Danson v. Casey

399 A.2d 360, 484 Pa. 415, 1979 Pa. LEXIS 486

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 14, 1979
• Docket: 78
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

Appellants allege that because the Philadelphia School District has and can expect to have inadequate revenues, the statutory system by which the School District of Philadelphia is funded violates Article III, section 32¹ and Article Ill, section 14² of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellants, the School District of Philadelphia and parents of children attending Philadelphia public schools, filed a Petition for Review in Commonwealth Court in April 1977. The Petition alleged that because expenditures exceeded revenues for the 1976-77 school year, the School District of Philadelphia would be compelled to close its schools early unless it received additional state funds. The predicted early closing did not occur and on June 23, 1977, appellants filed an Amended Petition for Review. Their amended petition alleges that although the School District would be able to operate for a full school year in 1977-78, estimated expenditures exceeded estimated revenues by $158,537,299 and the School District would be able to offer its students only a “truncated and uniquely limited program of educational services.”

Appellants seek a decree enjoining and restraining appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, from making payments of state funds to any school district other than Philadelphia until (a) “sufficient funds are made available to the School District of Philadelphia to enable it to furnish the children of Philadelphia in the 1977-78 school year and thereafter with a normal program of full educational services, or (b) the funds subject to defendants’ disposition are so distributed that the programs of educational services furnished the children of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the 1977-78 school year and thereafter are substantially uniform throughout all the school districts of the state.”³

Appellees filed preliminary objections to both the original and Amended Petitions for Review on the grounds that appellants had failed to state a cause of action and that the School District of Philadelphia was without standing. Commonwealth Court sustained appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissed the action. Danson v. Casey, 33 Pa.Cmwlth. 614, 382 A.2d 1238 (1978).

In reviewing Commonwealth Court’s determination we must accept as true every well and clearly pleaded fact and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Gekas v. Shapp, 469 Pa. 1, 364 A.2d 691 (1976); Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974). We need not accept as true, however, the conclusions drawn from those facts or the averments of law contained in the pleadings. Borden v. Baldwin, 444 Pa. 577, 281 A.2d 892 (1971). When viewed in this light it is clear that appellants have failed to state a justiciable cause of action. We therefore affirm the decree of Commonwealth Court dismissing the action.⁴

I

Appellants’ constitutional challenge to the state financing system is broad and general. They do not purport to challenge any particular portion of either the state subsidy or local taxation aspects of the scheme. Instead, appellants’ basic constitutional claim is that, viewed as a whole, the Pennsylvania system of school financing fails to provide Philadelphia’s public school children with a thorough and efficient education and denies them equal educational opportunity solely because of their residence in the School District of Philadelphia.

The statutory scheme by which Pennsylvania’s public schools are financed creates two primary sources of funding — state subsidies and local taxation.⁵ State subsidies are distributed by appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, to each of Pennsylvania’s 505 school districts pursuant to a complex statutory formula. See generally, School Code, 24 P.S. §§ 25-2501 et seq.

For each child enrolled in school, districts are eligible to receive a percentage of the median statewide actual instructional expense per student.⁶ This percentage is computed by dividing the market value of the district’s real estate and its personal income tax bases by the number of the district’s students and comparing it to the state average real estate and income tax bases per student.⁷ If the district and state tax base are equal, the district receives fifty percent of actual or median student cost, whichever is lower.⁸ If the district’s tax base is higher than the average state tax base, state support is lower.

This basic instructional subsidy is supplemented by dollar payments for each poverty-level or welfare student. “Density” and “sparsity” payments are made to districts with certain levels of either high or low population per square mile. In addition to the instructional subsidy, each school district also receives state funds earmarked to help defray the cost of specific services incidental to instruction such as, inter alia, health care, transportation, drivers education, and technical and special education.

Local tax revenues, however, are the major source of school financing in Pennsylvania. Generally, the power to levy local school taxes is vested in the local elected school board which has direct control over local educational programs. Section 507 of the School Code, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, § 507, 24 P.S. § 5-507, vests in each school district “all the necessary authority and power annually to levy and collect, in the manner herein provided, the necesáary taxes required, in addition to the annual State appropriation” and “all necessary power and authority to comply with and carry out any or all of the provisions of this act.” Despite broad language vesting power to levy and collect “the necessary taxes required,” the school board’s power to levy taxes is not unlimited. The General Assembly has imposed strict ceilings on the amount of taxes most school districts may levy and collect. School Code, 24 P.S. § 6-672.

Philadelphia is Pennsylvania’s only school district of the first class. See School Code, 24 P.S. § 2-201. Pursuant to statutory authority, the voters of Philadelphia have adopted a home rule school district. See Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 643, §§ 1 et seq., 53 P.S. §§ 13201 et seq.; Educational Supplement to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter (hereinafter Charter). While boards of education of other classes of school districts must be elected, School Code 24 P.S. §§ 3-301 et seq., section 12.12-201 of the Charter authorizes appointment of Philadelphia’s school board by the Mayor of Philadelphia. See also School Code, 24 P.S. § 3-301. Because the General Assembly may delegate its legislative power to levy taxes only to elected officials, the Philadelphia School Board does not have direct power to levy local taxes. Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937). The School District of Philadelphia is, therefore, in a unique position with regard to local taxation.

The Educational Supplement to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter grants the Board of Education indirect power to levy local taxes to provide funds for current operation of the Philadelphia public schools. “At least sixty (60) days prior to adoption of the annual operating budget, the Board shall adopt and submit to the Mayor and Council a lump sum statement of anticipated receipts and expenditures for the next fiscal year and a request for authority to levy taxes to balance its budget for the year.” Charter § 12.12-303(b). Section 12.12-305 of the Charter mandates that the local tax levy be sufficient to finance the school district’s operations adequately for the fiscal year.⁹

By statute, City Council is empowered to authorize the School Board to levy taxes sufficient to balance the school district’s annual operating budget on “any persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects, and real and personal property” which are taxable by the city. Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 640, § 1, as amended, November 16,1967, P.L. 500, § 1, 53 P.S. § 16101. Subject to certain limited exceptions, levies may also be made upon “income of all kinds from the ownership, lease, sale or other disposition of tangible and intangible real and personal property of persons who are residents of the school district, whether or not such income may presently be subject to tax by the city for general revenue purposes . . . .” Id. Levies may also be imposed, inter alia, upon net corporate income, Act of May 29, 1969, P.L. 47, § 1, et seq., 53 P.S. § 16111 et seq., and liquor sales, Act of June 10, 1971, P.L. 153, § 1, et seq., 53 P.S. §§ 16131 et seq.

II

Appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, have not breached any duty owed to any of the appellants. They have distributed those state funds earmarked for public education pursuant to the legislatively enacted formula. Nonetheless, appellants claim the state statutory formula is unconstitutional and that appellees must be enjoined from acting pursuant to it, until the legislative scheme is revised to guarantee that the School District of Philadelphia will receive whatever sum of money it deems necessary to operate the Philadelphia schools.

It is obvious, however, that appellant School District of Philadelphia has failed to allege that it has suffered any legal harm from its projected financial deficit. The School District argues that it has a duty to provide a certain level of educational services which it cannot fulfill because of the effect of the statutory funding scheme. This argument must fail. The School District has no greater duty to provide education for the children of Philadelphia than the Legislature has delegated to it. Cf. Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, supra. It would be unreasonable to conclude that a greater duty has been delegated than that which the Legislature, through the statutory funding scheme, has provided the school district the means to fulfill.

Moreover, the Amended Petition for Review does not allege that either the Legislature or School District has failed to fulfill any duty to appellant parents and school children. Nowhere do appellants allege that any Philadelphia public school student is, has, or will, suffer any legal injury as a result of the operation of the state financing scheme. And the Amended Petition for Review does not allege that the children of Philadelphia are being denied an “adequate,” “minimum,” or “basic” education. Rather, appellants only allege that they are being denied a “normal program of educational services” available to all other children in Pennsylvania and that in its place they will be offered only a “truncated and uniquely limited program of educational services.” As a result the children of Philadelphia are allegedly “rendered less able to make their contribution to their own well-being and prosperity and to the well-being and prosperity of their city.”¹⁰

The allegations are insufficient to support a cause of action unless appellant school children are entitled to “a normal program of educational services” available to all other public school students in the Commonwealth. Appellants contend that Article III, section 32 and Article III, section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, by providing for “a thorough and efficient system of public education,” guarantee them a constitutionally mandated minimum level of educational services, provided to the children of all other districts.

More than forty years ago, this Court recognized that because educational philosophy and needs change constantly, the words “thorough and efficient” must not be narrowly construed. In Teachers’ Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. 213, 224, 197 A. 344, 352 (1938), this Court characterized Article III, section 14 as a “positive mandate” that the Legislature “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools.” The Court then explained the substance and effect of the Constitutional “mandate”:

“In considering laws relating to the public school system, courts will not inquire into the reason, wisdom, or expediency of the legislative policy with regard to education, but whether the legislation has a reasonable relation to the purpose expressed in Article X, Section 1 [the predecessor provision to Article III, section 14], and whether the fruits or effects of such legislation impinge the Article by circumscribing it, or abridging its exercise by future legislatures within the field of ‘a thorough and efficient system of public schools.’ So implanted is this section of the Constitution in the life of the people as to make it impossible for a legislature to set up an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change. The very essence of this section is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational advances. The people have directed that the cause of public education cannot be fettered, but must evolute or retrograde with succeeding generations as the times prescribe. Therefore, all matters, whether they be contracts bearing upon education, or legislative determinations of school policy or the scope of educational activity, everything directly related to the maintenance of a ‘thorough and efficient system of public schools,’ must at all times be subject to future legislative control. One legislature cannot bind the hands of a subsequent one; otherwise we will not have a thorough and efficient system of public schools.”

329 Pa. at 224-25, 197 A. at 352.

The Constitution “makes it impossible for a legislature to set up an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change” because “the very essence of this section is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational advances.” It would be no less contrary to the “essence” of the Constitutional provision for this Court to bind future Legislatures and school boards to a present judicial view of a constitutionally required “normal” program of educational services. It is only through free experimentation that the best possible educational services can 'be achieved.

Even were this Court to attempt to define the specific components of a “thorough and efficient education” in a manner which would foresee the needs of the future, the only judicially manageable standard this Court could adopt would be the rigid rule that each pupil must receive the same dollar expenditures. Even appellants recognize, however, that expenditures are not the exclusive yardstick of educational quality, or even of educational quantity. It must indeed be obvious that the same total educational and administrative expenditures by two school districts do not necessarily produce identical educational services. The educational product is dependent upon many factors, including the wisdom of the expenditures as well as the efficiency and economy with which available resources are utilized.

Nonetheless, appellants argue that it is proper for courts to order that educational offerings be uniform. Indeed, they claim that the Pennsylvania Constitution demands such uniformity. In originally adopting the “thorough and efficient” amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, the framers considered and rejected the possibility of specifically requiring the Commonwealth’s system of education be uniform. II Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 422-26 (1873). Instead, the framers endorsed the concept of local control to meet diverse local needs and took notice of the right of local communities to utilize local tax revenues to expand educational programs subsidized by the state.

Nor is uniformity required by Article III, section 14. As long as the legislative scheme for financing public education “has a reasonable relation” to “[providing] for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools,” Teachers Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. at 224, 197 A. at 352, the General Assembly has fulfilled its constitutional duty to the public school students of Philadelphia. The Legislature has enacted a financing scheme reasonably related to maintenance and support of a system of public education in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The framework is neutral with regard to the School District of Philadelphia and provides it with its fair share of state subsidy funds. This statutory scheme does not “ ‘clearly, palpably, and plainly violate the Constitution’ ” (emphasis in original). Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 16, 331 A.2d 198, 205 (1975); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963).

Ill

Thus, the Commonwealth has not failed to fulfill any duty it may have to the School District of Philadelphia to provide state subsidies to help finance public school education. To the extent appellants complain of inadequate local revenues, appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, cannot provide relief. Those two named officials of the executive branch of state government lack constitutional, statutory, or administrative authority to increase local Philadelphia school revenues.

We must reject any contention that because the Philadelphia School Board does not have power directly to levy taxes, Article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has been violated. Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504, 46 A. 124 (1900). See also English v. Robinson Twp. Sch. Dist., 358 Pa. 45, 53-54, 55 A.2d 803, 808 (1947) (“The school boards of districts of the same class may tax at different rates without infringing the provision against local or special legislation”). Indeed, Philadelphia arguably benefits from the operation of the school financing scheme for more sources of taxation are made available to Philadelphia than to any other category of school district. See, e. g., 53 P.S. §§ 16101 et seq., 53 P.S. §§ 16111 et seq., 53 P.S. §§ 16131 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 6-651 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 581.31 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 582.1 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 583.1 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 584.1 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 586.1 et seq., 24 P.S. §§ 588.1 et seq. The Philadelphia School District’s ability to obtain local tax funds is limited only by the ability of its appointed school board to convince City Council and the Mayor that the levies it requests are necessary for current operation of the school district. See Charter §§ 12.12-303 and 12.12-305.

Whatever the source of the School District of Philadelphia’s endemic inability to obtain the funds the School District deems are necessary for it to offer its students a “normal program of educational services,” appellants by this litigation seek to shift the burden of supplying those revenues from local sources to the Commonwealth. This Court, however, may not abrogate or intrude upon the lawfully enacted scheme by which public education is funded, not only in Philadelphia, but throughout the Commonwealth.

Decree of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Each party pay own costs.

POMEROY, former J., did not participate in the decision of this case. MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which NIX, J., joins.

1 . Pa.Const., art. Ill, § 32 provides, inter alia:

“The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law and specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law:

1. Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, townships, wards, boroughs or school districts:”

2 . Pa.Const., art. Ill, § 14 provides:

“The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”

3 . Appellants’ request for relief does make certain exceptions and would allow appellees to continue to make payments to school districts other than the School District of Philadelphia for use “(a) for debt service or lease rentals, or (b) for the repayment of loans secured by a pledge of anticipated payments by the Commonwealth, or (c) upon prior approval of [Commonwealth] Court to relieve extraordinary hardship . . ..”

4 . We hear this appeal pursuant to Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. II, § 203, 17 P.S. § 211.203 (Supp.1979). This case was reassigned to the writer on January 19, 1979, for the purpose of preparing an opinion expressing the views of a majority of this Court:

5 . Federal funding constitutes another important source of revenue for Pennsylvania school districts.

6 . The number of secondary school students is weighted, presumably to reflect higher costs of instruction. A “weighted average daily membership (WADM) is then calculated. The WADM exceeds actual enrollment.

7 . The relative personal income tax base comprises forty percent of the aid ratio and the real estate value comprises sixty percent.

8 . The amount of instructional subsidy actually received is also, in part, a function of the school district’s taxing effort. The more the district’s effort sinks below the median statewide taxing effort, the more the figure to which the percentage is applied decreases.

9 . § 12.12-305(a) of the Charter provides:

“The Board of Education shall levy taxes annually within such limits and upon such subjects as the General Assembly of the Commonwealth or the Council of the City may from time to time prescribe, in amounts sufficient to provide funds for the current operation of the schools of the District, the payment of interest and sinking fund charges on or other amortization of the debt of the District and its predecessor districts, and to provide for any service which may be incidental to the operation of the schools. Provided, that if the rate of taxation shall be fixed at a mill rate it shall also be stated in dollars and cents on each one hundred dollars of assessed valuation.”

10 . Appellants argue that we should follow the lead of other jurisdictions where challenges to school financing schemes have been successful. See, e. g., Board of Education of the City School District of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. C-780001 (Ohio Ct. of App., filed Sept. 5, 1978); Board of Education v. Nyquist, 94 Misc.2d 466, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971). Essential to those decisions, however, was evidence that the particular state’s financing system resulted in some school districts having significantly less money than other districts, causing gross disparities in total and per child expenditures throughout the state. No such allegation has been made in this case. Indeed, the School District of Philadelphia ranks fifth in current expenditures per WADM and seventh in total expenditures per WADM among the Commonwealth’s 505 school districts. Well over 75% of the general fund revenues of each of the six districts with greater total expenditures than Philadelphia are derived from local sources. Local source revenues constitute from 87.4% to 92.4% of the total general fund revenues of the five districts with greater current expenditures. Of those five districts, state subsidies constitute only 6% to 10.5% of the total funds expended for school district operation. Federal grants constitute 2.1% to .7% of the entire general funds. In contrast, only 39.6% of Philadelphia’s general fund revenues are derived from local sources.- The greatest portion of Philadelphia school district funding, 44.8%, is obtained from state subsidies. The final 15.6% of the general revenue funds come from federal subsidies. Pennsylvania Department of Education, Our Schools Today: Public School Financial Statistics Report 1976-77 (1978).