Danisha B v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA DANISHA B,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:25CV907

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Danisha B. (“Danisha”) I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY brought this action to obtain review of a final decision of the Commissioner Danisha filed an application for of Social Security denying her claim disability insurance benefits and a for social security disability insurance period of disability in January of benefits and a period of disability.1 2023, alleging a disability onset date The Court has considered the certified of April 23, 2022. (Tr. 167-70.) The administrative record and dispositive applications were denied initially and briefing from the parties. Because upon reconsideration. (Tr. 80-83, 96- substantial evidence supports the 98.) After a hearing, the ALJ determination of the Administrative determined on August 27, 2024 that Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Court will Danisha was not disabled under the deny Danisha’s request for remand or Act. (Tr. 17-58.) The Appeals Council the award of benefits, as set forth denied a request for review, making below. the ALJ’s decision the final decision for review. (Tr. 1-6.)

1 Transcript citations refer to the Undersigned to conduct all proceedings Administrative Transcript of Record filed in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § manually with the Commissioner’s 636(c). Docket Entry 10. Answer. See Docket Entry 4. By Order of Reference, this matter was referred to the II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4), While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the 404.1520(a)(4)). United States Code “authorizes judicial review of the Social Security Under this process, the Commissioner’s denial of social Commissioner asks, in security benefits,” see Hines v. sequence, whether the Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. claimant: (1) worked during the 2006), the scope of that review is alleged period of disability; (2) specific and narrow, see Smith v. had a severe impairment; (3) Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th had an impairment that met or Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is equaled the requirements of a limited to determining if there is listed impairment; (4) could substantial evidence in the record to return to her [or his] past support the Commissioner’s decision. relevant work; and (5) if not, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. could perform any other work Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. in the national economy. 1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the reviewing for substantial evidence, claimant at any of several points in the Court does not re-weigh this five-step sequence forecloses a conflicting evidence, make credibility disability designation and ends the determinations, or substitute its inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the judgment for that of the fourth step, the burden of production Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 and proof is on the claimant. If the F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put claimant reaches step five, the burden simply: the issue before the Court is shifts to the Secretary to produce not whether Danisha is disabled but evidence that other jobs exist in the whether the finding that she is not national economy that the claimant disabled is supported by substantial can perform considering his age, evidence and based upon a correct education, and work experience.” application of the relevant law. Id. Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted). III. THE ALJ’S DECISION In this case, the ALJ determined at The ALJ followed the correct process, step one that Danisha had not set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to engaged in substantial gainful activity determine disability. See Albright v. since the alleged onset date of April Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d 23, 2022. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ next 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). found the following severe impairments at step two: “The Commissioner uses a five-step DeQuervains tenosynovitis; obesity; process to evaluate disability claims.” radial neuropathy; and degenerative Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, disc disease. (Tr. 20.) At step three, the ALJ found that Danisha did not Docket Entry 11 at 5. In support, have an impairment or combination Danisha emphasizes vocational of impairments listed in, or medically expert testimony providing that if an equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr. individual with her RFC were limited 20.) to no more than occasional (rather than frequent) use of the dominant The ALJ next set forth Danisha’s upper extremity, she would be unable Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform any light or sedentary jobs. and determined that she could Docket Entry 11 at 5 citing Tr. 53. As perform a reduced range of light work demonstrated below, this objection fails. except that she can sit, stand and walk up to six hours each. A. The RFC Determination. She can frequently reach, handle, finger and feel The RFC measures the most a bilaterally. She can lift and claimant can do in a work setting carry 20 pounds occasionally despite the physical and mental and 10 pounds frequently. She limitations of his or her impairments can frequently use ramps and and any related symptoms (e.g., pain). stairs, balance, bend, stoop, See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see kneel and crouch. She can have also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x no exposure to workplace 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015) hazards including dangerous (unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a] machinery and unprotected medical assessment of what an heights. individual can do in a work setting in spite of the functional limitations and (Tr. 21.) At the fourth step, the ALJ environmental restrictions imposed determined that Danisha was unable by all of his or her medically to perform her past relevant work. determinable impairment(s)”) (Tr. 27.) Last, at step five, the ALJ (internal citation omitted); Hines, concluded that there were other jobs 453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes in the national economy that she both a “physical exertional or strength could perform. (Tr. 27.) limitation” that assesses the claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, IV. DISCUSSION light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional In her appeal, Danisha asserts only limitations (mental, sensory, or skin that “[t]he ALJ erred by failing to impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658 perform a proper function-by- F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981). function evaluation of [her] ability to handle and finger with [her] “Social Security Ruling 96-8p dominant [right upper extremity] explains that the RFC assessment when formulating the RFC and did must include a narrative discussion not apply the correct legal standards.” describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to medical facts (e.g., laboratory do so constitutes reversible error. See findings) and nonmedical evidence Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 (e.g., daily activities, observations).” (4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 “analysis is incomplete and precludes (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations meaningful review,” remand is omitted). An ALJ need not discuss appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191. every piece of evidence in making an RFC determination. See Reid v. Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, credibility of a claimant’s subjective 865 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ statements about his condition as part “must build an accurate and logical of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v. bridge from the evidence to [the] Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner, Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two- 873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) part test: “[f]irst, there must be (internal quotation marks omitted). objective medical evidence showing “The RFC assessment must first ‘the existence of a medical identify the individual’s functional impairment(s) which results from limitations or restrictions and assess anatomical, physiological, or his or her work-related abilities on a psychological abnormalities and function-by-function basis . . . . Only which could reasonably be expected to [then] may RFC be expressed in terms produce the pain or other symptoms of the exertional levels of work, alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), very heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 404.1529(b)). 374184, at *1. If such an impairment exists, the ALJ The Fourth Circuit has held that must then consider, as the second “meaningful review is frustrated when prong of the test, all available an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence, including the claimant’s evidence to stating a conclusion.” statements about pain, to determine Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, whether the claimant is disabled. Id. 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need proper RFC analysis has three not credit them if they conflict with components: (1) evidence, (2) logical the objective medical evidence or if explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As the underlying impairment could not noted earlier, the ALJ “must both reasonably be expected to cause the identify evidence that supports his symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ conclusion and ‘build an accurate and has considered the relevant factors, logical bridge from [that] evidence to see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill, heard the claimant’s testimony and 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) observed his or her demeanor, the (alteration in original) (quoting Court will defer to the ALJ’s determination regarding those subjective complaints. Shively v. Function Assessment Was Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. Well-Supported and the ALJ 1984). Applied the Proper Legal Standards. Those relevant factors include: Here, as shown below, the ALJ (i) [Plaintiff’s] Daily sufficiently explained why the overall Activities; record supported the RFC findings. (ii) The Location, Duration, That is, the ALJ plainly performed a Frequency, and Intensity thorough function-by-function of [Plaintiff’s] Pain or analysis (particularly as to Danisha’s Other Symptoms; right upper extremity) that used the (iii) Precipitating and proper legal standards and logically Aggravating Factors; connected substantial evidence to the (iv) The Type, Dosage, RFC limitations. (Tr. 21-26.) Effectiveness, and Side Effects of Any First, the ALJ discussed the findings Medication [Plaintiff] of the non-examining state agency Take[S] or [Has] Taken consultants, specifically noting the to Alleviate His Pain or limitations found regarding Danisha’s Other Symptoms; handling and fingering with the right (v) Treatment, Other than hand. (Tr. 24, 59-64). At the initial Medication, [Plaintiff] level review, the non-examining state Receive[S] or [Has] agency consultants determined that Received for Relief of His Danisha was capable of a range of Pain or Other Symptoms; medium work with limitations as to (vi) Any Measures [Plaintiff] handling and fingering, specifically Use[S] or [Has] Used to explaining: “[frequent but not Relieve His Pain or Other continuous] fine/gross manipulation Symptoms (E.G., Lying [right] hand/wrist.” (Tr. 62.) The ALJ Flat on [Her] Back, explained that he was only partially Standing for 15 to 20 persuaded by the findings (and Minutes Every Hour, unpersuaded by the limitation to Sleeping on a Board, medium exertion work) and noted Etc.); and specifically that the record did not (vii) Other Factors contain any findings of reduced grip Concerning [Plaintiff’s] strength in Danisha’s right hand. (Tr. Functional Limitations 24.) Nevertheless, the ALJ did not and Restrictions Due to stop here but further noted that Pain or Other Symptoms. Danisha had some reports of tenderness to palpation and had 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). sought ongoing treatment for pain in the upper right extremity. (Tr. 24, 63, B. The ALJ’s Function-By- 696.) Ultimately, in conjunction with Danisha’s cervical spine impairment 10.) The ALJ first explained that Dr. and obesity, the ALJ determined that Kuzma had direct knowledge of she should be limited to light rather Danisha’s severe impairments and than medium exertional work. (Tr. treatment history. (Tr. 24.) However, 24.) In this regard, the ALJ explained the ALJ found the opinion, which that he had found greater limitations limited Danisha to only occasional in Danisha’s ability “to perform handling and fingering with the right manipulative activities and to work hand, to be inconsistent with other around hazards.” (Tr. 24.) evidence of record. (Tr. 24.) In particular, the ALJ explained that the At the reconsideration review level, opinion appeared to be based, at least the non-examining state agency in part, on Danisha’s subjective consultants determined, consistent allegations regarding pain in the right with the ultimate RFC finding, that upper extremity and alleged overuse Danisha should be limited to light of the left upper extremity. (Tr. 24, rather than medium work and also 609 (“Patient reports pain in right determined that she should be limited wrist that limits her functional use of to “frequent but not continuous the right hand in daily activities. She fine/gross manipulation” with the notes pain in left hand/wrist due to right hand and wrist.2 (Tr. 67-74.) The increased use”).) See Bishop v. ALJ’s reliance on the findings of the Comm’r of Soc. Sec’y, 583 F. App’x 65, state agency consultants provides 67 (4th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) substantial evidentiary support for his (affirming ALJ decision to reject finding that Danisha could frequently medical opinion that “appeared to handle and finger with her right hand. mirror . . . subjective statements” and See, e.g., Wanda Sineath v. Colvin, contrasted relatively “mild to No. 1:16CV28, 2016 WL 4224051 moderate” findings reflected in (M.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2016) (“These treatment notes); Craig, 76 F.3d at function by function assessments, 590 (affirming ALJ decision to reject that the ALJ gave great weight, medical opinion evidence based on provide support for the ALJ’s RFC subjective symptoms unsupported by determination and allow the Court to treatment notes). conduct a meaningful review of the ALJ’s analysis”) (collecting cases). Furthermore, the ALJ explained that the objective signs and symptoms Second, the ALJ discussed the during Danisha’s examinations were treating source opinion of Kevin R. not consistent with the degrees of Kuzma, M.D., which he found severity alleged. (Tr. 24.) For partially persuasive. (Tr. 24-25, 609- example, Dr. Kuzman cited the

2 In the regulations, “[o]ccasionally” is *5-6. defined as up to 1/3 of a workday, while “frequently” is defined as 1/3 to 2/3 of a workday. SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at inability to perform fine and gross Danisha and inconsistent with the movements effectively, “e.g. inability degree of limitation noted by Dr. to prepare a simple meal and feed Kuzma. (Tr. 25.) oneself, inability to take care of personal hygiene, inability to sort and Beyond this, a later examination in handle papers or files, or inability to January 2024 showed the same place files in a file cabinet at or above general, mild findings as found in July waist level” (Tr. 609); however, the 2023 cited above. (Tr. 704-05.) The findings of other examinations, such ALJ also acknowledged that, during as the examination from July 2023 in 2023, Danisha was diagnosed with which Dr. Kuzma noted, with respect degenerative disc disease of the to the right upper extremity, cervical spine which was noted to be a contradicted this: “Intact to light possible source of some of her pain, touch sensation and capillary refill in but those findings were relatively mild the fingertips. There is good soft as well. (Tr. 25, 501 (“She visited with tissue turgor in the fingertips. She can a[n] outside physician who suggested flex and extend the IP joint of the that the pain could be related to an thumb and can cross her fingers. No issue in her neck.”).) wounds. No swelling, erythema, or ecchymosis.” (Tr. 24-25, 526.) Treatment records from March 2024 also noted several findings Subsequent notes showed further inconsistent with Danisha’s inconsistencies with Dr. Kuzma’s allegations and Dr. Kuzma’s statements: “There is a chevron characterization of her limitations. incision over the first dorsal extensor (Tr. 26, 709-12.) For example, those compartment that has healed with records noted, among other things, minimal hypertrophy. Sensation is that Danisha had no more than mild intact to light touch in the ulnar nerve degenerative changes in her cervical distribution, but it is decreased in the spine and her motor function of the superficial radial and median nerve upper extremities was 5/5 in all distributions. Full active range of assessed areas. (Tr. 711.) As the ALJ motion with wrist flexion, extension, explained, this was in contrast to the pronation, and supination. Mild level of weakness and pain Danisha tenderness to palpation at the dorsal alleged. (Tr. 26.) distal radius. (Tr. 25, 523, 696.) The ALJ noted this evidence of some However, the ALJ did not find decreased sensation, but Danisha Danisha completely functional in the retained full range of motion and right upper right extremity (i.e., able expressed only tenderness to to constantly use it). Instead, the ALJ palpation. (Tr. 25, 523, 696.) explicitly acknowledged that there Accordingly, the ALJ found such was objective evidence of severe findings inconsistent with the level of impairments, including evidence that pain and dysfunction alleged by Danisha required surgical intervention on the right wrist and thumb. (Tr. 25-26, 359.) However, the Danisha also alleged difficulty ALJ also accurately noted that performing basic activities of daily Danisha recovered appropriately and living such as dressing, bathing, attained good flexion, extension, wiping and other relatively simple strength and healed within twelve tasks. (Tr. 26, 43.) However, the more months of surgery. (Tr. 26, 696.) recent objective evidence from March 2024, noted above, included The ALJ continued by explaining that extensive objective testing which did he did, indeed, consider Danisha’s not support the degree of severity subjective complaints of pain, but the alleged, including intact sensory severity of the complaints, in the examinations and 5/5 strength in all context of the entire record, did not assessed motor functions of the right support a limitation greater than and left hands. (Tr. 26, 709-12.) frequent handling and fingering. (Tr. Accordingly, in consideration of 26.) In support of a handling and Danisha’s complaints in relation to fingering limitation, the ALJ again the record evidence, the ALJ provided pointed to treatment records which “substantial reductions in the overall noted consistent complaints of exertional level, manipulative level difficulty gripping with the right hand and postural maneuvers” for Danisha. as well as hand and wrist pain. (Tr. (Tr. 25.) This analysis adequately 491-588, 615-705.) Danisha evaluated Danisha’s hand specifically endorsed difficulty functionality.3 gripping small items, pinching, pushing, pulling, and difficulty with a Danisha’s arguments to the contrary broad range of activities with the right are unpersuasive. As a general matter, hand, including some pain and fatigue Danisha ignores the fact that the ALJ in the left hand and wrist which were discussed her functionality in detail, attributed to overuse. (Tr. 26, 685.) properly evaluated the medical opinion of Dr. Kuzma, and partially

3 Danisha cites a Fourth Circuit case, remanded the matter because the ALJ Docket Entry 11 at 10, Dowling v. never performed a functional assessment Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 986 F.3d 377 (4th regarding Dowling’s ability to sit and in Cir 2021), in which the claimant, fact “barely mentioned” her sitting Dowling, had an anal fissure that made problems at all. Id. at 388. Here, in sitting painful, yet the ALJ’s disability contrast, no analogous set of facts exists. finding turned on her ability to sit. Id. at The ALJ addressed Danisha’s right upper 388. The ALJ concluded that Dowling extremity limitations directly and was not disabled based upon a finding thoroughly explained why they were not that she could perform sedentary disabling in light of all of the evidence, (primarily sitting) work activities. Id. including (but not limited to) the Dowling’s ability to sit, therefore, was treatment record, the medical opinions, both contested and “critically relevant to and the findings upon examination. determining her disability status.” Id. at 389. The Fourth Circuit consequently relied on the findings of the non- limiting effects of their symptoms.” examining state agency consultants Arakas v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., who also determined that she could 983 F.3d 83, 98 (4th Cir. 2020). frequently (rather than only However, long-standing cases occasionally or never) handle and containing the substance of that finger with her right upper extremity. holding, such as Craig and Hines Docket Entry 11 at 5-13. (among others), clarify that, “[a]lthough a claimant’s allegations Beyond this, Danisha more about her pain may not be discredited specifically asserts that the ALJ erred solely because they are not by relying “upon relatively normal substantiated by objective evidence of range of motion findings to counter the pain itself or its severity, they [her] complaints of pain and . . . the need not be accepted to the extent [otherwise] favorable objective they are inconsistent with the evidence.” Docket Entry 11 at 14. She available evidence, including further contends that “the ALJ objective evidence of the underlying essentially [and improperly] required impairment, and the extent to which objective evidence to verify [her] that impairment can reasonably be subjective statements regarding her expected to cause the pain the pain [ ] by discrediting her subjective claimant alleges she suffers.” Craig, pain based on normal range of motion 76 F.3d at 595 (emphasis added); see testing[.]” Id. at 12. However, for the also Hines, 453 F.3d at 565, n.3 following reasons, these objections (quoting Craig, 76 F.3d at 595). are unpersuasive. In other words, under the appropriate First, if Danisha intends her assertion circumstances, an ALJ may choose to that she could “‘rely exclusively on rely exclusively on a claimant’s subjective evidence in proving that subjective symptom reports to find her symptoms . . . prevented her from disabling symptoms. However, working” (id. at 11-12 (brackets and Oakes, Arakas, Craig, and Hines do ellipsis omitted) (quoting Oakes v. not compel ALJs to consider only Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 207, 215 (4th Cir. subjective evidence, as such a 2023)) to mean that the ALJ erred by requirement would conflict with both considering objective medical the Act and its implementing evidence at all in analyzing the regulations, which plainly require intensity, persistence, and limiting ALJs to consider a variety of factors, effects of her symptoms, such an including objective medical evidence, argument lacks merit. in evaluating the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of The Fourth Circuit has “reiterate[d] symptoms. See 42 U.S.C. § long-standing [Circuit] law . . . that 423(d)(5)(A) (“Objective medical disability claimants are entitled to evidence of pain . . . established by rely exclusively on subjective evidence medically acceptable clinical or to prove the severity, persistence, and laboratory techniques (for example, ALJ therefore discharged his duty deteriorating nerve or muscle tissue) under the first step of the Craig must be considered in reaching a analysis. Second, at step two of the conclusion as to whether [an] Craig analysis, the ALJ decided that individual is under a disability.”) Danisha’s “statements concerning the (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. intensity, persistence and limiting § 404.1529(c) (directing ALJs to effects of these symptoms are not consider a claimant’s medical history, entirely consistent with the medical medical signs and laboratory evidence and other evidence in the findings, daily activities, testimony record for the reasons explained in about nature and location of pain, this decision.” (Tr. 22.) The ALJ then medication and other treatment used set forth a number of reasons for to alleviate pain, along with medical partially discounting her assertions. opinions, in assessing intensity of a claimant’s symptoms).4 In other words, in compliance with Oakes, Arakas, Hines, Craig, and the Here, the ALJ completed the two-step applicable regulations, the ALJ Craig analysis. First, the ALJ stated considered the objective medical that he had carefully considered the evidence as one part of his evaluation evidence and found that Danisha’s of the intensity, persistence, and “medically determinable impairments limiting effects of Danisha’s alleged could reasonably be expected to cause pain. The ALJ also considered other the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. 22.) The record evidence, such as treatment

4 Courts, including this one, have long medical evidence simply failing to maintained a distinction between a lack support a plaintiff’s testimony and of objective medical evidence and medical evidence being inconsistent is inconsistency with the objective medical critical because the latter may qualify as evidence. See Chavis v. Colvin, No. a . . . reason to reject a plaintiff’s 1:11CV771, 2013 WL 7853486, at *9 testimony while the former does not.”) (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2013) (“[A]ny (citation omitted); see also Craig, 76 argument that the ALJ rejected her F.3d at 595 (“Although a claimant’s complaints of pain solely because of a allegations about her pain may not be lack of objective medical evidence must discredited solely because they are not also fail. . . . [T]he ALJ did not discount substantiated by objective evidence of Plaintiff’s complaints of pain solely the pain itself or its severity, they need because of a lack of objective medical not be accepted to the extent they are evidence. Rather, one reason the ALJ inconsistent with the available evidence, discounted Plaintiff’s complaints in part including objective evidence of the was because the medical evidence of underlying impairment, and the extent record contradicted Plaintiff’s to which that impairment can reasonably allegations”); Robles De Nunez v. be expected to cause the pain the Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00618- claimant alleges she suffers”) (emphasis SAB, 2023 WL 2839741, at *17 (E.D. Cal. added). Apr. 7, 2023) (“The distinction between used to alleviate pain (see Tr. 22-24 objective medical evidence (or the (discussing physical therapy, lack thereof) – even as just one of injections, a first surgery pursued and multiple factors – to discount a a second one not pursued), the claimant’s subjective complaints opinion evidence of record (see Tr. regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia,” 24-26 (discussing opinions of non- because “[o]bjective indicators such examining state agency physicians as normal clinical and laboratory and Dr. Kuzma), allegations involving results simply have no relevance to daily activities (Tr. 22-23 (discussing the severity, persistence, or limiting and ultimately discounting effects of a claimant’s fibromyalgia, allegations of extremely limited daily based on the current medical activities), and claimant testimony understanding of the disease.” Id. at (Tr. 22-23) (discussing claimant’s 97. admission that she could lift up to eight pounds). Consequently, this is Approximately four years later, the not a case where an ALJ failed to Fourth Circuit extended that holding consider the relevant factors in a in Arakas to major depressive subjective complaints analysis and disorder (“MDD”). See Shelley C. v. instead only focused on the objective Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 61 F.4th medical evidence or its absence. 341, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2023) Instead, here, the ALJ followed the (“[S]ymptoms of MDD, like those of governing law and the correct legal fibromyalgia, are ‘entirely subjective,’ standard in a manner supported by determined on a case-by-case basis.”) substantial evidence and susceptible (emphasis in Shelley C.) (quoting to judicial review. Arakas, 983 F.3d at 96). Notably, the Fourth Circuit has not extended the Second, any attempt to analogize the holding in Arakas to pain arising from facts of this case to those present in Danisha’s severe impairments Arakas falls short. See Docket Entry (DeQuervains tenosynovitis, obesity, 11 at 12. In that case, the Fourth radial neuropathy, and degenerative Circuit deemed fibromyalgia a disc disease), and she fails to explain “unique” disease, Arakas, 983 F.3d at how those conditions qualify as 97, with “symptoms [that] are entirely “disease[s] that do[ ] not produce subjective.” Id. at 96 (emphasis [objective] evidence.” Arakas, 983 added). The Fourth Circuit noted that F.3d at 97. See Docket Entry 11. “physical examinations of patients with fibromyalgia will usually yield Third, Danisha’s reliance on Oakes v. normal results — a full range of Kijakazi, 70 F.4th 207, 215 (4th Cir. motion, no joint swelling, as well as 2023) is also misplaced. Docket Entry normal muscle strength and 11 at 11-12. In that case, the court neurological reactions.” Id. (brackets remanded because the ALJ did not omitted). The Fourth Circuit thus include any symptom analysis. held that “ALJs may not rely on Oakes, 70 F.4th at 215 (“[t]he ALJ baldly stated that ‘the claimant’s subjective complaints and alleged go either way, without interference by limitations were not persuasive”). the courts. An administrative decision Here, the ALJ made no such sweeping is not subject to reversal merely statements devoid of further analysis. because substantial evidence would Rather, the ALJ analyzed Danisha’s have supported an opposite decision.” symptoms in light of the entire Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x 264, 266 recording including, for example, the (4th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) objective medical evidence, treatment (citation omitted). The ALJ’s decision history, and prior administrative here is legally correct, supported by medical findings. (Tr. 22-26.) substantial evidence, and susceptible Therefore, Oakes is factually distinct. to judicial review. For all these reasons, Danisha’s_ objection is Finally, the ALJ did not completely without merit. reject all of Danisha’s subjective complaints. Rather, the ALJ V. CONCLUSION concluded that Danisha’s symptom allegations, including those of After careful consideration of the disabling pain, should in fact be evidence of record, the Court finds largely credited and only partially that the Commissioner’s decision is discounted. Consequently, the ALJ legally correct, supported by limited her to a reduced range of light substantial evidence, and susceptible work with postural, manipulative, and to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS environmental limitations. (Tr. 21.) HEREBY ORDERED that the final While Danisha disagrees and points decision of the Commissioner is to evidence that the ALJ already upheld. considered to argue for greater limitations, this does not mean that Os f the ALJ’s decision was erroneous or Pe, that Danisha can ask this Court to lo) Anna Gibs@n McFadden reweigh the evidence to arrive at a United States Magistrate Judge different conclusion. July 16, 2026 In the end, the Court “must sustain Durham, NC the ALJ’s decision, even if [it] disagree[s] with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence. .. . The duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). Likewise, “[t]he substantial evidence standard presupposes . . . a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can