County of Portage v. Steinpreis

312 N.W.2d 731, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 1981 Wisc. LEXIS 3041

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: November 3, 1981
• Docket: 80-037, 80-038
• Status: Published

Opinions

COFFEY, J.

This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals reversing judgments of the Circuit Court for Portage County, HON. JAMES H. LEVI, presiding.¹ These judgments were entered after the trial court denied the motion of the defendant-appellant, Robert J. Steinpreis, to declare sec. 299.21, Stats. 1977,² unconstitutional in that it required the prepayment of a jury fee and costs upon the filing of a demand for a jury trial in a small claims action. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and found the statute unconstitutional holding that the required prepayment of the jury fee violated the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions.

The county of Portage, plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, (hereinafter county), filed two small claims complaints,³ both alleging that Steinpreis owed $34.25 plus filing fees for separate ambulance services provided by the county. (Total claim: $83.50). Steinpreis filed an answer and denied he owed the money and requested a jury trial. Shortly after filing his answer, Steinpreis received a letter from the Portage county clerk of courts demanding á $43 payment to the court to cover the suit tax, clerk’s fee and jury fee ($24) due, pursuant to sec. 299.21, Stats. 1977.⁴ Steinpreis refused to pay the required fees pending appeal, stating that he feared that payment of the same would make his challenge to the statute moot. Steinpreis then filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of sec. 299.21, Stats. He alleged that it denied either the right to a jury trial under the Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 5 and/or equal protection as guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. After argument, the trial court denied the motion. At trial he offered no defense to the small claims complaints and agreed to the immediate entry of a judgment in order to facilitate an appeal. An amended judgment in favor of the county was entered on December 3, 1979.⁵

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s finding of constitutionality and held that the jury fee required under sec. 299.21(3) (c), Stats., was a denial of equal protection and thus unconstitutional. The court reasoned that since no jury fee is required if a jury demand is made in a chs. 801-807 proceeding and since they could find no rational basis for this difference in the procedures of chs. 801 to 807 and those of ch. 299, there was a denial of equal protection. The court of appeals did not reach, the remaining issues.

Issues

1. Does sec. 299.21(3), Stats 1977, violate the right to a trial by jury protected under art. I, sec. 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution ?

2. Does sec. 299.21(3), Stats. 1977, constitute a “purchase of justice” as prohibited under art. I, sec. 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution ?

3. Does sec. 299.21(3), Stats. 1977, constitute a denial of the equal protection of law as guaranteed under both the Wisconsin and Federal Constitutions?

4. Is the challenge to the constitutionality of the fees set out in sec. 299.21(3), Stats. 1977, moot?

Right to a Jury Trial

The Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 5, preserves the right to a jury trial in civil actions as follows:

“Trial by jury; verdict in civil cases. Section 5. [As amended Nov. 1922] The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. . . .”

“This provision has been construed to mean that the right of trial by jury, as known to the law at the time of the adoption of our constitution, is to be preserved.” State v. Graf, 72 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 240 N.W.2d 387 (1976). See also: La Bowe v. Balthazor, 180 Wis. 419, 420, 193 N.W. 244 (1923); Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17 (*22), 22 (*29) (1853). Under the territorial statutes of Wisconsin, a party recovering a jury verdict was required to pay a fee into the court before the court’s declaration of the verdict.⁶

“Undoubtedly they [the occupants of the territory of Wisconsin] conceived this provision of the constitution as securing their established right to a jury trial in legal actions, a right which at that time bore the coordinate responsibility of being subject to a reasonable share of the expense incurred in obtaining a jury of their fellow citizens. . . .” State v. Graf, 72 Wis. 2d 179, 186, 240 N.W.2d 387 (1976).

As early as 1915 this court approved of the requirement of a jury fee holding that it doesn’t infringe upon the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. Reliance Auto Repair v. Nugent, 159 Wis. 488, 490, 149 N.W. 377 (1915). This court stated:

“The requirement that the party demanding a jury shall pay into court a jury fee of $12, to be recovered by him in the cost bill if successful in the action, is not an unreasonable regulation of the right, nor is it an invasion of sec. 9, art. I, of the constitution, which provides that ‘every person . . . ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it.’ ” Id. at 490.

Since that time, this court has consistently held that a reasonable jury fee is constitutional. La Bowe v. Balthazor, supra at 422; State v. Graf, supra at 185.

Our interpretation of the right to a jury trial is consistent with decisions of other jurisdictions which have almost uniformly found reasonable jury fees to be compatible with the right to a trial by jury. See: Anno. 32 ALR 865. In State v. Graf, supra, we quoted the following language as providing a succinct rationale for the allowance of such fees:

“The Constitution does not guarantee to the citizen the right to litigate without expense, but simply protects him from imposition of such terms as unreasonably and injuriously interfere with his right to a remedy in the law, or impede the due administration of justice.” quoting Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn. 456 (1862). Id. at 185.

Although the Wisconsin Constitution establishes a right to a tuition free public education (art. X, sec. 3), we have held that the public schools may charge fees for the use of books and items of a similar nature without violating that right. Board of Education v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 182, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974). Our holding that the requirement of a reasonable jury fee does not violate the right to a jury trial likewise is consistent with that decision.

Many additional costs are incurred when a jury trial is demanded. A share of these costs must be paid by the litigants or all must be paid with government tax revenues. It is only fair that the litigants bear a reasonable portion of the expense incurred due to the exercise of their rights unless determined by the court to be indigent. One should not be entitled to exercise his constitutionally protected rights at the expense of others if financially able to bear his share of the costs. One’s exercise of constitutional rights is not unduly burdened by the imposition of such reasonable costs. Surely one exercising the freedom of speech is not constitutionally entitled to the free use of printing presses or communications media. Similarly, one demanding a jury trial is not entitled to avoid paying any of the costs of the jury.

The general constitutionality of jury fees such as those required under sec. 299.21(3), Stats. 1977, is clear under the decisions discussed above. This court, however, has recognized that there are limits beyond which the legislature may not go in imposing such fees. La Bowe v. Balthazor, supra at 422. That limit has been described as the point at which the fee becomes “an unreasonable regulation of the right.” Reliance Auto Repair Co. v. Nugent, supra at 490. Because of this limit, the role of a court when a jury fee is challenged “is to review the fee for that excessiveness which would impair the right.” State v. Graf, supra at 186. With this standard in mind, we analyze the jury fee imposed under sec. 299.21(3), Stats. 1977.

Of the $43 court fee demanded, $19 represented a suit tax and clerk’s fee and the additional $24 constituted a jury fee. That assessment was made under sec. 299.21 (3) (c), Stats. 1977:

“(c) The fee for a jury is $24, plus an additional amount as suit tax which will result in a suit tax payment of the amount which would have been payable had the action been commenced under chs. 801 to 807 and additional clerk’s fees of $6.”⁷

By the terms of the statute itself, it is obvious that the additional suit tax and clerk’s fee are merely intended as a cost assessment equivalent to that which would be required in an action initiated under chs. 801 through 807, Stats. Under sec. 299.21 (4), Stats. 1977, the small claims action is treated as a chs. 801 to 807 action once a jury demand is made. After the jury demand is made, the action becomes the same as one commenced under chs. 801 to 807, and, therefore, it is reasonable that similar fees be paid to the court. The clerk’s fee imposed in a chs. 801 to 807 proceeding has remained the same since 1953 and the suit tax has not changed since 1969.⁸ In light of the fact that these fees have remained constant while the costs of running a courtroom have soared, they cannot be considered excessive, much less unreasonable. The fees are insignificant when compared to the actual cost of the courtroom procedures. We hold that the additional suit tax and clerk’s fee imposed under sec. 299.21 (3) (c), Stats. 1977, is reasonable and not excessive and, therefore, does not impair the right to a jury trial.

Before completing our discussion of the suit tax and the clerk’s fee imposed under sec. 299.21(3) (c), it should be noted that sec. 814.29, Stats., allows for the waiver of these assessments should the court determine that the litigant is indigent. The court of appeals noted that since defendant Steinpreis failed to file an affidavit of indigency, he had no standing to challenge the assessment of the suit tax and clerk’s fee. As we have addressed the question of the constitutionality of the fees because of its impact on the statutory small claims procedure, it is unnecessary to further explore the question of Steinpreis’ standing to challenge these fees.

Sec. 299.21(3) (c), Stats., in addition to the suit tax and clerk’s fee, imposes a $24 charge upon the party demanding a jury. The question of the reasonableness of a $24 jury fee was addressed in State v. Graf, supra. In finding that fee reasonable and not excessive, this court stated:

“In preserving the right to a jury trial, our constitution did not set dollar limits on its procedural aspects, as did the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution in preserving the civil jury only when at least $20 is in controversy. Although comparison of relative purchasing power of money may be indefinite, it does serve as one gauge of when a legislatively apportioned share is excessive and thus violative of the right to a jury trial by inhibiting such a choice. Another relevant measure is the relation between the fee and the compensation of the jury. A jury fee prior to our constitution comprised one-quarter of a day’s compensation for the jury. A fee of $24 falls into the same ratio, when jury compensation may range from $4 to $16 per diem. Sec. 255.25, Stats. Excessiveness has not been shown. Thus the advancement of the $24 fee as a condition of a jury trial here is not repugnant to the constitution.” Id. at 187.

The jury fee considered in that case was required under the provisions of sec. 345.43, Stats., and applied to civil forfeiture actions arising out of the violation of state traffic regulations:

“A review of sec. 299.21(3) (b), Stats., discloses that a jury trial in civil forfeiture actions is equated with a jury trial in small claims actions. Sec. 271.21, Stats.” State v. Graf, supra at 183.

We find that the reasoning of the Graf case set out above is equally applicable to the case at bar. A jury fee which is reasonable in a traffic forfeiture action is also appropriate in a small claims action as the added expense óf the jury trial is the same in each.

The statutory jury fee assessed is certainly reasonable when one considers the actual costs of the courtroom proceedings. Court personnel, judge, jury, clerk, court reporter, paper, light and heat are among the many expenses involved in running a courtroom and inflation is constantly driving these costs upwards. When a jury trial is demanded in a small claims action, more court time is required and hence costs are increased. In our litigious society, it is only fair that those who avail themselves of the courts bear a portion of the costs, when financially able. In addition, assessing these costs helps to insure the sincerity of the litigant’s jury demand. Thus, we hold that the $24 jury fee imposed under sec. 299.21(3) (c), Stats., is reasonable and not excessive and does not violate the right to a jury trial.

Purchase of Justice

Steinpreis argues that the jury fee required under sec. 299.21(3) (c), Stats. 1977, constitutes a “purchase of justice” as prohibited by the Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 9. That section of our constitution guarantees every person a remedy for wrongs in the manner set out below:

“Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.”

Appellants in State v. Graf, supra, similarly contended that the jury fee constituted a “purchase of justice.” In responding to this argument, the court made the following statement:

“Our court has explained this prohibition in terms of the arbitrary and injudicious bribery that accompanied the court systems prior to the Magna Carta, from whose principles the wording was derived. Christianson v. Pioneer Furniture Co. (1898), 101 Wis. 343, 347, 348, 77 N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 917. The Reliance Case specifically acknowledged this provision in upholding the jury fee there under constitutional attack.” Id. at 186.

The $24 jury fee involved in this case is in no way similar to the kind of “arbitrary bribery” the constitutional provision was intended to prohibit. This court in Reliance Auto Repair Co. v. Nugent, supra, specifically rejected the argument that the jury fee constituted a “purchase of justice” as prohibited under the Wisconsin Constitution. Id. at 490.⁹

The $24 jury fee assessed under sec. 299.21(3) (c), Stats., is not a “purchase of justice” but rather an allocation of a portion of the high costs of running our courts to the litigants. The fee is miniscule in proportion to these costs. Although inflation and increasing caseloads have caused the courtroom costs to soar, the jury fee assessed in small claims actions has remained the same for twenty years. Sec. 254.14, Stats. 1961.

In light of our prior holdings and our determination that the fees set out in sec. 299.21(3) (c), Stats., are not excessive, we conclude that the jury fees involved in this case do not constitute a “purchase of justice.”

Equal Protection

The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court based upon its holding that the jury fee required in small claims actions violated the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. The court stated it could find “no legitimate state objective which is rationally served by the legislature’s classification.”¹⁰ We believe the classification referred to by the appellate court is the difference in the fees required when a small claims litigant demands a jury trial as opposed to those applicable to a party making the same demand under chs. 801 to 807, Stats.

The constitutional question presented in this case is whether the difference in the jury fees required in small claims actions as opposed to those brought under chs. 801 to 807, Stats., is violative of the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. ¹¹

In State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978), the court reiterated the well-established rule that a party who challenges a statutory classification carries a heavy burden of persuasion.

“ . . It is not enough that respondent establish doubt as to the act’s constitutionality nor is it sufficient that respondent establish the unconstitutionality of the act as a probability. Unconstitutionality of the act must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. Every presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative enactment’s constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. This court has often affirmed the well-established presumption of constitutionality that attaches itself to all legislative acts . . . .’ quoting State ex rel. Hammermill Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 46, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973).” Id. at 506.

The appropriate test for review of the classification of small claims litigants and those proceeding under chs. 801 to 807, Stats., is whether there is a rational basis for the classification.¹²

The legislature has not set forth in detail its rationale for imposing a jury fee in small claims actions where a jury trial is demanded. This lack of a stated rationale, however, does not foreclose this court’s search for a rational basis for the legislation:

“However, it is the court’s obligation to locate or to construct, if possible, a rationale that might have influenced the legislature and that reasonably upholds the legislative determination. The rationale which the court locates or constructs is not likely to be indisputable. But it is not our task to determine the wisdom of the rationale or the legislation. The legislature assays the data available and decides the course to follow.” Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).

A separate statutory procedure for the handling of small claims was first adopted by the Wisconsin legislature 35 years ago. Ch. 212, Laws of 1949. At that time, a legal commentator noted that among the purposes of the small claims procedure was the need for an inexpensive and speedy method of handling these disputes.¹³ There was a need to both bring the costs of an action into proportion with the amount involved in the cases, and to allow for a summary disposition of small claims, exclusive of eviction actions. Id. at 366, 372.

It seems evident that one of the ways in which the legislature intended to hold the cost of small claim actions to a minimum was to allocate the court costs to a party in rough proportion to the expense of the procedures involved in resolving the dispute. The additional cost of jurors could be assessed separately if used in the specific case. In this way, the initial cost of bringing a small claims action would be kept to a minimum as it did not have to include the jury costs if none was demanded.

The fact that a fair allocation of the court’s expenses was the basis for the separate assessment of the jury fee can be logically inferred from the fact that under an earlier version of the small claims procedures (now ch. 799, Stats.) a different jury fee was assessed depending on whether a six or twelve person jury was requested. See: sec. 299.21(3) (b), Stats. 1967.

This court recognized the validity of the rationale discussed above in State v. Graf, supra at 183. In that case the defendant argued that the assessment of. an additional suit tax when a party requests a jury trial violated the equal protection clause. In rejecting this argument, the court found that the added expense of a jury trial provided a “rational basis” for the additional tax. a reasonable distinction, the higher tax is valid.” State v. Graf, supra at 183.

“The basic test is ‘not whether some inequality results from the classification, but whether there exists any reasonable basis to justify the classification.’ Omernik v. State (1974), 64 Wis. 2d 6, 19, 218 N.W.2d 734. . . . Since the disparate length of trial time and preparation on the part of the court and its officers for jury trials is

The imposition of a jury fee also reasonably served the legislature’s objective of providing a summary procedure for disposing of small claims, exclusive of eviction actions. A jury trial increases the time required to resolve a small claims dispute. It requires that valuable court time be spent impaneling, arguing, instructing and waiting for the jury verdict. The procedures for resolving evidentiary questions and handling witnesses are also more time consuming than a trial before a seasoned and experienced judge.

Considering the adverse affect of a jury demand upon the summary nature of the small claims procedure, the conclusion is compelled that the legislature intended the prepaid jury fee as a means of insuring the sincerity of the party requesting a jury trial. It discourages jury demands in actions where a last minute settlement is anticipated. The fee also discourages jury demands made in bad faith to delay the litigation or to increase the financial burden on the other party. The added burden includes increased witness fees and inconvenience to the parties and litigants, including lost time from work. Thus, by helping to insure the sincerity of the jury demand, the fee served the legislative objective of providing a summary procedure for resolving small claims, exclusive of eviction actions.

The preceding discussion demonstrates that the legislature can and did validly allocate the expense of small claims actions in a manner consistent with the objectives of those procedures. The constitutional challenge raised in this case, however, is not only to the allocation of fees within small claims procedures but to the difference between the fees assessed upon the demand for a jury in small claims actions as opposed to those assessed in an action brought under chs. 801 to 807, Stats. When a party brings an action under chs. 801 to 807, he is initially required to pay a clerk’s fee and suit tax considerably greater than that required to bring a small claims action, although there are no additional fees required if a jury is demanded.¹⁴

Since the legislature is entitled to allocate the costs of small claims actions in a manner consistent with the goals of that procedure, the legislature also is entitled to allocate the costs of actions brought under chs. 801 to 807 in a manner consistent with the different purposes of those procedures. Whereas, the small claims procedures are intended to provide for the summary, speedy and inexpensive resolution of disputes, exclusive of eviction actions, the procedures of chs. 801 to 807 are intended to provide for a more complete resolution of complex cases. The stricter rules of pleading and extensive provisions for discovery¹⁵ demonstrate the distinct objectives of the chs. 801 to 807 procedures. The different nature of the actions brought under chs. 801 to 807 and the distinct objectives of those procedures provide a “rational basis” for the difference in the fee structure.

Unlike small claims actions, cases brought under chs. 801 to 807 contain more complex legal and evidentiary questions. They range from highly technical products liability suits to antitrust litigation, from reviews of administrative decisions to multi-million dollar contract issues and from legal and medical malpractice actions to disputes over property rights. Resolution of these actions requires much more court time than that required in a summary trial. The procedures governing these actions were not meant to be summary in nature; rather, they provide for discovery, motions before and after verdict, pretrial conferences and other proceedings which absorb a large amount of the valuable court time. Trials can last as long as several weeks or months, even when tried to the court.

Since a chs. 801 to 807 action is not meant to be summary in nature, a jury demand does not change .the procedures applicable to the action in the manner that a jury demand does in small claims actions. It was reasonable, therefore, for the legislature to determine that a separate jury fee was not necessary in a chs. 801 to 807 action. The objective of a chs. 801 to 807 action is not ■to provide access to the courts at a minute cost and, therefore, the legislature could reasonably determine that the cost of juries could be borne by all litigants through a single larger fee. When taking into consideration the greater amounts of time and money that a party invests in bringing a chs. 801 to 807 action, exclusive of eviction actions, it is also reasonable for the legislature to determine that a jury fee was not necessary as a means of guaranteeing the sincerity of the party’s jury demand.

The court of appeals could find no rational basis for the difference in the fees required since the small claims action is treated as one initially commenced as a proceeding under chs. 801 to 807, Stats., after the filing of the jury demand. This view of the issue is too narrow. It fails to consider the issue in terms of the fair allocation of costs among the vast number of cases brought under either the small claims procedures or chs. 801 to 807 procedures.

The jury fee challenged in this case allocates the cost of services rendered by the government through its court system partially to those who derive the benefit therefrom. Gone are the days when we can demand services from our government without concern for how those services will be financed. The costs of these services to a degree are, and should be, borne by all of us. It is only fair, however, that some part of those costs are borne by the persons who directly benefit from those services. Reasonable assessments for government services are both fair and necessary.

The difference in the nature of the actions brought under the small claims procedures (ch. 799, Stats.), and the objective of providing a summary disposition of small claims at a minimal cost provide a rational basis for the fee structure applicable to small claims procedures as distinguished from chs. 801 to 807 actions. We hold the requirement that small claims litigants pay a fee upon demand for a jury trial does not violate the equal protection clause of either the federal or state constitutions.

Mootness

In light of our determination of the preceding issues, it is not necessary to address the question of mootness as raised by the county.

By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

1 The actions in which the judgments were entered were consolidated at trial and on appeal.

2 It should be noted that four days after the filing of these actions, ch. 299, Stats. 1977, was renumbered ch. 799. The renumbering, however, did not affect the substantive provisions of ch. 299 involved in this case. Under Wisconsin case law, changes in procedural statutes generally apply to civil actions retrospectively. State ex rel. Sowle v. Brittich, 7 Wis. 2d 353, 361, 96 N.W.2d 337 (1959). In light of this rule, the renumbered statute sections are applicable to this appeal. Since the parties have framed this case in terms of the former statute sections and because the renumbering did not affect the substantive provisions of the statute, we will refer to the provisions under the former section numbers.

3 The county originally filed complaints to recover the amount due on June 18, 1979. Steinpreis moved the court to dismiss these complaints for improper venue on August 2, 1979. In response to this motion, “amended” complaints were filed' by the county on October 2, 1979. Service of the second set of complaints was made in such a manner as to make venue in Portage county proper. These “amended” complaints form the basis for this action, although reference to them as “amended” has been deleted as it is not relevant to this appeal.

4 Under the assessment made by the county, an amount of $19 was required as a suit tax and additional clerk’s fee. We note that generally under the provisions of sec. 299.21 (3) (c), Stats., this amount should have been $13, $7 as an additional suit tax and a $6 clerk’s fee. It is possible that the additional $6 assessment represents an additional clerk’s fee required because this case actually involves two small claims actions. Since Steinpreis never paid the fee in question, the question of the proper amount due is not necessary to this opinion. We only note the discrepancy to avoid inadvertently approving what may be an incorrect assessment.

5 The judgment entered on December 3, 1979, is denominated an “amended” judgment. A judgment was initially entered on November 26, 1979. Steinpreis moved the court to correct this judgment on November 29, 1979, as it improperly stated the date of the motion hearing and incorrectly summarized Steinpreis’ position as to the entry of judgment against him. The trial court apparently agreed with the errors alleged in the original judgment and thus filed an amended judgment on December 3, 1979, from which the petitioner appeals.

6 “. . . Upon the trial of each cause in the district court, the clerk shall demand of the party in whose favor verdict shall be given, twenty-five cents for each juror, which shall be paid by him before the verdict is declared, and said clerk shall pay the same into the county treasury.” Territorial Statutes 1839 at 399, sec. 23.

7 See fn. 4 as to the computation of the fee.

8 Sec. 69.42, Stats. 1963, and sec. 271.21, Stats. 1969, respectively.

9 See language from Reliance Auto Repair Co. v. Nugent, 159 Wis. 488, 149 N.W. 377 (1915), quoted at p. 472 of this decision.

10 County of Portage v. Steinpreis, Unpublished Opinion (Ct. App.) June 28,1980, Slip Op. at 7.

11 Art. I, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution has consistently been interpreted as providing the protections against unequal treatment by the state guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 361, fn. 6, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980). Because of this similarity, the same legal analysis will be sufficient to test the validity of the statute under the guarantees of each constitution.

12 The “rational basis” test, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961), is applicable to this equal protection challenge rather than the “strict scrutiny” test. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 155 (1973). The “strict scrutiny” standard applies only to classifications involving a suspect category or a fundamental right. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 506, 261 N.W. 2d 434 (1978). In light of our finding that the jury fees involved in this case are constitutionally permissible, it is clear that the case does not involve an impingement upon a fundamental right. Steinpreis does not argue that this case involves a suspect category. Indeed, such an argument would not appear to be correct in light of our prior rejection of the argument that statutory classifications based on “economic conditions” should be considered suspect. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, supra at 507.

13 Note — Uniform Small Claims Act, 1950 Wisconsin L. Rev,, 363, 365, 372 (1950).

14 A total fee of $19 is due as opposed to the $7 fee in a small claims proceeding.

15 It should be noted that the small claims procedures do allow for use of the ch. 804 discovery procedures (sec. 799.04, Stats.). These procedures are used in the rare and exceptional case, the frequency of which is probably no more than 1 in 1000. The use of discovery procedures is generally inconsistent with the small claims procedures of ch. 799 which allow for trial on the return date, sec. 799.21(2), and immediate rendering of a decision, sec. 799.216. In addition, it can be noted that it is standard practice among our courts that once discovery procedures are used in a small claims action, the case is transferred to the court’s calendar for chs. 801 to 807 actions and no longer is disposed of summarily.