304 Ga. 460 FINAL COPY
S18A0933. DAVIDSON v. THE STATE. S18A0934. GRANT v. THE STATE.
BLACKWELL, Justice.
Richard Davidson and Michael Denay Grant were tried separately by
Fulton County juries, and both were convicted of murder and the unlawful
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with
the attempted robbery and fatal shooting of Christopher Walker. Davidson and
Grant appeal, each asserting that the trial court erred when it admitted certain
evidence at his trial. We find no harmful error with respect to Davidson. We
conclude, however, that the trial court erred when it admitted a statement against
Grant that law enforcement officers elicited from him in a custodial
interrogation after he unequivocally invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent, and the State has failed to show that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm in Davidson’s case, and we reverse
in Grant’s.1
Sufficiency of the Evidence as to both Davidson and Grant
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, evidence presented
at both trials shows that Walker and a friend, Alberto Rodriguez, went to a Taco
Bell restaurant in Alpharetta early on the evening of March 12, 2013. As they
1 Walker was killed in March 2013. Three months later, a Fulton County grand jury indicted Davidson, Grant, and Matthew Goins, charging them with three counts of murder in the commission of a felony and one count of murder with malice aforethought, aggravated assault, attempted armed robbery, and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Davidson was also charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Davidson was tried alone by a jury in October 2014, and that same month, Grant and Goins were tried together by a different jury. At Davidson’s trial, the jury found him guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole for malice murder and a consecutive term of five years for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At Grant’s trial, the jury acquitted him of malice murder, but found him guilty of felony murder and the other charges. (The same jury acquitted Goins on all counts.) Grant was sentenced to imprisonment for life for felony murder and a consecutive term of five years for unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In both cases, the other counts as to which Davidson and Grant were found guilty were merged or vacated by operation of law, see Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-373 (4), (5) (434 SE2d 479) (1993), and no party raises any claim of error with respect to the merger or vacation of counts on which Davidson and Grant were not sentenced. See Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 425 (1) (d) (811 SE2d 392) (2018). Davidson filed a motion for new trial in November 2014, he amended his motion in June 2015, and after a hearing, the trial court denied his motion in November 2015. Grant also filed a motion for new trial in November 2014, and he amended it in January 2016. After a hearing, the trial court likewise denied Grant’s motion in February 2017, and the trial court amended its denial in May 2017. Davidson and Grant both timely filed notices of appeal, and their respective appeals were docketed to the April 2018 term of this Court. Davidson’s appeal was submitted on the briefs, and Grant’s appeal was orally argued on August 6, 2018.
2 entered the restaurant, they saw two men standing outside. Rodriguez noticed
that one of these men had dreadlocks and appeared to be staring at Walker’s
gold chain, and the other man was wearing a striped shirt. Walker and
Rodriguez were inside the restaurant for approximately 13 minutes, and when
they left, Rodriguez saw the same man with dreadlocks, now seated in a car that
was parked in a lot across the street from the Taco Bell and in the company of
two other men. Walker and Rodriguez then drove about six miles to Walker’s
house in Milton, unaware that they were being followed. They parked in
Walker’s driveway, and as they exited their car, they were approached by the
man in a striped shirt, who asked them where he could get some marijuana.
When they responded that they did not know, the man started to walk away. But
he quickly turned and approached them again, commenting that he liked the
chain that Walker was wearing. The man in the striped shirt then pulled out a
gun and demanded the chain. When Walker refused, Walker and the man
struggled, the man held a gun to Walker’s head, and eventually, the man shot
Walker in the head. The man then fled to a nearby car — the same car that
Rodriguez had observed earlier in the lot across the street from the Taco Bell —
which sped away from the scene. Later that night, Walker died as a result of the
3 gunshot wound to his head. An autopsy led to the recovery of bullet fragments,
which indicated that Walker had been shot with a .40-caliber bullet.
Investigators retrieved a recording from the video surveillance system at
the Taco Bell, and they took notice of three men depicted in the recording, who
visited the restaurant close in time to Walker and Rodriguez. When investigators
showed the recording to Rodriguez, he identified one of these men as the man
with dreadlocks whom he had seen staring at Walker’s gold chain, and he
identified another as the man in the striped shirt who shot Walker. Investigators
also showed the recording to one of Walker’s neighbors, and the neighbor said
that she had seen the man in the striped shirt run through her yard with a
handgun around the time of the shooting. Investigators then released the
recording to the public and asked for information about the three men depicted
in the recording. Danielle Weed responded to this request for information, and
she told investigators that she personally knew all three men. She identified the
man with dreadlocks as Matthew Goins; she said that the man in the striped shirt
was Davidson; and she identified the third man as Grant. At the trials, Weed
again identified Goins, Davidson, and Grant in the video recording, and
4 Rodriguez testified that Grant’s car was the car that he had observed both at the
Taco Bell and in Walker’s neighborhood.
At his trial, Davidson disputed that he was present at the scene of the
shooting. The prosecution offered evidence (under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)) that
Davidson had robbed a traveling businessman at gunpoint only a few months
before Walker was killed. In addition, the prosecution presented evidence that
investigators had searched Davidson’s home, where they found .40-caliber
ammunition, although a firearms examiner testified that he was unable to
determine whether the .40-caliber ammunition was of the same brand as the
bullet that killed Walker. The prosecution also presented evidence of a statement
made by Goins, in which Goins admitted that he was present at the scene of a
killing. Goins, however, said nothing in that statement about Davidson.
Grant did not dispute at his joint trial with Goins that he was present at the
scene of the shooting, but Grant argued that he was not a party to the attempted
robbery or killing. The prosecution presented evidence that, after Grant was
arrested, he made a purportedly incriminating statement to investigators. In that
statement, Grant attempted to exonerate Goins, saying that Goins “didn’t know
5 we was doing none of that; he didn’t know we was going to do that; he didn’t
know we planned on doing nothing; he was just trying to get home.”
Only Grant asserts on appeal that the evidence is legally insufficient to
sustain his convictions, but it is our customary practice to review the sufficiency
of the evidence in all murder cases, and so, we will consider the sufficiency of
the evidence as to Davidson as well. We have separately reviewed the records
of Davidson’s and Grant’s respective trials. We conclude that the evidence
presented against Davidson is legally sufficient to authorize a rational jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crimes of which he was
convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781,
61 LE2d 560) (1979). And although the case against Grant is considerably
weaker, we conclude that the evidence presented at his trial also is legally
sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Grant is guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See id. See also Cowart
v. State, 294 Ga. 333, 343-344 (6) (751 SE2d 399) (2013) (when we assess the
legal sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson, we consider all of the evidence
presented at trial, even evidence that might have been admitted erroneously).
6 Davidson’s Claims of Error
2. Davidson claims that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of
the .40-caliber ammunition that was found in his home. Davidson argues that the
ammunition was not shown to be connected with Walker’s shooting, and the
prejudicial impact of the evidence, therefore, substantially outweighed its
probative value, rendering it inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-403.2 We
disagree. The probative value of this evidence may have been limited, but the
prejudicial impact was limited too. When the evidence was presented, Davidson
elicited testimony on cross-examination that investigators also found a .40-
caliber handgun in his home, which was excluded as the murder weapon by a
subsequent firearms examination. The testimony conveyed clearly to the jury
that the .40-caliber handgun found in the Davidson home was not the murder
weapon, and the presence of the .40-caliber handgun offered an innocent
explanation for the presence of the .40-caliber ammunition. In addition, the
testimony clearly conveyed that the connection between the ammunition found
in the home and the bullet with which Walker was shot was tenuous, if there
2 Rule 403 provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” OCGA § 24-4-403. Davidson does not argue that the ammunition was irrelevant to his guilt.
7 were any connection at all. Moreover, the other evidence against Davidson was
quite strong. The video recording from the Taco Bell and the testimony of
Rodriguez, Walker’s neighbor, and (especially) Weed identified Davidson as the
man who shot Walker. In this light, we cannot say that the probative value of the
ammunition was so substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the evidence. See Olds
v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 70 (2) (786 SE2d 633) (2016) (“[T]he exclusion of
evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only
sparingly.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
3. Davidson also contends that the trial court erred when it admitted
Goins’s statement. Weed testified at trial that, after she first saw the video
recording from the Taco Bell that investigators had released to the public, she
confronted Goins about it. The prosecuting attorney asked Weed how Goins
responded, and Weed testified that “[Goins] said that somebody was killed and
he was in the car, he was in the back seat, but he didn’t want to talk about what
happened.” The trial court admitted this evidence as the statement of a co-
conspirator under OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2) (E). Davidson argues on appeal that
the evidence was inadmissible under Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) because the
8 prosecution failed to establish a conspiracy, and in any event, the prosecution
failed to show that the statement was made “in furtherance of” the conspiracy.3
We need not decide, however, whether the admission of this evidence was
error because, even if it were, any error was harmless and would not warrant a
reversal. See Perez v. State, 303 Ga. 188, 190-191 (2) (811 SE2d 331) (2018).
Goins’s statement did not mention Davidson — it only indicated that Goins
himself was in the back seat of a car when someone was killed. To the extent
that this statement put Davidson at the scene of the crime, it did so only by
3 Davidson also argues on appeal that the evidence of Goins’s statement violated the Confrontation Clause and that the trial court erroneously failed to charge the jury that it was responsible for determining whether a conspiracy existed before it could consider the statement against Davidson. Neither of these arguments, however, merits much discussion. The statement was not testimonial — Davidson does not even argue that it was — and evidence of the statement does not, therefore, implicate the Confrontation Clause. See McClendon v. State, 299 Ga. 611, 618 (4) (b) (791 SE2d 69) (2016) (“[T]he question of whether hearsay evidence violates the Confrontation Clause turns . . . on whether the hearsay statement is testimonial.”). See also Pitts v. State, 280 Ga. 288, 288-289 (627 SE2d 17) (2006) (describing a testimonial statement as a “formal statement to a government officer made in an effort to establish an evidentiary case” or a “[statement] made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial” (citation and punctuation omitted)). About the jury charge, Davidson never asked for such a charge, and so, the failure of the trial court to give the charge is reviewable only for plain error. See Nalls v. State, 304 Ga. 168, 172 (2) (a) (815 SE2d 38) (2018). Plain error cannot be established here because, as we will explain later in Division 3, the statement itself was harmless, and it follows that the lack of an instruction limiting the use of the statement likewise could not have caused any prejudice. See Saffold v. State, 298 Ga. 643, 648 (3) (b) (784 SE2d 365) (2016) (an erroneous limiting instruction does not warrant reversal where the underlying evidence was harmless).
9 inference, and only when coupled with Weed’s testimony about the identity of
the men depicted in the video recording from the Taco Bell. Put another way,
Goins’s statement implicated Davidson only if the jury credited Weed’s
testimony that the video recording depicted both Davidson and Goins. But
Weed’s testimony, in combination with the testimony of Rodriguez and
Walker’s neighbor, established Davidson’s presence at the scene of the crime
independent of Goins’s statement, and much more directly besides. As a result,
Goins’s statement was not only cumulative of other, more probative evidence,
but it did not implicate Davidson unless combined with that other evidence. We
are unconvinced that any error in the admission of Goins’s statement had an
effect on the outcome of the trial.4 See id. at 191 (2) (“The test for determining
nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable that the error
4 Davidson also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer objected to the statement on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish a conspiracy, but failed to object on the ground that the statement was not “in furtherance of” any conspiracy. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). Given our conclusion that the admission of the statement was harmless, Davidson cannot establish that the failure of his lawyer to offer additional grounds for the objection to the statement was prejudicial, and his claim of ineffective assistance, therefore, fails. See Stroud v. State, 301 Ga. 807, 813 (III) (804 SE2d 418) (2017) (where error in admitting evidence was harmless, failure of lawyer to object to that evidence is not prejudicial under Strickland).
10 did not contribute to the verdict.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). See also
Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 872 (3) (a) (734 SE2d 876) (2012) (erroneous
admission of hearsay evidence may be harmless if it is merely cumulative of
other properly-admitted evidence).
Grant’s Claim of Error
4. Grant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted the statement
in which he attempted to exonerate Goins, arguably incriminating himself along
the way. That statement was the product of a custodial interrogation, and prior
to trial, Grant filed a motion to suppress it, asserting that he repeatedly and
unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent before giving the statement, but
the investigators nonetheless pressed forward with their interrogation. Following
a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Grant’s
repeated invocations of the right to remain silent were equivocal and ineffectual
because Grant attempted to invoke the right before he was advised of his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 473-474 (III) (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d
694) (1966). The trial court should have granted the motion to suppress, and the
admission of the statement was error that requires us to reverse Grant’s
convictions.
11 The record5 shows that, shortly after he was arrested, Grant was taken to
a police station, where he was placed in an interview room. There, two
investigators attempted to question Grant, who remained handcuffed throughout.
After the investigators collected some identification information from Grant,
this exchange occurred:
OFFICER: [W]hat do you think this is about? GRANT: I prefer you guys to tell me what this is about. OFFICER: Well, before we can do that, since you’re . . . handcuffed and we’re interviewing you in an interview room at the police department, we’re required to read your Miranda rights. Do you know what those are? GRANT: Yes, sir. OFFICER: Do you want to waive your Miranda rights and let us tell you what this is about? GRANT: Do I want to waive my rights? No. OFFICER: You don’t? So you don’t want to know what it’s about? GRANT: I’m not waiving nothing. OFFICER: So you don’t — you don’t want us to tell you? GRANT: Not if it causes me to give up my rights, no. OFFICER: You don’t want to talk about this at all? GRANT: Uh-uh [shaking head to indicate “no”] OFFICER: It’s the only way we can talk to you is if you waive your Miranda rights. And if there’s a question you don’t want to answer, you just say — you can just say you don’t want to answer it. GRANT: Am I under arrest? OFFICER: Uh-huh [nodding head to indicate “yes”]
5 The record includes a video recording of the interrogation.
12 GRANT: Then I don’t got nothing to say.
Following this exchange, the investigators continued to implore Grant to speak
with them, and they then stepped out of the room for a few minutes. When they
returned, they read the Miranda warnings to Grant. In response to the Miranda
warnings, Grant said: “If I’m already under arrest, then I’ve got nothing to say
about nothing.” Grant then nonetheless signed an acknowledgment and waiver
of his rights, and the investigators proceeded to question him about Walker’s
shooting. Although Grant answered some of their questions, he said nothing
incriminating. After several minutes, Grant refused to answer further questions:
GRANT: I ain’t got nothing to say. OFFICER: Just get it done. Just tell it. Get it over with. GRANT: It’s over with already. OFFICER: No, it ain’t. GRANT: I don’t got nothing to say.
At that point, Grant stood and indicated that he was ready to be transported to
the jail. One investigator then left the room, and Grant said to the other
investigator: “If it wasn’t for him, I probably would have said something to
you.” The remaining investigator then asked if Grant would speak with him
alone, Grant sat down, and the interrogation resumed. In the course of the
interrogation that followed, Grant made the statement at issue: “[Goins] didn’t
13 know we was doing none of that; he didn’t know we was going to do that; he
didn’t know we planned on doing nothing; he was just trying to get home . . . .”
From our review of the record, it seems clear that Grant invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent early and often in the interview, but the
investigators repeatedly disregarded those invocations and pressed forward with
their efforts to elicit a statement from Grant. To be sure, several (but not all) of
those invocations preceded the reading of the Miranda warnings. The State
argued in the trial court — and continues to argue on appeal — that any
invocations that precede the reading of Miranda warnings are ineffectual. The
trial court found that argument persuasive. We do not.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself,”6 and so, no person ever can be
compelled by law enforcement officers to make a testimonial statement in which
he incriminates himself. See generally Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nev., 542 U. S. 177, 189-190 (IV) (124 SCt 2451, 159 LE2d 292) (2004)
(discussing scope of privilege against self-incrimination). The right to remain
6 Our state Constitution also guarantees a privilege against self-incrimination: “No person shall be compelled to give testimony tending in any manner to be self-incriminating.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI.
14 silent that is described in the Miranda warnings derives from the Fifth
Amendment itself, not the decision in Miranda.7 A person in the custody of law
enforcement officers has a constitutional right to remain silent in response to
their questions, regardless of whether he fully understands that right or has been
advised of it under Miranda. See State v. Collins, 363 NW2d 229, 233-234
(Wis. App. 1984). Cf. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171, 182 (II), n.3 (111
SCt 2204, 115 LE2d 158) (1991) (“We have in fact never held that a person can
invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a context other than ‘custodial
interrogation.’” (emphasis supplied)). He always may, of course, elect to share
information with law enforcement, but it must be his voluntary choice to do so.
See Miranda, 384 U. S. at 478 (III) (“Any statement given freely and voluntarily
without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.”). See
also Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1, 14-15 (45 SCt 1, 69 LE 131) (1924) (“A
confession is voluntary in law if, and only if, it was, in fact, voluntarily made.
. . . But a confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may
7 Indeed, almost 70 years before Miranda, the United States Supreme Court recognized that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination applies with respect to a confession elicited in a custodial interrogation. See Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 542 (18 SCt 183, 42 LE 568) (1897).
15 have been the character of the compulsion, and whether the compulsion was
applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.” (citation omitted)). Recognizing
that compulsion is inherent to some extent whenever a suspect is in the custody
of those putting questions to him, the United States Supreme Court in Miranda
adopted a prophylactic rule that, before a suspect in custody can be questioned,
he must be advised of certain constitutional rights, including the right to remain
silent. Miranda, 384 U. S. at 467-468 (III). Nothing in Miranda suggests,
however, that the right to remain silent in response to a custodial interrogation
attaches only if, and when, law enforcement officers have read the Miranda
warnings. See Collins, 363 NW2d at 233. See also United States v. Bushyhead,
270 F3d 905, 911 (III) (9th Cir. 2001).
The law is clear that, when a person in the custody of law enforcement
officers unambiguously and unequivocally invokes his right to remain silent in
connection with their interrogation, the interrogation must cease immediately.
See Miranda, 384 U. S. at 473-474 (III). Whether an invocation is unambiguous
and unequivocal “depends on whether the accused articulated a desire to cut off
questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to
16 remain silent.” Rogers v. State, 290 Ga. 401, 404 (2) (721 SE2d 864) (2012)
(citations and punctuation omitted), disapproved on other grounds by State v.
Sims, 296 Ga. 465 (769 SE2d 62) (2015). Here, at the outset of the interview,
the investigators brought up the subject of “Miranda rights.” Immediately,
Grant said that he knew about his “Miranda rights,” that he did not want to
waive those rights, that he did not want “to talk about this at all,” and that he had
“nothing to say.” When the investigators finally got around to reading the
Miranda warnings to Grant, his response was: “If I’m already under arrest, then
I’ve got nothing to say about nothing.” The investigators nevertheless pressed
forward with their interview. Grant yielded to a few questions and then again
announced that “I ain’t got nothing to say. . . . I don’t got nothing to say.” No
reasonable officer could have understood these repeated statements as anything
other than clear assertions of the right to remain silent.8 See, e.g., Mack v. State,
296 Ga. 239, 243 (1) (765 SE2d 896) (2014) (“I’m done. I have no more to say.
I’m done” was unequivocal invocation of right to remain silent); State v. Moon,
8 We note that, in this case, not only would a reasonable police officer have understood Grant to have invoked his right to remain silent, but the record shows that the police officers conducting the custodial interrogation of Grant actually understood that he had done so yet continued to badger him to change his mind.
17 285 Ga. 55, 57 (673 SE2d 255) (2009) (“I ain’t got no more to say. I mean, that
is it” was unequivocal invocation); State v. Nash, 279 Ga. 646, 648 (2) (619
SE2d 684) (2005) (shaking of head to indicate “no” in response to question
about whether suspect wanted to talk with police was unequivocal invocation);
Green v. State, 275 Ga. 569, 573 (2) (570 SE2d 207) (2002) (“I don’t want to
talk” was unequivocal invocation). The custodial interrogation should have
ceased at the point of these unequivocal invocations of the right to remain silent,
well before Grant agreed to speak with one investigator alone and made the
arguably incriminating statement now at issue.9 See Green, 275 Ga. at 571-572
9 On appeal, the prosecution has continued to urge (as it did in the trial court) that the investigators were not obligated to respect the invocations of the right to remain silent until they had satisfied themselves that Grant understood those rights, and they could satisfy themselves only by reading the Miranda warnings. To begin, it was the investigators who first made reference to “Miranda,” Grant unequivocally said that he understood his “Miranda rights” in response to that reference and prior to the reading of the Miranda warnings, and he said nothing that gave reason to doubt that he understood the nature of his right to remain silent. Nor is it surprising that an ordinary citizen might know of his “Miranda rights” prior to the reading of Miranda warnings; the warnings are now deeply ingrained in our popular culture, and virtually anyone who has watched more than a couple of episodes of Law & Order could probably recite the Miranda warnings. More important, however, the Miranda warnings are a shield for persons in police custody; they cannot be interrogated until they have been advised of their rights and have then voluntarily relinquished them. The warnings are not a sword for the police, a means for police to deny the right of a citizen to remain silent — a right that exists independent of the Miranda decision and is secured by the Fifth Amendment itself (and the Georgia Constitution) — by withholding the warnings until the consistent disregard of repeated invocations of the right has broken the will to resist interrogation. And in any event, Grant again unequivocally invoked the right to remain silent after the Miranda warnings were read. The position of the prosecution is baseless.
18 (2). The statement that was elicited thereafter should have been suppressed, and
the admission of that statement was error.10
Even so, the prosecution argues that any error in admitting the statement
at issue was harmless. Although “the error is one of constitutional magnitude,
it can be harmless error if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
In this regard, we also remind prosecuting attorneys of their solemn obligation to seek justice in every case. See Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 84-88 (2) (55 SCt 629, 79 LE 1314) (1935). Sometimes, when a trial court has clearly gotten it wrong (even when it was the prosecution that originally led the trial court into that error), seeking justice on appeal means conceding the obvious error, and in those instances, that is the duty of the Attorney General and the district attorney. “[The offices of prosecuting attorneys] are of such independence and importance that while you are being diligent, strict, and vigorous in law enforcement you can also afford to be just. Although the government technically loses its case, it has really won if justice has been done.” Robert H. Jackson, Address to the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys: “The Federal Prosecutor” (Apr. 1, 1940). 10 In its briefs, the State urges that, even if the investigators failed early in the interview to scrupulously honor Grant’s invocations of his right to remain silent, his statements near the end of the interview are nonetheless admissible because Grant voluntarily reinitiated the interview after one investigator left the room. Although it is possible for a suspect who has previously invoked his right to remain silent to reinitiate contact with law enforcement, interrogation of such a suspect is permissible “only if the renewed contact by the suspect was not the product of past police interrogation conducted in violation of the suspect’s previously-invoked rights.” Mack v. State, 296 Ga. 239, 248 (2) (b) (765 SE2d 896) (2014). “In determining the causal connection between the prior unlawful interrogation and the suspect’s renewal of contact, the entire sequence of events leading up to the suspect’s renewal of contact must be considered.” Id. Here, we have reviewed “the entire sequence of events” preceding Grant’s statement to the remaining officer and his submission to continued questioning and find that the prior, unlawful conduct of the police officers “fatally tainted the spontaneity of [Grant’s] subsequent statement, making it . . . the product of inducement, provocation, or subtle coercion.” Id. at 247-248 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted).
19 error did not contribute to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is
cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence or when the evidence against
the defendant is overwhelming.” Brown v. State, 288 Ga. 404, 408 (3) (703
SE2d 624) (2010). Here, the case against Grant was, although legally sufficient,
not strong. There was evidence putting Grant in the company of Davidson, the
shooter, at the Taco Bell, and some evidence that he accompanied Davidson to
the scene of the shooting. But mere presence is not enough to prove guilt, see
Stewart v. State, 299 Ga. 622, 627 (2) (c) (791 SE2d 61) (2016), and apart from
his arguably incriminating (and erroneously admitted) statement, there was little
evidence to suggest that Grant was a voluntary participant or accomplice in the
crimes. Indeed, perhaps in an acknowledgment of their weak case, the
prosecuting attorneys pointed to the statement at issue repeatedly in their closing
arguments, telling the jury that Grant’s use of the word “we” when describing
what Davidson had done was proof that Davidson and Grant shared a common
criminal intent and did those things together. Moreover, soon after the jury
began its deliberations, it sent a note to the court, asking to see again the video
recording of Grant’s statement and asking for a recharge on the concept of
“parties to a crime.” Finally, we note that Goins — whose culpability seemed
20 no more doubtful than Grant’s, apart from Grant’s statement exonerating Goins
and arguably incriminating himself11 — was acquitted of all charges by the same
jury that found Grant guilty. The State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the erroneous admission of Grant’s custodial statement did not
contribute to the guilty verdicts, and Grant is entitled to a new trial. See Benton
v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 575 (2) (807 SE2d 450) (2017).
Judgment affirmed in Case No. S18A0933. Judgment reversed in Case
No. S18A0934. Melton, C. J., Nahmias, P. J., Benham, Hunstein, Boggs, and
Peterson, JJ., concur. Warren, J., not participating.
11 Grant owned the car in which they followed Walker to his home, but no evidence was presented at trial that Grant was driving. And it was Goins — not Grant — whom Rodriguez identified as the man who appeared interested in Walker’s gold chain at the Taco Bell, and whom Rodriguez identified as sitting in the car parked in a lot across the street from the Taco Bell when Rodriguez and Walker emerged from the Taco Bell some 13 minutes later.
21 Decided September 24, 2018.
Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Adams.
Chaunda Brock, for appellant (case no. A18A0933).
Benjamin D. Goldberg, for appellant (case no. A18A0934).
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Arthur C.
Walton, Teri B. Walker, Stephany J. Luttrell, Assistant District Attorneys;
Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy
Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew
D. O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.