Crall v. Michigan, State of

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedSeptember 30, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00996
StatusUnknown

This text of Crall v. Michigan, State of (Crall v. Michigan, State of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crall v. Michigan, State of, (W.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______

JORDAN MICHAEL CRALL,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:25-cv-996

v. Honorable Jane M. Beckering

STATE OF MICHIGAN et al.,

Respondents. ____________________________/

OPINION Petitioner Jordan Michael Crall is a detainee at the Branch County Jail in Coldwater, Michigan. Petitioner filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that his detention violates his constitutional rights.1 (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1.) Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, it plainly appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Accordingly, the Court will summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice. The Court will also deny Petitioner’s motions for “entry statement evidence exhibit request.” (ECF Nos. 6, 8.)

1 When Petitioner filed his petition, he did not specifically reference “28 U.S.C. § 2241”; however, in his petition, Petitioner challenges pending state criminal proceedings in the Branch County courts. Therefore, Petitioner’s petition is properly filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and the Court construes this habeas action as proceeding pursuant to § 2241. Discussion I. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis The filing fee for a habeas corpus action is $5.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). Petitioner is currently detained at the Branch County Jail pending state criminal charges in the Branch County courts. It reasonably appears that paying the cost of this filing fee would impose an undue financial hardship. Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court will grant

Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. II. Factual Allegations As an initial matter, Petitioner’s petition is not a model of clarity. He mentions that violations of his right to freedom of speech have led to him being charged in numerous cases pending in Branch County. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Petitioner mentions Case Nos. 20240736SM, 20250507FY, 20250016OM, 20250559FY, 20250560FY, and 20250561FY. (Id.) Petitioner, however, does not mention the nature of the pending charges, and these case numbers do not correlate to case numbers involving Petitioner in the Branch County Circuit Court. Presumably, Petitioner’s charges remain pending in the Branch County District Court, but that court does not provide public access to pending court matters. While Petitioner’s § 2241 petition

is vague, it appears that Petitioner seeks the dismissal of the charges against him and release from custody.2 (Id., PageID.2–3.) Petitioner also appears to take issue with the fact that he was not granted bond. (Id., PageID.3.) III. Exhaustion Under § 2241 Section 2241 confers upon federal courts the jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ of habeas corpus of state pretrial detainees. Atkins v. People of the State of Michigan, 644 F.2d 543,

2 Petitioner also seeks $30 million in damages, but “habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy” to pursue “a damages claim.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973). 546 (6th Cir. 1981). Although petitions under § 2241 are not subject to all of the specific statutory requirements set forth in § 2254, a pretrial detainee may not simply seek relief in federal court under § 2241 where state relief is still available. Thus, a federal court ordinarily “should abstain from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state courts or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.” Id.

at 546 & n.1; see Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 668 F.3d 804, 810 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Unlike exhaustion under § 2254, exhaustion under § 2241 is not a statutory requirement. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), with id. § 2241. Rather, in the § 2241 context, ‘decisional law has superimposed such a requirement in order to accommodate principles of federalism.’”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has approved consideration of a pretrial § 2241 petition in the following exceptional circumstances: (1) when the petitioner seeks a speedy trial, Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546–47; (2) when a petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on double jeopardy grounds, see Christian v. Wellington, 739 F.3d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 2014); (3) when

a petitioner claims that he has been subjected to excessive bail, Atkins, 644 F.3d at 549; and (4) when a petitioner faces prejudice from prior ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations on retrial, Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1204 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1990). Here, as to any claim by Petitioner that the state criminal charges against him are unconstitutional and that the charges against him should be dismissed, that relief is “not attainable by way of pretrial habeas corpus.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 547. When a habeas petitioner brings a prejudgment habeas petition seeking dismissal of the charges against him, his habeas action must await the conclusion of the state proceedings. See In Re Justices of Superior Ct. Dept. of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 17 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2000). Moreover, although not specifically articulated by Petitioner, to the extent that Petitioner intended to raise an excessive bail claim in the present petition, he would still have to exhaust his available state court remedies before proceeding in federal court. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir.

Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490–91 (1973) (recognizing the long-standing judicial doctrine of exhaustion of state-court remedies in all habeas actions); Klein v. Leis, 548 F.3d 425, 429 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky
410 U.S. 484 (Supreme Court, 1973)
Preiser v. Rodriguez
411 U.S. 475 (Supreme Court, 1973)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Atkins v. People Of Michigan
644 F.2d 543 (Sixth Circuit, 1981)
James Howard Turner v. State of Tennessee
858 F.2d 1201 (Sixth Circuit, 1988)
Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton County
668 F.3d 804 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Joseph D. Murphy v. State of Ohio
263 F.3d 466 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
Wagner v. Smith
581 F.3d 410 (Sixth Circuit, 2009)
Klein v. Leis
548 F.3d 425 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Duniek Christian v. Randell Wellington
739 F.3d 294 (Sixth Circuit, 2014)

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