Dcpp v. P.h-i-j.N., in the Matter of the Guardianship of R.T.F.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: A-2491-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2491-24

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.H-I-J.N.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

C.W.F.,

Defendant. _________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF R.T.F., a minor. _________________________

Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided February 4, 2026

Before Judges Currier, Smith and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FG-09-0102-25.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Catherine Wilkes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mary L. Harpster, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor R.T.F. (Meredith A. Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Noel C. Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, P.H-I-J.N. (Patricia) appeals from a Family Part order

terminating her parental rights to R.T.F. (Richard).1 Patricia exclusively argues

the guardianship judgment must be reversed because the Division of Child

Protection and Permanency (Division) did not provide sufficient rehabilitative

services to Patricia when she was involved with the Division as a child and

before she aged out of the Division's custody. After a review of the record and

the controlling legal principles, we affirm.

1 We use initials and pseudonyms to identify the parties, the child, and others to protect their privacy and because records relating to Division proceedings held under Rule 5:12 are excluded from public access under Rule 1:38-3(d)(12). A-2491-24 2 I.

Richard, the child at the center of this appeal, was born to Patricia and

defendant C.W.F. (Charles)2 in May 2023. Prior to Richard's birth, Patricia was

involved with the Division as a minor. Her childhood was marked by significant

trauma and instability, including sexual abuse, physical discipline from family

members, and the death of her mother from sickle cell anemia shortly before

Patricia's sixteenth birthday. After her mother's death, Patricia struggled with

anxiety and substance abuse, including the alleged illegal use of marijuana,

alcohol, and Ecstasy. When Patricia turned eighteen, she aged out of the

Division's care. One year later, Richard tested positive for marijuana at his birth.

Patricia informed the Division that she had ingested two

tetrahydrocannabinol gummies two weeks before Richard was born and

disclosed past alcohol use during her pregnancy. She agreed to undergo a

substance abuse evaluation and accept additional services from the Division.

A few weeks later, the Division was notified that Patricia had been

involved in a domestic violence incident with Charles. Patricia told the Division

she intended to obtain a restraining order against Charles and agreed to

2 The court also terminated Charles' parental rights under its order. Charles has not appealed from the order. A-2491-24 3 participate in a psychological evaluation and mental health treatment. She

rescheduled her substance abuse screening due to a court appearance to finalize

a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Charles but subsequently missed

the rescheduled screening and three additional appointments. She ultimately

dismissed the TRO.

Patricia was hospitalized a few weeks later because of a liver infection.

While in the Jersey City Medical Center, Patricia requested that T.H. (Theresa),

Richard's paternal aunt, care for Richard during her hospitalization. Although

Patricia stated she had not used illegal substances while caring for Richard, she

reported her hospitalization was due to excessive alcohol consumption, and

acknowledged testing positive for amphetamines, alcohol, and marijuana.

Upon discharge from the hospital, Patricia had another verbal

disagreement with Charles at her brother's home and reported consuming

alcohol. The Division contacted the shelter where Patricia was living and

learned she was not adhering to that program's requirements. She missed

scheduled counseling sessions, violated her curfew, concealed alcohol in her

room, and tested positive for marijuana and alcohol. Patricia's drug use

persisted.

A-2491-24 4 On July 27, 2023, the Division removed Richard from Patricia's care

because of her drug use, the history of domestic violence with Charles, and

Richard's young age. Both parents asked Theresa to care for Richard.

Over the following months, the court required Patricia to attend domestic

violence counseling and ordered Charles to resolve an open warrant and

complete parenting training. The court also continued supervised parenting time

and directed the Division to provide transportation, housing, and communication

support for both parents. Both Patricia and Charles were ordered to undergo

psychological and substance abuse evaluations, and the Division was directed

to facilitate necessary parenting and rehabilitative resources. After the court

found Patricia and Charles were unable to care for Richard properly, it ordered

increased support services to both parents and made early intervention services

for Richard available to them.

Regular compliance hearings were held, with the court continuing to order

psychological, psychiatric, and substance abuse evaluations, therapy, and

participation in domestic violence and parenting skills programs. The Division

provided both parents with transportation, housing assistance, and technology

access. Parenting time for both Patricia and Charles was periodically reduced

A-2491-24 5 in response to compliance issues, and they were required to maintain regular

communication with the Division.

Despite these interventions, Patricia consistently failed to comply with

required evaluations, treatment, and ordered programs, or to maintain contact

with the Division. Her participation was sporadic and was limited primarily to

certain evaluations and occasional visits with Richard.

Ultimately, the court entered a permanency order and accepted the

Division's plan to terminate Patricia's and Charles' parental rights and permit

Theresa to adopt Richard. The trial court specifically found that Patricia failed

to comply with reunification services, and acknowledged the Division's

reasonable efforts, which included referrals for psychological, psychiatric, and

substance abuse evaluations; supervised visitation; substance rehabilitation

opportunities; housing assistance; transportation; domestic violence services;

technology access; and family team meetings.

The Division decided to pursue guardianship of Richard and dismissed the

protective services litigation accordingly. The Law Guardian, representing

Richard, supported the Division's position. The two-day trial included

testimony from the Division's caseworker, the Division's expert witness Allison

A-2491-24 6 Strasser Winston, Ph.D., a psychologist, and Theresa. Patricia did not attend the

trial.

In a comprehensive fifty-nine-page written opinion, the trial court

analyzed the matter under the statutory four-prong test set forth in N.J.S.A.

30:4C-5.1(a) and granted the Division's application for guardianship of Richard.

The court held the Division provided clear and convincing evidence to satisfy

each prong of the test.

First, the judge found Richard's safety, health, or development was or

would continue to be endangered by the parental relationship. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-

15.1(a)(1). The court found the combination of Patricia's untreated mental

health disorders, persistent substance abuse, and ongoing exposure to domestic

violence created an unsafe and unstable environment for Richard and seriously

impaired his safety, health, and development. These issues remained

unremedied throughout the case.

Second, the trial judge found Patricia was unwilling or unable to eliminate

the harm facing Richard, she was unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable

home for him, and the delay of permanent placement would add to that harm.

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2). According to the trial court, Patricia had not

sufficiently addressed nor overcome the challenges that necessitated Richard's

A-2491-24 7 removal, and she had not engaged in meaningful treatment or services. The

court specifically found any delay in permanency would further harm him whose

only stable environment had been in Theresa's care.

Third, the trial judge held the Division made reasonable efforts to provide

services to help Patricia correct the circumstances which led to Richard's

placement outside the home. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). The court also

considered alternatives to termination of parental rights. Ibid. The court found

the Division repeatedly provided referrals and facilitated access to services for

substance abuse, mental health treatment, parenting support, domestic violence

counseling, and housing assistance. The Division also explored kinship legal

guardianship, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -6, through the resource parent.

Finally, the court found termination of Patricia's and Charles' parental

rights would not do more harm than good. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). Expert

testimony provided by Dr. Winston established that Richard's needs for stability,

safety, and permanency were best met in his current placement and that reuniting

him with either Patricia or Charles posed a risk of enduring emotional and

physical harm to him. Ultimately, the court found that no viable evidence

suggested that maintaining the parental relationship served Richard's best

interests.

A-2491-24 8 Only Patrica appealed.

Before us, she raises this single issue:

THE JUDGMENT OF GUARDIANSHIP SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE [THE DIVISION'S] REASONABLE EFFORTS OFFERED PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3) DID NOT COMPENSATE FOR ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO [PATRICIA] PURSUANT TO N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3 PRIOR TO HER AGING OUT OF [THE DIVISION'S] CUSTODY AT AGE EIGHTEEN.

A. [The Division] Failed to Provide the Appropriate Services to [Patricia] After Age Eighteen Pursuant to DCF CP&P-III-A-1-500.

B. [The Division] Had A Duty to Provide Services to [Patricia] After Age Eighteen Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3 to Address Her Significant Childhood Trauma.

C. Due to the Unique Circumstances of [The Division's] Failure to Provide Services to [Patricia] Prior to Her Aging Out of [The Division's] Custody[, The Division] Should Extend the Time Past the Twelve-Month Requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-61.2(a)(2).

II.

A.

Our standard of review is well-settled. In Title 30 cases, we will neither

second-guess nor substitute our judgment for that of the Family Part provided

its factual findings are "grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the

A-2491-24 9 record." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023).

"Deference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial

and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412

(1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)).

"We accord deference to fact[-]findings of the family court because it has the

superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it and

because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family." N.J. Div.

of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). "[A] trial court's

factual findings 'should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly unsupportable

as to result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. P.P.,

180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440,

472 (2002)). We owe no deference to a judge's legal conclusions which we

review de novo. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354,

369 (2017).

Guided by these standards, we conclude the trial court's factual findings

are amply supported by the credible evidence in the record and the judge's

ultimate legal conclusion was correct.

A-2491-24 10 B.

In considering whether to terminate parental rights, the trial court applies

a best interests test set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) which requires

consideration of these four prongs:

(1) [t]he child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) [t]he parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

(3) [t]he [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) [t]ermination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

The Division must prove each prong by clear and convincing evidence.

N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.H., 469 N.J. Super. 107, 115 (App.

Div. 2021). These prongs "are not discrete and separate;" they overlap to inform

a more general inquiry that the termination of parental rights is in a child's best

interests. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 145

(2018) (quoting In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999))

A-2491-24 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). "'The question ultimately is not whether a

biological mother or father is a worthy parent, but whether a child's interest will

best be served by completely terminating the child's relationship with that

parent.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. T.S., 417 N.J. Super. 228, 249

(App. Div. 2010) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.

88, 108 (2008)). "'[P]arental fitness is the key to determining the best interests

of the child.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 170 (2010)

(quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348).

"Parents have a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship

with their children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261,

279 (2007). That right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's

parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or

psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously

endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. In

guardianship and adoption cases, such as here, it is well-established that

"[c]hildren have their own rights, including the right to a permanent, safe[,] and

stable placement." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. C.S., 367 N.J. Super.

76, 111 (App. Div. 2004). We acknowledge "the need for permanency of

placements by placing limits on the time for a birth parent to correct conditions

A-2491-24 12 in anticipation of reuniting with the child." Ibid. Thus, a parent's interest must,

at times, yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. See N.J.

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009).

C.

On appeal, Patricia does not contest that the Division proved statutory

prongs one, two, and four by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, we

address only her challenge to the proofs of prong three.

Patricia argues the Division should have provided her with services while

she was in its custody as a child herself and after she aged out of its custody to

address her childhood trauma, depression, and anxiety. She contends that since

that assistance was neither coordinated nor individualized to her specific needs,

any "realistic possibility" for successful reunification with Richard was

impossible. See N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super.

451, 489 (App. Div. 2012). We find this argument unavailing for the following

reasons.

First, Patricia did not raise this issue before the trial judge to permit the

parties and the judge to consider the contentions. "Generally, an appellate court

will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised [before

the trial court]." State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012). "For sound

A-2491-24 13 jurisprudential reasons, with few exceptions, 'our appellate courts will decline

to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

opportunity for such a presentation is available.'" State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409,

419 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). We do not

"consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an

opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so raised

on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great

public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)

(quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App.

Div 1959)). Issues raised for the first time on appeal need not be considered

because they "never were subjected to the rigors of an adversary hearing, and .

. . their legal propriety [was never] ruled on by the trial court." Robinson, 200

N.J. at 18-19. Despite the numerous opportunities during the trial to address

this issue with both the Division's caseworker and the Division's expert, Patricia

did not raise this issue before the trial court. We, therefore, have no record to

review.

Second, we note the Division has a statutory duty to provide services to a

youth previously under the Division's custody as that child ages out of the foster

care system. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-2.3. According to that statute, the Division must

A-2491-24 14 provide services to an individual from ages eighteen to twenty-one, provided he

or she received Division services after the age of sixteen and had not refused

nor requested termination of services, and the Division determined that services

would be in the child's best interests and would assist him or her to become

independent. Ibid.

In L.J.D., we concluded the Division possessed a "heightened burden" to

provide "satisfactory services to aid the development of the child-parent's

maturation and necessary skills to adequately parent . . ." to a fourteen-year-old

mother who was then in the Division's custody. L.J.D., 428 N.J. Super. at 489.

However, we also held there was "no statutory authority or precedent holding

that the Division's failure to provide services to a child under its ca re can be

considered in a subsequent guardianship matter involving that same child in her

later capacity as a parent when assessing the adequacy of services required under

Title 30." New Jersey Div. of Child. Prot. & Permanency v. N.C.M., 438 N.J.

Super. 356, 369 (App. Div. 2014). For this reason, Patricia's argument is

rendered infirm.

Additionally, Patricia's claim that additional support at age eighteen

would have impacted the outcome of this case is speculative and overlooks the

undisputed fact that, from the time Patricia became a parent at age nineteen, the

A-2491-24 15 Division provided ample services to help stabilize her life and to address the

circumstances that led to Richard's removal. Patricia failed to engage

consistently with or to comply with these rehabilitative efforts. It is equally

speculative to suggest that any additional, unspecified services would have

produced a different result, given her pattern of noncompliance throughout the

proceedings. Rather, she continued to struggle with substance dependence,

untreated mental health issues, and was involved in a volatile relationship

marked by domestic violence. We discern no error in the court's analysis of

prong three.

We find the trial judge's findings on the remaining three prongs of

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) are amply supported by the record. To the extent that

we have not addressed any of Patricia's arguments, it is because they lack

sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-2491-24 16