Davis v. Robinson

346 F. Supp. 847, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12491
CourtDistrict Court, D. Rhode Island
DecidedAugust 2, 1972
DocketCiv. A. 4488
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 346 F. Supp. 847 (Davis v. Robinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Davis v. Robinson, 346 F. Supp. 847, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12491 (D.R.I. 1972).

Opinion

OPINION

PETTINE, Chief Judge.

Claiming that needy school children have a constitutional and statutory right to receive free or reduced price school lunches, plaintiffs bring this civil rights action. The action is brought on behalf of the class of impoverished school children within the State who are not provided with free or reduced price school lunches, and it has been certified as a class action.

Jurisdiction is asserted on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, § 1337, § 1343, § 2201 and § 2202. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the refusal by defendants to establish National School Lunch Programs (NSLP’s) in the neediest schools first, and provide free lunches to the neediest children first, is violative of the National School Lunch Act, (NSLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1757, 1758 and 1759a, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, 7 C.F.R. § 245.4. They also seek a declaration that the “arbitrary” refusal to provide such lunches in some schools, while providing them in other schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the law. They ask a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from refusing to provide free lunches to children attending Rhode Island schools who qualify for free lunches under defendants’ own free lunch criteria. They also ask a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from refusing to establish School Lunch Programs and provide free lunches on a priority of need. Finally, they seek their costs and such further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

Plaintiffs argue, inter alia, that as a condition for receiving federal funds under the National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1751 et seq., the entity responsible for implementation of the school lunch program within a state must assure that all poor children under its jurisdiction receive a free or reduced price lunch, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1758, 7 C.F.R. § 245.3. They assert that in Rhode Island, unlike most other states, a state agency, the Rhode Island State Agency for Elementary and Secondary Education, is the entity responsible for directly operating about 80% of all school lunch programs in the state. It is alleged that in their respective capacities, defendants Robinson and O’Connell have supervisory powers and direct control over the establishment, administration and operation *849 of the Federal school lunch program in numerous schools throughout the state of Rhode Island.

Plaintiffs claim two statutory and regulatory violations by defendants. First, they assert defendants have failed to follow the priority of need in establishing school lunch programs and providing free lunches. Second, they argue that defendants have failed to provide free lunches to members of the plaintiff class who meet the eligibility requirements for a free lunch.

They argue that defendants have violated the Constitution by conditioning the provision of free lunches on the basis of the school attended or the district in which the school is located. They argue that poor nutrition adversely affects a school child’s education, that the right to equal educational opportunity is a fundamental interest, and that defendants have not shown a compelling state interest justifying this infringement on poor school children’s education. Alternatively, they argue that new procedures for providing school lunches have minimized the expenditures of local school authorities who participate in the program, so that there is no rational basis for defendants’ failure to provide school lunches to all needy school children.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) to hear the claim of denial of equal protection. Ayala v. District 60 School Board of Pueblo, Colorado, 327 F.Supp. 980, 981 (D.Colo. 1971). The claims of violation of the statutes are pendant to the constitutional claim and within this Court’s jurisdiction. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970).

Defendants do not, for the most part, dispute plaintiffs’ contention that needy children are not receiving state lunches. Rather, they argue that they do not have the authority ascribed to them by plaintiffs and that “in the first instance the school committees have the ultimate power to afford or withhold lunches.” Relying upon Briggs v. Kerrigan, 431 F.2d 967 (1st Cir. 1970) they urge on behalf of the school committees that lack of facilities is sufficient justification for a failure to provide lunch and that school committees can appropriate moneys for other school purposes without violating federal law. Plaintiffs respond that state officials do control the school lunch program and that, due to satellite feeding and catering programs, lack of facilities cannot be a justification for failure to provide a lunch.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment and have moved to dismiss for failure to join as indispensible parties the members of local school committees. The motions are denied for reasons which will appear in the Court’s discussion of the case infra.

Named plaintiffs all have incomes below the poverty levels set by the state, making such families eligible for free or reduced price benefits under the NSLA. These lunches are not available to children in the plaintiff families, because they attend schools without a school lunch program.

National School Lunch Program

For the purposes of this opinion only a summary description of the National School Lunch Program will be given. A careful and more thorough description may be found in Briggs v. Kerrigan, 307 F.Supp. 295 (D.Mass.1969).

Under the National School Lunch Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1751, federal financial assistance is offered to the states to help defray the costs of serving lunches to school children, with general cash assistance paid for each meal served, special cash assistance paid for meals served free or at a reduced price, non-food assistance paid to meet the costs of equipment, and surplus commodities made available without charge.

Each federal dollar expended in the program must be matched by three state dollars. Federal funds are not available for expenses attributable to construction of or alteration of buildings or land acquisition. States who wish to participate in the program enter into written agreements with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Through *850 measurement of an “assistance need rate,” the matching requirement for poorer states is reduced. Thus poorer states receive greater proportional assistance than wealthier states.

Under 42 U.S.C.A. §.

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Related

Pace Ex Rel. Pace v. State
38 A.3d 418 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 2012)
Charette Ex Rel. Charette v. Bergland
457 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Rhode Island, 1978)
Robbiani v. Burke
390 A.2d 1149 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1978)
School Lunch Program
4 Pa. D. & C.3d 23 (Pennsylvania Department of Justice, 1977)
Justice v. Board of Education
351 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D. New York, 1972)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
346 F. Supp. 847, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12491, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/davis-v-robinson-rid-1972.