrete floor enclosed by posts.
Subsequent to their original meeting the plaintiff took the defendant to at least two farms in the neighborhood where modem milking facilities had been constructed and installed. The plaintiff also went to the defendant’s farm and looked over the area and the old schoolhouse the defendant had purchased. He then provided the defendant with a statement setting forth the dimensions of the various buildings to be constructed and a sketchy reference to the installation of footings, stalls, partitions, water system, and other features. The statement did not contain complete details and specifications. The copy of the statement given to the defendant contains the figure $4,000. The plaintiff testified that he told the defendant the job would cost approximately [171]*171$4,000. He handed the defendant the piece of paper with these notations. The paper was not signed. There was no formal written contract. The defendant testified that at the time the paper was given to him there was an oral agreement that the work referred to both in the paper and in the conversation between them would be performed for the sum of $4,000.
Work was commenced about November 15, 1958. While the work was in progress, on February 24, 1959, the defendant paid the plaintiff the sum of $3,000. When the work was completed the plaintiff determined that the reasonable value of materials and labor which went into the job was $8,715.13 and demanded payment of the difference. The defendant refused payment, asserting that the plaintiff was entitled to no more than the agreed amount of $4,000. The plaintiff thereupon filed a lien for the sum of $5,715.13, which allowed for credit of the $3,000 previously paid. The plaintiff sought by this action to secure a judgment for the balance claimed and to enforce a lien therefor.
The case was tried before the court without a jury. The court found that there was a contract entered into by which the plaintiff agreed to perform the work and provide the material for the job for the sum of $4,000. It determined that there was a balance of $1,000 due on the contract. Pursuant to a stipulation entered into between the parties with reference to extra work performed and materials supplied by the plaintiff not covered by the original agreement, and making allowance for work which was originally included in the contract but not performed, the court determined that there was an additional amount due the plaintiff of $581.08, making a total of $1,581.08.1
[172]*1721. In considering the issues presented we must keep in mind the cardinal rule that' findings of a trial court are entitled to the same weight as those of a jury and will not be reversed unless manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence. Gifford v. Vore, 245 Minn. 432, 72 N. W. (2d) 625; In re Estate of Dahl, 249 Minn. 156, 81 N. W. (2d) 701; Hynan v. First Trust Co. 258 Minn. 118, 103 N. W. (2d) 209; Alsdorf v. Svoboda, 239 Minn. 1, 57 N. W. (2d) 824. The trial court, who heard the evidence, saw the witnesses, and took the trouble to visit the site of the improvement with counsel for both sides, as he had a right to, resolved conflicts in the testimony of the parties in favor of the defendants.
2. The plaintiff argues that the record does not support the court’s finding that a contract in the sum of $4,000 was ever entered into between the parties and that the court should have granted recovery on the basis of the reasonable value of services performed and material furnished. The trial court carefully considered the evidence bearing upon the acts and statements of the parties relating to the agreement. While it is true no written contract was entered into which specifically set forth plans and specifications, it nevertheless satisfactorily appears from the testimony of both parties that most, if not all, of the details with reference to the work to be done and material to be furnished was orally agreed upon in substantially definite terms. In his testimony plaintiff related at some length the specifications of the various kinds of material which were to be used in the work. During the course of his examination, the court inquired:
“The Court: Are you telling how you are building?
“The Witness: How it was supposed to be built, and how it was built, yes.
“The Court: Well, which did you build it, the. way it was supposed to be built?
“The Witness: Yes, right.”
Later in plaintiff’s testimony, after he had described the work and material involved in the project, the court inquired:
[173]*173“The Court: Did he ask you for a bid, did he ask you to bid on it?
“The Witness: No, I approached him, he didn’t approach me, I approached him and asked him if I could have the opportunity of giving an estimate on his pole building.
“The Court: What I am trying to find out is, from your talk,- you gather that he understood you were going to do it for $4,000.00?
“The Witness: I would say that he understood that I was going to do it, what he had figured we’d do.
“The Court: For $4,000.00?
“The Witness: For $4,000.00, yes.
“The Court: And you expected to do what you had figured to do, you had expected to do that for $4,000.00?
“The Witness: Our way, yes.
“The Court: All right,”
There is no contention here that this is a contract required by law to be in writing. The contract consists of the memorandum submitted by plaintiff to defendant and the oral undertakings expressed in conversations at or about the time the memorandum was delivered. We think there is sufficient evidence in the record from which the court could, from the memorandum and oral statements of the parties, spell out a valid contract. Whether a contract was made is primarily a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in the light of the evidence presented and the surrounding circumstances. Seitz v. Sitze, 215 Minn. 452, 10 N. W. (2d) 426; Alsdorf v. Svoboda, 239 Minn. 1, 57 N. W. (2d) 824. In McArdle v. Williams, 193 Minn. 433, 438, 258 N. W. 818, 820, we said:
“ ‘Words are not the only medium of expression. Conduct may often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a proposed promise, and where no particular requirement of form is made by the law a condition of the validity or enforceability of a contract, there is no distinction in the effect of a promise whether it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3) in acts, or (4) partly in one of these ways and partly in others.’ Restatement, Contracts, American Law Institute, § 21.”
[174]*174We pointed out in Tysk v. Griggs, 253 Minn. 86, 93, 91 N. W. (2d) 127,133:
“The trial court may properly, in the construction of a contract, put itself in the place of the contracting parties and then, in view of all the facts and circumstances surrounding them at the time the instrument was executed, consider what they intended by the terms of their agreement.”
It appears from these authorities that the intention of the parties to a contract may be manifested by words, conduct, or a combination of both words and conduct, all interpreted in the context of the surrounding circumstances. We are, accordingly, of the view that under the facts in this case there was sufficient evidence from which the court could find that there was a meeting of the minds with reference to the amount of work to be performed and material furnished for an agreed price of $4,000. The record further establishes that the plaintiff stipulated as to the reasonable value of extra work and material furnished which was not included in the original agreement. The finding of the trial court with reference to extra work is supported by the stipulated facts and other evidence contained in the record.
3. The plaintiff further asserts that the court erred in denying the statutory lien. Minn. St. 514.03, so far as applicable here, provides:
“If the contribution be made under a contract with the owner and for an agreed price, the lien as against him shall be for the sum so agreed upon; otherwise, and in all cases as against others than the owner, it shall be for the reasonable value of the work done, and of the skill, material, and machinery furnished.”
It is clear from the foregoing statute that if there is a contract to do work at an agreed price the amount of the lien shall be for the unpaid portion of the contract only. In all other cases the lien shall not exceed the reasonable value of services performed and materials furnished. As we have heretofore noted, the court found that the sum actually due the plaintiff was $1,581.08. The amount claimed in the lien statement was grossly in excess thereof.
[175]*175Section 514.74 is determinative of the issue as to whether the court erred in denying plaintiff’s lien. It reads as follows:
“In no case shall the liens given by this chapter be affected by any inaccuracy in the particulars of the lien statement; but, as against all persons except the owner of the property, the lien claimant shall be concluded by the dates therein given, showing the first and last items of his account. In no case shall a lien exist for a greater amount than the sum claimed in the lien statement, nor for any amount, if it be made to appear that the claimant has knowingly demanded in the statement more than is justly due.” (Italics supplied.)
In Aaby v. Better Builders, Inc. 228 Minn. 222, 37 N. W. (2d) 234, and Temes v. Westberg, 246 Minn. 485, 75 N. W. (2d) 415, we noted that the lien provided for by the above statute will not be defeated by an honest mistake on the part of the lienor or mere failure to prove some items in the lien statement. To deprive the claimant of his right to a lien under this statute there must be a showing of fraud, bad faith, or an intentional demand for an amount in excess of that due. The trial court indicated in its memorandum that the plaintiff started to work on the job late in the season and ran into cold weather so that the labor was considerably more than he had probably anticipated. The court further observed:
«* * * At any rate, the claim of the Plaintiff in his complaint and in his lien statement are so excessive that I have concluded that the Plaintiff, in making his complaint and his lien statement, claimed more than he knew or should have known as justly due.”
The facts in this case distinguish it from Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. Mortgage Land Investment Co. 144 Minn. 24, 173 N. W. 849, 176 N. W. 202, relied upon by plaintiff. While in that case the claim made was excessive, the difference in the amount claimed and the amount actually due was not so great as to indicate bad faith or intentional overstatement of the amount of the claim. Here the great disparity between the amount actually found to be due and the amount stated in the lien statement supports the trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff intentionally claimed an amount greater than that which was [176]*176justly due him. The amount claimed is so excessive as to preclude the likelihood of a mistake made in good faith.
Affirmed.