Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr.

CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedApril 19, 2017
DocketM2014-02379-SC-R11-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr. (Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr., (Tenn. 2017).

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE June 2, 2016 Session

DARRYL F. BRYANT, SR. v. DARRYL F. BRYANT, JR.

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 141059I Claudia Bonnyman, Chancellor ___________________________________

No. M2014-02379-SC-R11-CV – Filed April 19, 2017 ___________________________________

SHARON G. LEE, J., dissenting.

The Court has adopted a majority rule that allows a co-tenant to unilaterally sever a joint tenancy with right of survivorship and convert the estate into a tenancy in common without the knowledge or consent of the other co-tenant. The better rule, followed by other jurisdictions, does not allow a co-tenant to act unilaterally to sever the other co-tenant’s interest, thereby protecting the rights and expectations of joint tenants who are conveyed property with a survivorship interest.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-1-1071 does not provide for a right of survivorship in a joint tenancy; however, the parties to a conveyance may create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship through express language. Jones v. Jones, 206 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tenn. 1947). ―[P]arties can still create estates of survivorship where the instrument creating the estate, whether deed or will, evidences such an intention.‖ Bunch v. Bunch, No. 02A01–9705–CH–00106, 1998 WL 46217, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 1998) (citing Jones, 206 S.W.2d at 803; McLeroy v. McLeroy, 40 S.W.2d 1027, 1028

1 Tennessee Code Annotated section 66-1-107 provides:

In all estates, real and personal, held in joint tenancy, the part or share of any tenant dying shall not descend or go to the surviving tenant or tenants, but shall descend or be vested in the heirs, executors, or administrators, respectively, of the tenant so dying, in the same manner as estates held by tenancy in common. (Tenn. 1931)). Other states also allow for the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship through express language.2

In this case, Ms. Bryant and her son used express language to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The quitclaim deed from Ms. Bryant to herself and her son expressly stated that it was ―for the purpose of creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.‖ The deed was signed in 2009 when Ms. Bryant was eighty-five years old. The express language used in the conveyance demonstrated Ms. Bryant and her son’s clear intent that the son would be the sole owner of the property at Ms. Bryant’s death. However, the next year, Ms. Bryant had a change of heart and unilaterally quitclaimed her undivided interest to her grandson. It is unclear whether Ms. Bryant’s son knew about the second deed or whether he had invested in improvements or repairs to the property before his mother’s death. Under the Court’s decision, Ms. Bryant’s unilateral conveyance of her interest in the property destroyed her son’s right of survivorship, denied him the full value of any investments he may have made in the property, and defeated his expectation that he would become the sole owner of the property upon his mother’s death.

The trial court ruled for Ms. Bryant’s son, relying on court decisions from Michigan and Oregon. In the Michigan case of Albro v. Allen, real property was conveyed to Carol Allen and Helen Albro ―as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.‖ 454 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Mich. 1990). When Ms. Allen agreed to sell her interest in the property to a third party, Ms. Albro sued to enjoin the sale. In reversing the trial court’s decision enjoining the sale, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that under Michigan law, there are two forms of joint tenancies—a standard joint tenancy and a joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship. Id. at 87–88. In a standard joint tenancy, the right of survivorship may be destroyed by severance of the joint tenancy. Id. at 87. In contrast, in a joint tenancy with full rights of survivorship, the survivorship interest cannot be destroyed by an act of the other co-tenant. Id. at 88. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled

2 Michigan and Pennsylvania common law allow for the creation of a survivorship interest through express language. See Albro v. Allen, 454 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Mich. 1990) (holding a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is created by express language in the granting instrument); In re Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d 471, 474 (Pa. 2006) (―A [joint tenancy with right of survivorship] must be created by express words or by necessary implication, . . . but there are no particular words which must be used in its creation.‖ (citing Pa. Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 247 A.2d 771, 771 (Pa. 1968); Maxwell v. Saylor, 58 A.2d 355, 356 (Pa. 1948)).

The legislatures in Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia have enacted statutes that allow for the creation of an estate with right of survivorship by express language. See Ala. Code § 35-4-7; Fla. Stat. § 689.15; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381.130(1); Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-7; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5302.20(A); Or. Rev. Stat. § 93.180(1)(a), (2); Va. Code Ann. § 55-21; W. Va. Code § 36-1-20(a). -2- that the interest conveyed to Ms. Allen and Ms. Albro was a joint life estate with dual contingent remainders. Id. at 93. While Ms. Allen could transfer her interest in the joint life estate, this conveyance would not destroy the contingent remainder. Accordingly, upon the death of a co-tenant, the other co-tenant or any person to whom the other co-tenant transferred the contingent remainder owned the entire estate.

The Albro court relied in part on Halleck v. Halleck, 337 P.2d 330 (Or. 1959), where a father and son were deeded property ―not as tenants in common but with the right of survivorship, their assigns and the heirs of such survivor, all the following real property . . . .‖ Id. at 337. The habendum stated that ―the fee shall vest absolutely in the survivor of the grantees.‖ Id. The Oregon Supreme Court construed this language to create concurrent life estates with contingent remainders that would vest in the survivor. Id. at 337–38. Joint tenancies in Oregon were abolished by statute, but ―[a] declaration of a right to survivorship creates a tenancy in common in the life estate with cross-contingent remainders in the fee simple.‖ Or. Rev. Stat. § 93.180(2), (3). The Oregon Supreme Court held in Halleck that the deed created indestructible contingent remainders in each co-tenant that could not be defeated by any act of a co-tenant. Halleck, 337 P.2d at 338.

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Related

Halleck v. HALLECK
337 P.2d 330 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1959)
Holbrook v. Holbrook
403 P.2d 12 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1965)
In Re Estate of Quick
905 A.2d 471 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2006)
Albro v. Allen
454 N.W.2d 85 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1990)
Spitz v. Rapport
604 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1992)
Murphy v. Murphy
602 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1991)
Maxwell v. Saylor
58 A.2d 355 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1948)
McLeroy v. McLeroy
40 S.W.2d 1027 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1931)
Jones v. Jones
206 S.W.2d 801 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1947)
Pennsylvania Bank & Trust Co. v. Thompson
247 A.2d 771 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
Darryl F. Bryant, Sr. v. Darryl F. Bryant, Jr., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/darryl-f-bryant-sr-v-darryl-f-bryant-jr-tenn-2017.