DeJesus v. Tapia

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 15, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-06448
StatusUnknown

This text of DeJesus v. Tapia (DeJesus v. Tapia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeJesus v. Tapia, (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALEX DEJESUS, Plaintiff, 24-CV-6448 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND P.O. TAPIA-RODRIGUEZ, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Alex Dejesus, a resident of Bensalem, Pennsylvania, filed this pro se action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. By order dated October 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s complaint, filed against New York City Police Officer Tapia-Rodriguez,

concerns an incident that occurred in Manhattan on July 6, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant pulled his car over after Plaintiff made a right turn onto South Clinton Street. (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Plaintiff asked Defendant why he had been stopped, and Defendant responded that Plaintiff was “not supposed to make a right turn” there. (Id.) Plaintiff said that he had seen other cars making the same turn without being stopped and that “this is call[ed] selective enforcement.” (Id.) Defendant “refuse[d] to give [Plaintiff a] real response,” and ticketed Plaintiff for the traffic infraction. (Id.) Another officer “took his flash light and started looking inside [Plaintiff’s] car,” which Plaintiff alleges violated his constitutional rights. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $20,000 in damages.(Id. ¶ IV.) DISCUSSION A. Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Because Plaintiff is alleging that police officers violated his constitutional rights, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color

of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). Equal Protection The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause mandates that all persons “similarly situated . . . be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To establish a violation of equal protection based upon selective enforcement, a plaintiff may show that he was (1) selectively treated as compared with others similarly situated (“comparators”); and (2) that such selective treatment was based on “impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.” Latrieste Rest. & Cabaret Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606,

609-10 (2d Cir. 1980)). Alternatively, a plaintiff may show “that a facially neutral law or policy has been applied in an intentionally discriminatory race-based manner, or that a facially neutral statute or policy with an adverse effect was motivated by discriminatory animus.” Towns v. Stannard, 431 F. Supp. 3d 44, 65-66 (N.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2001)). The complaint does not include any allegations that could support an equal protection claim under a selective enforcement theory. Plaintiff alleges that “he had seen other cars making the same turn,” but he does not plead facts sufficient to show whether other drivers were similarly situated to him. Plaintiff has identified no comparators the Court could consider to determine whether Plaintiff was treated differently as compared to others similarly situated. See Kuiken v. Cnty. of Hamilton, 669 F. Supp. 3d 119, 126-27 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (describing requirements for selective enforcement claim). While Plaintiff need not describe an “identical”

comparator, Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000)), Plaintiff must plead enough facts to show “that ‘[he] was similarly situated in all material respects to the individual[ ] with whom [he] seeks to compare [himself],’” Hu v. City of N.Y., 927 F.3d 81, 96 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Graham, 230 F.3d at 39).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Texas v. Brown
460 U.S. 730 (Supreme Court, 1983)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
473 U.S. 432 (Supreme Court, 1985)
New York v. Class
475 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Paul Mollica v. James A. Volker
229 F.3d 366 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Christopher Graham v. Long Island Rail Road
230 F.3d 34 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Brown v. Daikin America Inc.
756 F.3d 219 (Second Circuit, 2014)
Hu v. City of New York
927 F.3d 81 (Second Circuit, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
DeJesus v. Tapia, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dejesus-v-tapia-nysd-2025.