Davison v. Harpe

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedApril 29, 2025
Docket24-5104
StatusUnpublished

This text of Davison v. Harpe (Davison v. Harpe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davison v. Harpe, (10th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-5104 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 29, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court ALONZO G. DAVISON,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v. No. 24-5104 (D.C. No. 4:23-CV-00456-SEH-CDL) STEVEN HARPE, (N.D. Okla.)

Respondent - Appellee. _________________________________

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _________________________________

Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Alonzo G. Davison, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1 seeks a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241 habeas application. We deny his request for a COA and dismiss this matter.

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Mr. Davison appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Appellate Case: 24-5104 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 2

I. BACKGROUND

Under Oklahoma law, people convicted of certain offenses committed on or after

March 1, 2000, must serve 85 percent of their sentence to be eligible for parole. See

Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 12.1.

In 2002, an Oklahoma jury convicted Mr. Davison of lewd molestation (count

one) and sexually abusing a minor child (count two). The trial court imposed a 50-year

sentence on count one, and a consecutive 75-year sentence on count two. The court’s

judgment did not say when Mr. Davison committed the crimes. The Oklahoma Court of

Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions but modified the sentences to two concurrent

45-year terms.

In 2004, after the appeal, the trial court amended the judgment, changing the crime

of conviction on count one from lewd molestation to sexually abusing a minor child,

stating that crime occurred on August 8, 2001, and listing the sentence as 45 years. On

count two, the amended judgment noted the crime occurred on January 1, 2000, and

changed the sentence to a concurrent 45 years.

In 2023, Mr. Davison applied for § 2241 habeas relief in federal court. Section

2241 permits a state prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence. See

Leatherwood v. Allbaugh, 861 F.3d 1034, 1041 (10th Cir. 2017). Mr. Davison’s § 2241

application asserted he had already completed his sentence and disputed how his

“sentence is being carried out, calculated, or credited by prison or parole authorities.” R.

at 31. He alleged they had mistakenly applied the 85-percent rule to his count-one

sentence. In his view, he was eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence.

2 Appellate Case: 24-5104 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 3

The district court denied his § 2241 application. The court found that although the

85-percent rule does not apply to Mr. Davison’s sentence on count two, it does apply to

his sentence for sexual abuse of a minor child committed on August 8, 2001. See Okla.

Stat. tit. 21, § 13.1 (2001). It follows, the court said, that Mr. Davison will not be eligible

for parole until 2040.

II. DISCUSSION

A state prisoner must obtain a COA to appeal the denial of § 2241 relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2000). To

receive a COA, the prisoner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and must show “that reasonable jurists

could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or

that issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). We deny Mr. Davison’s

request for a COA because reasonable jurists could not debate that he has failed to state a

claim for relief under § 2241.

Mr. Davison does not dispute that if the amended judgment accurately identified

when he committed the crime, the 85-percent rule governs. He admits that prison

officials applied the 85-percent rule to his count-one sentence because the amended

judgment says he committed the crime on August 8, 2001. His § 2241 application fails to

show any error in the execution of his sentence.2

2 Mr. Davison argues the district court should have held a hearing. A district court has discretion to hold a habeas-case evidentiary hearing, which is unnecessary where, as 3 Appellate Case: 24-5104 Document: 11-1 Date Filed: 04/29/2025 Page: 4

In this court, Mr. Davison does not contend prison officials erred in executing his

sentence. See Appl. for COA at 18. He instead argues the Oklahoma trial court erred by

including the date of the count-one offense in the amended judgment. But this attack

does not challenge the execution of the sentence and must be made in a § 2254

application.3 See Leatherwood, 861 F.3d at 1042; see also Magwood v. Patterson, 561

U.S. 320, 332 (2010) (recognizing a § 2254 application “seeks invalidation (in whole or

in part) of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s confinement” (quotations omitted)).

Mr. Davison’s § 2241 application identifies only a single ground for relief—

improper application of the 85-percent rule. Reasonable jurists would not debate the

district court’s rejection of that claim.

III. CONCLUSION

We deny Mr. Davison’s application for a COA and dismiss this matter.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge

here, the court can resolve a habeas application based on the record. See Anderson v. Att’y Gen. of Kan., 425 F.3d 853, 858-59 (10th Cir. 2005). Because the amended judgment refutes Mr. Davison’s § 2241 claim, no reasonable jurist could debate that the district court acted within its discretion in not holding a hearing. 3 Mr. Davison has already challenged his Oklahoma judgment in a § 2254 habeas application. See Davison v. McCollum, 696 F. App’x 859, 860 (10th Cir. 2017). He may not file a second or successive § 2254 application challenging the judgment without prior authorization from this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 4

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Related

Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Magwood v. Patterson
561 U.S. 320 (Supreme Court, 2010)
Montez v. McKinna
208 F.3d 862 (Tenth Circuit, 2000)
Anderson v. Attorney General KS
425 F.3d 853 (Tenth Circuit, 2005)
James v. Wadas
724 F.3d 1312 (Tenth Circuit, 2013)
Davison v. McCollum
696 F. App'x 859 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)
Leatherwood v. Allbaugh
861 F.3d 1034 (Tenth Circuit, 2017)

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Davison v. Harpe, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davison-v-harpe-ca10-2025.