Decatus v. the City

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 13, 2024·No. 1:24-cv-02224·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VANESSA DECATUS, Plaintiff, 24-CV-2224 (JGLC) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL CITY OF NEW YORK; COUNTY OF NEW WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD YORK, Defendants. JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, paid the filing fees to commence this action.1 For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the action for failure to state a claim, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claims. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fees, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil 1 Plaintiff initiated this matter as a miscellaneous case on behalf of the “Vanessa Decatus Trust/Estate.” By order dated January 23, 2024, the Honorable Mary Kay Vyskocil, of this court, determined that the case does not fit any of the listed categories of miscellaneous cases and that the case cannot proceed under the miscellaneous docket. (ECF No. 1.) Judge Vyskocil further directed the Clerk of Court to open this case as a new civil action “with Decatus listed as the plaintiff and the City and County of the State of New York listed as the defendant.” (Id.) The Clerk of Court opened this matter as a new civil action on March 28, 2024, and assigned the above docket number. By order dated March 27, 2024, Chief Judge Swain issued an order directing Plaintiff to either pay the fees or file a completed and signed IFP application. (ECF No. 4.) On April 26, 2024, Plaintiff paid the fees. Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Moreover, the court “has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim,” Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 609 n.11 (2d Cir. 1980), so long as the plaintiff is given notice and “an opportunity to be heard,” Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir.1991) (per curiam); see also Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir.

1988); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 301 & n.3. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Although pro se litigants enjoy the Court’s “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28 F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A complaint states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). To review a complaint for plausibility, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s favor. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). As set forth in Iqbal: [T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully- harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Id. (internal citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Vanessa Decatus, who writes her name as “Vanessa Decatus (Interest title

holder),” “Vanessa Decatus, Security title Interest Holder,” and “Decatus Brand Holdings Trust,” identifies herself as a citizen of New York in this action filed against the City and County of New York. Using the Notice of Claim form for the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Plaintiff indicates that the nature of her claim is: Claim of Property & Interest in Equity for 2018 Mercedes Benz C300 Identified by VIN #3FA6P0LUXJR248445 Title and Identification Number – 55SWF4KBXJU282583 Document No. 076569H Violation of UCC1 & UCC3 Security Agreement Property (See UCC #202209070375089) (ECF No. 2 at 2.) Plaintiff’s action is not clear or well organized, but it appears from a Property Damage or Loss Claim Form included in her submission that this action arises out of Plaintiff’s 2018 white Mercedes Benz C300 being booted and towed from the northwest corner of 43rd Street and 10th Avenue on July 12, 2023, at 2:42 a.m. (ECF No. 1 at 10-14.) She alleges: The UCC 1 & UCC3 & Notice of Claim placed on the record is to vie you notice that a lien is in place and to put you on NOTICE that Vanessa Decatus is 1st in Line; First In Time. I accept for value all the charging instruments in this matter! Make my exemption as principal available for discharge of all obligations and charges connected with Case Number #2307120450 & Boot Number #NY23230. (Id. at 12.) She further alleges: The complainant, being an Equitable Beneficial Title Holder, seeks just compensation for the damages incurred due to the unauthorized taking of the TRUST’s private property. Unreasonable Seizure with Malicious Intent Trespass of Private Property Continuing Seizure Fraud. (Id. at 14.) She seeks “just compensation for Damages in the Sum Total of 10,800,000 dollars in lawful money, property(ies) and/or gold.” (Id.) DISCUSSION A. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Because Plaintiff sues the City of New York, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claims as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

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