David Angel Sifuentes, III v. John Prelesnik

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedDecember 29, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01214
StatusUnknown

This text of David Angel Sifuentes, III v. John Prelesnik (David Angel Sifuentes, III v. John Prelesnik) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
David Angel Sifuentes, III v. John Prelesnik, (W.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

DAVID ANGEL SIFUENTES, III,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:25-cv-1214

v. Honorable Paul L. Maloney

JOHN PRELESNIK,

Respondent. ____________________________/

OPINION This is a habeas corpus action brought by a former state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussing that a district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). The present petition is properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. I. In Custody Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), district courts have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for habeas corpus relief “only from persons who are in custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he habeas petitioner must be ‘in custody’ under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Id. (citing Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)). Except in limited situations not relevant here, the custody requirement is not met if the petitioner files his habeas corpus petition after the sentence imposed for the challenged conviction has “fully expired.” See id. at 493–94; see also Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v.

Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401 (2001); Steverson v. Simmers, 258 F.3d 520, 522–25 (6th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied these principles to Petitioner as follows: “The statute that authorizes district courts to entertain state prisoners’ habeas petitions expressly limits their jurisdiction to petitions filed by persons ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’” In re Lee, 880 F.3d 242, 243 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)); see also Hautzenroeder v. Dewine, 887 F.3d 737, 740 (6th Cir. 2018) (“This language is jurisdictional: if a petitioner is not ‘in custody’ when she files her petition, courts may not consider it.”). And Sifuentes was not in prison when he filed his amended § 2254 petition in 2020; his 2001 sentence of five to fifteen years was expired. Sifuentes “was released on parole on Ma[]y 26, 2009, and subsequently discharged from parole.” Sifuentes v. Prelesnik, No. 1:03-cv-637, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2021) (order). He does not allege that he was still serving a term of parole, see Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per curiam), or that he was otherwise subject to any “severe restraints on [his] individual liberty,” Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973), that would satisfy § 2254(a)’s “in custody” requirement when he filed his amended habeas petition. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction . . . . In re David Angel Sifuentes, No. 20-2212, Order at pp. 2–3 (6th Cir. June 7, 2021). This Court, likewise, has no jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition from a person who is no longer in custody. Therefore, the petition is properly dismissed.1 II. Certificate of Appealability Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a “substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

1 “[D]ismissals for lack of jurisdiction should generally be made without prejudice.” Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 367 (6th Cir. 2005). The Court will proceed accordingly. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth

by the Supreme Court in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000). Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller- El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of Petitioner’s claims. Id. The Court resolved Petitioner's § 2254 petition on the procedural ground that the Court lacks jurisdiction. “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without

reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Both showings must be made to warrant the grant of a certificate. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to proceed further.” Id.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Carafas v. LaVallee
391 U.S. 234 (Supreme Court, 1968)
Maleng v. Cook
490 U.S. 488 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Miller-El v. Cockrell
537 U.S. 322 (Supreme Court, 2003)
Theodore R. Allen v. E. P. Perini, Superintendent
424 F.2d 134 (Sixth Circuit, 1970)
Howard H. Steverson v. Paul G. Summers
258 F.3d 520 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Joseph D. Murphy v. State of Ohio
263 F.3d 466 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss
532 U.S. 394 (Supreme Court, 2001)
In re Marcus DeAngelo Lee
880 F.3d 242 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)
Julie Hautzenroeder v. Michael DeWine
887 F.3d 737 (Sixth Circuit, 2018)

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David Angel Sifuentes, III v. John Prelesnik, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/david-angel-sifuentes-iii-v-john-prelesnik-miwd-2025.