BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment on stipulated facts upholding a policy of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that reduces their food stamp benefits. The district court upheld the USDA policy of counting as income for food stamp purposes the utility reimbursements plaintiffs receive from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and from the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). Estey v. Commissioner, Maine Dep’t of Human Servs., 814 F.Supp. 152 (D.Me.1993). Because we conclude that the energy-related components of HUD and FmHA utility reimbursements are excluded by statute from income under the Food Stamp Act, we reverse.
I.
BACKGROUND
The defendant-appellees are the Secretary of USDA (Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services, the state agency charged with applying USDA’s uniform guidelines in administering the food stamp program in Maine. Plaintiffs are a class of tenants receiving food stamps, paying for household utilities, and living in HUD public housing, in privately-owned “Section 8” HUD-assisted apartments, and in privately-owned FmHA-assisted housing.1
Plaintiffs, as tenants in HUD and FmHA housing, receive monthly payments, called “utility reimbursements,” because all of their utilities are not included in their rent, and because their monthly income is very low relative to average utility costs in their communities. The issue on appeal is whether USDA may count utility reimbursements as income under the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2082, although section 2014(d)(11)(A) of the Act expressly excludes “energy assistance” payments from food stamp income.
A. Food Stamp Act
The Food Stamp Act establishes a federally-funded, state-administered program to alleviate malnutrition and hunger in low income households by providing needy persons with coupons to purchase food from retail stores. See id. § 2011; Massachusetts v. Lyng, 893 F.2d 424, 425 (1st Cir.1990); West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1124 (3d Cir.1989). USDA establishes uniform standards for food stamp eligibility. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b). Eligibility depends on income. “Income” is defined as money payable to a household, from whatever source, subject to the exclusions and deductions in the Act. See id. § 2014(d)-(e). The exclusion at issue exempts from food stamp income “any pay[1200]*1200ments or allowances made for the purpose of providing energy assistance under any Federal law.” Id. § 2014(d)(11)(A). Plaintiffs, as recipients of FmHA and HUD utility reimbursements, are allotted fewer food stamps because USDA interprets the Act to include utility reimbursements as income.
B. HUD and FmHA Utility Reimbursements
To frame an analysis of whether utility reimbursements are “energy assistance” under the Food Stamp Act, we outline the regulations on utility reimbursements under the FmHA rental assistance program and the HUD section 8 and public housing programs. In relevant respects, these regulations are identical. Tenants in HUD and FmHA housing pay no more than 30% of household income for rent plus an allowance for any utilities not supplied by the landlord. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1); 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, exhs. B.IV.A.2.C, E.II.E. Water, sewerage, trash collection, electricity, cooking fuel, heat, and hot water are utilities for which allowances may be established. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 813.102, 965.472, 965.476; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1944, subpt. E, exhs. A-5, A-6. The FmHA utility allowance reflects the utility costs incurred by the majority of households in similar units in a housing complex. See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1944, subpt. E, exh. A-6.I, - 6.II. HUD utility allowances represent a “reasonable consumption” of utilities “by an energy-conservative household of modest circumstances consistent with the requirements of a safe, sanitary and healthful living environment.” 24 C.F.R. §§ 813.102, 965.476(a).
To prevent tenants who pay for their own utilities from generally incurring excessive utility costs, HUD and FmHA regulations permit rent (capped at 30% of income) to be offset by an allowance for utilities. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 813.102, 913.102; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, exh. E.IX.A.1. This set off results in a payment called a “utility reimbursement” whenever monthly income is very low and utility costs are relatively high. A utility reimbursement is equal to the sum of all allowances for any utilities not supplied by the landlord minus 30% of monthly income. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 813.102, 913.102; 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, exh. E.IX.A.2.
For example, if a tenant’s monthly income is $100, $30 (30%) is the total amount the tenant must pay for housing costs, including any utility allowance. If the utility allowance is $5, the tenant will not receive a utility reimbursement, but will owe the landlord only $25 because the allowance is credited against the total amount due. A tenant with the same monthly income, but with a utility allowance of $50, will pay the landlord no rent and will receive a utility reimbursement of $20 (the utility allowance minus 30% of $100). Every tenant entitled to a utility reimbursement receives a bill from at least one utility company. The reimbursement ensures that FmHA and HUD tenants, living in very poor households, will not generally pay more than 30% of household income for energy, water, sewerage, and trash collection costs.
II.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs argue that utility reimbursements are “energy assistance,” and that section 2014(d)(ll)(A) of the Food Stamp Act exempts such assistance from income calculations. USDA contends that this provision, excluding from food stamp income “any payments for the purpose of providing energy assistance,” is inapplicable because “energy assistance” is limited to payments made to offset rapidly rising energy costs, whereas utility reimbursements cover routine utility costs.2
[1201]*1201A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers must first determine whether Congress has spoken to the “precise question at issue.” Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The precise question in this case is whether “energy assistance” under section 2014(d)(11)(A) encompasses only payments offsetting rapidly rising energy costs. Cf. id. at 840, 845, 104 S.Ct. at 2780, 2783 (noting that precise question at issue is whether EPA’s plantwide definition of “stationary source” applies to a statute requiring permits for new or modified stationary sources of air pollution). If Congress’s intent on this question is clear, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. Our review of the district court’s construction of the statute is de novo. See Lyng, 893 F.2d at 428.
In determining congressional intent, we employ the traditional tools of statutory construction, including a consideration of the language, structure, purpose, and history of the statute. See Dion v. Commissioner, Maine Dep’t of Human Servs., 933 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir.1991). Our inquiry begins with an examination of the relevant statutory language. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748 (1982). To be excluded from income under section 2014(d)(11)(A), a payment must be “for the purpose of energy assistance.” The Act provides no definition for “energy assistance,” but its meaning is generally understood. A payment that provides “assistance” commonly refers to a public subsidy; for example: housing assistance, rental assistance, and medical assistance payments. We assume ‘“that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.’ ” American Tobacco Co., 456 U.S. at 68, 102 S.Ct. at 1537 (citation omitted). In the absence of a manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary, we con-elude that “energy assistance” means what it says: a public subsidy for the purchase of energy.
Under this plain reading of the provision, the plaintiffs have no colorable claim unless their utility reimbursements are subsidies for energy. FmHA and HUD utility allowances account for nonenergy utilities such as water, sewerage, and trash collection, as well as energy utilities including heat, electricity, natural gas, and hot water. A tenant directly liable for certain utilities receives a utility reimbursement only if the sum of the allowances for these utilities exceeds 30% of household income. Therefore, a utility reimbursement does not subsidize energy purchases unless the tenant pays at least one energy company for the services provided. Otherwise, a utility reimbursement is not an energy subsidy at all because it assists the tenant only in paying nonenergy utility providers.
In response, to the Secretary’s argument that, utility reimbursements can never be energy assistance because they might offset nonenergy utility costs, plaintiffs contend that utility reimbursements are always energy assistance because they are intended “primarily” for the payment of energy bills. A, committee report discussing the energy assistance exclusion states that benefits provided by the Home Energy Assistance Act, and the Energy Crisis Intervention and Energy Crisis Assistance Programs, are “energy assistance.” See H.R.Rep. No. 788, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 122-23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 843, 955-56. Because these programs historically provided food, medicine, and rental assistance, as well as direct subsidies for fuel bills, plaintiffs contend that Congress did not intend, “energy assistance” to include payments only for energy utilities.
Plaintiffs fail to acknowledge the difference between their utility reimbursements and the benefits provided under the programs discussed in the House Report. According to the report, these programs provided assistance to offset the impact of high energy costs. See id.; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 1061.-[1202]*120251-6(a), 1061.70-8. At issue in this case, however, are utility reimbursements that are designed in part to offset nonenergy utility costs. The analogy suggested by plaintiffs is thus not apt; it does not clarify whether payments designed to account for a mixture of energy and nonenergy expenses are “energy assistance.” Neither the énergy assistance exclusion’s plain language, nor its legislative history evince an intent to exclude payments provided primarily for the purpose of energy assistance. For this reason, we decline plaintiffs’ invitation to read the word “primarily” or its equivalent into the statute.
The Secretary argues that a utility reimbursement can never be a subsidy for the purchase of energy because the allowance may be based exclusively on nonenergy utility costs. In all likelihood, however, part of every tenant’s utility reimbursement is based on an energy-related utility allowance. In fact, some tenants receive utility reimbursements only for energy utilities. Named plaintiff Felix St.-' Peter’s utility reimbursement, for example, is a two party check made jointly payable to him and Maine Public Service Company. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 813.108, 913.108 (providing that HUD utility reimbursements may be made payable to utility providers). The energy and nonenergy components of a utility allowance are itemized when the allowance is approved by FmHA and HUD; this information may be used to determine what fraction of a utility reimbursement is energy-related. FmHA regulations require a landlord to list each utility allowance separately when seeking FmHA approval for the allowance, and to provide this information to the tenant. 7 C.F.R. pt. 1944, subpt. E, exh. A-6.III to A-6.V. The local public housing agency operating a HUD public housing project must maintain similar lists of utility allowances, and this information is available to the tenant. 24 C.F.R. §§ 965.473, 965.474. Although HUD regulations for section 8 privately-owned housing do not explicitly require that itemized information on utility allowances be retained for the tenant, this is the implication of regulations requiring that HUD or the local public housing agency approve proposed allowances and that allowances be reviewed annually for adjustments. See, e.g., id. §§ 813.102, 882-116, 882.214. We assume that HUD and the local public housing agency would retain records of utility allowances and would make this information available to the tenant whose rent , depends on that allowance.
■ Such information may be used to determine how much of a utility reimbursement is in fact a subsidy for energy costs. See South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 824 F.Supp. at 1477 (“computing the energy and non-energy components of [utility reimbursements] would be a simple matter of arithmetic, not a great administrative burden”). If 60% of a utility allowance is attributable to energy costs, then 60% of the utility reimbursement is a payment assisting the purchase of energy. According to a construction of the statute consistent with its plain language, only 40% of the reimbursement may be counted as income under the Food Stamp Act.
B. Structure of the Act: Deductions and Exclusions
Turning to an analysis of the structure of the Act, we consider whether reading the energy assistance exclusion in context renders counter-intuitive or ambiguous Congress’s intent on the meaning of “energy assistance.”
The Secretary argues that the structure of the Food Stamp Act indicates that utility reimbursements are not “energy assistance.” Income eligibility determinations for food stamps resemble income tax calculations, see Department of Health & Welfare v. Block, 784 F.2d 895, 900 (9th Cir.1986); that is, net food stamp income equals gross income, minus any payments that are excluded by statute, minus the standard deduction and any other deductions applicable to the household. The Food Stamp Act’s “standard deduction” and “excess shelter cost deduction” account for utility costs. See 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e). According to the Secretary, excluding utility reimbursements as “energy assistance” would subtract utility costs twice: once as an exclusion and again as a deduction.
The argument that a payment may not be excluded because it offsets a cost already accounted for by the standard deduction is [1203]*1203not persuasive. All households, regardless of size, receive the standard deduction, which only in the most general sense reflects energy utility costs, just as it reflects many other costs. The standard deduction is a fixed sum that is adjusted annually according to the Consumer Price Index “for items other than food and the homeowners’ costs and maintenance and repair component of shelter costs.” 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e).
The deduction for excess shelter costs specifically accounts for energy utilities, but it does not capture the entire cost of energy utilities. The statute allows a household to deduct shelter expenses, including rent and utilities, only “to the extent that the monthly amount expended by [the] household for shelter” exceeds 50% of the household’s income after all other deductions have been taken. Id. Deductible expenses include rent, property taxes, property insurance, and mortgage payments and interest, as well as fuel, electricity, water, sewerage, trash collection, and telephone service. See 7 C.F.R. § .273.9(d)(5)(ii). The cap on the deduction is adjusted to reflect changes in the Consumer Price Index for the shelter, fuel, and utilities components of housing costs. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e).
According to the Secretary, Congress could not have intended to exclude the energy component of utility reimbursements, given the existence of the excess shelter cost deduction. But the Secretary does not offer an alternative construction of the Act that absolutely precludes deducting energy utility costs whenever energy assistance payments are excluded from income. Even if the energy assistance exclusion were intended to cover only payments offsetting rising energy costs, as USDA contends, any payments designed to offset rising energy costs would be excluded, while the energy costs themselves would be deductible. Implicit in any construction of the energy assistance exclusion is that Congress intended energy assistance to be excluded and energy utility costs to be deducted, to the extent that all shelter costs .exceed 50% of monthly income. This is borne out in the legislative history of the energy assistance exclusion: “If a household receives an energy allowance or grant, that allowance or grant is not to be included in income at all, but the energy costs which it covers may continue to be treated as a potentially deductible shelter expense when billed or due.” H.R.Rep.. No. 788, supra, at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956.
As a practical matter, there is unlikely to be a substantial overlap between households excluding the energy component of utility reimbursements and those deducting excess shelter costs. Tenants receiving utility reimbursements pay no rent and incur no homeowners’ expenses. They are entitled to the excess shelter cost deduction only to the extent that their utility costs alone exceed half of their monthly income, including the nonenergy component of their utility reimbursements.3 In other words, the poorest food stamp recipients living in public housing would exclude the energy component of their utility reimbursements, then deduct the fraction of their utility bills exceeding half of their income. This result is consistent with the Act’s purpose to alleviate hunger and malnutrition by augmenting the food purchasing power of participating low-income households. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011. We do not find that the structure of the Food Stamp Act requires that the energy assistance provision be construed contrary to its plain language. Our reading of the provision in con[1204]*1204text reinforces our determination that the plain language manifests Congress’s intent.
C. Legislative History
We next consider the legislative history of the energy assistance exclusion, to determine whether the legislative intent we find clearly expressed in the statutory language is clouded or contradicted by any statements of members of Congress.4 When the exclusion was enacted in 1980, the House Committee on Agriculture issued a report noting that certain energy grants and allowances, designed to'offset the rising cost of energy, had been excluded from food stamp income calculations in prior years by express provisions in other statutes. H.R.Rep. No. 788, supra, at 122, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 955. The report cites examples of energy assistance programs that were designed to offset the rise in energy costs in the late 1970s and in 1980, id. at 121-22, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 954-55, and notes that the exclusions for assistance provided under these programs ensured that food stamp recipients would be held “harmless” for their benefits. Id. at 122, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 955.
Preferring that amendments to the Food Stamp Act be made under its aegis, the committee drafted the energy assistance exclusion, which “incorporatefs] the essence” of these prior exclusions. Id. The committee stated that the provision would exclude “all energy assistance provided households through the use of Federal, State, or local funds flowing from ... laws that focus on the problem of energy assistance.” Id. at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956. The committee further stated that the provision would “exclude from income any direct payments made to households by the Federal Government” under “crisis intervention” or “regular energy assistance” programs. Id. This aspect of the committee report does not define “energy assistance,” but does indicate that section 2014(d)(ll), by incorporating the essence of similar, program-specific provisions in other statutes, was intended to exclude “any” payments providing energy assistance under “any” federal law.
The committee report further states:
Where energy assistance provided households through the use ... of Federal, State, or local funds flowing from Federal, State, or local laws not specifically dealing with energy assistance is concerned, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children or General Assistance, the Committee also intends to guarantee excludability provided that [USDA] is satisfied that the increase in benefits awarded by the State or local government (either on a matching basis with the Federal Government or on its own) is, in fact, an energy assistance-related increase and not simply a general welfare increase that would have occurred even were energy costs not a factor and that, therefore, should be viewed as income for food stamp program purposes. Only where energy costs are a but-for cause of the increased payment should the payment be excluded from income and, then, only to the extent that the increase is attributable to high heating costs rather than general inflationary conditions. The Committee obviously expects that State legislatures and local councils will ... not take advantage of this exclusion by labeling every ... regular welfare allotment adjustment an energy assistance increase in order to take advantage of this exclusion—
Id. (emphasis added).
The Secretary argues that the highlighted statements support a narrow definition of “energy assistance” for the purpose of section' 2014(d)(ll)(A). Our scrutiny of the context, however, leads us to conclude that these remarks were prompted by the concern that state and local governments might pass off increases in existing, nonenergy-related welfare program payments as “energy assistance.” See Maryland Dep’t of Human Res., 976 F.2d at 1470-71. Because the federal government pays the entire cost of food stamp benefits, 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a), such a [1205]*1205ploy would increase , the allotments of food stamps to a state’s residents at no substantial cost to the state. To thwart such efforts, Congress subsequently amended the exclusion for energy assistance payments provided under state and local laws.5 See Maryland Dep’t of Human Res., 976 F.2d at 1471. Utility reimbursements, in contrast, are provided under federal regulations that specify that the payments account for energy and nonenergy utility costs. Although we do not dispute that the committee intended that “energy assistance” include benefits offsetting the rising cost of energy, the legislative history of the provision' reveals no intent to circumscribe the plain language of the provision so that it would apply only to such benefits.
Furthermore, we note that the Secretary’s interpretation of the energy assistance exclusion causes a result at odds with the legislative history. The 1980 House Report indicates that typical' energy assistance programs “hold low-income households harmless by permitting them to buy the same amount of energy they would have utilized in past years without having to diminish their already marginal incomes.” H.R.Rep. No. 788, supra, at 122, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 955. An exclusion for such assistance, according to the House Report, guarantees that low-income households are held harmless for the assistance they receive. Id. Utility reimbursements with energy components are designed in part to ensure that tenants, on average, will be able to purchase energy utilities without spending more than 30% of household income. The allowances underlying these reimbursements are adjusted annually to reflect substantial energy cost increases. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. pt. 1930, subpt. C, exh. E.IX.C; 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.214, 965.478. In this manner, utility reimbursements ensure that a household’s expenditures for energy remain constant as a percentage of household income, from year to year. USDA’s practice of counting the energy component of utility reimbursements as income does not hold tenants “harmless” for the assistance they receive.
The Secretary argues that Congress ratified USDA’s interpretation of the statute when it amended the energy assistance exclusion in 1988. Prior to 1988, section 2014(d)(11)(A) exempted from income “any payments, or allowances made under any Federal 'law for the purpose of providing energy assistance.” See West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d at 1130. Congress reworded the statute in Í988 so that the provision currently excludes “any payments or allowances for the purpose of providing energy assistance under any Federal law.” A Senate committee report indicates that this “technical amendment” clarified
that USDA and local agencies do not need to conduct an inquiry into the purpose of a federal statute before excluding federal “payments for the purpose of energy assistance.” The law as now written could be read to require this analysis.
The crucial question should be whether the purpose of the payment is energy assistance, not whether the statute, as a whole, is primarily for energy assistance or includes other human services as well. This change is not intended to change current policy.
S.Rep. No. 397, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2239, 2266-67 (emphasis added).
The Secretary urges us to read the last sentence in the quoted text as endorsing the agency’s policy of restricting the definition of energy assistance solely to payments offsetting dramatic increases in the cost of energy. The problem with the Secretary’s argument [1206]*1206is that USDA’s policy of applying the exclusion only to payments offsetting dramatic increases in the cost of energy did not exist at the time the Senate Report was drafted. Although USDA treated utility reimbursements as income before 1988, the agency based this practice on the faulty interpretation of the energy assistance exclusion that the 1988 amendment was designed to correct. The two cases construing the statute prior to 1988, West v. Bowen, No. 84-3883, 1987 WL 28346 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 17, 1987), rev’d, 879 F.2d 1122 (3d Cir.1989) and Mitchell v. Block, No. 82-3297-3, slip op. at 10 (D.S.C. June 22, 1983), held, consistent with USDA’s interpretation at that time, that utility reimbursements are not “energy assistance” because they were authorized by federal housing laws, rather than energy assistance laws.6
Viewed in this light, the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the 1988 amendment and the Senate Report is more persuasive: the amendment was not intended to change congressional policy, but in effect it repudiated the agency’s litigation position by clarifying that any payments for energy assistance be excluded, regardless of the purpose of the law authorizing the payments. Further support for this interpretation is that the committee described the rewording of the statute as a “technical amendment.” The statement in the legislative history that the amendment “is not intended to change current policy” reaffirms that it is not a substantive revision of the statutory language.
The Secretary’s final argument based on the legislative history is that Congress expressed tacit approval of USDA’s interpretation by leaving it in place when it amended the statute in 1988. Inaction may signify acquiescence to an agency interpretation. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 674, 600-01,103 S.Ct. 2017, 2032-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 167 (1983). A logical prerequisite to inferring approval or ratification from silence is that the agency’s interpretation antedates any relevant amendments. That is not so here. Although ÚSDA has invariably deemed utility reimbursements to be income under the Food Stamp Act, the agency’s rationale for this practice has changed over time. Prior to the 1988 amendment of the Act, the agency asserted in litigation that the exclusion applied only to payments made under federal laws specifically enacted to provide energy assistance. The 1988 amendment condemned this interpretation, see West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d at 1322, and the agency abandoned it in favor of the position it espouses in this case, that “energy assistance” refers only to payments offsetting rapidly rising energy costs. The interpretation of the statute at issue on appeal thus does not predate the 1988 amendment.
We have considered USDA’s unvarying treatment of utility reimbursements as an “interpretation” of the statute capable of ratification by silence, but we do not find great significance in Congress’s inaction.- “Congressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupation, or paralysis.” Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186-86 n. 21, 90 S.Ct. 314, 323-324 n. 21, 24 L.Ed.2d 346 (1969). Legislative silence is most significant when the “area is one of traditional year-by-year supervision, like tax, where watchdog committees are considering and revising the statutory scheme.” Id. In the baker’s dozen years that have passed since the Food Stamp Act energy assistance exclusion was enacted, the Act has been amended many times, but the exclusion itself has been amended only twice. The 1981 amendment affected only the provision excluding state and local energy assistance payments. The legislative history of the 1988 amendment reflects a senate committee’s appreciation that USDA misread the statute, but does not indicate the committee’s awareness of USDA’s treatment of utility reimbursements. See S.Rep. No. 397, supra, at 28, 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2266 (stating that “USDA and local agencies do not need to conduct an inquiry into the purpose of a federal statute before excluding” energy assistance). Therefore, even if what the senate committee recognized about the agency’s prior misreading of the statute were attributable to the entire Congress, this would not prove con[1207]*1207gressional cognizance of the treatment of utility reimbursements.
There are still fewer facts outside the legislative history supporting an inference of congressional awareness. USDA has not embodied its interpretation of the federal energy assistance exclusion in a regulation. Moreover, our research uncovered nothing suggesting that the agency embodied its position on utility reimbursements in any agency publication prior to 1990, when it issued policy statements on the matter. And the only courts considering USDA’s treatment of utility reimbursements prior to 1988 issued unpublished opinions. E.g., West, No. 84-3883, 1987 WL 28346; Mitchell, No. 82-3297-3. Furthermore, the policy of including utility reimbursements in food stamp income affects only very poor FmHA and HUD tenants, persons unlikely to have the resources to publicize their plight. We cannot infer from the legislative history and from these facts that congressional silence signals ratification of the agency’s policy. Nor do we find in the legislative history any statements belying our determination that Congress’s intended meaning for the energy assistance exclusion is manifested by its plain language.
D. Deference
The Secretary argues that we must defer to the agency’s judgment on the applicability of the energy assistance exclusion to utility reimbursements because this authority has been expressly delegated to the agency. According to the Secretary, Congress explicitly called on USDA to determine whether any payments provided under federal “laws not specifically dealing with energy assistance” were “energy-assistance related.” H.R.Rep. No. 788, supra, at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956. An agency’s reasonable construction of a statute is entitled to deference when Congress delegates to the agency the power to interpret the statute. See St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 810 F.2d 325, 331 (1st Cir.1987).
We previously quoted the passage from the House Report cited by the Secretary in support of this argument, see H.R.Rep. No. 788, supra, at 123, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 956, and we noted that the remarks reflected the committee’s concern that state or local governments might pass off increases in general welfare as energy assistance. Utility reimbursements, in contrast, are authorized by federal regulations specifying that the payments account for energy utility costs. The legislative history cited by the Secretary does not empower USDA to refine the energy assistance exclusion so that it does not apply to the energy component of a utility reimbursement.
Finally, the Secretary contends that USDA’s policy should be upheld because, under Chevron, courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers. Chevron prescribes that courts employ a two-step analysis of an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. See Dion, 933 F.2d at 14-15. Deference is appropriate only when the legislative intent is unclear. See St. Luke’s Hosp., 810 F.2d at 331. In this case, the plain language of the statute1 manifests Congress’s intent on the question at issue: any payment designed to offset energy costs is excluded from food stamp income, not just payments offsetting rapidly rising energy costs. We conclude that the energy component of a HUD or FmHA utility reimbursement, as a subsidy for the purchase of energy, must be excluded from food stamp income calculations. Any policy of USDA to the contrary is impermissible.
The decision of the district court is therefore
Reversed.
Dissent follows.