NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2658-23
CRISTINA KNOETTNER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RYAN KNOETTNER,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted September 9, 2025 – Decided September 16, 2025
Before Judges Chase and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FM-01-0356-23.
Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Confusione, on the brief).
Hankin Palladino Weintrob Bell & Labov, PC, attorneys for respondent (Amy R. Weintrob, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Ryan Knoettner appeals from an April 1, 2024 final judgment
of divorce. We affirm.
I.
The parties participated in a two-day trial in February 2024. Plaintiff,
represented by counsel, testified on her own behalf. Defendant represented
himself and did not testify, call witnesses, or present a case-in-chief. At the
conclusion of testimony, defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.
The parties were married in May 2013 and have three children: G.K. (age
six) and twins M.K. and A.K. (age two). They purchased a home in Absecon
and lived there until separation, after which defendant resided in the home alone.
Plaintiff moved with the children to her parents' two-bedroom condominium,
where she slept on the couch, the children shared a bedroom, and her parents
occupied the other room.
Plaintiff holds a master's degree in social work and has worked full-time
for seven years. She testified about her earnings, presenting Social Security
records and her 2023 year-end income. Plaintiff explained her gross income
was $46,000, but after mandatory retirement contributions, taxes, and health
insurance premiums, her net income for 2023 was a little over $33,000. She
A-2658-23 2 also provided evidence of her 2024 income from current paystubs. Plaintiff
described the marital standard of living from her Case Information Statement.
Defendant has a bachelor's degree. After the birth of the twins, defendant
was fired and remained unemployed for eight months. After the parties
separated, defendant became employed at the Children's Hospital of
Pennsylvania, earning a gross income of $75,000. Defendant did not dispute
plaintiff's income and offered no Case Information Statement.
Plaintiff testified that the parties' relationship deteriorated over the course
of several months. In December 2022, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") and a week later, filed for divorce. In January 2023, both parties
entered a consent order for civil restraints, dismissing the TRO. Defendant was
required to install Soberlink, an alcohol monitoring device, and limit
communications with plaintiff to child-related matters using "app close."
After several months, plaintiff filed an enforcement application, as
defendant had failed to install Soberlink. In August 2023, the court reduced
defendant's parenting time to one day per month and required defendant to
immediately install Soberlink. Defendant was also ordered to obtain an alcohol
evaluation and attend parenting and anger management courses.
A-2658-23 3 At trial, plaintiff admitted recordings of defendant verbally abusing her in
front of the children. Plaintiff also testified at length about defendant's alcohol
abuse.
Judge Benjamin Podolnick issued a comprehensive thirty-nine-page
written opinion. He found plaintiff credible, awarded her sole custody of the
three children,1 and ordered the sale of the marital home as well as equitable
distribution of any proceeds, child support at $245 per week and alimony at $150
per week for five years. Defendant was required to maintain a $500,000 life
insurance policy; plaintiff, $200,000.
This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding
on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at
412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)). Because we recognize "the special expertise of judges hearing matters
1 The family court acknowledged defendant would be granted additional parenting time if he underwent an alcohol evaluation, attended anger management and parenting classes, downloaded Soberlink, and successfully utilized it for a period of one year. A-2658-23 4 in the [family court]," Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010)
(citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will only disturb the family court's factual
findings if "'they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice'
and should be upheld whenever they are 'supported by adequate, substantial, and
credible evidence."' In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App.
Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84).
We apply our deferential standard to family court judges' determinations
regarding alimony. We will uphold an alimony award on appeal unless the judge
failed to apply the correct legal standards or abused their discretion by making
findings that are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 485 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Heinl v. Heinl,
287 N.J. Super. 337, 345 (App. Div. 1996)). The same standard applies to family
court judges' child support determinations. Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super.
295, 309 (App. Div. 2008).
"Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to
discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci,
448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when
a trial court's decision "rested on an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant
or inappropriate factors, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made
A-2658-23 5 findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v.
Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Moreover, a trial judge abuses his or her discretion "'when a
decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from
established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.'" Kornbleuth v.
Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020) (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC
Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)).
In contrast, the family court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010).
III.
On appeal, defendant challenges four aspects of the court's order: (1) the
parties' respective earnings; (2) parenting time; (3) the sale of the marital home;
and (4) the parties differing life insurance amounts.
First, defendant argues the court was mistaken in determining the parties'
respective earnings for calculations concerning alimony and child support.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2658-23
CRISTINA KNOETTNER,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RYAN KNOETTNER,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted September 9, 2025 – Decided September 16, 2025
Before Judges Chase and Augostini.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FM-01-0356-23.
Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael J. Confusione, on the brief).
Hankin Palladino Weintrob Bell & Labov, PC, attorneys for respondent (Amy R. Weintrob, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Ryan Knoettner appeals from an April 1, 2024 final judgment
of divorce. We affirm.
I.
The parties participated in a two-day trial in February 2024. Plaintiff,
represented by counsel, testified on her own behalf. Defendant represented
himself and did not testify, call witnesses, or present a case-in-chief. At the
conclusion of testimony, defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.
The parties were married in May 2013 and have three children: G.K. (age
six) and twins M.K. and A.K. (age two). They purchased a home in Absecon
and lived there until separation, after which defendant resided in the home alone.
Plaintiff moved with the children to her parents' two-bedroom condominium,
where she slept on the couch, the children shared a bedroom, and her parents
occupied the other room.
Plaintiff holds a master's degree in social work and has worked full-time
for seven years. She testified about her earnings, presenting Social Security
records and her 2023 year-end income. Plaintiff explained her gross income
was $46,000, but after mandatory retirement contributions, taxes, and health
insurance premiums, her net income for 2023 was a little over $33,000. She
A-2658-23 2 also provided evidence of her 2024 income from current paystubs. Plaintiff
described the marital standard of living from her Case Information Statement.
Defendant has a bachelor's degree. After the birth of the twins, defendant
was fired and remained unemployed for eight months. After the parties
separated, defendant became employed at the Children's Hospital of
Pennsylvania, earning a gross income of $75,000. Defendant did not dispute
plaintiff's income and offered no Case Information Statement.
Plaintiff testified that the parties' relationship deteriorated over the course
of several months. In December 2022, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining
order ("TRO") and a week later, filed for divorce. In January 2023, both parties
entered a consent order for civil restraints, dismissing the TRO. Defendant was
required to install Soberlink, an alcohol monitoring device, and limit
communications with plaintiff to child-related matters using "app close."
After several months, plaintiff filed an enforcement application, as
defendant had failed to install Soberlink. In August 2023, the court reduced
defendant's parenting time to one day per month and required defendant to
immediately install Soberlink. Defendant was also ordered to obtain an alcohol
evaluation and attend parenting and anger management courses.
A-2658-23 3 At trial, plaintiff admitted recordings of defendant verbally abusing her in
front of the children. Plaintiff also testified at length about defendant's alcohol
abuse.
Judge Benjamin Podolnick issued a comprehensive thirty-nine-page
written opinion. He found plaintiff credible, awarded her sole custody of the
three children,1 and ordered the sale of the marital home as well as equitable
distribution of any proceeds, child support at $245 per week and alimony at $150
per week for five years. Defendant was required to maintain a $500,000 life
insurance policy; plaintiff, $200,000.
This appeal followed.
II.
Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding
on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at
412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484
(1974)). Because we recognize "the special expertise of judges hearing matters
1 The family court acknowledged defendant would be granted additional parenting time if he underwent an alcohol evaluation, attended anger management and parenting classes, downloaded Soberlink, and successfully utilized it for a period of one year. A-2658-23 4 in the [family court]," Parish v. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010)
(citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will only disturb the family court's factual
findings if "'they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice'
and should be upheld whenever they are 'supported by adequate, substantial, and
credible evidence."' In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App.
Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84).
We apply our deferential standard to family court judges' determinations
regarding alimony. We will uphold an alimony award on appeal unless the judge
failed to apply the correct legal standards or abused their discretion by making
findings that are not supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.
J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 485 (App. Div. 2012) (citing Heinl v. Heinl,
287 N.J. Super. 337, 345 (App. Div. 1996)). The same standard applies to family
court judges' child support determinations. Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super.
295, 309 (App. Div. 2008).
"Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to
discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci,
448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017). An abuse of discretion occurs when
a trial court's decision "rested on an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant
or inappropriate factors, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made
A-2658-23 5 findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v.
Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Moreover, a trial judge abuses his or her discretion "'when a
decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from
established policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.'" Kornbleuth v.
Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 302 (2020) (quoting Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC
Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015)).
In contrast, the family court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010).
III.
On appeal, defendant challenges four aspects of the court's order: (1) the
parties' respective earnings; (2) parenting time; (3) the sale of the marital home;
and (4) the parties differing life insurance amounts.
First, defendant argues the court was mistaken in determining the parties'
respective earnings for calculations concerning alimony and child support.
Specifically, defendant contends the court erred by determining that plaintiff 's
annual income was $33,000. This argument is unpersuasive.
The uncontested testimony of plaintiff, which the court found to be
credible, was that she annually made $46,000 in gross pay and $33,000 in net
A-2658-23 6 pay. The child support guidelines incorporated into the final judgment of
divorce also reflect that the court used $46,000 as gross income. The court
explained its calculations regarding both alimony and child support and applied
the fourteen factors outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23. Therefore, neither
determination regarding alimony nor child support represents an abuse of
discretion.
Second, defendant posits the court erred in limiting defendant's parenting
time, arguing that he is effectively unable to maintain a relationship with his
children. We disagree.
"In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration
is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105
(App. Div. 2007). N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 governs custody determinations and provides:
In making an award of custody, the court shall consider but not be limited to the following factors: [(1)] the parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child; [(2)] the parents' willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; [(3)] the interaction and relationship of the child with its parents and siblings; [(4)] the history of domestic violence, if any; [(5)] the safety of the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent; [(6)] the preference of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision; [(7)] the needs of the child; [(8)] the stability of the home
A-2658-23 7 environment offered; [(9)] the quality and continuity of the child's education; [(10)] the fitness of the parents; [(11)] the geographical proximity of the parents' homes; [(12)] the extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation; [(13)] the parents' employment responsibilities; and [(14)] the age and number of the children.
[N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.]
Defendant's claim that the judge erred in applying factor one is without
merit. Although the parties do not need to be cordial to have shared custody,
the court concluded the parties were unable to get along based on defendant's
use of plaintiff's financial hardships for his gain, defendant's refusal to install
Soberlink, and his refusal to abide by the consented-to civil restraints. This is
supported by the record.
Defendant also maintains the judge erred by failing to take into
consideration factor (5)—the wishes of G.K.—by not allowing him to be
interviewed. This argument is unavailing. The language of the statute is clear:
"the preference of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as
to form an intelligent decision" makes the decision to interview the child
optional. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4; see D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 454-60 (App.
Div. 2014). Here, the child was only six-years old and the court was well within
its discretion to forgo an interview.
A-2658-23 8 Third, defendant challenges the judge's order mandating the sale of the
marital home, while plaintiff asserts this issue is moot as the home has already
been sold. "Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the
notion that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately
threatened with harm." Stop & Shop Supermarket, LLC v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450
N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp.,415
N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010)). "[C]ourts normally will not entertain
cases when a controversy no longer exists and the disputed issues have become
moot." Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. 400 v. Borough of Tinton Falls, 468
N.J. Super. 214, 224 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J.
420, 428 (1993)). "An issue is 'moot when [the] decision sought in a matter,
when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy.'" Redd
v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015) (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v.
Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011)). As the house has been
sold, we decline to address this issue as it is moot.
Fourth, defendant argues that the judge erred in requiring him to obtain a
more expensive life insurance policy than plaintiff. Under New Jersey law, a
judge may require a party to obtain life insurance particularly to secure a party's
child support and alimony obligations. Davis v. Davis, 184 N.J. Super. 430, 439
A-2658-23 9 (App. Div. 1982). Doing so is "appropriate and plainly within the broad
authority conferred upon a judge in a matrimonial action by the provisions of
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23." Ibid. The trial court's determination of life insurance
amounts was well within its discretion and was supported by credible evidence
in the record.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions
raised by plaintiff, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-2658-23 10