Curtis Hightower v. United States

325 F.2d 616

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: January 10, 1964
• Docket: 17376
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, on March 3,1962, attempted to steal five suits from a local department store. When apprehended by a store detective, appellant resisted arrest and assaulted the detective. Before trial, upon appellant’s motion a mental examination was ordered. After the appellant had been certified as competent, a jury trial was waived. A District Judge upon all the evidence found the appellant guilty of larceny and assault. The facts as to criminal conduct are not in dispute so that upon appeal, appellant’s principal claim is that he was entitled to an acquittal by reason of insanity.

At the trial the defense called Dr: Dorothy S. Dobbs who some time after May 1, 1962, in question and answer conversation on three occasions, had examined the appellant during the pre-trial period at St. Elizabeths where she was a staff psychiatrist. She saw him once at a staff conference. Dr. Dobbs testified that appellant had “an emotionally unstable personality” which she classified as a “mental illness, or mental disease.” She had approved and signed a hospital report in which a resident psychiatrist found “There was no evidence of abnormal contents. His attention, perception, comprehension, seems adequate.”

Other reports considered by the witness had used in describing the appellant such terms as “clever, scheming, ornery,” she recalled. Appellant had discussed with her his drug addiction which she said stemmed from “extreme anxiety, tension, feelings of inadequacy, particularly around other people, and of depression.” Such feelings, Dr. Dobbs explained, “are partially relieved by heroin.” She deduced that there was a chain of circumstances between the “feelings” of the appellant which were partially relieved by drugs, and the drug addiction, and thence “to the obvious and well-known constant need for money to support his drug addiction, and from that to the stealing.” She added on cross examination: “If, however, the stealing is unrelated to his drug addiction, then I can’t see any relationship between the illness and the stealing.”

Dr. Dobbs testified that appellant, when he stole the suits, knew he was doing wrong. She assumed “that the stealing was to provide himself with money in order to purchase drugs for his own use.” The record discloses no evidence that on March 3, 1962, the appellant was without funds, or that the appellant had committed the crime in order to obtain funds to satisfy a craving for drugs.

Dr. Dobbs explained that the hospital staff was unable to say whether or not the offenses were a product of his mental disease. She testified that the staff had “no valid opinion” on this subject, an expression utilized in cases where there is a relationship, but “not necessarily a direct one” between the mental condition and the offense.

Queried by the judge as to the incidence of emotional instability among the general population, the witness noted that “all of us at times react with excitability or inappropriateness or mani-, fest poor judgment. I think it is a matter of degree when we call it a mental disease. * * * [A]t times we have difficulty in drawing this line readily.”

The defense next called Dr. Hamman, a psychiatrist who saw the appellant at St. Elizabeths on July 30, 1962. It was his opinion that the appellant for quite some time had been suffering from a personality disorder of severe proportions. He deemed drug addiction a symptom of a mental disease. He interpreted the hospital reports as showing “that there was no abnormal thinking present. In other words, the man was not suffering from a psychotic condition.” He testified that from his conversation with the appellant the latter “has felt inadequate. He has felt uncomfortable around people. He has felt unable to partake of social intercourse. These are predominantly features of the schizoid personality. When he was able to obtain narcotics he felt more comfortable, more comfortable with people, increased his self-esteem. He was able to feel more normal.”

Further on cross-examination, the witness said “The average person in the street would describe him as a mean, ornery, unlikable sort of fellow, or if they met him at another time, they might describe him as a nice guy. This is evidence of the mood swings which this man has shown.”

Dr. Hamman believed “that a person who is, in fact, addicted to drugs is most likely suffering from a mental disease.” Asked if the appellant would steal in the presence of a police officer, he answered “I would doubt it. I would think that he would go to a place where there was no police officer present. * * * I think control would be very limited. I think that he would — -I don’t think a person who is sick is necessarily stupid and I think that he would, if he saw a policeman present, he would immediately dispatch himself to another location.”

In colloquy with Dr. Hamman the judge pointed to Dr. Dobbs’ statement “that everybody had an unstable personality. It is a matter of degree and we don’t know just where the degree goes into mental disease or where it doesn’t, is that right or isn’t it?”

Dr. Hamman replied: “Well, I think I’d put it this way: I think one of the best definitions of a normal person, I read, is one who is not too neurotic.

“I think it depends on how one handles himself, how one handles his conflicts. Essentially, I agree with it.”

The judge: “Does a normal person ever commit a crime, completely normal person ?”

Dr. Hamman replied: “I suppose so. I guess it would depend on the type of crime. I can see a reasonably normal person — I can see where a normal person would commit a crime, but then, of course, they may be driven by some passion which may not necessarily be an excuse.”

The trial judge commented as the trial concluded, “[I]f -I had known that the testimony was going to be this weak, I wouldn’t have permitted waiver of a jury trial and I would have instructed the jury on insanity. I have got an idea the jury would have been in in ten minutes with a verdict of guilty * *

The judge then continued the case that another expert psychiatrist, Dr. Marland, chosen by the Government, might examine the appellant and thereafter further advise the court. When informed by the doctor that the court had requested the examination, the appellant refused to cooperate, the expert testified. In Dr. Marland’s opinion, a person suffering from an emotionally unstable personality is not suffering from a mental disease, nor is drug addiction a mental disease.¹

Our compendious summary of the sort of testimony which the trier was free to accept is presented simply to illustrate the record before us. There was no testimony that this appellant on March 3, 1962 was without funds or that he was stealing to get money to buy drugs or that he was then an addict or even that he was in a state of remission if he earlier had been an addict.

There is no factual evidence in this case — as distinguished from conclusory opinion — that appellant’s drug addiction caused him to commit the theft and the assault here involved. The record shows nothing about how recently he had taken drugs²; how great a craving, if any, he was then suffering; whether he had a supply of drugs; or specifically, whether his need for drugs directly produced this particular theft and assault. Both psychiatrists called by the appellant agreed that the appellant’s “emotionally unstable personality” was a factor only insofar as it explained drug addiction. A trier of fact could perhaps assume some of the foregoing things without any specific proof — as evidently the psychiatrists did in evaluating the appellant’s general condition.³ ***But the trier of fact in this case was not bound to make any such assumptions, or to accept the general and conclusory assumptions of the psychiatrists as representing the actual facts in this case. The judge was thus not compelled as a matter of law to have a reasonable doubt as to the element of causation — -i. e., whether the offense was the “product” of a mental disease, within the meaning of the Durham rule.⁴

Thus it was the judge announced that he found no evidence that the appellant was suffering from a mental disease at the time of the alleged acts, or that there was a mental disease of which the appellant’s conduct was the product.

We have recently made it clear that a jury is not ordinarily required to accept the opinion of psychiatrists as to whether one was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the offense and as to whether the act was the product of or was caused by a mental illness.⁵ Similarly, a trial judge sitting in lieu of a jury is not required to accept expert opinion on such matters. There must be a serious mental disease, and satisfactory evidence of causation, before a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity must follow as a matter of law.⁶ For the reasons given, this is clearly not such a case.⁷

As to the problem whether reversible error was committed, requiring a new trial, it is clear that a judge sitting without a jury must be reversed if he shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence or of the governing law. Cf. J. D. Hedin Construction Co. v. F. S. Bowen Electric Co., 106 U.S.App. D.C. 386, 388, 273 F.2d 511, 513 (1960), and cases cited. But we do not think that this occurred here. True, the judge said that he could not find “on the evidence before the court that this defendant was suffering from a mental disease at the time of the alleged acts, or that there was any mental disease that the-crime was a product of * * *.” In effect he said that as trier of the facts he found that the defendant was not suffering from a mental disease at the time of the alleged acts and that there was no mental disease that produced the crime. There is no justification for an assumption that he had a reasonable doubt as to either point. We do not know that the judge’s view of the law or of his duties as trier was in any way erroneous, and we have indicated why we think an assumption that he did not understand the matter is unwarranted. Further, the presumption is that he did know the proper standard to apply, and applied it. To reverse the judge’s decision as a trier of fact on a ground such as this, absent any real indication that he applied the wrong standard and absent an objection or request for clarification, would not, we think, be justified. Compare Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937).

Affirmed.

1 . We do not, of course, pass on the correctness of these views, -or those of the other witnesses, as we are not required to do so to reach a decision in the present case. As to proposals for the “treatment” of drug addicts and methods, past and current, for their “punishment,” see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668 et seq., 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962).

2 . There is evidence that the defendant was under observation at D. C. General Hospital from February 14-19, 1962; that he was released on February 19, about two weeks before committing the acts with which ho was charged; and that the General Hospital reported that he then suffered from drug addiction, not mentioning any mental disease. But we are not informed as to what, if anything, that report stated as to the degree of his addiction, or the frequency and severity of his need for drugs at that time. Presumably he was not provided with drugs while in the Hospital.

3 . Both of the psychiatrists referred to a “chain of circumstances” as causing the stealing: a mental condition or illness leading to drug addiction, a need for money to support the addiction, and finally stealing to supply the money. Neither psychiatrists testified to any facts elicited from the defendant or obtained in some other way to support a conclusion that, with respect to the conduct involved here, the defendant needed money and that he stole to obtain it. Neither testified that the assault on the officer was caused by mental disease. One psychiatrist stated indeed that her chain included “an assumption that the stealing was to provide himself with money in order to purchase drugs for his own use,” but — as we have already pointed out — added that if “the stealing is unrelated to his drug addiction, then I can’t see any relationship between the illness and the stealing.”

4 . He could, no doubt, have acquitted appellant on the ground of insanity. But he was not bound to do so. The appellant did not testify so that the record contains no explanation from him.

5 . Campbell v. United States, 113 U.S.App. D.C. 260, 307 F.2d 597 (1962); Carey v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 296 F.2d 422 (1961); McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (1962).

6 . Campbell v. United States and McDonald v. United States, supra note 5; cf. Blocker v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 63, 64, 274 F.2d 572, 573 (en banc 1959).

7 . In Campbell v. United States, supra note 5, tbe alleged illness was “emotionally unstable personality,” and the expert evidence for the defense — offered by: Dr. Dobbs and Dr. Owens for St. Elizabeths: Hospital — was strikingly similar to that offered in this case, though without mention of, or reliance on, drug addiction. We held that a motion for a directed verdict was properly denied, and. that the-issue was one for the jury.