Eugene C. Campbell v. United States

307 F.2d 597

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: June 28, 1962
• Docket: 16414
• Status: Published

Opinions

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was convicted of robbery under two counts of an indictment. D.C. Code (1961) § 22-2901. After commitment to St. Elizabeths Hospital on August 29, 1960, to determine his competency to stand trial, appellant was adjudged competent on February 24, 1961. At the trial, held on April 18, 1961, he raised the defense of insanity. He did not seriously contest commission of the offenses. Two psychiatrists at St. Eliza-beths, Dr. Owens and Dr. Dobbs, gave testimony indicating that defendant-appellant was suffering from an “emotionally unstable personality.” In rebuttal, a psychiatrist who had never examined appellant testified that in his opinion emotional instability was not a mental disease. Appellant now seeks reversal of his conviction on three grounds.

I.

Appellant first claims that the evidence introduced was such as to compel the trial court to grant his motion for a directed" verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Appellant says, and we agree, that the testimony of the psychiatrist relied on. by the Government was of little probative value. The psychiatrist had no information about defendant’s mental condition, testified largely in terms of a legal conclusion, and had never seen defendant prior to the trial. On the other hand, appellant’s evidence of insanity was far from conclusive. With regard to the existence of a mental disease, Dr. Owens and Dr. Dobbs testified that defendant possessed an emotionally unstable personality. The factors on which Dr. Owens based his diagnosis included the following: “ * * this individual was extremely emotional, -x- * * He was qUite tense and anxious, perspiring profusely.” Dr. Dobbs testified that defendant, as an emotionally unstable personality, “reacts with excitability and ineffectiveness and may demonstrate poor judgment and in a sense has difficulty in his relationships with the people around him.” Dr. Owens noted memory impairment both as to the time of the offenses and earlier, but Dr. Dobbs stated that defendant’s memory seemed adequate except as to the offenses.

On the issue of causality, Dr. Owens testified only that the robberies “could have” been caused by appellant’s mental condition. Dr. Dobbs, at various points in her testimony, said: “[Defendant], in all probability, could not refrain from committing the alleged offenses”; “We have no opinion as to the alleged offenses being a product of his mental condition or mental disease”; and “I don’t know why he committed them [the offenses].”

We have previously found error in the failure of the District Court to direct verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity only where the evidence of mental disease has been very strong and the condition a serious one.¹ The two psychiatrists who testified for the defense labeled appellant as an “emotionally unstable personality,” a broad classification which may include severe or relatively minor personality disorders. Although both psychiatrists agreed that appellant’s particular condition constituted a mental disease, the existence or not of mental disease is ordinarily an issue exclusively for the jury. See, e. g., Stewart v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 295, 214 F.2d 879, 881 (1954). As an administrative matter, “emotionally unstable personality” has been regarded by the staff at St. Elizabeths as-a mental disease only since November-1957. Many of the symptoms relied on-by Dr. Dobbs and Dr. Owens in arriving at their diagnoses (i. e., “tense,” “anxious,” “poor judgment”) are possessed by people with relatively normal personality structures. Cross-examination below may have cast some doubt on the-thoroughness of the examination made by Dr. Owens. Given these facts, and with due regard to the opportunity of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that reasonable jurymen might find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not insane.² The motion for a directed verdict was thus properly denied.

II.

Appellant claims that the instructions delivered by the District Court on the issue of insanity were erroneous. The court first defined “mental disease” and “mental defect,” in a manner not challenged here. The pertinent parts of the charge then read:

“Now, our legal and moral traditions require that those who, of their own free will and with evil intent, commit acts which violate the law shall be held criminally responsible for those acts, but the law and our moral traditions also require that a person is not to be punished for a criminal act if that act was the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In other words, a defendant is not responsible for an act that is a violation of the law if he did not understand that his act was a violation of the law, or if he did, that he lacked the capacity to exercise his will so as to choose not to do it.

“ * * * The relationship between the mental disease or defect and the act must be such as to justify a reasonable inference that the act would not have been committed if the person had not been suffering from the disease or defect. In other words, if because of some abnormal mental condition, the defendant did not understand that his act was a violation of the law or if he did understand but still he lacked the capacity to exercise his will and choose not to commit the act, then he cannot be found guilty.

“ * * * By the term ‘product of’ or ‘critical causal relation’ [between abnormal mental condition and criminal act] we mean to convey the idea that except for the abnormal mental condition the defendant would not have committed the acts.

“In other words, and by way of example: If, because of some abnormal mental condition the defendant had an impulse to rob which he could not control, then it may be said that the mental disease produced the act but if he could have controlled it and refrained from doing the act, then his will must have assented to the act, and it was not caused by the disease, but by the concurrence of his will and he was therefore responsible for his act.

“Therefore, to hold the defendant guilty or responsible for his criminal act, the jury must find a- *

“(1) That the defendant committed the acts constituting the violation of the law for which he is charged, and

“(2) That the defendant understood that the act charged was a violation of the law, and

“(3) That he possessed the capacity to exercise his will so as to choose to do or not to do the act.

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“If * * * the Government has proved all of the elements of the crime charged * * * and has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant understood that the act was a violation of law and that he had the capacity to exercise his will and to choose to do the acts or to refrain from doing the acts, that is that the acts were not a product of a mental disease or defect, then you may find the defendant guilty of the offense charged.”

In the District of Columbia, the test of criminal responsibility is whether the offending act is the product of a mental disease or defect. Upon that issue, “the jury’s range of inquiry is not to be limited to particular symptoms, but may include, under proper instructions, any symptoms and manifestations of mental disorder.” Misenheimer v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 221, 271 F.2d 486, 487 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 971, 80 S.Ct. 603, 4 L.Ed.2d 550 (1960).

There was some testimony in this case bearing on Campbell’s capacity for control.³ Hence, we may assume that it would have been proper to give a brief instruction, telling the jury it might consider evidence of lack of capacity as tending to show that the offenses resulted from a mental disorder, and that evidenee of capacity could be considered as tending to show the contrary.⁴ But here, the trial court, by its emphasis, explicit language, and repetition, in effect made the “right-wrong” test, coupled with “capacity to exercise his will so as to choose to do or not to do the act,” the controlling criteria for imposing criminal responsibility.⁵ The charge at length admonished the jury to consider whether defendant had the capacity to choose, or whether he understood that his act was a violation of law. In that part of the instruction which we have not quoted, the court refers three more times to appellant’s capacity to exercise his will or to control his conduct. Moreover, the erroneous impression which may have been left with the jury was not corrected by explicitly telling them either (1) that capacity to choose is only one of several considerations in determining whether the act in question was the product of mental disease,⁶ or (2) that it cannot be an affirmative test of criminal responsibility.

In addition, the instruction is quite inconsistent with two of our opinions which have gone to great pains to explain Durham. In Douglas v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 238, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (1956), we said:

“ * * * the court may pesnnit the jury to consider whether or not the accused understood the nature of what he was doing and whether or not his actions were due to a failure, because of mental disease or defect, properly to control his conduct.” (Emphasis added.)

The emphasized words place the problem in its proper perspective: they show that failure to control conduct because of mental disease or defect may be considered in deciding whether the defendant should be relieved from criminal responsibility. The thrust of the trial court’s charge in this case was quite different. As we shall see, it may well have led the jury to believe that capacity to refrain from doing the act was the overriding determinant of criminal responsibility.

In Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 236, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (1957), we explained that the defendant was entitled to a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity if he would not have committed the offense “but for” or “except for” the mental disorder. We insisted only that the mental disease make an “effective or decisive difference between doing and not doing the act,” ibid., even if other factors or reasons combine to cause commission of the offense. In contrast, the instruction given here could reasonably have been interpreted by the juiw to require that the mental disease or defect be so severe that it must completely obliterate defendant’s “capacity to exercise his will.” More important, in Carter we explained with great care what we meant when we said that the defense of insanity requires that the act be a “product of” a disease. We spoke in terms of a “critical” relationship, and described “product of” in terms of phrases such as “because of,” “but for,” and “result of.” ⁷ The instruction below now seeks to brush all of this aside and use entirely different terminology as the overriding criterion of “product of.” Here the court said that if the defendant “could have controlled it [the impulse to rob] and refrained from doing the act, then his will must have assented to the act, and it was not caused by the [mental] disease, but by the concurrence of his will and he was therefore responsible for his act.” (Emphasis added.) In explicit language the court below thus says that the controlling test of whether the act was “caused” by the mental disease is whether defendant could have controlled an impulse to rob.⁸ All of the explanatory language in Carter is thus brushed aside; whether there is a “critical causal relationship” or whether the act would have occurred “but for” a mental disorder now is to be measured and decided by the jury on the basis of an entirely different standard.

The point can be illustrated by assuming. a situation where the defendant admits commission of the act and the jury finds that (1) defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect, and (2) a "determinative” element causing the offense was the disease or defect. In such a situation the instruction here, by its overriding and persistent emphasis on the term “capacity,” would clearly leave room for the implication that apart from elements (1) and (2) the jury could consider, as a wholly separate, independent and controlling question, whether (3) the accused had the “capacity” to refrain from the act. Although Durham encompasses consideration of (3) in determining (1) and (2), it ends the inquiry once they are established. Here the court could have foreclosed the implication that (3) was something different and apart from either (1) or (2) by telling the jury in unmistakably clear terms that elements (1) and (2), if found, are plainly inconsistent with the existence of “capacity.” But it did not.

To subject a person suffering from a severe mental disorder, who would not have committed the criminal act but for his disorder, to the sanctions of imprisonment or perhaps execution would offend our sense of morality and justice. As we said in Durham: “The legal and moral traditions of the western world require that those who, of their own free will and with evil intent (sometimes called mens rea), commit acts which violate the law, shall be criminally responsible for those acts. Our traditions also require that where such acts stem from and are the product of a mental disease or defect as those terms are used herein, moral blame shall not attach, and hence there will not be criminal responsibility.” See Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228 at 242, 214 F.2d 862 at 876, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430. And “If [the defendant’s] violent act * *' * sprang from mental disorder — if, indeed, he has a mental illness which makes it likely that he will commit' other violent acts when his sentence is served, imprisonment is not a remedy. Not only would it be wrong to imprison him, but imprisonment would not secure the community against repetitions of his violence. Hospitalization, on the other hand, would serve the dual purpose of giving him the treatment required for his illness and keeping him confined until it would be safe to release him.” Williams v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 58, 250 F.2d 19, 26 (1957). A similar view was expressed in Overholser v. Lynch, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 404, 288 F.2d 388, cert. granted, 366 U.S. 958, 81 S.Ct. 1936, 6 L.Ed.2d 1252 (1961).

Since we are holding only that the instruction below was inconsistent with the law in this jurisdiction, we consider inappropriate an extended discussion of the substantive deficiencies and practical disadvantages inherent in the standards it expresses.⁹ We have no question that the charge given here does not conform to our prior decisions. In no sense could it be called an “explanation” of the rule governing the insanity defense in the District of Columbia. What the trial judge has in effect done is to reject Durham and to substitute some kind of “right-wrong” plus “capacity” test. To sustain the present instruction would also, as we have pointed out, require repudiation of Douglas and Carter as well.

For these reasons, we conclude that the challenged instruction was erroneous, and that reversal must follow.

III.

Finally, appellant alleges error in the refusal of the District Court to admit into evidence a prior finding of incompetency to stand trial. As a technical matter, we need not reach that issue, since we are reversing on another ground. Nor as a practical matter is it necessary for us to decide the question in order to avoid error when Campbell is tried again in the District Cou3~t. Appellant’s counsel, in his opening statement, told the jury: “We’ll further show that * * * those psychiatrists determined that the defendant was not even mentally competent to stand trial.” At this point, the prosecutor interrupted, and asked for a special instruction to the jury to disregard the comment. The court gave the requested instruction, and admonished defendant’s counsel not to present evidence on the subject. None was offered. On this record, it is not clear whether defendant wanted to present the bare legal conclusion of incompeteney or only the psychiatric evidence which seswed as the basis of that conclusion. If the latter, there is little doubt that such evidence, if offered again in the new trial, will be admissible on the same basis as any other information pertinent to defendant’s condition at or near the time of the offense. The question whether the simple conclusion of incompetency to stand trial is admissible as some evidence of insanity thus may never arise in this case and need not be decided now.

For these reasons, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.

1 . See Fielding v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 251 F.2d 878 (1957) (dementia praecox); Satterwhite v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 398, 267 F.2d 675 (1959) (paranoid schizophrenic); Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 250 F.2d 4 (1957) (schizophrenia established by testimony of at least five psychiatrists) ; Isaac v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 284 F.2d 168 (1960) (schizophrenic, disassociative reaction, testimony of three psychiatrists and a clinical psychologist). Cf. Douglas v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 239 F.2d 52 (1956) (new trial ordered, dementia praecox established by three disinterested psychiatrists, no medical evidence otherwise). As we have very recently said, “When we have ordered’ directed verdicts [in this class of case] it has been upon strong evidentiary grounds.” Turberville v. United States, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 400, 303 F.2d 411.

2 . This is not to say, of course, that under other circumstances a defendant suffering from an emotionally unstable personality may not be able to make such a strong showing as to entitle him to a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. But that is not this case. The question here was one for the jury.

3 . It should be noted that the testimony as to capacity was presented only after the judge had informed counsel that he would charge the jury in terms of “right-wrong” and capacity.

4 . In Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413, 22 S.Ct. 895, 46 L.Ed. 1225 (1902), the evidence adduced was given in terms of the M’Naghtcn Rule and irresistible impulse. The trial court charged the jury in those terms, saying in part:

“ * * * the burden is upon the government to establish that he was of sound mind, and by that term is not meant that he was of perfectly sound mind, but that he had sufficient mind to know right from wrong, and knowing that the act ho was committing at the time he was performing it was a wrongful act in violation of human law, and he could be punished therefor, and that he did not perform the act because he was controlled by irresistible and uncontrollable impulse. In that state of case the defendant could not be excused upon the ground of insanity, and it would be your duty to convict him.” (186 U.S. at 417, 22 S.Ct. at 897)

The approval given by the Supreme Court to the charge just quoted cannot mean that the M’Naghten Rule and the irresistible impulse test are the sole criteria in every case where insanity is the defense, regardless of the evidence offered. Compare Burns v. United States, 274 U.S. 328 at 332, 47 S.Ct. 650, 71 L.Ed. 1077 (1927). Nor can it mean that the adoption by this court of the Durham Rule for this jurisdiction was beyond our authority, cf. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 at 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946), or was otherwise improper. The Hotema case approved a particular charge given under particular circumstances: it does not say that that charge is the only one which can be given, or that other tests cannot properly be adopted.

5 . As to that part.of the instruction which deals with defendant’s capacity to distinguish right from wrong, we said in Douglas v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 232, 238, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (1956), that “where a proper evidential foundation is laid a trial court should permit the jury to consider such criteria in resolving the ultimate issue ‘whether the accused acted because of a mental disorder’.” Here, there is considerable doubt as to whether such evidential foundation existed. Since we are reversing because of other defects in the instruction, however, it is unnecessary for us to rule on this point.

6 . The Government cites language in Douglas v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. , 238, 239 F.2d 52, 58 (1956); Stewart v. United States, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 54, 247 F.2d 42, 44 (1957); and Wright v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 44, 250 F.2d 4, 12 (1957).

In effect, these cases hold that evidence is admissible concerning the defendant’s inability to distinguish between right and wrong, or his being subject to an irresistible impulse. There is a great difference, however, between admitting evidence on “right-wrong” or irresistible impulse, and making those symptoms the ultimate test of criminal responsibility.

7 . “When we say the defense of insanity requires that the act be a ‘product of’ a disease, we mean that the facts on the record are such that the trier of the facts is enabled to draw a reasonable inference that the accused would not have committed the act he did commit if he had not been diseased as he was. There must be a relationship between the disease and the act, and that relationship, whatever it may be in degree must be, as we have already said, critical in its effect in respect to the act. By ‘critical’ we mean decisive, determinative, causal; we mean to convey the idea inherent in the phrases ‘because of’, ‘except for’, ‘without which’, ‘but for’, ‘effect of’, ‘result of’, ‘causative factor’; the disease made the effective or decisive difference between doing and not doing the act. The short phrases ‘product of’ and ‘causal connection’ are not intended to be precise, as though they were chemical formulae. They mean that the facts concerning the disease and the facts concerning the act are such as to justify reasonably the conclusion that ‘But for this disease the act would not have been committed.’ ” Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. at 236, 252 F.2d at 617.

8 . The jury was thus in substance told that the defendant should be held criminally responsible if he could have controlled an impulse to rob. Such an instruction is in our view patently erroneous.

9 . Compare Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 111-12 (1949-53), rejecting the so-called capacity test.