DeJesus v. Rudolph

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 11, 2019
Docket1:19-cv-04480
StatusUnknown

This text of DeJesus v. Rudolph (DeJesus v. Rudolph) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
DeJesus v. Rudolph, (S.D.N.Y. 2019).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ALEX DEJESUS, Plaintiff, 19-CV-4480 (CM) -against- ORDER TO AMEND STEPHANIE RUDOLPH, COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Defendant. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that Defendants are “depriving [him] to exercise [his] civil right from a public agency and ‘14 amendment’ I shall not be deprive[d] by law.” (ECF No. 2 at 2.) By order dated September 30, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff Alex DeJesus identifies himself an individual with a mental health disability. His complaint is not the model of clarity, but the Court is able to glean the following facts from his complaint and the attachments. Plaintiff filed complaints with the New York City Commission on Human Rights (CHR) against several landlords alleging discrimination. Plaintiff called the CHR several times to find out the status of his complaints, but he alleges that the office refused to answer the phone. On March 28, 2019, Plaintiff went to the office located at 22 Reade Street, New York, New York. He asserts that he was kicked out of the office by DCAS police officers Wilson and Uylessy, and they told Plaintiff that they could not disclose any information. Plaintiff alleges that the officers caused him humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, and emotional distress. Plaintiff brings this action seeking $200,000.00 and “a one-bedroom apartment in the best ‘neighborhood’ away from the nonsense and enforce the agency to investigate these landlords

and why are the[y] not accepting ‘Section 8.’” DISCUSSION A. Mandamus Relief Because Plaintiff seeks to have this Court compel the New York City Commission on Human Rights to investigate his complaints about landlords who do not accept Section 8, Plaintiff’s complaint is construed as a request for mandamus relief. The federal district courts have jurisdiction over “any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. “It is well-settled that ‘federal courts have no general power to compel action by state officials.’” Columbia Artists Mgmt., LLC v. Swenson & Burnakus, Inc., No. 05-CV-7314 (LBS), 2008 WL 4387808, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2008) (quoting Davis v. Lansing, 851 F.2d 72, 74

(2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting application for writ of mandamus compelling state court judge to permit defense counsel’s use of race-based peremptory challenges)); see Lebron v. Armstrong, 289 F. Supp. 2d 56, 58 (D. Conn. 2003) (“By its terms, the federal mandamus statute does not apply to an action to compel a state or state officials to perform a particular duty.”). Plaintiff’s request is denied because this Court does not have jurisdiction to compel city actors to perform their duties. That part of the complaint is therefore dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. B. Claims Under the ADA The ADA prohibits discrimination against the disabled in major areas of life. The statute consists of three parts: Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 12111−12117, which prohibits discrimination in employment; Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12131−12165, which prohibits discrimination by public entities; and Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12181− 12189, which prohibits discrimination in access to

public accommodations. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
532 U.S. 661 (Supreme Court, 2001)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Chavis v. Chappius
618 F.3d 162 (Second Circuit, 2010)
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877 F.2d 170 (Second Circuit, 1989)
McElwee v. County of Orange
700 F.3d 635 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Camarillo v. Carrols Corp.
518 F.3d 153 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Lebron v. Armstrong
289 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D. Connecticut, 2003)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Dolan v. Connolly
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DeJesus v. Rudolph, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dejesus-v-rudolph-nysd-2019.