Dairyland Power Cooperative v. United States

77 Fed. Cl. 330, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 212, 2007 WL 1931357
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJune 29, 2007
DocketNo. 04-106 C
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 77 Fed. Cl. 330 (Dairyland Power Cooperative v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Dairyland Power Cooperative v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 330, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 212, 2007 WL 1931357 (uscfc 2007).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

DAMICH, Chief Judge.

On January 18, 2007, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Compel Production of Documents Withheld Under the ‘Deliberative Process’ and Attorney-Client Privileges.” Defendant filed its response on February 28, 2007, and Plaintiff filed a reply on March 19, 2007.

Background

In its motion, Plaintiff asks the Court to compel the production of 281 documents as to which the Government invokes, inter alia, the deliberative process and/or attorney-client and work product privileges. All of these documents were among a larger group of documents similarly at issue in another spent nuclear fuel (SNF) case before the Court of Federal Claims in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, No. 04-74 C (consolidated). In general, Plaintiff seeks: 1) all the documents the Government withheld in Pacific Gas on deliberative process grounds except for such documents pertaining to Greater-Than-Class-C (GTCC) waste, subject only to the protective order in this case, or, 2) in the alternative, (a) the documents that the court in Pacific Gas ordered to be produced, subject to the protective order in this case (sans GTCC waste-related documents, but only if the Government does not argue that Dairy-land’s damages should be reduced or eliminated due to such waste), and (b) 55 documents1 which the court in Pacific Gas did not order to be produced. In addition, Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s invocation of the attorney-client privilege as to 12 of the documents at issue and seeks their production in unredacted form.2

In its reply, Plaintiff urges the Court to “put an end to repetitive litigation of the deliberative process issues,” Pl.’s Reply at 2 (capitalized in original), and adopt the “sound, comprehensive, well-supported opinion [in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. U.S., 70 Fed.Cl. 128 (2006) ] that rejected entirely— for three separate reasons—the Government’s deliberative process privilege claims over the same documents involved here.” Id. at 1. Moreover, Plaintiff argues, “because all spent fuel plaintiffs have essentially the same ‘evidentiary need’ for these documents, and given both the enormous burden and cost of litigating these privilege issues separately in each case and the protective orders that exist in all the spent fuel eases, this Court should direct the government to produce the above documents for use by all spent fuel plaintiffs.” Pl.’s Mot. at 19.

To the extent that this Court determines to grant any of Plaintiffs motion to compel, ordering production of such document(s) for use by all SNF plaintiffs, despite the allure [336]*336of efficiency suggested by Plaintiff here, would be unfair to the Government. This Court cannot overlook that Defendant has repeatedly sought consolidation of the SNF eases before a single judge in order to achieve just such efficiencies and that it has been the SNF plaintiffs in general who successfully opposed such motions. While this Court was favorably inclined towards such consolidation, the course of the SNF litigation before the various judges of the Court of Federal Claims has moved significantly beyond such an approach. Thus, Dairyland’s attempt “to champion the cause of other spent nuclear fuel plaintiffs,” as Defendant characterizes it, amounts in a practical sense to judge-shopping. In a similar vein, this Court is not a position to “end” repetitive litigation of the deliberative process privilege nor to “enforce” or “reject” the rulings of the presiding judge in Pacific Gas. Rather, this Court’s determination of Dairyland’s motion to compel—as it may be properly informed and persuasively guided by those rulings— must nevertheless be considered in the context of this case.

Boundaries of the Deliberative Process Privilege

A. Purposes and Policies Underlying the Deliberative Process Privilege

At the heart of the deliberative process privilege, as Plaintiff notes, is a concern for the potential harm to governmental decision-making from the disclosure of internal documents. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 38, 49, 157 F.Supp. 939, 946 (1958). The Federal Circuit has said the policy behind the privilege is “protecting] agency officials’ deliberations, advisory opinions and recommendations in order to promote frank discussion of legal or policy matters in the decision-making process.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 38, 49, 157 F.Supp. 939, 946 (1958) (“There is a public policy ... of open, frank discussion between subordinate and chief concerning administrative action.”); Abramson v. United States, 39 Fed.Cl. 290, 293 (1997). Two additional rationales for the deliberative process privilege are that it “protect[s] against premature disclosure of proposed policies before they have been finally formulated or adopted; and ... protects] against confusing the issues and misleading the public by dissemination of documents suggesting reasons and rationales for a course of action which were not in fact the ultimate reasons for the agency’s action.” Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.Cir.1980). See also Jordan v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 773 (D.C.Cir.1978) (overruled on other grounds by Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C.Cir.1981)). On the other hand, there exists a countervailing public interest in the production of evidence needed to establish truth through litigation; our “[adversarial] system requires development of all relevant facts to produce real justice through due process.” Cetron Electronic Corp., 207 Ct.Cl. 985, 989 (Ct.Cl.1975). This tension notwithstanding, the deliberative process privilege has gained wide acceptance in federal courts since it was first recognized in Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. at 49, 157 F.Supp. 939. See, e.g., United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389-1390 (7th Cir.1993) (citing other cases). Moreover, and determinatively, the Supreme Court itself declared, “[t]he deliberative process privilege rests on the obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news.” Dep’t of Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8-9, 121 S.Ct. 1060, 149 L.Ed.2d 87 (2001) (emphasis added).

B. Procedural Requirements for Invoking the Deliberative Process Privilege.

In Walsky Constr. v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct.

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Bluebook (online)
77 Fed. Cl. 330, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 212, 2007 WL 1931357, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/dairyland-power-cooperative-v-united-states-uscfc-2007.