PER CURIAM.
In March 2004, Brian Scott Culver was indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury for one count of second-degree domestic violence, a violation of § 13A-6-131, Ala. Code 1975; one count of furnishing drugs to a minor, a violation of § 13A-12-215, Ala.Code 1975; and two counts of possession of obscene matter containing a visual reproduction of a person under the age of 17 years, violations of § 13A-12-192(b), Ala.Code 1975. The jury found Culver guilty of the two counts of possession of obscene matter, but acquitted him of domestic violence and furnishing drugs to a minor. The trial court sentenced Culver to 10 years’ imprisonment for each of his convictions, the sentences to run concurrently.
The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. In November 2003, Culver was living at a residence in Hoover that he shared with his wife, S.B., her son, and her daughter, K.W.,1 who was then 13 years old. Culver and S.B. had married in February 2003, and Culver was KW.’s stepfather. Sometime after midnight on November 11, 2003, Culver listened on an extension telephone to a conversation between K.W. and her boyfriend, and he learned that the couple had been sexually active. Culver informed S.B., and she also listened to some of the telephone conversation. Culver and S.B. then confronted K.W. Culver insisted that they speak to the boyfriend and his parents, and he drove to the boyfriend’s house at approximately 2:00 a.m. that morning; S.B. and [504] K.W. accompanied Culver. S.B. spoke to the boyfriend’s father, and they agreed that they would watch their children more closely and keep in contact with one another.
When S.B., K.W., and Culver returned to the residence, they went into the room next to K.W.’s bedroom that the family used as a playroom and as an office. S.B. talked to K.W. about her sexual activities while Culver typed on the computer. S.B. testified that Culver called K.W. a slut and a whore and that he was very angry and agitated. Culver got up from the computer and got a telephone book, looked through it for a telephone number, and then left the house. S.B. and K.W. looked at the computer after Culver left, and they saw that he had been conducting Internet searches for stun guns.
K.W. testified that later that day, sometime during the afternoon, she and Culver were at the residence alone, and she was asleep on the couch. According to K.W., Culver woke her up and gave her two blue pills. K.W. said that Culver told her that she needed to take them because she had a headache. K.W. said that she took one pill and threw the second one into the garbage can in the kitchen.
K.W. said that late that evening, near midnight, she was awakened in her bed by what felt like an electrical shock to her upper back. When she awoke, she discovered that Culver was in bed beside her, beneath the covers. According to K.W., he appeared to be shoving something underneath the pillow when she first saw him in her bed, but she did not see an object. K.W. said that Culver was wearing shorts and a tank top, and that he had a stethoscope around his neck; according to K.W., Culver rubbed her back and told her not to say anything. K.W. then got out of the bed and, when she did, she saw a bag that looked like a shaving kit on the floor beside her bed. K.W. said that she also noticed other items around her bed, and that she saw Culver pushing those items under her bed. K.W. left her bedroom, went to the kitchen to get a drink of water, and then went to the master bedroom where her mother was sleeping. K.W. told S.B. that Culver had shocked her, but when Culver came into the master bedroom, he denied doing anything to K.W. K.W. testified that she then stated to Culver, “ Tes, you did. I woke up, and you were beside me, and you hurt me.’ ” (R. 928.)
Culver and S.B. argued over the incident, and then S.B. and K.W. went to K.W.’s bedroom, where they found several items in a clear box under her bed, including “sex toys,” condoms, pornographic magazines, and a vaginal syringe. (R. 929.) K.W. said that her mother pushed the syringe and that Vaseline-brand petroleum jelly and a brown pill came out. According to K.W., she and her mother also found Vaseline on the headboard of KW.’s bed. K.W. testified that, although he initially denied any involvement, Culver eventually admitted that he had put all of those items in her bedroom. S.B. and Culver continued to argue, K.W. said, and Culver finally told S.B. that he was going to leave. Culver told S.B. that she could stay at the house with her children and that he would move into their house at Smith Lake.
At that point, Culver gathered a variety of items and put them into his vehicle. K.W. said that he put the clear box that had been beneath her bed into his vehicle but that she took it out and hid it in the bushes. After Culver left, S.B. telephoned the police, and several officers came to the residence. K.W. said that police officers searched the house, photographed her back where she had been shocked, and photographed her hands. When Culver returned to the residence before 6:00 a.m. [505] the following morning with clothing that belonged to S.B. and the children from the house at Smith Lake, the police arrested him on a charge of domestic violence.
During the search of the residence in the early morning hours of November 12, 2003, police officers found seven Polaroid photographs; five of the photographs depicted a female’s genitalia and two photographs depicted a male’s genitalia. The photographs were found inside two envelopes that had been placed between two books on a bookshelf in the playroom/office located next to KW.’s bedroom. The Polaroid photographs were later shown to K.W., and K.W. identified herself as the female in the photographs. K.W. stated that she recognized the razor burn on her shaved genital area and that she recognized her hands in the photographs, including her fingernail polish. K.W. also testified that she recognized the sheets depicted in some of the photographs as being sheets that had been used on the bed Culver and her mother shared at their lake house. K.W. testified that her mother had purchased the sheets for Christmas in 2002. The police also showed each of the Polaroid pictures to S.B., and S.B. identified K.W. and Culver in the photographs based on her knowledge of certain of their physical characteristics. S.B. also identified the sheets in the Polaroid pictures as the sheets she had purchased as a Christmas gift for Culver in 2002 and that they kept at the lake house. K.W. testified that she and Culver had stayed at the lake house without S.B., and that, on more than one of those occasions, she had gone to sleep on the couch in the lake house and she had awakened in the bed her mother and Culver shared, but she did not know how she got into the bed. K.W. remembered the sheets depicted in the photographs being on the bed on one of the occasions when this occurred.
In addition, when police officers first arrived at the residence, S.B. gave an officer what she described at trial as a vaginal syringe that she had found in KW.’s room. According to S.B., the syringe contained “ICY jelly or petroleum stuff’ and a pill. (R. 1369.) The pill S.B. alleged to have found inside the syringe was later determined to be a prescription sleep aid. Also recovered during the search of the residence were adult magazines and a Polaroid camera in a storage room in the attic that was accessed through K.W.’s bedroom. A Raptor-brand stun-gun box was recovered from the master bedroom closet. In the playroom/office next to KW.’s bedroom, police recovered a bottle of Aleve brand pain reliever that had several blue pills inside. The pills were later tested and determined to be prescription medication, Xanax and Valium. A pill later determined to be Xanax was recovered in the garbage can in the kitchen. K.W. underwent an examination to assist in determining whether she had been sexually assaulted, and samples of her blood and urine were taken. The physical examination revealed no signs of sexual abuse, but test results revealed the presence of the prescription medication Valium in K.W.’s blood.
The police told S.B. to note anything unusual she found in the house and to inform them of anything she found. On November 13, 2003, S.B. turned over to the police an 8mm video camera and a Polaroid camera that she found at the residence. The police conducted a second search of the residence on November 14, 2003, and an 8mm-format videotape was found in a storage room that was accessed through the walk-in closet in the master bedroom. The police officer who found the videotape testified that it had not been in plain view when he entered the storage room, but that he had found the videotape in a corner.
[506] The videotape was played for the jury, and we have reviewed the tape. The first portion of the videotape depicted a female on her back with her legs parted. Only the genitals, which appear to have been shaved, and the uppermost portion of the inner thighs were visible in most of the videotape; a portion of the buttocks and a portion of the lower abdomen were visible in some parts of the videotape, as the camera was repositioned and those portions of the body were filmed. The female’s hands were resting motionless above her pubic area, with the fingers slightly curled. Specks of what appear to be fingernail polish were visible. The female was lying on a blue sheet or blanket that had a white imprint. The body appeared to have been covered above the abdominal area. A male’s hands are also depicted in the videotape; subject to certain objections he made at trial, Culver stipulated that he was the man depicted in the videotape.
In the first portion of the videotape, Culver first rubbed the female’s lubricated vaginal area, and then he digitally penetrated the female’s vagina for several minutes. Culver then inserted what appeared to be a plastic vaginal syringe into the female’s vagina, and moved the syringe in and out of the female’s vagina for several minutes. More digital penetration followed, and at the end of this portion of the videotape, Culver placed a large white, ridged object at the entrance of the female’s vagina. Culver repositioned the camera during the filming of this portion of the videotape and he placed his right thumb in front of the lens as he did so. Ridge detail on the thumb was visible. The female was motionless during the videotaping, and she appeared to be unconscious. K.W. viewed a still photograph depicting the female in this portion of the videotape, and she identified herself in the photograph. She recognized her hands and a red spot on one of her fingers. K.W. said she also recognized the sheets in the photograph as those that had been on her mother and Culver’s bed at the lake house.
Immediately following this portion of the videotape, a second, shorter, portion of the videotape depicted a nude female body filmed from the back, so that only the female’s buttocks and upper thighs were visible. The videotape depicted Culver inserting his fingers into the female’s anus and vagina. The female was motionless in this portion of the videotape. K.W. viewed still photographs of the nude female depicted in the second part of the videotape, but she could not identify herself as the female in those photographs.
A freeze-frame photograph of the right thumb that was placed over the lens during the videotape was made, and the image was matched to Culver’s thumbprint. Fingerprints were also lifted from the back of one of the Polaroid pictures and from the outside of the 8mm videotape. Subject to objections made at trial, Culver stipulated that all the prints were his.
The parties stipulated that during a search of the lake house, the police recovered a set of blue sheets with a white printed pattern on them. K.W. and S.B. testified that the pattern on those sheets matched the pattern on the sheets in the Polaroid photographs of the female and the sheets in the 8mm videotape.
Photographs of K.W.’s hands were taken on November 13, 2003. Photographs of K.W.’s genitalia, buttocks, and upper thighs, and of S.B.’s genitalia, buttocks, and upper thighs were taken. Photographs of S.B.’s hands were also taken. All of the photographs were admitted into evidence, and the jury was able to compare those photographs with the Polaroid photographs and the 8mm videotape and the [507] still photographs made from that videotape.
I.
Culver contends that the trial court erred when it joined for trial the four charges against him. He argues that the charges of possession of obscene matter2 should not have been consolidated with the charges of domestic violence and distribution of drugs to a minor because, he says, the offenses were not of the same or similar character and because, he says, evidence of one offense would not have been admissible at the trial of the other offenses. He further alleges that “the join-der for trial of ‘sex crimes’ with ‘non-sex crimes’ in Mr. Culver’s case produced ... ineradicable prejudice .” (Culver’s brief at p. 24.)
We note, first, that the trial court consolidated the four charges for trial before the State filed a motion to consolidate the charges, but after Culver had presented his argument to the trial court that the cases should not be consolidated. Culver argued that consolidation was not permitted under Rule 13.3, Ala.R.Crim.P., because, according to Culver, there was no common scheme or design. He further argued that he would be unfairly prejudiced if any of the cases, other than the two possession-of-obscene-matter cases, were tried together. The trial court determined that evidence from each case would likely be introduced in all the trials, and it consolidated the four cases sua sponte. (C. 102.)
A trial court is vested with substantial discretion in deciding whether to consolidate cases, and its decision as to consolidation will be reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion. See Snell v. State, 677 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.Crim.App.1995). An appellant who argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to grant a severance must prove “compelling prejudice” before he is entitled to relief. Ex parte Hinton, 548 So.2d 562, 566 (Ala.1989).
Rule 13.3, Ala. R.Crim. P., provides, in relevant part:
“(c) Consolidation. If offenses or defendants are charged in separate indictments, informations, or complaints, the court on its own initiative or on motion of either party may order that the charges be tried together or that the defendants be joined for the purposes of trial if the offenses or the defendants, as the case may be, could have been joined in a single indictment, information, or complaint.”
Rule 13.3(a), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides, in relevant part:
“(a) Offenses. Two or more offenses may be joined in an indictment, information, or complaint, if they:
“(1) Are of the same or similar character; or
“(2) Are based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected in their commission; or
“(3) Are alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan.”
In Lewis v. State, 889 So.2d 623 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), this Court discussed the legal principles relevant to consolidation when Lewis argued on appeal that the trial [508] court had erred when it consolidated capital and noncapital indictments for trial. This Court stated:
“In Yelder v. State, 630 So.2d 92 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), rev’d on other grounds, 630 So.2d 107 (Ala.1993), this Court stated:
“ ‘ “Joinder, and thus consolidation, is appropriate where the crimes are of similar character, meaning nearly corresponding, resembling in many respects, or having a general likeness. United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1980).” Ex parte Hinton, 548 So.2d 562, 566 (Ala.1989). The question is whether the offenses are of a same or similar character so that a person evaluating the crimes would believe that the offenses were committed by the same person. See King v. State, 518 So.2d 880 (Ala.Cr.App.1987). Perhaps the most important consideration is the answer to the following question: If the offense[s] were tried separately, would evidence of each offense be admissible in the trial for the other offense? See Nickerson v. State, 523 So.2d 504 (Ala.Cr.App.1987); King, supra.’
“630 So.2d at 96. Moreover,
“ ‘[T]he “common scheme or plan” provision of Rule 13.3 is limited by the “common scheme or plan” exception to the rule excluding collateral crimes evidence. That is, multiple offenses alleged to have been committed by the same defendant may not be consolidated and tried jointly under the “common scheme or plan” provision of Rule 13.3 unless evidence of each offense would be admissible, under the “common scheme or plan” exception to the collateral crimes exclusionary rule, at a separate trial of the other offense. See King v. State, 518 So.2d [880,] 884 & n. 2 [ (Ala.Crim.App.1987) ]; Ex parte Hinton, 548 So.2d [562,] 566 [ (Ala.1989) ].’
“Kennedy v. State, 640 So.2d 22, 29 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). Thus, consolidation in this case was proper only if evidence of each offense would be admissible at a separate trial of each of the other offenses.
“ ‘On the trial for the alleged commission of a particular crime, evidence of the accused’s having committed another act or crime is not admissible if the only probative function of such evidence is to prove bad character and the accused’s conformity therewith. This is a general exclusionary rule which prevents the introduction of pri- or acts or crimes for the sole purpose of suggesting that the accused is more likely to be guilty of the crime in question. This rule is generally applicable whether the other crime or act was committed before or after the one for which the defendant is presently being tried....
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“ ‘The foregoing exclusionary rule does not work to exclude evidence of all crimes or acts, only such as are offered to show the defendant’s bad character and conformity therewith on the occasion of the now-charged crime. If the defendant’s commission of another crime or misdeed is relevant for some other material purpose in the case then it may be admitted.’
“C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence § 69.01(1) (5th ed.1996) (footnotes omitted). The other purposes for which collateral-crimes evidence may be admissible, i.e., the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, include:
“ ‘ “(1) Relevancy to prove physical capacity, skill, or means to commit the now-charged crime; (2) part of the res gestae or part of a continuous transac[509] tion; (3) relevancy to prove scienter or guilty knowledge; (4) relevancy to prove criminal intent; (5) relevancy to prove plan, design, scheme, or system; (6) relevancy to prove motive; (7) relevancy to prove identity; (8) relevancy to rebut special defenses; and (9) relevancy in various particular crimes.” ’
“Nicks v. State, 521 So.2d 1018, 1026 (Ala.Crim.App.1987), aff'd, 521 So.2d 1035 (Ala.1988), quoting Nelson v. State, 511 So.2d 225, 233 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), affd, 511 So.2d 248 (Ala.1987). These exceptions do not apply unless ‘there is a real and open issue as to one or more of those “other purposes.”’ Bowden v. State, 538 So.2d 1226, 1227 (Ala.1988). Furthermore, the common plan, scheme, or design exception is ‘essentially coextensive with the identity exception,’ Ex parte Darby, 516 So.2d 786, 789 (Ala.1987), and ‘applies only when identity is actually at issue.’ Campbell v. State, 718 So.2d 123, 128-29 (Ala.Crim.App.1997).”
889 So.2d at 660-61.
In Summerlin v. State, 594 So.2d 235 (Ala.Crim.App.1991), this Court held that no error had occurred when the trial court refused to sever arson charges from assault and sexual-abuse charges. Summerlin had threatened to harm his former roommate, J.E., a woman who was at that time living with another man, James Fillmon, and he had threatened to kill Fillmon. A few days later, Summerlin cut J.E. and touched her vaginal area. A few evenings later, the mobile home Fillmon and J.E. were sleeping in was burned, and the fire was determined to have been caused by an accelerant. This Court determined that the offenses were properly tried together because they were connected and that Summerlin had failed to show that he suffered any specific or compelling prejudice as a result of the joinder. This Court also noted that Summerlin was acquitted of the arson charge and that the jury could easily separate the evidence of separate crimes.
In Snell v. State, 677 So.2d 786 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), Snell was charged with enticing a child to enter a house for immoral purposes and with two counts of sodomy. Snell allegedly enticed a minor child to come into his house using pornographic movies and attempted to convince the minor child to allow him to have oral sex with her. The minor child testified that Snell performed oral sex on her twice. Snell argued on appeal that the trial court had erred when it denied his motion to sever the enticement charge from the sodomy charges. This Court in Snell discussed the facts and the severance issue decided in Summerlin, supra, and held that “the enticement charge was even more closely connected with the sodomy charges than the arson charge was connected to the sexual abuse and assault charges in Summerlin.” Snell, 677 So.2d at 789. The Court also stated that no prejudice results from consolidation when the jury can easily separate the evidence of the separate crimes. See id. “Clearly,” the Court said, “the jury separated the evidence of the separate crimes, as evidenced by the fact that it convicted Snell of the offense of sodomy, but not the offense of enticement.” 677 So.2d at 789-90. The Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it refused to sever the enticement charge from the sodomy charges.
Here, the evidence indicated that during the afternoon before K.W. awoke to find Culver in bed with her, Culver gave K.W. two blue pills, one of which she ingested. The prescription drug Valium was later found in K.W.’s blood. K.W. testified that Culver shocked her with something later that night, after he had gotten into bed [510] with her while she was asleep. Culver was wearing a stethoscope, and sexual devices and pornographic magazines were found underneath KW.’s bed. The 8mm videotape recovered in a search of the house the following day depicted an apparently unconscious K.W. being sexually assaulted by Culver on a bed with blue and white sheets, and the Polaroid photographs discovered on the night Culver was arrested appeared to depict K.W. in a position similar to the position on the videotape and on a bed made up with the same sheets. K.W. testified that she recalled waking up at the lake house in the master bedroom on the blue and white sheets, even though she had fallen asleep on the couch. Based on this evidence, the State’s theory was that Culver had previously given drugs to K.W. to render her unconscious so that he could sexually assault her and so that he could videotape and photograph her genitalia as he did so, and that when Culver gave K.W. drugs and later got into bed with her on November 12, 2003, he intended to incapacitate her and abuse her further.
The charged crimes were clearly connected in their commission and were part of a common plan or scheme, and the evidence in the cases overlapped. In addition, evidence of each crime would have been admissible at separate trials as part of the res gestae and to establish motive. Based on our review of the relevant legal principles and on the circumstances surrounding the charges, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it consolidated the cases for trial.
We note that Culver argues that the “common plan or scheme” rationale did not support the consolidation of the cases for trial because, he says, his identity was never genuinely at issue. However, the record reveals otherwise. During a pretrial hearing on the propriety of consolidation of the four charges, Culver argued that there was no question of identity so far as the State was concerned, because the State had always alleged that Culver was the perpetrator. When the trial court asked Culver if he was agreeing with that, however, Culver stated, “No, ma’am, I am not. I’m not agreeing to it at all. But that is their position.” (R. 66.) During the trial, Culver argued to the trial court that it should not allow testimony that his thumbprint had been identified as the print filmed on the videotape, stating: “At this time, the defendant is not saying whether that is or is not him on that videotape.” (R. 1607.) Thus, Culver placed his identity at issue before and during trial. Furthermore, as discussed above, the cases were properly consolidated for reasons other than that they were part of a common plan or scheme. Specifically, as the prosecutor argued during a pretrial hearing, evidence of each crime would have been admissible in the trials of the other crimes as evidence of motive and as part of the res gestae. (R. 88-89.)
Finally, we note that the jury found Culver not guilty of the offenses of domestic violence and furnishing drugs to a minor. He was convicted only of possessing obscene matter depicting a child under the age of 17 years. Thus, Culver’s argument that he was prejudiced by the joinder of “sex crimes” with “non-sex crimes” is clearly refuted by the record. The jury was most certainly able to separate the evidence of the four crimes because it convicted Culver only of the crimes involving possession of obscene matter. Culver has failed to establish that he suffered specific and compelling prejudice as a result of the consolidation of the cases for trial. Therefore, Culver is not entitled to any relief on this claim of error.
[511] II.
Culver also contends that the trial court erred when it refused to consolidate the two possession-of-obscene-matter charges into a single charge or to dismiss one of the charges because, he says, he should not have been charged separately for possession of the 8mm videotape and for possession of the Polaroid photographs. Because he was convicted twice for a single offense, Culver argues, the prohibition against double jeopardy was violated and one of the convictions and sentences must be set aside. Culver raised this issue in pretrial motions, and the parties presented extensive arguments on the issue. The trial court denied Culver’s motions to consolidate the possession charges into one charge or to dismiss one of the possession charges, and it submitted both charges to the jury. The court determined that because the charges were based on different media — a videotape and a series of photographs — two charges of possession were proper. The jury found Culver guilty of both charges, and the trial court imposed sentences on both convictions.
Culver argues on appeal, as he did in the court below, that Girard v. State, 883 So.2d 714 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), aff'd, 883 So.2d 717 (Ala.2003), limited the State to charging him with only one count of possession of obscene matter because the “unit of prosecution” as defined in Girard was the simultaneous possession of a collection of obscene material, even though the collection contained multiple pieces of obscene matter. The State argues that Culver is not entitled to relief based on this Court’s holding in Girard, because, it says, the police found the 8mm videotape and the Polaroid photographs on different days and in different locations inside Cul-ver’s residence and that, therefore, each charge was based on a separate act of possession.
Section 13A-12-192(b), Ala.Code 1975, the statute under which Culver was indicted, provides that “[a]ny person who knowingly possesses any obscene matter containing a visual reproduction of a person under the age of 17 years engaged in any act of sado-masochistic abuse, sexual intercourse, sexual excitement, masturbation, genital nudity, or other sexual conduct shall be guilty of a Class C felony.” At the time of Culver’s actions, § 13A-12-190(12), Ala.Code 1975, defined “matter” as “[a]ny book, magazine, newspaper, or other printed material, or any picture, photograph, motion picture or electrical or electronic reproduction, or any other articles or materials that either are or contain a photographic or other visual reproduction of a live act, performance, or event.”3
In Girard, supra, Girard was charged with 26 counts of possession of obscene matter under § 13A-12-192(b), Ala.Code 1975, because “numerous downloaded images and videos of underage boys” were discovered on the hard drive of his computer and on a computer disk. 883 So.2d at 714-15. Some of the files contained multiple images, and the possession of each file was charged as a separate crime. Girard argued in the trial court that he should have been charged with only one count of possession of obscene material, [512] and that the remaining counts were duplicitous. The trial court granted Girard’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to several counts, and he was convicted for 10 counts of possession. On appeal, after noting the well-established principle that a single crime cannot be prosecuted as multiple offenses, this Court stated that, to determine whether double-jeopardy principles were violated when Girard was convicted of and sentenced for multiple counts of possession, the correct unit of prosecution had to be defined. 883 So.2d at 715-16. This Court then noted that it had addressed Girard’s argument regarding multiple prosecutions previously, though only in dicta:
“In Harris v. State, 563 So.2d 9 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), the defendant was indicted for four counts of possession of obscene material, violations of § 13A-12-192(b), Ala.Code 1975. Harris filed a ‘ “motion to dismiss the indictment as being multiplicitous, or in the alternative, motion to compel an election by the State as to the count it intends to prosecute.” ’ 563 So.2d at 9. The trial court denied the motion, and Harris subsequently pleaded guilty and received concurrent sentences of five years in prison. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Harris had waived this argument by pleading guilty subsequent to the denial of his motion, but continued:
“ ‘Harris was charged in a four-count indictment with four separate violations of § 13A-12-192(b). Count one alleged the possession of a pornographic magazine. Counts two, three, and four each involved the possession of a different video cassette tape. Hams contends that he should have been convicted and sentenced for only one offense, because the magazine and cassette tapes were seized from his residence on the same occasion. We recognize that this argument may have considerable merit. See United States v. Meyer, 602 F.Supp. 1480, 1480-81 (S.D.Cal.1985) (the appropriate unit of prosecution for offenses of transportation of material involving sexual exploitation of children and importation of obscene material, arising from defendant’s transporting several photographs in one binder, was one count for each offense, rather than one count for each photograph for each offense); Braunstein v. Frawley, 64 A.D.2d 772, 407 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253 (1978) (“[t]he promotion or possession of more than one item at the same time and on the same date constitutes one crime, and cannot be split into as many crimes as there are items”); State v. Smith, 323 N.C. 439, 373 S.E.2d 435, 438 (1988) (“[o]ther courts have similarly held that a single transaction involving obscene materials constitutes but one offense”). See also United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir.1975) (possession of firearms); Vogel v. State, 426 So.2d 863, 878-82 (Ala.Cr.App.1980), affirmed, 426 So.2d 882 (Ala.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107, 103 S.Ct. 2456, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983) (possession of drugs); Owens, Alabama’s Minority Status: A Single Criminal Act Injuring Multiple Persons Constitutes Only a Single Offense, 16 Cum. L.Rev. 85, 105-06 (1985) (discussed in McKinney v. State, 511 So.2d 220 (Ala.1987)). However, this issue has not been preserved for review.’
“563 So.2d at 10.”
883 So.2d at 716-17 (emphasis added).
This Court held in Girard that the unit of prosecution was “the simultaneous possession of a collection of obscene material,” and that Girard was guilty of only one count of possession. Girard, 883 So.2d at 717. The Court reversed the trial court’s [513] judgment and remanded the cause for the trial court to vacate all but one of Girard’s convictions and sentences. The Court explained:
“The act rendered illegal by the statute — the possession of any obscene matter, even if the possession is of multiple pieces of obscene matter — is simultaneous and inseparable, more like the simultaneous, single act of transportation or importation of multiple pieces of obscene matter, see United States v. Meyer, 602 F.Supp. 1480 (S.D.Cal.1985), than the separate transactions involved in the distribution of multiple pieces of obscene matter, see King v. State, 674 So.2d 1381 (Ala.Crim.App.1995).”
Girard, 883 So.2d at 717 (footnote omitted).
The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s judgment and, in doing so, quoted extensively from this Court’s opinion. See Girard v. State, 883 So.2d 717 (Ala.2003). The State had argued in its petition for the writ of certiorari that the Alabama Legislature had clearly indicated in the statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography that the unit of prosecution was each obscene image, regardless of the medium in which the image was stored. However, the Alabama Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument:
“The State cites King v. State, 674 So.2d 1381 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), in support of its argument. In King, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that § 13A-12-200.2(1), Ala.Code 1975, part of the Alabama Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act, authorizes the prosecution of each distributed item that qualifies as obscene material pursuant to the statute. The court explained that ‘[e]very item listed’ in the statute’s definition of ‘material’ ‘is singular’ and that ‘[i]f the legislature intended for violations based on transactions instead of individual items distributed, it could have indicated that each item ... could also be plural.’ 674 So.2d at 1383. The State argues in its brief that ‘[t]he court based its holding on its interpretation of the term “material” in Ala.Code [1975,] § 13A-12-200.1(2),