1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Myrna de Jesus, No. CV-21-00926-PHX-DWL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Dignity Health Corporation,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Myrna de Jesus’s motion to remand. 16 (Doc. 8.) For the following reasons, the motion is denied. 17 BACKGROUND 18 On April 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed the complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court, 19 naming as the sole Defendant Dignity Health Corporation, identified in the complaint as 20 “a municipal corporation formed under the laws of California . . . whose state of corporation 21 and principal place of business is 185 Berry Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California.” 22 (Doc. 1-3 at 7.) 23 On May 26, 2021, Defendant removed the action to federal court. (Doc. 1.) The 24 sole basis on which subject matter jurisdiction is asserted is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity). 25 (Id. ¶ 5.) 26 On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed the pending motion to remand, asserting that the 27 parties are not diverse because Defendant’s “leadership” is based in Arizona and because 28 Defendant performs “a plurality of business activities in Arizona as it owns and operates 1 several other hospitals and emergency healthcare facilities . . . in the State of Arizona,” 2 such that its principal place of business is in Arizona.1 (Doc. 8 at 5.) 3 On June 16, 2021, Defendant filed a response in opposition to the motion to remand. 4 (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. 5 DISCUSSION 6 I. Legal Standard 7 “A defendant generally may remove any action filed in state court if a federal district 8 court would have had original jurisdiction.” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 9 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). There is a “strong 10 presumption” against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 11 1992).2 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 12 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Matheson 13 v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where doubt 14 regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”). 15 A federal district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter 16 in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs” and 17 the parties are diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of citizenship exists when 18 “all the persons on one side of it are citizens of different states from all the persons on the 19 other side.” Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 20 The party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction has the burden of 21 proof, Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986), by a preponderance of the 22 evidence. McNatt v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 972 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); see 13B Federal 23 Practice § 3611 at 521 & n. 34. “When challenged on allegations of jurisdictional facts, 24 the parties must support their allegations by competent proof.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 25 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010).
26 1 The parties do not dispute the fact that Plaintiff is an Arizona citizen. 27 2 The “strong presumption” against removal in “mine-run diversity cases” was not altered by Dart, which addressed removal of class actions under the Class Action Fairness 28 Act. Dart, 574 U.S. at 89; see also Johnson v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1442644, *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2015). 1 A corporation, whether incorporated in a state of the United States or in a foreign 2 country, is “deemed a citizen of its place of incorporation and the location of its principal 3 place of business.” Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 4 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). “[T]he phrase ‘principal place of 5 business’ refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and 6 coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80. This place, metaphorically 7 dubbed the corporation’s “brain” or “nerve center,” “will typically be found at a 8 corporation’s headquarters,” “provided that the headquarters is the actual center of 9 direction, control, and coordination,3 . . . and not simply an office where the corporation 10 holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors and officers who have traveled 11 there for the occasion).” Id. at 80-81, 93, 95. It is “a place within a State,” “not the State 12 itself.” Id. at 93. 13 In Hertz, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the “general business activities 14 test,” which focused on where the “most important” place of business activities is located:
15 The metaphor of a corporate “brain,” while not precise, suggests a single location. By contrast, a corporation’s general business activities more often 16 lack a single principal place where they take place. That is to say, the corporation may have several plants, many sales locations, and employees 17 located in many different places. If so, it will not be as easy to determine which of these different business locales is the “principal” or most important 18 “place.” 19 Id. at 95. 20 The Supreme Court emphasized that “[c]omplex jurisdictional tests complicate a 21 case, eating up time and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but 22 which court is the right court to decide those claims,” “produce appeals and reversals, 23 encourage gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and settlements 24 will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits,” and eat up “[j]udicial resources.” Id. at 94. 25 “[C]ourts benefit from straightforward rules under which they can readily assure 26 3 “[I]f the record reveals attempts at manipulation—for example, that the alleged 27 ‘nerve center’ is nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with a computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat—the courts should instead take as the ‘nerve center’ 28 the place of actual direction, control, and coordination, in the absence of such manipulation.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 97. 1 themselves of their power to hear a case.” Id. “A ‘nerve center’ test offers such a 2 possibility. A general business activities test does not.” Id. at 95. 3 II. Analysis 4 As a preliminary matter, Defendant’s response makes much of the fact that 5 Plaintiff’s complaint originally stated that Defendant’s principal place of business is in San 6 Francisco, California, asserting that “Plaintiff cannot now retreat from these facts.” (Doc. 7 9 at 1.) Although it is certainly an about-face on Plaintiff’s part, Plaintiff’s previous 8 assertion does not establish the existence of a jurisdictional fact and Defendant has not 9 cited any cases suggesting that waiver or estoppel principles apply in this context. Cf. 10 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Myrna de Jesus, No. CV-21-00926-PHX-DWL
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Dignity Health Corporation,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Myrna de Jesus’s motion to remand. 16 (Doc. 8.) For the following reasons, the motion is denied. 17 BACKGROUND 18 On April 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed the complaint in Maricopa County Superior Court, 19 naming as the sole Defendant Dignity Health Corporation, identified in the complaint as 20 “a municipal corporation formed under the laws of California . . . whose state of corporation 21 and principal place of business is 185 Berry Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California.” 22 (Doc. 1-3 at 7.) 23 On May 26, 2021, Defendant removed the action to federal court. (Doc. 1.) The 24 sole basis on which subject matter jurisdiction is asserted is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity). 25 (Id. ¶ 5.) 26 On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed the pending motion to remand, asserting that the 27 parties are not diverse because Defendant’s “leadership” is based in Arizona and because 28 Defendant performs “a plurality of business activities in Arizona as it owns and operates 1 several other hospitals and emergency healthcare facilities . . . in the State of Arizona,” 2 such that its principal place of business is in Arizona.1 (Doc. 8 at 5.) 3 On June 16, 2021, Defendant filed a response in opposition to the motion to remand. 4 (Doc. 9.) Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. 5 DISCUSSION 6 I. Legal Standard 7 “A defendant generally may remove any action filed in state court if a federal district 8 court would have had original jurisdiction.” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 9 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). There is a “strong 10 presumption” against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 11 1992).2 “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 12 matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Matheson 13 v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Where doubt 14 regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”). 15 A federal district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter 16 in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs” and 17 the parties are diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Complete diversity of citizenship exists when 18 “all the persons on one side of it are citizens of different states from all the persons on the 19 other side.” Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806). 20 The party seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction has the burden of 21 proof, Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1986), by a preponderance of the 22 evidence. McNatt v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 972 F.2d 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); see 13B Federal 23 Practice § 3611 at 521 & n. 34. “When challenged on allegations of jurisdictional facts, 24 the parties must support their allegations by competent proof.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 25 U.S. 77, 96-97 (2010).
26 1 The parties do not dispute the fact that Plaintiff is an Arizona citizen. 27 2 The “strong presumption” against removal in “mine-run diversity cases” was not altered by Dart, which addressed removal of class actions under the Class Action Fairness 28 Act. Dart, 574 U.S. at 89; see also Johnson v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1442644, *2 n.2 (D. Ariz. 2015). 1 A corporation, whether incorporated in a state of the United States or in a foreign 2 country, is “deemed a citizen of its place of incorporation and the location of its principal 3 place of business.” Nike, Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 4 987, 990 (9th Cir. 1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). “[T]he phrase ‘principal place of 5 business’ refers to the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and 6 coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 80. This place, metaphorically 7 dubbed the corporation’s “brain” or “nerve center,” “will typically be found at a 8 corporation’s headquarters,” “provided that the headquarters is the actual center of 9 direction, control, and coordination,3 . . . and not simply an office where the corporation 10 holds its board meetings (for example, attended by directors and officers who have traveled 11 there for the occasion).” Id. at 80-81, 93, 95. It is “a place within a State,” “not the State 12 itself.” Id. at 93. 13 In Hertz, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the “general business activities 14 test,” which focused on where the “most important” place of business activities is located:
15 The metaphor of a corporate “brain,” while not precise, suggests a single location. By contrast, a corporation’s general business activities more often 16 lack a single principal place where they take place. That is to say, the corporation may have several plants, many sales locations, and employees 17 located in many different places. If so, it will not be as easy to determine which of these different business locales is the “principal” or most important 18 “place.” 19 Id. at 95. 20 The Supreme Court emphasized that “[c]omplex jurisdictional tests complicate a 21 case, eating up time and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but 22 which court is the right court to decide those claims,” “produce appeals and reversals, 23 encourage gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and settlements 24 will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits,” and eat up “[j]udicial resources.” Id. at 94. 25 “[C]ourts benefit from straightforward rules under which they can readily assure 26 3 “[I]f the record reveals attempts at manipulation—for example, that the alleged 27 ‘nerve center’ is nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with a computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat—the courts should instead take as the ‘nerve center’ 28 the place of actual direction, control, and coordination, in the absence of such manipulation.” Hertz, 559 U.S. at 97. 1 themselves of their power to hear a case.” Id. “A ‘nerve center’ test offers such a 2 possibility. A general business activities test does not.” Id. at 95. 3 II. Analysis 4 As a preliminary matter, Defendant’s response makes much of the fact that 5 Plaintiff’s complaint originally stated that Defendant’s principal place of business is in San 6 Francisco, California, asserting that “Plaintiff cannot now retreat from these facts.” (Doc. 7 9 at 1.) Although it is certainly an about-face on Plaintiff’s part, Plaintiff’s previous 8 assertion does not establish the existence of a jurisdictional fact and Defendant has not 9 cited any cases suggesting that waiver or estoppel principles apply in this context. Cf. 10 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012) (“Subject- 11 matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited.”). Put another way, Defendant bears 12 the burden of establishing the existence of diversity jurisdiction, and in turn bears the 13 burden of establishing its principal place of business, regardless of whether Plaintiff has 14 taken inconsistent positions on the matter. 15 At any rate, Defendant has submitted an “unchallenged declaration,” Hertz, 559 16 U.S. at 97, from “Corporate Paralegal – Physician Integration” Pamela Migas, which states 17 that Defendant’s “corporate headquarters is in San Francisco, California” and that this is 18 “the actual center where high level officers of the corporation direct, control and coordinate 19 the activities of the corporation . . . .” (Doc. 1-5 at 2.) Although this declaration is fairly 20 conclusory, Plaintiff has not challenged it or submitting any conflicting evidence. Cf. 3123 21 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 468 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Anthony Kling provided 22 unimpeached deposition testimony and sworn declaration statements . . . . To reach [an 23 adverse] conclusion . . . , the court would need to reject this evidence . . . .”). In Plaintiff’s 24 motion, she merely asserts that Defendant’s leadership is in Arizona (without submitting 25 any proof) and notes that Defendant operates several facilities in Arizona (Doc. 8 at 5), 26 which seems to evoke the “general business activities test” the Supreme Court has rejected. 27 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 95. Plaintiff did not file a reply and did not challenge Defendant’s 28 evidence in any manner. 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to remand (Doc. 8) is denied. 3 Dated this 2nd day of July, 2021. > > ‘Dominic W. Lanza 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
-5-